YouSaid · the spoken record

Qazi

lines on the record: 217
first: 2004-09-14
most recent: 2009-02-05
sittings or episodes: 12
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The Sudan's parties and leaders and, indeed, the international community, will be judged by the people of the Sudan on whether or not they deliver peace to them. In that regard, I also appeal to the donor community to continue its invaluable support to the people of the Sudan at this critical juncture. There is little time and there is much to do.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“We have received assurances of protection and cooperation from Sudanese authorities at the highest levels, but those assurances have been qualified by warnings about public outrage. There have also been public threats and incitements to violence. The United Nations has made the necessary contingency plans and kept the Sudanese authorities informed. Political and security circumstances permitting, the United Nations is committed to continuing its work in accordance with the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council. In conclusion, the CPA remains fundamental to peace in the Sudan. The remainder of the interim period will require determination and joint efforts by all concerned.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“That will be a daunting task, but, given the alternatives, it is an absolutely necessary one. It is in that context that the impact of a decision by the International Criminal Court on the CPA and the Darfur situation will need to be discussed. The purpose of the CPA is the building and keeping of peace and security in the Sudan, without which no justice for its people will be possible. Towards that end, it is incumbent upon the Sudanese parties and leadership, as well as the international community, to remain focused on ensuring the full implementation of the CPA. In its deliberations on that issue, the Security Council may also wish to consider potential threats to the ongoing functions of UNMIS and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur in 09-22822 the Sudan and the security of its personnel.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“Darfur and East Sudan are politically part of North Sudan. The humanitarian cost of the strife in the Sudan has been enormous. Memories are bitter. Mutual trust and confidence are lacking in the required degree. The political and institutional infrastructure is still a work in progress. The country has two Governments and two armies. Neither a vote for unity nor separation in the referendum can bring an end to conflict and suffering unless the essential blocks of peace are in place. If unity is to be made attractive, the meaning of the term will need to be elaborated and agreed upon in terms of constitutional arrangements. All that will require a much improved ability and willingness of the parties to gain each other's trust and work together for mutual gain.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“In addition to public salary cuts, the Government of Southern Sudan has shelved plans to take over basic services currently provided by international non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies. That external support currently amounts to 80 per cent of the South's safety net, including health care and clean water. Increased returns ahead of elections and referendums in South Sudan and in Abyei will create additional basic services requirements. To maintain that level of support, continued financial assistance by the international community is indispensable. The Sudan is a large and complex country. Since its independence in 1956, the Sudanese people have suffered two civil wars between the North and the South, a civil war in the East and an ongoing and 09-22822 possibly intensifying conflict in the West.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“In that regard, I would like to reiterate that DDR is an important precondition for peacebuilding and development across the Sudan. Equally, it must be frankly stated that the success of DDR, like that of other CPA benchmarks, including redeployment and the development of JIUs, is and will remain dependent on the degree and quality of the commitment of the two parties to discussing outstanding issues and taking difficult but necessary decisions for their solution. The United Nations efforts are increasingly focused on the transition from humanitarian assistance to early recovery and development. However, despite the international community's 2009 Sudan Work Plan, projected budget cuts by the Government of Southern Sudan and other factors have increased the need for humanitarian assistance in the South.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“Should DDR falter, their expectations would be disappointed and their reactions could further complicate the security situation. The North and South Governments, through the Governments of National Unity and Southern Sudan, have allocated a total of $45 million for DDR, but the estimated overall costs are high: $430 million for reintegration and $200 million for demobilization. Moreover, demobilization cannot possibly go ahead without funding for the reintegration process, which will depend on donor contributions for that process. The leadership shown by Japan in contributing $17 million is much appreciated. A round-table conference is scheduled in Juba for 12 February, at which a firm political commitment by donor countries to providing the estimated $80 million for 2009 is expected.