YouSaid · the spoken record

Prince Zeid Ra'Ad Zeid Al-Hussein

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187
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2014-01-06
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2014-07-14
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un-security-council

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  1. In that regard, I note that, along with sponsors Australia and Luxembourg, we have been in constant contact and coordination with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, headed by Under-Secretary-General Valerie Amos, and her team dealing with the Syrian dossier, with a view to arriving at the most efficient means to extend humanitarian assistance on the ground. In conclusion, Jordan hopes that the Council will take measures against any Syrian that does not abide by resolutions 2139 (2014) and 2165 (2014), adopted today.

    2014-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7216 (2014) · source

  2. That non-compliance has been confirmed in the past four reports ofthe Secretary- General, in which he has stated that the humanitarian situation in Syria has deterioriated further and that humanitarian assistance has been on the decline. The resolution is an operational text and should be read in concert with resolution 2139 (2014). It is designed to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all those in need, wherever they are in Syria and through the most direct routes, without delay or discrimination.

    2014-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7216 (2014) · source

  3. Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan) (spoke in Arabic): Jordan welcomes the Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2165 (2014). We are proud to have been one of the sponsors and drafters of the resolution, along with Australia and Luxembourg. We negotiated the text of the draft resolution with the other members of the Council, trying our best to come up with the highest degree of consensus thereon. In that regard, we would like thank all members of the Council - permanent and elected - for their good intentions and profound understanding of the goals and motives of the text. We appreciate the unified position taken by the Council. The resolution is a response to the non-compliance of Syrian parties, particularly the Syrian authorities, with resolution 2139 (2014).

