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Polyanskiy/Ms. Evstigneeva

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19
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2022-02-07
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2022-02-07
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un-security-council

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  1. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  2. The Russian Federation has traditionally co-sponsored draft resolutions introduced in the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on the adverse impact of unilateral coercive measures on respect for human rights. Similar positions have been advanced by our partners in the Group of Friends in Defence of the Charter of the United Nations, whose representatives will have an opportunity to speak today. Today’s discussion, even as it was being prepared, has inspired lively interest among States Members of the United Nations. We call on the Secretary-General and other senior officials of the Organization to pay close attention to the issues raised today and to speak openly in favour of a sanctions policy that focuses on individuals and respect for their fundamental rights.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  3. There is an increasingly urgent need for a multilateral effort to seek collective approaches to curbing unilateral sanctions in order to avoid a total loss of trust in international institutions and the irreversible collapse of the global economy and the long-term deterioration of the socioeconomic situation of ordinary citizens. At a minimum, the social and humanitarian sphere should be exempted from any restrictive barriers. The Russian Federation has been addressing this issue at key multilateral forums for a long time. On the basis of the rejection of the sanctions philosophy, a broad group of like-minded people who embrace this approach is forming in the international community.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  4. We view attempts by certain international actors to leverage the sanctions stick to put pressure on the leaders of Myanmar and Mali as illegitimate. Extraterritorial unilateral measures are causing enormous damage to developing countries throughout the world and undermine their ability to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. They also run counter to their efforts to combat climate change. It is supremely inhumane to apply unilateral restrictions in the current epidemiological situation. Our call for the creation of green corridors for the unimpeded movement of medical personnel and goods remains in force.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  5. A stark example of the discriminatory policy of applying unilateral coercive measures is the situation in Cuba, which has withstood the blockade by its northern neighbour for more than 60 years. Genuine economic terror was unleashed a few years ago against the country and legitimate Government of Venezuela, which, owing to the imposed measures, is not able to contribute to the United Nations regular budget and is therefore illegally denied a voice in the General Assembly. Sanctions pressure also has an adverse impact on the socioeconomic situation in Iran. The decisions taken by a number of countries to freeze the Afghan Government’s accounts in Western banks following the Taliban’s takeover is a major obstacle to the normalization of the lives of ordinary Afghans.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  6. Particularly intolerable are those situations whereby individual countries, demanding the implementation of their own sanctions restrictions, target third-country economic operators operating within the framework of their national legislation. The extraterritorial implementation of sanctions runs counter to the most basic norms of international law — and there are many examples of that. The sanctions war against Syria has had an extremely negative impact on the country’s internal situation, provoking a further aggravation of the socioeconomic crisis. Broad sectoral restrictions against Belarus are aimed at destroying its competitive enterprises and destabilizing the sociopolitical situation.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  7. The Russian Federation is traditionally guided by the understanding that the only legitimate sanctions regimes are those of the Security Council. In that connection, the practice of applying unilateral coercive measures by individual countries and groups of countries is of growing concern. We view such measures as an encroachment upon the prerogatives of the Council, and thereby as hindering the maintenance of peace. We interpret the practice of using such restrictions as an infringement of the sovereignty of States and as interference in their internal affairs. The trend of the increasing use of unilateral sanctions undermines the norms and institutions of international law.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  8. In that regard, it is necessary to consider ways to minimize the broad interpretation of sanctions provisions, including perhaps through the fine-tuning of terminology; by conducting a comprehensive impartial assessment of the humanitarian consequences of international restrictive measures; and by mandating personnel on sanctions committees’ groups of experts to monitor the impact of sanctions on the humanitarian situation and increasing the required level of expertise in that area. The authority to report to the Council on the negative consequences of sanctions should also be granted to specific Secretariat bodies, such as, for example, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  9. As for Afghanistan, resolution 2615 (2021) was of key significance in clarifying that humanitarian aid is not a violation of the sanctions regime provided for by resolution 1988 (2011). We hope that it will help to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in the country. We are convinced that the Security Council sanctions apparatus requires a strong dose of humanization.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  10. The sanctions- related measures, imposed due to the unwillingness of stakeholders to abandon their reliance on military force, have interrupted supplies of food and fuel. As a result, millions of people are suffering from malnutrition and have limited access to drinking water. It is unacceptable for the banking systems of third countries to profit off of Libya’s frozen assets, which should be preserved for future generations of the country in its post-crisis era. It is inhumane for those that are elderly or terminally ill, who pose no threat to security, to be forced to waste time waiting for permission to travel abroad. Do such situations contribute in any way to the Council’s credibility?

