YouSaid · the spoken record

President Museveni

lines on the record: 41
first: 2000-01-24
most recent: 2004-11-18
sittings or episodes: 2
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“In my opinion, if there is an intractable problem, that package of players should shepherd the solution through all the stages: negotiations, agreement, implementation, and guaranteeing the agreement in the post-implementation period. Because, if it is not guaranteed, the internal forces will guarantee it through war - through fighting - asserting their rights themselves in the absence of anybody else to guarantee their interests.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“That is how that issue was handled in South Africa, if the Council remembers: first negotiations, then the transitional process, elections and then the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to establish questions of justice. I am taking a lot of your time, members of the Council, but I imagine you came a long way to listen to us, so do not complain. You voluntarily came to listen to us. In my opinion and according to my experience, the magic formula when internal forces have failed to apply in dealing with the issue is the following: the internal parties, the regional players, and the international players. That is how the problem of Amin was solved, how the problem of apartheid was solved and how the problem of Mobutu was solved, to some extent, although not wholly.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“Only the other day, I sent a special envoy to see President Kabila to tell him about my worries, because I have heard stories of these thousands of people who are out there in that part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with guns, unaccounted for, and whom the Government wants to investigate first. If we had followed that logic of justice before peace and legitimacy, we would have had no peace process in Burundi, because I cannot vouch for most of the people in Burundi's army. Many among the rebels may have committed crimes. But, by using the technique of "immunite provisoire", however, we gathered all of them and we can proceed to establishing a transitional Government. From a transitional Government, we will proceed to elections, and thus to legitimacy. Then we can come back to the question of justice.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“Now when we do that, we are solving two or three problems at once. First, people with guns come and hand in their guns. Secondly, we are helping the faction leaders. A faction leader has real problems. He has his followers, and he cannot join the transitional Government and leave his followers out. His followers would kill him and say, "You have betrayed us; you only care about yourself and you forgot about us". That is why some of the faction leaders are very reluctant to come: because they cannot join the process without first having a solution for their followers. When you integrate combatants, you also help the faction leaders. The faction leader is then able to tell his followers, "Look here, my friends, the transitional process has catered for you, so do not harass me". I truly hope that this issue is dealt with.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“We should not say, "No, I do not want to allow you in, because I think you may have committed crimes and I want to investigate you first". If people want to come, we should welcome them with open arms. That is why in the case of Burundi we used the method of "immunite provisoire", provisional immunity. We assume that these people are not all criminals. They bring their guns, they all come, and we put them in the army temporarily. We then use technical standards to reduce their number to the number we want. We take out those who are over age and those who are sick. We may have a standard regarding education as well. Thus, in the end, we have a smaller number than the original number. Then we give a package to those who are not absorbed. That is where the World Bank comes in: we give them a package, and they go home with a good heart.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“One of the problems I had with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) is that it has delayed the integration of the combatants. For one and a half years, rebels in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have been appealing to the Government to integrate them. The Government has been saying, "No, we cannot integrate you". When I inquired further, I was told that Western ambassadors in Kinshasa are the ones advising the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo not to integrate the rebels. Why? Because the rebels committed atrocities, so they must be investigated first. This must be a new theory of conflict resolution. The little I know about conflict resolution is that you first establish peace. If all the troublemakers come peacefully, you accept them with open arms.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“By putting our heads together, we always reach a good solution. The only problem in Burundi is money. What is it the French word for money? "Argent." I keep saying that argent is what is needed now, first of all for the elections, for printing the ballots. I think some money has been raised for the ballot boxes and so forth, but we also need money to assemble the combatants, put them in one place, disarm them and disband them. If we do not do this, free elections cannot be held, because the parties that have armed groups will use them to intimidate rival parties. It is therefore very important that we get the argent for the purpose of demobilizing the combatants. As regards the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I have expressed my worries to both President Kabila and the Secretary-General. I hope that those worries are taken into account.