    2014-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7216 (2014) · source

  4. Ultimately, if we do not accept the risks, we believe that Sir Brian Urquhart was right all those many years ago when he argued that if the Member States could not do it, the United Nations might need its own a standing force - a force that knew how to carry out the very mandate set for it by the Council, and which would not be subject to the influences and whims of the Member States, and whether they decided to participate or not, and if they participated presented countless caveats. This may still be radical thinking to some, yet inevitably we are headed in that very direction if the threats to international peace and security expand. We very much believe, therefore, that we need to discuss more seriously Urquhart's still profound thoughts in the months ahead.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  5. We should perhaps have a field commanders academy, which instills in young commanders the sort of leadership that could be required of them. With the right commanders, and with us the Member States willing to accept more risk ourselves on behalf of the Organization, we can better ensure that United Nations peacekeeping will remain the flagship activity of the Organization.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  6. Every United Nations peacekeeping operation deployed in a dangerous theatre needs the very best company and battalion commanders. They must be fearless, or at least show no fear. They must know what military honour is; have a clear understanding of their mandate, the concept of operations and their rules of engagement; and know that their supreme duty is to protect civilians when required to do so. Every time civilians are deserted by the United Nations, rather than protected, not only do the civilians tend to suffer, but of course the United Nations credibility takes a body blow. These body blows, rather disturbingly, seem to be accumulating, as the recent report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (A/68/787) shows us.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  7. It was a military observer mission established in 1994 with only 40 unarmed military observers deployed in Tajikistan, and yet it was credited in the first two years with saving a very large number oflives, and potentially the country altogether, simply by being everywhere. Whenever a situation grew critical in one remote corner or another and demanded the observers be there - day or night, hail or snow - somehow they were always there. So What is needed most for a successful peacekeeping operation is not just the best equipment or the best-trained soldiers, and not even modern fighting units equipped with artillery and tanks. What is needed, above everything else, are remarkable field commanders and field officers.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  8. When Dag Hammarskjold first heard, in a discussion with leaders in the Middle East on 27 August 1958, the term "a United Nations presence", he instinctively knew how he could develop it further. He understood better than anyone else that there were more alternatives to peacekeeping than simply a stark choice between either the deployment of United Nations battalions or the sending of an observer mission. The presence of only one official in theatre, with a small office, meant to Hammarskjold that the entire United Nations was there as a whole. But, crucially, this presence required skilled humans to fill the void - to make the United Nations felt. The lessons from the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan must be borne in mind, in this regard.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  9. The same can be said of the Fifth Committee and the troop reimbursement rate to TCCs, based upon General Assembly resolution 67/261 and the figure derived from the survey (A/68/813 and A/68/859). Returning to the need for us to adopt a new operating calculus for how we delineate surgically between consent and enforcement, even were this to be possible, if large numbers of TCCs are not willing to accept casualties there is little we can usefully discuss. The increasing unwillingness to accept high risk has also, in part, led the United Nations to think of using modern technologies, such as unmanned aerial observation platforms. My delegation supports this initiative, and we commend the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for it. But we all need to analyse this together very carefully.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  10. We believed instead that certain Chapter VI mandates needed agreed triggers built into them, which, iftripped, would switch the geometry completely into Chapter VII. The TCCs would know this before they joined the operation and would be prepared for, and have accepted, that possibility. The Council and the General Assembly, particularly the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, need to re-enter this discussion. Here, I would like to state that it is disastrous the Special Committee cannot agree anymore on outcomes. I served for several years on the Committee and it was never like this. We have to do better and discuss these fundamental issues with a View to reaching agreement.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  11. But even when we establish a force intervention brigade, legal questions abound, and questions raised 20 years ago return to the fore, about whether a peacekeeper acting under an initial Chapter VI mandate, and who is considered to be a civilian and therefore, in legal terms, a protected person under international humanitarian law, should also be in a force, part of which - the brigade - is given, under Chapter VII, the authority to use military force aggressively. Both the Rapid Reaction Force and the Force Intervention Brigade were successful in fulfilling their intended roles, yet these so-called Chapter VI 1/2 mandates still need an intense discussion. Years ago, many of us felt that the blending of chapters was inadvisable from a security standpoint, and was also legally very problematic.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  12. And almost all contributors will interfere in United Nations operations when the situation becomes markedly more dangerous than normal. And when the challenges posed by a group like the Mouvement du 23 mars mount, we are forced to reconsider add-ons again, like the Force Intervention Brigade, and ponder in other cases whether we should contract private security firms, simply because there is little willingness by a growing number of troop- contributing countries to take extreme risks.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  13. The current trend is a repetition of previous cycles in peacekeeping, only the challenges posed by transnational organized crime and international terrorism accentuate the overall demands on peacekeeping, as the concept note correctly implies, and yet the means to address them are diminishing. At the heart of our growing incapacity is this unfortunate fact - fewer countries than ever before are willing to field troops and formed police units for peacekeeping duty with commanders who are ready to take extreme risks, even if the cause - such as protecting civilians - is noble. In more specific terms, fewer countries than was the case 20 years ago, will accept casualties when there is no direct national interest at stake for the contributor.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  14. The routes were slightly different in appearance, but the destination was the same. Finally, while there once was a preponderance of classic missions, the most demanding challenges facing the United Nations from 1948 onward were in conflicts not of an international character. Also contrary to popular perception, civilians have always borne the brunt of the casualties in war, from the time of Herodotus onward. The only exception being the First World War and even in that war, when the civilian deaths caused subsequently by the influenza outbreak are factored in, the numbers were huge. So what is the current trend?

