YouSaid · the spoken record

Prince Norodom Ranariddh

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30

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1993-10-05

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1993-10-05

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1

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un-security-council

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1. “I should like once again very humbly to express, from the very bottom of our hearts, to the members of the Council, and through them to their countries and their peoples, our deepest gratitude for all the United Nations has done, with striking success, to help Cambodia. The success of the United Nations in Cambodia, as I said yesterday, is but the expression of a desire held in common between the international community, which wishes to save this people, and this people, which wishes to save its country.”

   1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

2. “As for how many, we have said 20, but one could say 20, 30, 35 or 50. As for the mandate, the mission of the observers: observers are simply observers. They cannot take any action or participate in any operation; they can only observe. Those are some of the points we should like to clarify, but again, if this matter is problematic for the Security Council, His Excellency Mr. Hun Sen and I are ready to forgo our request and stand on the historic success, on the will of the Cambodian people to assume responsibility for and take hold of the destiny of their country. That is how I wish to conclude my statement - a bit long, and I apologize; that is the problem with making a statement without a written text, but there are longer speeches made with a text.”

   1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

3. “I hope that this body will consider the problems of vandalism and the theft and sale of Cambodian works of art. The efforts of UNESCO and of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) are very necessary. My final, and most thorny, point concerns the military observers. As this matter gives rise to so many difficulties, I shall give the Council some information. First, it was His Majesty the King - at that time still Head of State - who, together with his Excellency the Special Representative, thought it would be advisable to have a small presence of observers; if members prefer and if it would be reassuring, one could call them liaison officers. Their role would be primarily psychological. But in any case their presence must have a time-limit: six months, or maybe a little longer; it is up to the Security Council to decide that.”

   1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

4. “Human rights of all types are set out clearly in Cambodia's new Constitution. My next point concerns national reconstruction. Mr. Hun Sen and I, as Prime Ministers of the Royal Government of Cambodia, would prefer to keep the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia, rather than have another coordinating body established. The International Committee could meet regularly to assess the assistance promised by our friends. Many promises have been made: some $800 million in Tokyo and $123 million in Paris. There must be a coordinating body, a United Nations programme for Cambodia, perhaps. There must be a United Nations presence. In addition to the bodies I have mentioned there is the United Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). I have raised the question of our cultural heritage.”

   1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

5. “I should like to refer now to an operation that must continue, no matter what the cost. I refer to de-mining - a job that will take 5, 10 or 20 years. Millions of mines have been planted everywhere. We must look to the safety of present and future generations of Cambodians. We need people to cultivate the fields again - thousands of hectares. The de-mining cannot be done without the presence and assistance of the international community. Here, we should like to acknowledge the help of friendly countries that have been especially concerned about the question of de-mining. We must also consider human rights. In this context, I must refer to the recent past - yes, the recent past. We ask simply for a United Nations presence in the shape of a permanent Centre for Human Rights.”

   1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

6. “But the Cambodian people made it possible, and they must be helped. We Cambodians are determined to rebuild our country together, while maintaining internal peace, social peace and securing international guarantees of our independence and security. That is what we are determined to do. But a small United Nations presence, following its massive presence, would help to strengthen the confidence that already exists. I apologize to my Chinese friends here when I say that if one is Chinese one does not invest $2 billion and then try to save S30 million. What is needed is a small presence. I have not come here to beg. Mr. Hun Sen and I have already decided that if our request is too much for the Organization we shall do without. But this small presence is the first matter for consideration.”

   1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

7. “Bearing in mind these two essential parts, would it not be reasonable - after the expenditure of so much money, after so many efforts have been made, and after so many lives have been sacrificed in a good cause - to have a small United Nations presence in Cambodia, not to continue the peace-keeping operation for which UNTAC was given a mandate in the Agreements of 23 October, but to increase the confidence that the Cambodian people need, because there is still not complete security in Cambodia? Mr. Hun Sen and I are determined to strengthen national reconciliation. Mr. Akashi would confirm that no one hearing the speeches made by me and by Mr. Hun Sen during the election campaign could have believed that such reconciliation was possible. But it is possible. No one is required to do the impossible.”