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“The DDR process is set to commence in earnest on 10 February with a pilot project in Blue Nile State, followed by the launch of the operation in Southern Kordofan, in line with the jointly agreed "Three Areas first" approach. As capacities increase and funding becomes available, DDR operations will spread through the entire country. The DDR process enjoys strong support from both the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan. Once it develops momentum, it can encourage the parties to move more effectively on other aspects of the peace process, including redeployment and proportional downsizing of forces in accordance with the CPA. Accordingly, it also facilitates local stability and conflict management, especially in the Three Areas. More than 50,000 ex-combatants have been preregistered.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“Finally, in Southern Kordofan, some positive developments can be discerned, including progress with the integration of the areas former SPLM- controlled areas into the State administration. Local authorities have stated that the security situation and intertribal relations within the State have improved. At the same time, however, the abundance of arms, local dissatisfaction with the lack of a peace dividend and fluid tribal and political affiliations does make this area prone to conflict. Recurrent low-scale conflicts are of concern in light of the sizeable presence of troops of both parties in or near the State. DDR and the provision of a palpable peace dividend are essential inputs to stabilizing the security situation and strengthening the structures of peace in all the Three Areas.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“Agreements with regard to the impact of implementing the arbitration decision on the local populations will be crucial, and UNMIS will be ready to assist the reaching of such understandings. Related to that is continuing concern about free access in Sector VI. As of now, UNMIS has free access only in the Abyei Road Map area. It is denied access to the areas north of the Road Map area, which makes up two thirds of the Sector VI area. That blinds the Mission with respect to movements of armed forces and impedes its ability to monitor the ceasefire arrangements and respond to situations that may develop into serious clashes, as indeed happened last May. It is hoped that those and other restrictions on UNMIS will be lifted by the authorities in both the North and South.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“The redeployment of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the southern military police forces out of the Abyei area is almost complete. The Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) have almost completed their deployment, but they still struggle to be truly joint and integrated. That will take time. Meanwhile, the JIUs remain desperately short of Vital communications and transport equipment without which their effectiveness will remain very limited. The Joint Integrated Police Units are not fully deployed and have yet to deploy out of Abyei town. It is hoped that the arbitration award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, expected in July or later this year, will be accepted in good faith by both parties. Failure 3 here can expose the CPA to grave danger.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“An administration has been established, but it is still without funds and so unable to provide basic services. That, along with the uncertain security situation, has been a disincentive for the return of the internally displaced persons who were forced to flee their homes last May. There have, however, been some returns to the surrounding areas of Abyei town. UNMIS and the United Nations Development Programme recently organized a meeting of donor countries with the Abyei administration in which the administration presented its plans and needs, which a number of donor countries have indicated their willingness to fund. But the primary responsibility for providing a budget and releasing the respective funds rests with the Government of National Unity.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“This new input should enable the Committee to complete and submit its delayed technical report to the presidency. Just as with the census commission, it is important that the work of the Border Committee not be politicized. There will inevitably be political bargaining and adjustments once the technical report is submitted to the leadership of the North and the South. That is natural, but hopefully it will not result in deadlock. Meanwhile, UNMIS is ready to provide further technical support to the delineation and demarcation process. It is also ready to provide its good offices for addressing the various concerns of affected communities. The situation in Abyei, after the brief flare-up of 12 December last year, remains calm but tense.