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  15. Secondly, the recently created Force Intervention Brigade is almost exactly the same as the rapid reaction force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, created by resolution 998 (1995). The only difference being one of presentation, not of substance: the rapid reaction force was created "to enable UNPF/UNPROFOR to carry out its mandate" (resolution 998 (1995), para. 9), while resolution 2098 (2013) authorizing the establishment of the Force Intervention Brigade refers specifically of neutralizing armed groups. The effect was largely the same, however. An add-on to an existing peacekeeping operation, ostensibly founded on Chapter VI principles, but increasingly becoming Chapter VII in orientation, was employed to pursue - for reasons entirely justified - a specific party to the conflict.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  16. It is a myth, for example, to state that United Nations peacekeeping today is more complex than it was in the 19605 or 1990s. It is also a myth to state that the Force Intervention Brigade is a new feature in United Nations peacekeeping. It is a myth to state that classic peacekeeping was inter-State while current peacekeeping is intra-State. It is also a myth for us to believe that more civilians are killed now in conflicts than in the past. The reality is that the environments facing the United Nations in the 1960s - in the Congo, for example - or in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s were no simpler then than those we face today, and the United Nations Operation in the Congo, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor were just as complex as anything we have now.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  17. I thank you, Sir, for organizing this thematic discussion on "United Nations peacekeeping operations: negotiationsew trends". It is the right time for the Security Council to have such a debate and the concept note (S/2014/384, annex) is really excellent. In one way, it is too excellent, for it raises so many fundamental points, the sum of which would require well over a week's worth of discussion, which we do not have time for. We also thank the Secretary-General for his clear analysis this morning and salute Under-Secretary- General Ladsous for his leadership of the Department. I have the honour to disagree most respectfully with many of the arguments presented by my colleagues this morning. 1 would like to begin by dispelling certain myths about United Nations peacekeeping.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  18. Those challenges are not rocket science, and they can be resolved; that is simply a matter of continued or expanded burden- sharing and will. We also completely understand the struggle both Tribunals face on a daily basis as they work to fulfil their mandates while still needing a highly motivated set of skilled professionals at the heart of their operations. We urge the United Nations leadership to think creatively about how to keep these officials in The Hague and Arusha until all remaining decisions have been dealt with. Such issues cannot be beyond our ability to solve. Finally, we congratulate all four of the briefers on their outstanding achievements and the continuing extraordinary work being accomplished by the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism.

    2014-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7192 (2014) · source

  19. All of this must then be fed into the national curriculums of the countries concerned, curriculums that must themselves be wholly reconstructed to reflect the truth as they and we can best assess it. We hope that in the future the Council will focus more on these sorts of issues rather than the nitty-gritty of the completion strategies the Tribunals are pursuing. That said, I began by saying that we should be discussing only the most pressing challenges. We agree with others who have said that those challenges consist, in the case ofthe ICTY, in finding lasting remedies to the issue of relocating witnesses and in ensuring progress in the category II cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in finding safe and permanent homes for those acquitted, in the case of the ICTR.

    2014-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7192 (2014) · source

  20. To begin with, well-intended historical commissions need to be established. They need to cement the conclusions of the Tribunals drawn from the decisions handed down in the broader historical narratives. Those narratives must be threaded into precise algorithms designed to draw out a reckoning from the perpetrator and, where applicable, his or her broader community. Without a genuine signature planted in the register of remorse by those individuals who have done much wrong and by their supporting communities, there can be no permanent peace - a temporary peace, even lasting decades, yes - but no permanent peace. Reckoning opens the gate to human compassion from which a reconciliation of a permanent character can begin to emerge.

    2014-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7192 (2014) · source

  21. Naturally, in the case of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Seselj, Karadeic', Mladie and Hadeic' trials still have to be concluded, and they will very much be part of the centrepiece of the Tribunal's work. We therefore await the completion of the trials. We also join others in calling for the apprehension of the nine remaining fugitives in respect of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Yet even before we end all outstanding criminal proceedings, if we are to achieve a permanent peace among all the concerned societies covered by the work of the two Tribunals there must be a seamless transition from the judicial operations mounted by the Security Council two decades ago to a more structured formation of historical accounts. What do we mean by that?

    2014-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7192 (2014) · source

  22. While it is true that the Residual Mechanism, the referrals and subsequent national prosecutions will continue the work done judicially, and that in the years ahead there will likely be further outreach conducted by the United Nations building on the existing programmes, the jurisprudence and the establishment of fact and of truth must still be made to fit much more deliberately into the recovery architecture ofthe concerned societies. Denials of wrongdoing by a particular ethnic group or other are still detectable in respect of the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, despite the weight of evidence underscoring no grounds for them.