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“We are already paying those soldiers, but if we need to raise new battalions, we may need more money, including for salaries. That is what Somalia needs now. It needs a number of brigades to escort that Government into Somalia so that they can start preparing for elections, so that they can have a legitimate Government. The situation in Burundi is progressing quite well, mainly because the region, the internal parties of Burundi and the international community are coordinating well. Things are moving along quite well in Burundi, because all of us are there all the time. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ms. Carolyn McAskie, is working with all the stakeholders. We encounter all sorts of complications, but nobody can deceive us, because we know the situation.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“I am not here for decoration. If you want me to make a contribution, I must send a brigade, so that you can see what Ugandan soldiers can do in order to make a contribution. But just one company from me - that would be like a jamboree, or something like that." Let us use Somalia as an example. I am the Chairperson of IGAD, and I have consulted the new President, President Abdullah Yusuf. We can have several brigades of African soldiers go into Somalia and assist the Transitional Government to establish its authority on the ground, if we have the money. Money is the only problem. After all, these soldiers are being paid; even when they are at home they are being paid. The money we may be looking for could be money for transportation, food and so on.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“Getting rid of the regime and enabling people to survive was done by Africans. We are the ones who fought apartheid; the Africans are the ones who fought apartheid. I do not know why, therefore, we do not have a system whereby we have international resources and use African troops to solve these problems. If there is money, we can raise soldiers to deal with this problem of Somalia, or any problem, for that matter. The youth in Africa are doing nothing, they are not employed, they are looking for jobs. It would be very easy for me to raise any number of brigades - two, three, four, five. Now once, when we were working with the former President Bush on the question of Somalia in 1991, I wanted to make a contribution, but I was told that I could send only one company. I said, "No, I am not going to send one company.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“What they need is troops to assist the Transitional Government to establish its authority inside Somalia. I would propose here the use of African troops. There are troops from very far away - from Uruguay, from the North Pole, from the South Pole; there are quite a variety of them - but I think that African troops could do this work much better. First of all, they are cheaper; we pay our soldiers much less than those people are paid. And they can stand and fight; there is no problem at all. Where African troops have been involved, we have found solutions quickly. We solved the problem of Amin almost alone, we the Africans - Tanzania, ourselves and a few other countries. We solved the problem of Mobutu. We are the ones who dealt with the problem of genocide in Rwanda. Genocide would never have stopped if we had not taken a stand.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“But, in my opinion, dealing with southern Sudan is part of dealing with the question of Darfur. If you deal with southern Sudan correctly, then you will be able to deal with Darfur more easily. Turning to Somalia, that country now has an agreed Transitional Government. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union, the Arab League and the United Nations should materially and technically back that Government so that it can establish its authority in Somalia within the shortest possible time. We should not lose any time, because this package in Somalia is very, very important. I must thank President Kibaki and his Government for helping IGAD to negotiate this agreement here in Nairobi, and I would appeal to everyone to support this process.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“We need to okasinga, to borrow my language. I think that is what the Sudan needs. That sense of okusinga is captured in these six protocols. I hope we can implement these protocols, so that we can see what happens next. Therefore I appeal to the parties to the Sudan problem to resolve the remaining issues without delay. When I spoke with Mr. Garang on the telephone the other day, he mentioned the issue of paying the army, and a few other issues. I hope that these can be resolved quickly, so that we can get moving. I saw a television interview last night when I was in Arusha - we were in Arusha for the meeting on AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis - in which a Sudanese person was saying that the Khartoum Government was busy with the problem in Darfur and that therefore it was not attending to this problem.