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“Elections are essential to a democratic transformation process. However, adequate preparation and progress on other benchmarks are also essential to ensure that the election process does not lead to further polarization that would actually undermine the peaceful implementation of the CPA. Similarly, border demarcation affects the implementation of the other outstanding benchmarks. Without border demarcation, the elections will be 09-22822 impeded and the referendum will not be possible. Moreover, redeployment will not be completed without an agreed border. Delay and deadlock will also generate additional tensions in an already volatile area. UNMIS has delivered satellite imagery to the Ad Hoc Technical Border Committee for the production of a digitized base map.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“But the long delays in the enactment of the electoral law and the establishment of the NEC, the time it will take for the NEC to reach operational capacity, the timelines established in the National Elections Act itself and the enormous amount of work to be done call into question the feasibility of that date. The two CPA parties, in consultation with the NEC, may need to review the feasibility of the dates established in the CPA. However, it is their decision. From a political point of View, the overall security situation, especially in Darfur, delays in legislating an agreed legal framework, possible differences over the census results, and delays in border demarcation could affect the timing of the elections. Not least, the impact of an International Criminal Court decision will be a factor.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“The Government will need to fund its operations adequately and in a timely manner, and the national legislature will need to provide an appropriate legal framework to ensure free and fair elections. The electoral division of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) has begun to provide the NEC with information and materials to assist it in its work and anticipates receiving a letter of request from the NEC to provide further details on the assistance it will need. The scale of assistance, including training, logistical and technical support, will determine the staffing and funding requirements of the electoral division of UNMIS. According to the CPA, elections are scheduled to take place by July of this year.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“As a result, despite the commitment of the National Congress Party and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to CPA implementation, the Peace Agreement is vulnerable. Should, as a result, the CPA unravel, conflicts and instability in the Sudan are likely to escalate dramatically. The humanitarian implications of a relapse into conflict and chaos throughout the Sudan are, to put it 09-22822 mildly, sobering. The CPA is central. The CPA is fragile. That is the challenge facing the Sudan and the international community and, with all due respect, the Security Council today. Without any exaggeration, 2009 could be a make-or-break year for the CPA and for the prospect of peace in the Sudan. The National Elections Commission (NEC) has been established, but it will take some time to reach full operational capacity.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“Preparations for a referendum that maintains peace and stability, whatever the decision of the people of Southern Sudan, and preparations for popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States will need to commence immediately. For a peaceful referendum, an agreement on wealth and oil- revenue sharing for the post referendum period will be a prerequisite. These challenges have to be met and surmounted within limited time and with the current situation in the Sudan marked by deepening political uncertainty and insufficient mutual trust among the parties to the CPA. This uncertainty has been exacerbated by the ongoing conflict in Darfur and the awaited International Criminal Court decision.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“The Abyei Road Map agreement will need to be adhered to, including accepting the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration expected later this year. The provision of a peace dividend, especially in the South and the Three Areas, will be key, as will be stabilizing the security situation through the promotion of reconciliation and confidence-building measures, especially in hot spots along the North-South border areas. Making unity attractive to the people of Southern Sudan, where a referendum on the issue is scheduled to be held in 2011, should remain the focus of the parties and the international community in the next two years.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“Mr. Qazi: I have the pleasure to introduce the latest report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan 2 (S/2009/6l) and I am grateful for the opportunity to brief the Council on the current situation in the Sudan. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has reached a critical juncture with little over two years of the interim period remaining. The environment for these final two years is likely to be difficult and complex. The implementation of outstanding CPA provisions, which are mostly political in nature, will test the parties. The critical challenges that lie ahead include completing border demarcation, finalizing the redeployment of forces, census results, elections at several levels, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process.”