    2014-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7192 (2014) · source

  23. More fundamentally, we should concentrate on the question of how the work of the two Tribunals can be developed to ensure that their conclusions shape the conscience of the concerned communities. We recognize, of course, that crimes were indeed committed by individuals of all ethnicities, but we understand too that in two of the overall situations covered by the Tribunals, the huge lopsidedness in the overall volume and balance of crimes committed creates no moral equivalences in that respect.

    2014-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7192 (2014) · source

  24. Nor do we try to understand in detail what those courts have revealed over the course of their operations and then decide how best their discoveries can fit into an agreed recognizable formula needed for a permanent peace. Instead, too much time is spent by us on the technical and administrative details of the work of the Tribunals, and it need not be so. The thematic debate the Council held late last year on the Tribunals (S/PV.7073) provided us with an indication of the sort of deeper analysis the Council can conduct, and indeed should conduct. If we are to focus on the administrative issues, it should only be where the challenges are considerable. I will get to those in a moment.

    2014-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7192 (2014) · source

  25. We join all other members in welcoming warmly to the Security Council this morning Judge Theodor Meron, Judge Vagn Joensen, Prosecutor Serge Brammertz, and Prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow. We also thank all of them for their important briefings to us and for their reports on the work of the Criminal Tribunals and on the progress made regarding the implementation of the completion strategy in keeping with resolution 1534 (2004). We have listened carefully to the briefers' thoughts and insights, and we welcome in particular President Meron's willingness to touch upon some broader reflections. Indeed, it is a pity the Security Council, the one non-judicial organ of the United Nations that undoutedly produces law, spends so little to no time evaluating the jurisprudence of the Tribunals.

    2014-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7192 (2014) · source

  26. We reaffirm our call on all influential parties to persuade the rebels to lay down their weapons and to withdraw from the buildings and facilities they are occupying.

    2014-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7185 (2014) · source

  27. We urge the international community to recognize the results of the election and to work with President-elect Petro Poroshenko so as to enable him to meet his people's aspirations to a better future. We express our concern about continuing acts of violence and criminality in eastern Ukraine, especially in the Donestk region, where there have been a number of casualties. Jordan reaffirms Ukraine's legitimate rights, guaranteed under international law, to protect its territorial integrity, sovereignty and the security of its citizenry. The exercise by the authorities of their right to calm tensions and restore stability must be in line with international law and international humanitarian law.

    2014-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7185 (2014) · source

  28. Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan) (spoke in Arabic): We thank Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey F eltman for the briefing he has just provided to the Council. Jordan welcomes the successful holding of presidential elections in Ukraine, despite the exceptional circumstances in the country caused by the illegal actions of lawless individuals and rebels seeking to prevent a successful voting process. It is our hope that the elections will signal a return to stability in Ukraine and lead it down the road to democracy. We commend the efforts of the Ukraine Government to ensure successful elections by eliminating obstacles in order to allow all Ukrainians to vote for their future. Now that Ukrainians have been able to vote fully and freely, the international community must respect their choice.

    2014-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7185 (2014) · source

  29. The successful conduct of local elections in the Republic of Kosovo is proof of the Government's commitment to building inclusive State institutions and of the abilities of the Kosovo authorities to manage the democratic process and to hold free and fair elections, as has been emphasized by international observers. Jordan hopes that preparations for the legislative elections in Kosovo will continue apace and with wide participation. We also hope that the elections will be held with equal success. In conclusion, we would like to express our appreciation to the Head of UNMIK for his and for the efforts of all UNMIK personnel in the implementation of all aspects of the Mission.