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“The six protocols, in my opinion - given what has gone on, given the loss of time in solving this problem - are a reasonable package that should give this region a chance to see peace in the Sudan and then make a fresh start. When you want to jump, you do not stand in one position and jump. No; you go back first. English is a poor language; it does not have enough vocabulary, like my language. In my language, we have a verb for going backwards in order to jump better: we call it okusinga. Okiisinga is when you go back in order to gather enough momentum to jump far. I think there is a word in English, but I do not remember it, even though I did English at an advanced level. In the Sudan, because of lost time and lost opportunities, because of mistakes in defining the problem, we need to go backwards.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“Now the Sudan is aware that some of those language groups meet; the Arabic-speaking people meet Garang's people. Those are very different people; they all are African, but they are very different. As you can see, Mr. Garang's people are not only black; they are actually blue, when you look at them very carefully. Now when you have Arabs and blue men living together under one sovereignty, that is a very serious project, and it should be taken seriously. But that was not taken into account. We are talking to our brothers; fortunately, I have been dealing with them for a long time, and they know my views. At one time, I went to Khartoum - I was invited to the university, and I gave my views there. As a consequence of not dealing with the issue over the past 50 years, this is where we are today on the question of the Sudan.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“The second group are the Nilo-Saharan people, like John Garang, and all the people in southern Ethiopia, Chad and so on. Their languages are the Nilo-Saharan group of languages. The third group are the Afro-Asiatic group of languages, of which those are three in Africa: Arabic, Amharic in one part of Ethiopia, and Tigray in Eritrea and in part of Ethiopia. The fourth group of languages is the Khoisan, a very small group in South Africa. Those people have somewhat Asiatic facial features, but they live in South Africa, and a few in Botswana and Namibia. Those are the four linguistic groups of Africa. We have now added the new European languages - I do not know whether we can also call them African: English, French, Portuguese - and even Spanish in some places. Those are the additional new languages of Africa.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“I cannot speak about what I do not know about. Regarding those four issues, I would like to give the following summarized comments. The leaders of the Sudan, who are sitting next to me here, for a long time refused to listen to the advice of the region in handling the diverse character of that great African country - that country where different African peoples meet. Many in the world may not know who the Africans are. Africans fall into four major linguistic groups. Africans in all of Central Africa, Southern Africa, much of East Africa and quite a bit of West Africa are part of the Niger-Congo group of languages. It includes the Bantu languages, and also the Kwa languages, the languages spoken in some parts of West Africa.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“So once you have the knowledge and you have all the stakeholders brought in, then the next level is international solidarity, especially with respect to resources and maybe some technical contributions. The four issues of this area are the Sudan, Somalia, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I am reversing the order, because I would have started with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but I put it last, because the region is now out of the Congo. The region is the one which shepherded the Congo process, through the Lusaka process, stopped the war and brought about a ceasefire and the disengagement plan. But then, when the United Nations came in, it said the region is out. So the region is now out of the Congo. That is why I am putting it last: because I do not know what is happening.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“One should not complicate an already difficult problem with a lack of knowledge and with superficiality. Secondly, there is the question of stakeholders. Normally, when there is a problem in a country, the first victims are the people in that country. But the next victims are the neighbours, who are affected next by refugees and all the other problems. The neighbours are therefore stakeholders, next to the citizens of the country. Although sometimes there may be some rivalries which may complicate the issue, those can be specifically isolated and dealt with. Thirdly, there is the question of international solidarity, especially concerning the question of resources.