2009-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6079 (2009) · source
“There has been progress in Abyei. The census enumeration has been completed. The electoral process is under way. There is at last progress on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Recovery and development projects have begun to make some difference on the ground. However, ultimate success will require the parties to realize that peace can be consolidated only through the full implementation of the Abyei road map and the successful demarcation of the 1956 border. For longer- term peaceful coexistence and prosperity, it will also be imperative, irrespective of the outcome of the referendum, for the two sides to prepare the ground for longer-term economic cooperation.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“Meanwhile, engagement with all parties relevant to the implementation of the CPA will remain essential for the success of our mandated mission in the Sudan. The predominant fact remains that peace in the Sudan is indivisible. Should the CPA unravel, the prospects for a peaceful outcome in Darfur will largely disappear. The successful implementation of the CPA brightens the prospects for peace in Darfur. I say that because the perception that an over-focus on Darfur has diverted attention from the need to provide a peace dividend through the implementation of the CPA is real, especially among southern Sudanese. We have to change that perception through emphatic and tangible recognition of the centrality of the CPA. In the light of the foregoing, three years down the road the prospects for the CPA are uncertain but not necessarily bleak.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“The Government has qualified the ICC action as political and not legal, but it has acknowledged the distinction between the ICC and the mandate of the two peacekeeping missions in the Sudan. However, the Government has conveyed to me that the issuance of an arrest warrant against President Al-Bashir could create a situation that might have serious consequences for United Nations staff and infrastructure in the Sudan. We are taking all the necessary precautionary measures, including strengthening our cooperation with the Sudanese security institutions. We are also engaged in contingency planning for a range of possible scenarios, in close consultation with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“Very importantly, the parties have finally agreed on an interim administration for Abyei, which should be able to provide basic services to the returning civilian population. An assistance plan is in place and will be submitted to the interim administration for approval. The donor community is expected to be generous in contributing to the Abyei reconstruction fund. It is not possible to discuss the current situation in the Sudan outside the context of the recent action taken by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the reaction of the Sudanese Government to that development. I have conveyed to the Government of the Sudan that the ICC is an independent institution and that UNMIS will continue to implement its mandate in the Sudan.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“I urge the Council to initiate a debate on such issues so that clear guidelines on the subject can emerge that can be translated into realistic rules of engagement for peacekeepers equipped with the requisite capability. Those discussions, however, should not distract us from the fact that there has been significant progress in Abyei. In line with the four-point agreement signed by the parties, the redeployment of SAP and SPLA forces out of the area is almost complete. We are encouraging both parties to redeploy the remaining elements as a matter of priority. The training of the Joint Integrated Units and the Joint Integrated Police Units is under way. The Units will deploy in the area soon.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“Moreover, the degree of robustness to which a mission mandate can be interpreted is a function of the political and military space allowed to the missions by the parties. Being a Chapter VI mission, UNMIS neither possesses the robust intervention capability nor was it provided the requisite political and military space by the parties, including the freedom of movement for monitoring and verification. That has been repeatedly conveyed to the Council by the Secretary-General and his Special Representatives over the past three years. The issue of responsibility to protect civilians under imminent danger precludes law enforcement activities such as the protection of civilian property. Nevertheless, it does create expectations of an international commitment to providing a broad range of protection and enforcement measures.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“Moreover, UNMIS has no such mandate, nor do its rules of engagement allow the use of lethal force to protect civilian property. Nevertheless, the Abyei events do indicate the need for urgent discussions on the critical issue of incorporating Chapter VII provisions in a Chapter VI mandate and the expectations it generates vis-a-vis the capabilities given to the Mission. In that regard, I commend the report entitled "Security Council action under Chapter VII: myths and realities", which was released on 23 June 2008 and which highlights the dilemma that is faced by peacekeepers all over the world. The question of mandate and capabilities are inevitably interlinked. You cannot have a robust interpretation of a given mandate for which a robust intervention capability is not provided.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“That is still far too many, but given the scale of hostilities between both sides and their inability or unwillingness to implement measures already agreed upon, there was little UNMIS could do to prevent the loss of life. With regard to the protection of civilian property, the fact is that most of the arson was committed during the fighting and most of the looting after the cessation of hostilities on 20 May - although it also occurred during lulls in the fighting. The impression that UNMIS did nothing while Abyei burned and was looted is not correct. When two regular armies fight each other with tanks, multi-battery rocket launchers, artillery and heavy machine guns, irrespective of the specific numbers of peacekeepers assigned to Abyei, there is no way they can actively intervene to suppress the fighting.