YouSaid · the spoken record

Rajasingham

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169
first
2019-03-27
most recent
2023-12-20
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13
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un-security-council

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  1. National staff accounted for 98 per cent of the humanitarians killed, injured or kidnapped. This year looks no better. The conflict in Ukraine has caused immense civilian suffering and loss. Since 24 February, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has recorded 8,089 civilian casualties in the country. Of that number, 3,811 were killed and 4,278 injured. Hospitals, schools, residential buildings and shelters have come under attack. Some 12 million Ukrainians have been forced from their homes. Civilians remain trapped and cut off from food, water and electricity. And the prospect of nuclear conflict, once unthinkable, is now back within the realm of possibility. As we all know, the war has effectively ended Ukraine’s food exports, and the humanitarian impacts are being felt far beyond its borders.

    2022-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9042 (2022) · source

  2. Social media facilitated the spread of harmful information influencing various audiences. In some cases, that information included false stories about humanitarian organizations, hampering their work. When humanitarian activities were politicized, community acceptance was jeopardized. Humanitarian staff were intimidated, arrested or detained while carrying out their functions. For instance, staff from the NGO Médecins sans Frontières have been harassed and abused in Afghanistan, Iraq and Nigeria for allegedly supporting terrorists by providing impartial health care. Humanitarian workers and assets also came under attack. Last year, some 143 security incidents against humanitarian workers were recorded in 14 countries and territories affected by conflict. They resulted in the deaths of 93 workers.

    2022-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9042 (2022) · source

  3. In Myanmar, for instance, obstacles have included lengthy processes for approval of travel and difficulties registering organizations or obtaining visas for international staff. In some parts of the country, humanitarian access to people in need was blocked because of delayed or denied travel authorizations, roadblocks and checkpoints. The increased number of non-State armed groups in conflicts complicated humanitarian access negotiations, while the growing presence of private military and security contractors also created difficulties for humanitarians trying to reach people in need. Sanctions and broadly conceived counter-terrorism measures impeded principled humanitarian activities. Misinformation and disinformation eroded trust, put humanitarians at risk of harm and ultimately jeopardized humanitarian operations.

    2022-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9042 (2022) · source

  4. And in the Central African Republic, armed groups occupied fields and prevented access to crops and opportunities to harvest. Humanitarian operations have also faced continued complex access challenges that deprived people of the assistance that they need to survive. In Somalia, fighting has impeded the movement of humanitarian personnel and supplies along main routes. In the Central African Republic, insecurity has forced non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to scale back or suspend their activities, and the increased use of explosive devices has hampered humanitarian movements and civilian access to assistance and services. Some fighting parties imposed severe limitations on humanitarian activities. Bureaucratic measures also slowed or stalled operations.

    2022-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9042 (2022) · source

  5. By the end of last year, conflict and insecurity were major drivers of crisis, with worse levels of acute food insecurity for approximately 140 million people in 24 States. Thousands of people in Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen found themselves on the cusp of catastrophic food insecurity, primarily owing to armed conflict and violence. Parties to conflict made food insecurity worse by impeding food production, cutting access to food and destroying food sources. In northern Ethiopia, agricultural production was significantly hampered because people were displaced from their farms, crops were destroyed and livestock were looted or killed. In Yemen, farms, livestock, food storage facilities and other essential food production inputs and infrastructure were damaged.

    2022-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9042 (2022) · source

  6. In Afghanistan, attacks on health-care facilities hampered access to health services for 300,000 people. In Yemen, only half of the health facilities were fully functioning, and those that remained often faced huge shortages of staff, medicine, fuel and medical supplies. Over and above conflict, the pandemic intensified human suffering and further strained and weakened health-care services. Nearly 3 billion people are still waiting for their first vaccination, many of them in conflict situations where health systems are weak and the level of public trust is low. As we heard from the Secretary-General and others last week (see S/PV.9036), conflict-driven hunger has worsened.

    2022-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9042 (2022) · source

  7. When civilians fled to safer areas, people with disabilities, including children and older people, were often left behind. Those who did manage to flee often lacked their assistive equipment and faced difficulty with mobility or were unable to access assistance. Conflict also takes a significant mental health toll. More than one in five people living in conflict-affected areas were estimated to suffer from depression, anxiety or post-traumatic stress disorder. Medical workers, facilities, equipment and transport continued to come under attack, while parties to conflict interfered with medical care. In northern Ethiopia, health-care facilities, equipment and transport were attacked and looted, and hospitals were used for military purposes.

    2022-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9042 (2022) · source

  8. In Syria, for instance, damage to industrial infrastructure generated millions of tons of rubble and dust containing hazardous material, such as asbestos, heavy metals, chemicals and combustion products, with a potentially serious impact on civilians’ health. We are all too familiar with the cycle of violence and displacement, and 2021 was no exception. By mid-year, fighting and insecurity had forcibly displaced 84 million people, with close to 51 million internally displaced. As the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported over the weekend, the war in Ukraine, and other conflicts, have now pushed the number of people forced to flee conflict, violence, human rights violations and persecution to more than 100 million for the first time on record.