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“I was Chairperson of the process, and President Jimmy Carter is my very good friend, but I said no. By the time President Carter learned to pronounce Barundi names - and Barundi names are so long: Ntibantunganya, for instance - it would be 10 years later. And he would be unable to help. So I insisted that the retired President of Tanzania, the late Mwalimu Nyerere, should head that process. Then, unfortunately Mwalimu Nyerere died, then we brought in Mr. Mandela. Although South Africa is rather far away, he was supported by all of us and he has done a very good job. That is how the Burundi process is moving steadily and surely. Thus, again, the first advantage I see in this arrangement is the question of knowledge: the ability to know the problem so that one is able to provide a correct solution.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“Thirdly, ultimately the African Union should bless the process. Fourthly, it is only then that the international bodies, such as the United Nations, should come into the process, to provide solidarity and back-up support. The advantages are the following. First, there is the question of knowledge of the problem. Because part of the problem is the fact that the players do not know the problem. I have been Chairperson of the Burundi peace process for a very long time. In 1994-1995, when we were first coming into the process once the citizens of Burundi had failed to provide their own solution, there were many suggestions. Some people suggested that the respected former President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, should head that process. I said no.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“Therefore, in my view, and following our long experience in this part of the world, our actions should be guided by the following steps. First and foremost, any political problem should be solved by the citizens of the country in question, following democratic principles and guided by belief in the equality of all persons before the law. That should be step number one. Secondly, if the citizens of that country, for some reason, cannot solve the problem, then the region should come in. In the case of our area, the regional organizations concerned are the following: the East African Community (EAC); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which is here; the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and others.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“Is the international involvement in such situations part of the solution or part of the problem? Is the analysis of those situations correct or defective? What about the incredible suffering visited on the people in those situations? I would like the Council to seriously evaluate all those factors. As the Council knows, Uganda has had a lot of problems. Nevertheless, Uganda has never sought, nor would we ever accept, international involvement in our internal affairs, other than our collaboration with our Tanzanian brothers in getting rid of Idi Amin in 1978 and 1979. That is because we do not like to add to our own copious confusion the international supplies of the same commodity of confusion. It is not wise to add international confusion, to what is already an oversupply of local confusion.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“Since there was no strong Congolese independent State, trouble broke out soon after independence. The United Nations troops came in. Instead of assisting the only legitimate leadership to emerge in the Congo up to then, and indeed since then, the United Nations took the side of illegal elements, including the famous General Mobutu. It has now been almost 45 years since the Congolese tragedy of 1961. The United Nations is back in the Congo. How can it be that a country cannot develop a capable State in 45 years? What is the problem? Who is responsible for that problem? We are now witnessing the tragedy of Cote d'Ivoire. How can it be that a country, 47 years after independence, does not have the minimum pillars of State, such as an army capable of defending the territorial integrity of the country, political problems notwithstanding?”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“In my opinion, as someone who has been observing the scene for the last 40 years, those factors are always present when there is chaos in any part of the world. If I had time, I would elaborate on each of those four factors. But I do not have the time now. It is enough, however, that I have stated them today. Without correcting them, especially the first three factors, we cannot reach a solution, in my opinion. Some of the chronic problems, such as that of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are due to a combination of some of those factors. Some nationalist legitimate local leadership emerged in 1960, and the first and only elections in the history of the Congo were held. I am referring to the leadership of Patrice Lumumba and his party, the Mouvement National Congolais.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“President Museveni: I greet the Security Council on behalf of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Before I talk about IGAD issues, I would like to point out that, in my opinion, wherever there is chaos in the world, one will most likely find a confluence of four factors. And what are those four factors? Factor one is parasitic, vested interests. Factor two is superficiality and obscurantism in identifying and dealing with those parasitic interests and their effects on a particular country or group of countries. Factor three is weak or disoriented local leadership. Factor four is the pre-industrial character of many of the affected areas, especially in Africa, where societies are backward and pre-industrial.”