    2014-05-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7183 (2014) · source

  30. In that regard, Jordan commends the commitment of Kosovo to ensuring the rule of law and its establishment of a special court to look into the allegations contained in the 2010 Marty report. All issues arising from the past conflict must continue to be addressed because they have a significant impact on the collective psychological state of the different communities in Kosovo and the region, including issues related to internally displaced persons, returnees and missing persons. We hope that UNMIK and other international organizations will continue to contribute to addressing such issues in order to build trust and deepen reconciliation.

    2014-05-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7183 (2014) · source

  31. We welcome the ongoing cooperation between Kosovo and the European Union on extending the mandate of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo and the strategic review of the role of the Mission and its functions in the upcoming period of its mandate, while taking into account the progress made in the implementation of relevant agreements on the rule of law on the ground. Ensuring the prosecution of the perpetrators of grave crimes committed during conflicts, regardless of the ethnicity of the perpetrator or the victim, is a main pillar of transitional justice. It is equally important in post-conflict societies seeking to consolidate reconciliation to ensure that all parties feel that justice in the future will always be sought and provided for in a fair and adequate manner.

    2014-05-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7183 (2014) · source

  32. We believe that both parties share the responsibility to pursue the dialogue and to continue making progress towards the full and faithful implementation of the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations. The European Union continues to play a pivotal role in advancing progress in that dialogue. We express the hope that the aspirations of both parties to integration into the European Union and to strengthening relations with regional organizations will contribute to promoting regional security and stability, as well as the development of cooperation among countries of the region in various fields in a manner that meets the aspirations of the people and contributes to their prosperity.

    2014-05-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7183 (2014) · source

  33. The progress made in Kosovo and the calm security situation prompts a certain optimism at a time when the agenda of the Security Council is crowded with complex disputes and delicate situations in various regions. Today we must commend the leaders in Kosovo and the different parts of the Kosovar community for their dedication in building a unified multi-ethnic and democratic State and for their serious engagement with the international community. We call on all countries to support them in their endeavours. Jordan supports the ongoing active participation of Belgrade and Pristina in the European Union-facilitated dialogue, and the serious commitment shown by both sides during those meetings. We applaud recent agreements regarding technical judicial matters.

    2014-05-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7183 (2014) · source

  34. Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan) (spoke in Arabic): I thank Mr. Farid Zarif, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), for his comprehensive briefing. I welcome both Her Excellency the President of the Republic of Kosovo, Ms. Atifete Jahjaga, and His Excellency the President of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Nikolie, and thank them both for their statements. Allow me to convey the condolences of the Kingdom of Jordan to the Government of Serbia and its people and to the Governments of neighbouring countries for the victims of the flood that hit the Balkans region earlier this month.

    2014-05-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7183 (2014) · source

  35. The General Framework Agreement for Peace provides no legal basis for secession by the Republika Srpska, and so every effort must be invested to forge a serious discussion on the historical narratives and about the reckoning required before a deeply felt reconciliation becomes possible. Twenty years ago, the Council met urgently, almost every day, on the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now, two decades later, we must begin to wake up and pay closer attention again to the problems facing this important country, knowing full well what the ultimate consequences could look like if the steady deterioration were to remain unchecked.

    2014-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7176 (2014) · source

  36. There are still enough Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina who want nothing more than a life where they can prosper together in something like normal circumstances. They want to be part of the European Union. They know that further division would be bad for them and that if left unresolved, the present state ofpolitical polarization does not augur well either. As we saw dramatically at the beginning of the year, what they want most is functional Government. We agree with the High Representative. The international community must look deeper into why it is the tensions persist and what could be done to reverse the gradual deterioration of the political condition.

    2014-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7176 (2014) · source

  37. Or was the war waged because, as we were told then, those prosecuting it were the real victims once? If every people believed they were justified in breaking customary international law because of crimes committed against their parents, grandparents or forebears, the Council would remain in permanent session and the world would be ungovernable. We concede that the oppression and persecution of any people today ought to be resisted by those very same people and that resistance ought to be lawful too. No one would dispute that. But citing an oppression that simply does not exist or that existed some 50, 60 or hundreds of years agom, is no basis today for adopting policies laden with obstruction and division, the effect of which can only ultimately imperil peace.