   1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

8. “I have said that Cambodia has too few resources to guarantee its own security. As Cambodia has been devastated, it must devote all the resources compassionately given by friendly countries to economic, social and other types of rehabilitation. Thus there is an obligation on the part of the international community. My next point concerns the fourth part of the Paris Agreements, which refers to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia.”

   1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

9. “The first one was good, but usually the sequel is not as good as the first one. I agree. Cambodia agrees, that the mandate of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which stems from the 23 October agreements, has been completed with the greatest success. Once again, I would like to pay it a tribute here. It has been completed. None the less, I should like to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the peace Agreements contain four important parts. The third deals with guarantees given by the international community, through the United Nations, with regard to matters including the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and internal security of Cambodia. The international community has an obligation under these Agreements.”

   1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

10. “It remains only to speak of national reconstruction and rehabilitation. May we be allowed to take this unique opportunity to express to the international community, and especially to France and Japan, our gratitude for having been good enough to organize - with well-known success - two conferences, one in Tokyo and the other recently in Paris, on the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Cambodia. I come to the conclusion, as follows. Some Members of the United Nations, in light of the problem this Organization is encountering at this time, would like us to rest on the laurels of an outstanding success. It is true that the United Nations operation in Cambodia has been an outstanding success. One does not want to have a sequel, such as Rambo I or Rambo II: one Rambo was enough.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

11. “We hope that when the round table takes place - which will be in a month, I believe, in November - His Majesty the King, in his wisdom and magnaminity, will succeed in resolving this problem, because we need national reconciliation. We need peace, after 23 years of war and suffering. Now we have to rebuild and reconstruct Cambodia, which is in ruins. On the subject of this round table, I wish to make a clarification: it will not be a party-to-party discussion. Let there be no mistake about this point. There will be no discussion among parties. It is a meeting, presided over by the King, among the legal representatives and a group. That group must decide very quickly whether it would like to remain within the international community, within the sphere of legality, or outside legality. That is our position on this famous problem.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

12. “The Khmer Rouge has recognized that Constitution, and it must apply one of its fundamental provisions. Again, it is a completely reasonable request. How to resolve all these problems? We are awaiting the response of Mr. Samphan. Allow me to tell the Council that before I came here, Mr. Khieu Samphan sent us a letter in which he continues to speak of Vietnamese forces and of entente: "Vietnamese forces" and "entente" which continue to attack the patriotic Khmer Rouge forces. And do not think that by "entente" he means us; this is not the Hun Sen-Ranariddh entente. By "entente" he means to designate the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, Japan, Australia - this is the "entente" that would, with Vietnam, destroy the patriotic forces. Not long ago, the "entente" was led by Mr. Yasushi Akashi and General Sanderson.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

13. “We would like to take this opportunity to thank and express all our gratitude to all the friendly Governments that have recognized de jure the Royal Government of Cambodia as the governmental structure which is the sole legitimate representative of Cambodia. Secondly - and these are not preconditions - the Khmer Rouge group, like the three former Cambodian groups, must dismantle its army and its administration, in order to merge into a single national royal army and a single national royal administration. This request seems to us to be reasonable and legitimate. Why would they not do as the others did? We would also like the Khmer Rouge group to open up its autonomous zone. The Cambodian Constitution makes it clear that the national territory is indivisible.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

14. “First, as I had the honour to say in my speech yesterday, the position of the Royal Government is very clear: "We are prepared to welcome the Khmer Rouge into the royal armed forces of Cambodia." (A/48/PV.15) We are prepared to accept them into our Government, as advisers. But in return we are entitled, as the legal, legitimate representatives of the Cambodian people, to ask them, first of all, to recognize the Constitution - which they have done - and to recognize His Majesty the King - which they did as well; but they must also recognize the Royal Government whose Prime Ministers were appointed by His Majesty the King in keeping with the new Constitution. That is not very much to ask.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

15. “Let us no longer call it, please, the part of Democratic Kampuchea. That Party exists only in so far as the Agreements of 23 October apply, that is, if there is a Supreme National Council. The day there is a new assembly, a new Head of State, and, first and foremost, a new government formed in conformity with those Accords, the Cambodian Supreme National Council ceases to exist. Therefore, we should no longer speak of a "part". Moreover, the old parts have merged within the framework of a National Assembly and a Royal Government, with a royal administration and royal armed forces. What remains to be attended to is the matter of the Khmer Rouge, which we call a "group". Where do we stand?”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