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“The fact of the matter is that there was a breakdown of local command and control. The instructions of high officials were simply ignored by local commanders. However, the review also acknowledges our failure to protect United Nations agency compounds in the town. In the aftermath of the conflict, the United Nations provided, and continues to provide, humanitarian assistance to those displaced from the area. The tragic exodus of most of the population of Abyei before the main escalation of the fighting was, in a way, fortunate; it averted the possibility of a real bloodbath among the residents of Abyei. According to estimates so far, there were 89 fatalities, including 18 civilians.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“In the aftermath of the fighting, UNMIS carried out a comprehensive and detailed after-action review of its response, which was submitted to Headquarters. It identified the strengths, the weaknesses and the lessons learned from our experience. UNMIS sheltered and escorted to safety over 100 civilians during the fighting. All United Nations and humanitarian staff were evacuated without a single injury. Emergency security meetings were convened at which the parties pledged to take a number of actions to calm the situation and maintain the ceasefire, but implemented none of them. Meetings of the area joint military committees and the Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission were convened on the ground. Ministers were flown to Abyei to end the fighting, but to no avail.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“The two sides and their respective armies bear primary, and indeed exclusive, responsibility for what happened in Abyei. As signatories to the CPA, they continue to be responsible for ensuring that the tragedy of May 2008 is never repeated, whether in Abyei or elsewhere. Because of the extreme political sensitivity of the events in Abyei, there has been a tendency to blame UNMIS for the consequences of decisions taken elsewhere. That is not to suggest that UNMIS regards itself beyond criticism - far from it. Complacency and the refusal to draw lessons from the experience of such crises would contradict the basic obligation of the Mission to constantly seek ways and means to improve its own performance.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“The United Nations has supported the Committee with technical expertise and is now in the process of providing further technical assistance for the satellite imagery for the development of the border map. Progress on the delineation and demarcation of the 1956 border is critical for the peaceful implementation of the CPA. I urge the parties to ensure the expedited submission of the report to the presidency so that the delineation and demarcation process can move forward. We are ready, if requested by both sides, to assist them in the resolution of outstanding issues with regard to this matter. With regard to the role of UNMIS vis-a-vis the recent Abyei crisis, it needs to be appreciated where the primary responsibility for the violence, escalation, looting, arson, death and displacement lie.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“However, a major concern of the displaced people is to avoid disrupting the education of their children. It may be likely that the bulk of the returns will take place in December, at the end of the current school semester, but it could be 3 earlier. The United Nations family is prepared to assist with immediate and long-term recovery needs. The demarcation of the 1956 border line - the border between the North and the South - is the most crucial outstanding issue. The Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee has yet to complete its report, which will then be submitted to the presidency. The next stage will consist of developing a satellite-imagery-based map and of conducting the demarcation process on the ground.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“The donors welcomed the adoption of the Government of National Unity's five-year plan, the Government of the Southern Sudan's medium-term expenditure priorities, as well as the proposed joint projects, and pledged $4.8 billion in support of the Sudan over the planning period 2008 to 2011. Humanitarian needs continue to be addressed as part of UNMIS mandate. Of significance were the 50,000 displacements from Abyei and an additional 25,000 affected people, who moved to Aguok and outlying areas, while close to 5,000 moved to Muglad, north of Abyei. The rapid deployment of United Nations humanitarian agencies resulted in the immediate provision of humanitarian assistance. With elements of the Abyei road map in place, it is envisaged that people will start returning there.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“Vice-President Taha presided over the event and the Norwegian Government graciously hosted. The Consortium agreed on the recovery and development priority for the second half of the CPA period 2008 to 2011. The review of progress of the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) suggested that targets had been largely met. These included a stable macroeconomic environment, containment of inflation, progress towards creating a conducive environment for foreign direct investment and increasing pro-poor expenditure. However, external debt remains very high and the economy remains heavily dependent on oil. There was general consensus with regard to a common way forward.