    2014-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7176 (2014) · source

  38. It was a cruel war that achieved absolutely nothing, in which for most ofits duration a mechanized army inflicted massive violence against a largely defenceless civilian population. It was as pathetic as it was criminal - a war which brought inexcusable pain to the Bosnian people and in which the victims who survived it suffer still. It was a war that wounded everyone somehow, and in which the battlefields were not the streets of Sarajevo, Mostar or Tuzla, but rather, to borrow from Denis Mukwege, the battlefields over which the war in Bosnia were fought were the very bodies of the victims themselves: the rapes, the enforced pregnancies, the torture and all that killing. And for what? For one ethnicity or another? My delegation has never heard of a human value called ethnicity.

    2014-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7176 (2014) · source

  39. I would like to begin by thanking High Representative Valentin Inzko for his briefing to us this morning and for his forty-fifth report to the Council (S/2014/3l4, annex). Listening to the High Representative and reading his report is sobering. While there are some positive developments highlighted, particularly where the people are concerned at the municipal level, like the formation of plenums soon after the February protests, much of the enmity that existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina before and during the war still remains. That is most evident at the level of senior officials, especially those who argue, with increasing vigour, for the dissolution of the State. The Bosnian War was a war that at least three of us at this table experienced firsthand.

    2014-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7176 (2014) · source

  40. Unless the threat to the Al Aqsa Mosque compound from the extreme right-wing movement is reversed, it will not only provoke a massive crisis with the Muslim world and even parts of the Christian world, but will also obviously, given what I have just said, pose a direct threat and challenge to one of the two neighbours with whom Israel has a peace treaty. Such actions and incitements must therefore end, and end permanently, for the sake of a region that can ill afford yet another crisis, especially since this would be anything but yet another crisis. Rather, it would be the crisis to overwhelm all others, and one that we must do everything in our power to prevent.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7164 (2014) · source

  41. Naturally, the draft law discussed last month in the Knesset on the extension of sovereignty aims to overturn, unlawfully, the national authority's role as the custodian of that cultural property. Moreover, in March 2013 an agreement signed by His Majesty King Abdullah II and President Mahmoud Abbas reaffirmed the status of His Majesty as the Custodian of the holy sites in Jerusalem. Under that agreement, His Majesty enjoys the full right to exert all legal efforts to safeguard Jerusalem's holy sites, including the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, the Dome of the Rock, all its mosques, buildings, walls, courtyards over and beneath the ground and the Waqf properties connected to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, as well as the churches in the Old City of Jerusalem, including the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7164 (2014) · source

  42. Paragraph 2 of article 9 of the Jordan-Israeli peace treaty reflects the special role ofthe Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and article 5 of the Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, to which Israel is a party, also imposes a clear obligation on that country to support the "competent national authorities in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property". In that respect, I would like to make two points. First, the Jordanian Awqaf was the national authority when East Jerusalem was occupied and has remained so continuously since June 1967. Secondly, Israel's actions undermine the exercise by the national authority of its role in preserving the Al-Aqsa Mosque by allowing Israeli incursions and violations.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7164 (2014) · source

  43. As an occupying Power, Israel is also under obligation, by virtue of article 56 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which reflects an established rule of customary international law to treat religious institutions, even when State-owned, as private property. As such, the rights that derive from private ownership under international law apply, including the right of the holder of such rights - in this case the Jordanian Awqaf department 4 to administer its property without interference from the occupying Power. As such, Israel may not interfere with any aspect of the administration of worship in the Al-Aqsa Mosque, except to ensure the safety and security of the site. That is an obligation more than a right, and must be carried out without undermining the exercise of religious administration of the Awqaf department.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7164 (2014) · source