2004-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5080 (2004) · source
“I should like to conclude by once again reiterating our appreciation to the President and to the Council for affording us this opportunity to discuss a very important and urgent priority that has dogged Africa for four decades now, starting with the murder of Patrice Lumumba in 1961. We are happy that this is taking place here at the United Nations and particularly in the Security Council, whose primary mandate is the maintenance of international peace and security. This should mark the beginning of a new era of reconciliation, peace, stability and prosperity in the Great Lakes region. The timing of this dialogue could not be more appropriate. Mrs. Albright (United States of America) returned to the Chair.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source
“The magnitude of an effective United Nations involvement in the Congo, given its size, and, as I said, the complexity of the situation, will be large and certainly costly. The Secretary-General confirms this in his report. But the cost of inaction, as we witnessed in Rwanda, would be too ghastly, more costly and morally repugnant. I appeal to the Council to act now to avoid this type of unfortunate happening. It is the hope of Uganda that the United Nations mandate will be under chapter seven of the United Nations Agreement that thoroughly equips the United Nations to play its part fully.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source
“The renewal and strengthening of our commitment to carrying them out, as we have just done, should, however, provide the first concrete step forward. We, the regional leaders, must be seen to lead the way. This is what I believe we are here for. However, as I have already mentioned, the international community also has to demonstrate clear and concrete support for the efforts we as Africans are undertaking. Recent events in all parts of the world have clearly demonstrated that conflict and war are not exclusively African phenomena. They can happen anywhere for a variety of reasons, including the most rampant - that is, the farming of racial and ethnic hatred. The response of the international community must be even-handed and not lopsided.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source
“This aspect presupposes the active cooperation of all of the parties to the Lusaka accord, especially with regard to the obligation to guarantee the security of United Nations and related personnel. Here again I would like to assure the Council of the total cooperation of Uganda. We also expect that a national conference involving all Congolese political stakeholders will be convened as soon as possible, with the assistance of the OAU and the new facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire, to determine the political future of the Congo. Uganda supports the appointment of retired President Masire as the facilitator and the reaffirmation of President Chiluba in Maputo as a coordinator of the peace process. Mr. Holbrooke (United States of America) took the Chair. We recognize, of course, that these are complex and huge undertakings.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source
“In the Lusaka Agreement, the opposition groups in the Congo should be involved in the peace process in order to ensure that they cooperate fully in its implementation. We expect a neutral international peacekeeping force to be deployed as an interpositional force in the Congo under the auspices of the United Nations. That is why we propose that this United Nations mission to the Congo should be established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to enable it to effectively deal with questions of disarmament, demobilization and the protection of civilians. We expect all foreign troops to withdraw in accordance with a timetable to be worked out according to the Lusaka Agreement, by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), under the supervision of the United Nations interpositional force.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source
“I did not want to go into this; in fact, it was not part of my speech. But since someone floated this red herring, I have no alternative but to respond. We had to fight Mobutu's regime in 1996 because it was threatening to visit another Holocaust on our area and to cause another genocide in Rwanda. As we fought Mobutu's regime, we supported Mr. Kabila, who is sitting here. When we were supporting him, he did not call us aggressors. When we supported Mr. Kabila and opposed Mr. Mobutu, we did not hate Mr. Mobutu, nor did we love Mr. Kabila. We had to defend ourselves; that was all. Unfortunately, when Mr. Kabila went into the Government, he forgot about our original problems and why we had supported him. This is inconsistent. Today they are allies, tomorrow aggressors. I do not think that this is consistent.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source
“We have no competition in terms of horrific stories, aside from Hitler's Germany, where 6 million people were killed, and Cambodia's Pol Pot. These are our competitors. This is the issue: the human being is the highest form of God's creation in terms of intelligence. To find, therefore, that approximately 2.5 million citizens of the contiguous countries of the Great Lakes region have been extra-judicially killed in the period from 1959 to date is something the patriots of this area have rejected for good. We will not allow ourselves to be killed without resisting. We are not chickens to be slaughtered by demented political actors. We expect the international community to support us in this. That is why the Security Council was set up. Another red herring was floated: aggression against the Congo.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source
“My country supports the territorial integrity of all the countries in Africa, so the territorial integrity of the Congo is not the issue. It has not been the issue throughout this conflict. The issues are as follows. It is important for the Security Council to remember that since 1960, approximately 1.2 million Rwandans, 400,000 Burundians, 800,000 Ugandans and many Congolese have been exterminated extra-judicially by the fascist regimes of Kayibanda and Habyarimana, leaders of Rwanda; Michombero of Burundi; Idi Amin, the monster of Uganda; and Mobutu. This is the issue - not the territorial integrity of the Congo, not all of these red herrings that are being floated around. In the century that has just ended, only Hitler's Germany and P01 Pot's Cambodia could compete with our area with respect to these horrific stories.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source