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“The clear challenge with respect to returning populations is to ensure that over and above the basic services provided as immediate humanitarian aid, development assistance 08-46313 is available in the communities where they are returning, including health, water and sanitation, education and regaining lost skills for agricultural livelihoods. In this context, I am pleased to announce that the Southern Sudan Recovery Fund was successfully launched at the Sudan Consortium in Oslo earlier in May this year. This will enable transition funding to the States of Southern Sudan and rapid implementation and capacity-building of provincial and State-level institutions. The third Sudan Donor Consortium was attended by 250 delegates from 48 countries and organizations.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“The next senior level roundtable meeting in the Sudan between the Government, donors and the United Nations is expected to take place in October, at which time the status of the programme will be revealed. Donor pledges will be made and the next steps may be discussed, including a starting date of the programme. The United Nations continues to exert a significant effort on the humanitarian and development front. This reporting period continued to see returns of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to the south. It is estimated that 153,638 returned in 2008, of which 58 per cent were organized returns.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“Significant progress has been made regarding disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) benchmarks, the National Council for DDR Coordination has endorsed the national reintegration policy and on 25 June of this year, agreement was reached on the content and modalities of the multi- year, reintegration component of the DDR programme, which will require donor contributions of $430 million over 4 years. On 20 July, the parties agreed on the respective roles of the Northern and Southern Sudan DDR Commissions in the three transitional areas. This will pave the way for implementation of DDR in these areas. I encourage the parties to make further progress on joint operational plans and funding for reintegration programmes.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“The low 08-46313 percentage of SPLA forces redeployed from Southern Kordofan State and its renewed presence in Blue Nile State remains a source of tension between the two parties. The enumeration process in the national census has been completed and the results are expected in early 2009; however, this agreement over the final results, if any, would impact on critical CPA processes, such as the elections and welcome power sharing. The electoral law has been passed and the parties are now engaged in finalizing nominations for the National Election Commission (NEC). These nominees are expected to be confirmed by parliament by the end of this month. The parties are aware of our offer of assistance and may be requesting it in the coming weeks. If things proceed accordingly, elections can still take place by the end of 2009.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“Building on some recent positive developments will accordingly be an urgent priority for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). At all times, however, the prime responsibility for the adoption of peaceful and non-zero-sum approaches towards meeting critical benchmarks and resolving differences over outstanding issues will remain that of the two CPA partners. The international community will also be called upon to offer a range of assistance to enable both sides to meet their obligations. The figures for redeployment remain largely unchanged; 97 per cent of SAP troops verified by UNMIS and accepted by the Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission (CJMC) have redeployed north of the current border line. SPLA verified and accepted redeployment stands at 10 per cent of the initial stated figures of 59,168 troops.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“SPLA forces also clashed with local tribesman in Southern Kordofan State. Inter-communal fighting in the Southern Sudan continued and was further compounded by the coercive civilian disarmament campaign by SPLA in some areas. This period also saw a rise in the alleged activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Western Equatoria State. On 5 June, the LRA attacked an SPLA garrison in Nabanga, killing 14 SPLA soldiers and 12 civilians. The peace process has crossed a halfway mark and a number of critical benchmarks are either fast approaching or have past. While the working relationship between the two partners is relatively cordial, the lack of mutual trust and confidence remains a significant obstacle to the goals of making unity attractive and the peaceful implementation of the CPA.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“In Abyei, fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) from 14 to 20 May 2 resulted in 89 fatalities, 18 of which were reported to be civilians. Around 50,000 people were displaced and most of the town of Abyei was destroyed. All United Nations civilian staff and humanitarian workers had to be evacuated from the area. On 10 May, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) launched an attack on Omdurman in an effort to reach Khartoum. The JEM. forces traversed 1200 kilometres from Darfur to reach Omdurman. They used 300 pickup trucks. Government forces repulsed the attack. According to figures released by the Government, 79 members of the Government's security forces, 57 civilians and 329 JEM. fighters lost their lives during the fighting.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“Mr. Qazi: I have the pleasure to introduce the Secretary-General's latest report on the Sudan (8/2008/485). I am grateful for the opportunity to brief the Council on the situation on the ground in the Sudan. Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), though behind schedule, remains on track. The level of mutual cooperation between the two CPA partners has shown some signs of improvement. Nevertheless the foundation for a durable peace remains fragile. The security situation during the reporting period remained precarious. The two parties were involved in the most severe violations of the ceasefire since the Malakal clashes in November 2005.”