16. “This is the third point I wish to make in my statement here today. The first of these rather extraordinary problems is the problem of internal security, and here there are two kinds of security problem involved. First there is the security problem resulting from the presence of armed men, of armed bands; because, whether we like it or not, the United Nations operation has not succeeded in disarming and demobilizing those famous "at least 70 per cent", because it wasted its time in fighting over whether to put "70 per cent" - and I beg the Americans to excuse me here - and the Americans said we must add the words "at least", and then there were those who wanted them all disarmed. We are far from achieving that, and this is the situation we inherited. Then there is also the security problem of that group called the Khmer Rouge.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

17. “The new, definitive cabinet will be formed; I shall not waste your time by talking to you about the Constitution, but I should like to reassure the purists in matters of constitutional law - and I myself teach constitutional law - that the new Constitution does say that once the transition period is over, there will be only one Prime Minister, so please be reassured. The ministerial portfolios have already been distributed between the two or three parties; we shall hurry back to Cambodia in order to appoint the ministers. The fact remains that a government has arisen out of 23 years of war, of unspeakable suffering, in order to govern the country - not to govern it alone but to govern it with the assistance of the international community. So, what are the problems that Cambodia will or must face?”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

18. “Once a Head of State, a King, had been elected, he, knowing that we were to take part in the General Assembly hurried, in accordance with articles XIII and XIV of the Constitution, on the proposal of the President of the National Assembly and the two Vice-Presidents, to appoint the Prime Ministers of His Majesty's Government. These are the first and the second Prime Ministers - rather a difficult notion. Here again, we have not exactly done like everybody else, but what matter: here we are before you, and we understand each other very well. This, more than anything, is the key to success, that is to say, the key to peace and stability in Cambodia.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

19. “So, the two-headed government made it possible for the work of the Constituent Assembly to take place in conditions of near normalcy; it managed to meet, and elected the 12 members of the Constitutional Commission, who drafted a constitution, of the constitutional monarchy type, but extremely democratic in nature. That constitution was adopted without difficulty - not unanimously, but with 113 votes in favour - and unanimity would be even better then a very large majority, would it not? After that, a king was elected; you know who he is: the New York Times or the Washington Post published on its front page two photographs of my suzerain, King Sihanouk, sitting in the same chair - the caption was that it was the same chair, and also the same man, and that the only difference was age.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

20. “The two-headed government, as the Khmer Rouge called it - and I should tell you that meanwhile the Khmer Rouge continued to accuse us of being "puppets", saying that we had one old puppet and one new one - but they continued to insist on being advisers to the government, which is to say that they continued to insist on being advisers to puppets, which does not exactly make much sense, particularly Cartesian sense, even though Mr. Pol Pot was a graduate of the Sorbonne. I do beg pardon if my statement seems rather disjointed; the thing is that Mr. Akashi managed to persuade me to appear before the Council only as recently as 12.10 this afternoon, so I have not had the time, not even an hour, to prepare.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

21. “The Khmer Rouge boycotted, threatened - but the elections passed off just the same, successfully, with the massive, record turnout that we saw. But after the elections, that was not the end of the story. Far from it! Would we have the two-thirds majority needed to adopt the new constitution? And once the new constitution was adopted, what would happen with the transfer of powers? I know that the famous "Prime Five" - and they are famous - got together, agreed, and thought up scenarios - the worst possible scenarios, of course - for the transfer of power.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

22. “It is not exactly a canonical solution in terms of classic liberal democracy. As a professor of constitutional law I might have to answer to my students about this structure, which is rather unusual but conforming - if one wished to conform - to principles. One might say something about peace and national reconciliation. This is the solution that my suzerain, the Head of State, has chosen, and this is the rather unusual solution that the major parties have adopted. One might say that Cambodians never do things the way everybody else does; I must say, though, that it is not everybody that has Prince Sihanouk as Head of State either. Why is it that after the elections the international community was worried - and it was worried, moreover, before the elections too? Because the Khmer Rouge were not taking part in them.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