“The security concerns of the neighbouring countries and of the Congo have been recognized, and a committee has been established to resolve the question of the destabilization of neighbouring countries by elements operating from the Congo territory. In this regard, we agree with the recommendation of the Secretary-General that to create the conditions for a lasting peace in the subregion it is vital to include the security of the borders of the States concerned, their territorial integrity and their full enjoyment of their natural resources, and that at the appropriate time a regional conference on peace and security in the region must be convened. I therefore see as a red herring the repeated talk about the territorial integrity of the Congo, because this is not the issue. The issue is not the territorial integrity of the Congo.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source
“I take this opportunity to renew Uganda's total and unequivocal support for the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. I know that my colleagues have variously alluded to the salient provisions of the Lusaka accord. I will nevertheless repeat some of them, so that this Council may take them into account in charting the way forward. The Agreement provided for a ceasefire and troop standstill, and, as I mentioned earlier, a Political Committee is in place to work out the details of the ceasefire and the modalities of its implementation. We urge that the work of this team be supported by the international community and that, when a fully fledged united international involvement is agreed upon, the Committee's activities be coordinated with those of the United Nations Mission.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source
“We take the Lusaka accord very seriously and challenge all the parties to do likewise. I have stated before, and reaffirm, that the Lusaka accord deserves our total support because it addresses, in a comprehensive way, all legitimate and security concerns of all the parties. It addresses the long, drawn-out internal problems of the Congo right from the time of Mobutu. Secondly, it addresses the concerns of the neighbours, including Uganda. Thirdly, and most importantly, it restores the unity of Africa. Lastly, it promises peace and prosperity in our region, because, with its full implementation, we can turn our whole attention to issues of national and regional development. For all these reasons, we will oppose any parties that adopt an adventurous attitude that flouts this Agreement.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source
“Thirdly, the Security Council must be cognizant of the terrorist role played by the Islamic regime of the Sudan, sometimes using the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with or without cooperation from Kinshasa, to destabilize the neighbouring countries. The situation in Central Africa, unfortunately, divided for the first time the former anti-colonial freedom fighters of Africa. This is a very unfortunate episode in our history, and we must resolutely put an end to it. Africans are not new actors on the international political stage. We fought injustice and oppression as a united front for many years. This was one of the reasons that caused us to append our signatures to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement as a concrete framework for ending the sad events in our region.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source
“In fact, a meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Defence, which met in Lusaka, Zambia from 14 to 16 January 1999, established a committee on the security concerns of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbouring countries, whose terms of reference included working out a mechanism to fully and satisfactorily address those concerns. Secondly, our region, which had just witnessed a most gruesome genocide in Rwanda, in 1994, was on the verge of yet another catastrophe of ghastly proportions as a result of the fallout from the ouster of the murderous regimes of the late Presidents Habyarimana of Rwanda and Mobutu of Zaire. The events that followed, which were to pit our armies against each other, are well known to the Council.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source
“It is my view that this occasion is not one on which we want to dwell on the background to the unfortunate situation in the Congo that has made the political and security situation in the Great Lakes region so precarious and fragile. I have, since the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo began in 1995, categorically stated the Uganda position on the conflict. I also dispatched two special envoys - our Prime Minister and our Minister of State for Foreign Affairs - to come to the Council to discuss the issues involved. I will therefore only restate that Uganda and, indeed, the other neighbouring countries of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have legitimate security concerns, which, fortunately, have now been recognized by the region in the Lusaka Agreement, and also by the international community.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source
“President Museveni: I should first of all like to echo the congratulations which I know my delegation has already extended to you, Madam President, and your country, the United States, on assuming the Presidency of the Security Council for the first month of the new millennium. I also want to salute your initiative, supported by this Council, to give the highest priority to the consideration of African matters this month. I thank the Secretary-General for his incisive statement and for his report on the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The report should help focus the discussion of the issue before the Council today.”
2000-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4092 (2000) · source