2008-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5956 (2008) · source
“The experience of the past three years strongly suggests the need for a policy of engagement, rather than sanctions. While our Charter and mandate obligations, as well as the several delays in CPA implementation commitments, often leave us with little choice but to give public voice to our concerns, it remains just as essential to retain the confidence of both of our main interlocutors if we are to successfully assist the parties in implementing the CPA, with the ultimate aim of facilitating the development of a democratic and rights-based system of governance in the Sudan. 5”
2008-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5840 (2008) · source
“On the other hand, should the implementation of the CPA succeed in bringing about a democratic transformation and in making unity attractive to the people of Southern Sudan, the prospects for an end to the humanitarian crisis and a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Darfur would brighten. I say this because the perception that the overwhelming concentration on Darfur has distracted attention from the CPA is especially real among the Southern Sudanese. Accordingly, we must change that perception through a better focus on recovery and development in the rest of the Sudan, so that its people can experience the fact that peace brings prosperity and that international assistance is not just a function of conflict. We must also recognize the need for better and more effective engagement with the Government of National Unity.”
2008-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5840 (2008) · source
“We have undertaken a strategic assessment and structural review of the mandate and the configuration of the Mission. The process will be completed by a technical assessment mission, which is being undertaken as we speak. Recommendations in that regard will be submitted through the Secretary-General's report in April. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the Sudan is one country with two systems for the duration of the CPA. The United Nations has one integrated mission and one hybrid mission with the African Union; it also has a Joint Mediation Support Team for Darfur. That inevitably presents political and organizational challenges. Nevertheless, the predominant fact remains that peace in the Sudan is indivisible. Should the CPA unravel, the prospects for a peaceful outcome in Darfur would largely disappear.”
2008-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5840 (2008) · source
“The United Nations and partners are working closely with the Government of Southern Sudan to develop that strategy, which will include a focus on shifting from annual funding to multi-year predictable funding, and from bilateral funding to direct budget support. It is hoped that key decisions will be made in that regard at the meeting of the Sudan Consortium in April. We hope that the donor community will respond in a timely manner to the urgent early recovery and development needs of the Government of Southern Sudan. The Council, in its resolution 1784 (2007), requested an assessment regarding whether any changes to the mandate of UNMIS were needed to enhance the Mission's ability to assist the parties in the implementation of the CPA.”
2008-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5840 (2008) · source
“Resources from the international community for recovery and development have been slow to arrive for various reasons, including the time required for the Multi-Donor Trust Fund to become operational. The Multi-Donor Trust Fund is now supporting longer-term recovery and development projects, but there is an urgent need for delivery in the short to medium term of visible peace dividends, in particular basic services, infrastructure, reintegration support and community- based security initiatives. The Government of Southern Sudan insists that the delivery of peace dividends needs to be expedited through the implementation of a Southern Sudan transition strategy, supported by the Southern Sudan recovery fund, which is the second window for the Southern Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund.”
2008-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5840 (2008) · source
“On the humanitarian, recovery and development side, Southern Sudan and the transitional areas continue to progress towards early recovery, although many humanitarian challenges remain. The forthcoming census and elections, scheduled for 2008 and 2009 respectively, have increased the pressure on the Government of Southern Sudan to deliver peace dividends to the population. The strategic focus of the Government of Southern Sudan is to support the implementation of decentralized development, and it includes policies and programmes designed to consolidate peace and deliver tangible benefits - that is, peace dividends - to the population as a whole. The need to support that strategic focus by shifting to early recovery and development programming in Southern Sudan is thus an imperative.”
2008-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5840 (2008) · source
“The presidency is currently seized of that issue, and we hope that progress will be made. The UNMIS police component has successfully established a close relationship with the police services in the north and the south of Sudan. Significant progress has been made in terms of the training and operational capability of both police services. The Assessment and Evaluation Commission is one of the most important CPA institutions. A 08-2428] presidential decree appointing a new Chairman has just been issued. We hope that the Commission will now be able to operate with more autonomy and freedom than it has been able to do in the past. Working closely with the Commission will be a high priority for UNMIS.”
2008-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5840 (2008) · source