23. “Nor could I fail to take this opportunity to express our deepest gratitude to the Security Council, which always knew how to adopt wise and moderate resolutions. On several occasions they faced problems created by various parties, at one time it was the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, but the Security Council always knew how to react firmly but wisely. It was almost what one might call an iron fist in a velvet glove. The three elements for success I have dealt with. The second point I should like to make - and the Council is perhaps expecting me to deal with it - is: What is going on now and what will happen in the future? Members of the Council know that after these elections a provisional national administration was formed with two co-Prime Ministers. That is an original formula.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

24. “Without in any way underestimating the United Nations operation itself, the third element is also very important. For example, after the elections, which were hailed by the international community, then endorsed, I believe, on 15 June by the Security Council, some problems did remain, even serious problems, among the Cambodian parties themselves, but once again, thanks to the Head of State and to the will of the two major parties to become reconciled - why not say so? - they saved Cambodia. That is the last element which ensured that the United Nations operation, mandated by the Paris Agreements of 23 October 1990, was hailed as the most successful operation ever undertaken by the United Nations in a country which had suffered a long conflict - even more than that, I was even going to say genocide. There you have it.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

25. “The Cambodian political parties are represented here by the Cambodian People's Party, the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique et Cooperatif (FUNCINPEC) Party, the Liberal Party. You say, "But then there are the Khmer Rouge". But the Khmer Rouge participated in their own way - not always the best way. Mr. Akashi knew something about that. So did the representatives of the Five. Often Mr. Khieu Samphan was more artistic than Ranariddh in the National Supreme Council. Fine! But the collaboration of the political parties was essential. That is the second important element that may be lacking for some United Nations operations. Finally, a third element for success, namely the will of the Cambodian parties to seek reconciliation. That is the third important element.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

26. “There were death threats first of all by a group called the Khmer Rouge, for example. So massive participation was a just assessment for those elections. Collaboration and cooperation of an entire people; a necessary element. But there were also collaboration and cooperation on the part of our Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, without whom this success could not have been possible. The Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, always gave his full support to Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the leader of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). He also succeeded in overcoming all the obstacles within the Supreme National Council of Cambodia. That is the second element of collaboration: that of the people, that of the Head of State, but also that of the political parties.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

27. “Nor should we forget that the United Nations chose the best of its best. The second element of the success it seems to me is even more important, namely the will of the Cambodians to work together with the United Nations. I think this is an essential element, one which deserves to be thought about deeply. This cooperation - I would even call it collaboration - took on several forms. First, people have talked about the massive, record participation: 90 per cent. It was I think, unigue, and by that high percentage the Cambodian people have shown that they fully understood the importance of the elections organized and supervised by the United Nations. The Cambodian people were able to overcome all obstacles and meet every threat. Nobody will gainsay me on this particular point.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

28. “I spoke a moment ago about the success of the United Nations. Allow me to call attention to what I believe are three essential elements of that success, while elsewhere the United Nations - despite very laudable efforts - is still encountering difficulties. The first element is the commitment of the international community. People usually say that this operation was the most costly. That is true, but this most costly operation is but the expression of the compassion of the international community for the people of Cambodia. And today those people are paying a tribute to them. It is not necessary to say anything more with regard to this first essential element. The contingents - 20,000 men - and materiel, but more than that - the will of the international community to save Cambodia - these were the important things.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

29. “We should like to take this unique opportunity to express our heartfelt thanks to all the Members of the United Nations, but especially to those who so generously sent either military contingents or civilian personnel to serve in UNTAC, an operation wisely and competently led by the United Nations Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, to whom we should like to pay here a public tribute. So we would like to express our gratitude to those countries that were good enough to send their members to save Cambodia, but also to restore peace and honour with independence, and to help us regain our territorial integrity and our sovereignty. I would not want to fail to take advantage of this opportunity to pay a final tribute to all those who lost their lives, who sacrificed their lives, for the cause of peace and democracy.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source

30. “Prince NORODOM RANARIDDH (Cambodia) (interpretation from French): It is a great pleasure for me to be invited to address this meeting as First Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Cambodia, along with His Excellency Mr. Hun Sen, Second Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Cambodia. Let me begin by expressing, on behalf of the Cambodian people, on behalf of His Majesty King Norodom Sihanouk and on behalf of the Royal Government of Cambodia, our deepest and eternal gratitude for everything the international community, through the agency of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), has done for the Cambodian people in bringing to a successful end - I might even say a historically successful end - 23 years of war, suffering and factional upheaval.”

    1993-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3287 (1993) · source