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  11. Such problems can clearly be seen in the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, where secondary sanctions imposed by large Western countries created a toxic atmosphere around Pyongyang and resulted in widespread unwillingness to cooperate with it, even in those areas that are not subject to international restrictions. It is no coincidence that the Russian Federation, together with the People’s Republic of China, is putting forward specific initiatives aimed at overcoming that disastrous trend. If the Council is truly thinking about ordinary Koreans, and not about geopolitics, then those proposals warrant support. It is impossible not to mention the situation in Yemen, rightly characterized as the largest humanitarian catastrophe of our time.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  12. In addition, we draw inspiration from experiences in the early 2000s, when, even before the imposition of sanctions, preliminary assessments of their humanitarian consequences were carried out. A daunting obstacle to the full functioning of humanitarian exemptions are so-called secondary unilateral restrictions, which are introduced in addition to Security Council sanctions. Under the threat of falling under harsh national and sometimes extraterritorial restrictions, counterparties refuse to conclude contracts for the procurement of humanitarian assistance authorized by the Security Council and transport operators to deliver it. There are also difficulties with cargo insurance, and banks say that it is impossible to conduct routine monetary transactions.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  13. Unfortunately, despite declarations that restrictive Security Council measures should not affect the lives of ordinary people, in practice international restrictions often lead to a deterioration in the socioeconomic situation in countries under sanctions. In that connection, there is a need to fine-tune the range of humanitarian exemptions provided for in Council resolutions, including those that could be leveraged for humanitarian organizations on a permanent basis. It would be possible to consider drafting lists of goods — not individual appellations — such international commodity classification codes, which should under no circumstances be listed as prohibited.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  14. Based on our assessments, many of the Security Council sanctions regimes currently in force no longer correspond to the situation on the ground, hindering the plans of national Governments in terms of State-building as well as socioeconomic development. Two examples in that vein are the situations in the Central African Republic and the Sudan. Moreover, the persisting sanctions against Guinea-Bissau are completely anachronistic. The collateral damage resulting from sanctions measures should be taken seriously, as it manifests in detrimental impacts on the national economy and the lives and well-being of the population. That issue has been further exacerbated against the backdrop of the raging coronavirus disease pandemic.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  15. International sanctions should reflect the situation on the ground and serve to further political processes, while sanctions regimes should be subject to regular review and modification, up to and including their full lifting, where applicable. We emphatically call for the targeted and flexible nature of Security Council restrictions to become standard practice. It is necessary to listen more attentively to, and heed the views of, the authorities of sanctioned States, as well to more realistically formulate so-called benchmarks to prevent their morphing into deliberately unattainable objectives.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  16. I thank Mr. Griffiths for his briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Russian Federation. I wish to thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Under-Secretary-General Martin Griffiths for their assessments of the humanitarian aspects of sanctions, which align with our approaches in many ways. Security Council sanctions are an important instrument for the implementation of the functions vested in the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. As one of the strongest forms of response to threats to peace, such sanctions must be applied with extreme care, as well as irreproachably substantiated and nuanced. Leveraging sanctions as a punitive weapon is unacceptable.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  17. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2022/86, which contains the text of a letter dated 2 February 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a concept note on the item under consideration. I now give the floor to Ms. DiCarlo.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  18. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of the Iraq, Mali, South Sudan, the Sudan and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; and Mr. Martin Griffiths, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source

  19. I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to Her Excellency Ambassador Mona Juul, Permanent Representative of Norway, for her service as President of the Council for the month of January 2022. I am sure I speak for all members of the Council in expressing deep appreciation to Ambassador Juul and her team for the great diplomatic skill with which they conducted the Council’s business last month. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. General issues relating to sanctions Preventing their humanitarian and unintended consequences Letter dated 2 February 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2022/86)

    2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source