  44. And any members of the Council who have visited either would have seen Jordanian officials tending to those two sites. Indeed, we have maintained them since 1924, when the Hashemite guardianship over the holy sites was formalized. Presently, it is His Majesty King Abdullah II, who is the Guardian and Custodian of the Muslim and Christian holy sites in the Old City of Jerusalem. As we have noted time and again, East Jerusalem is occupied territory under international law. The International Court of Justice has affirmed that. In paragraph 78 of its 2004 advisory opinion, citing decisions of this Council, it emphasized the way that international humanitarian law applies to East Jerusalem, as well as to the rest of the occupied Palestinian territory.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7164 (2014) · source

  45. We join the Arab world and the Islamic Ummah in condemning those irresponsible and inflammatory actions. We are also satisfied that virtually every country in the international community shares a deep concern about those developments, and we welcome their supportive actions in that regard. Ambassador Mansour has spoken eloquently in expressing the Palestinian position on that and, given that the Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, remains under foreign military occupation, we appeal to colleagues to listen to his words very carefully. I would, however, like to explain how the actions of the extreme Israeli right-wing also threaten Jordanian interests directly. How so? The Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, together with the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, falls under Jordanian custodianship and protection.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7164 (2014) · source

  46. I will limit myself to the essential features of the broader violations on the part of the Israeli authorities. They consist of the illegal and intrusive excavations on both sides of the wall surrounding the Old City; a blatant disregard for the decisions adopted by UNESCO'S World Heritage Committee and the Executive Board of UNESCO; obstructing a UNESCO reactive monitoring mission to the Old City, and renovating parts of the wall of the Al-Aqsa Mosque without the approval of the Jordanian side - and I will get to that point shortly - regular incursions by Israeli right-wing politicians, settlers and extremists, as I mentioned earlier, into the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, as well as a recent debate organized in the Knesset aimed at imposing Israeli sovereignty over the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7164 (2014) · source

  47. Moreover, the incursions are gaining in intensity and, if they continue, will tip the situation throughout the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound into a colossal crisis. Last month, a delegation led by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which included the Chair of the Group of Arab States, the Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, together with the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine, the Egyptian Permanent Representative and myself, met with the then President of the Council to deliver a letter, voice our deep concern and follow up on a previous letter sent to the Council by the Arab Group on that subject. While we affirm today everything that was contained in those letters, I will not go into detail word for word.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7164 (2014) · source

  48. (spoke in English) I would like now to focus my attention on why the recent actions by leading right-wing members of the Israeli Government, as well as members of the Israeli Knesset, with respect to the Muslim sites throughout the Haram al-Sharif/Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, as well as the Christian sites in the Old City, are a challenge and threat to Jordan, and to peace and security in the immediate region and beyond. Over the past few years, the most extreme parts of the Israeli right-wing movement have been intent on overturning the status quo regarding the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound. Their regular incursions into the compound, which spike in frequency with the observance of religious holidays and occasions, have been nothing short of provocative and menacing.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7164 (2014) · source

  49. Failure to do so will expose all countries in the region and its peoples, who are increasingly frustrated, to new and unprecedented waves of tension and violence. That failure will have serious repercussions, not only for the region, but also on international peace and security. It is necessary to intensify international efforts to establish an independent, sovereign and viable Palestinian State, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in accordance with the borders of 4 June 1967, based on the two-State solution and the relevant international resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative. The achievement of that goal is a high priority for Jordan, and we underscore, in particular, that all agreements on final status issues must uphold Jordan's high priorities.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7164 (2014) · source

  50. Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would like to extend my thanks to Mr. Robert Serry for the comprehensive briefing he gave this morning. The efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East are passing through a very sensitive stage due to the lack of meaningful progress and stagnation in the negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, despite the intensive, continuous and commendable efforts undertaken by the United States and other influential international actors. Reaching a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian question on the basis of a two-State solution is at the core of solving the conflict in the region and is a strategic regional and international interest.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7164 (2014) · source