    2022-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9042 (2022) · source

  9. Conflicting parties attacked and occupied schools, depriving hundreds of thousands of children of learning and making them more vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups, exploitive labour and other dangers. In the first nine months of last year, more than 900 schools in Afghanistan were destroyed, damaged or closed, and their rehabilitation was hindered by explosive hazards. In Ethiopia, thousands of schools were entirely or partially damaged, and more than 30,000 teachers were displaced. And conflict does not damage infrastructure alone. It damages the natural environment, not just through the fighting itself, but also through weak governance and neglect.

    2022-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9042 (2022) · source

  10. In Syria, Afghanistan and elsewhere, improvised explosive devices, landmines and explosive remnants of war caused civilian deaths and injury and hindered access to farm land, essential services and livelihoods. Conflict damaged and eroded critical infrastructure, disrupting vital water, sanitation, electricity and health services. In Yemen, attacks damaged or destroyed schools, hospitals, telecommunications infrastructure, roads, factories, houses, cars and farms. And in Gaza, in the occupied Palestinian territory, fighting damaged wells, reservoirs, desalinization and waste-water plants and water-delivery networks and pumping stations, depriving people of access to clean drinking water. Conflict also puts education at risk. Schools were relentlessly attacked, and hundreds of teachers killed, injured, kidnapped or assaulted.

    2022-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9042 (2022) · source

  11. Mr. Rajasingham: Let me highlight some of the key concerns set out by the Secretary-General in his annual report (S/2022/381) on the protection of civilians, released last week. The report illustrates the grim reality that civilians continue to bear the brunt of suffering in situations of conflict. First, and most fundamentally, conflict continued to cause widespread civilian deaths and injury last year. When hostilities took place in densely populated areas, the risks of death and injury for civilians rose sharply. When explosive weapons were used in populated areas, about 90 per cent of casualties were civilians, compared with 10 per cent in other areas.

    2022-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9042 (2022) · source

  12. Ensuring access for women to those kinds of programmes is especially important to boost household incomes, improve food security and reduce needs. But the most transformative change will come only with an end to the fighting that is supported by a lasting and just peace agreement. That is what Yemenis want above all else, and I strongly support everything the Special Envoy is doing to help them achieve that.

    2022-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8946 (2022) · source

  13. That requires a mix of financial and political commitments that, together, could quickly reduce the scale of humanitarian needs. Those commitments include resuming foreign- exchange injections through the Central Bank. Foreign-exchange injections worked in the past and are especially urgent now to protect a recent and fragile partial recovery in the Yemeni rial exchange rate. As members know, the exchange rate is key to people’s ability to afford food and other essential goods, nearly all of which must be imported. Those commitments also include policy decisions to lift import restrictions and use import revenues to pay for basic services delivered by public institutions. That, too, will help bring down prices and improve people’s lives. We must also do more to strengthen livelihoods, skills development and financial services.

    2022-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8946 (2022) · source

  14. One area where we are already seeking to improve is in creating a more inclusive response. That means, among other things, a more enabling environment for women and girls, promoting gender parity among our staff and supporting more investments in gender- sensitive programming. It also means amplifying women’s voices at all levels. Today’s meeting is a good example of that approach, so I am very pleased to be briefing alongside Ms. Al-Aghbary. But humanitarian aid — no matter how effective or inclusive — cannot solve the crisis in Yemen by itself. As I have said before, economic collapse, accelerated by the conflict, is the biggest driver of people’s needs. The United Nations economic framework lays out a way to strengthen the economy and deliver lasting improvements to people’s lives right now.

    2022-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8946 (2022) · source

  15. Regarding the FSO SAFER tanker, I wish to note that the United Nations continues to engage all stakeholders to find a pragmatic, workable solution. Everyone is aware of the grave danger posed by the tanker, and we appreciate the recent constructive engagement of the parties, Member States and other stakeholders on that important issue. My last point focuses on what we can do, beyond increasing funding and improving access, to strengthen the aid operation and reduce people’s suffering. Improving the way aid agencies work is one place to start. An inter-agency evaluation of the humanitarian response in Yemen is now under way. The evaluation is an important opportunity, and initial findings are being integrated into the 2022 response plan. Final results should be available in March.

    2022-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8946 (2022) · source

  16. On 19 December, Ansar Allah authorities suspended humanitarian flights through Sana’a airport, citing technical issues with airport communications equipment. Flights resumed on 27 December. Those kinds of disruptions risk undermining the aid operation and staff safety. I call on Ansar Allah authorities to avoid unilateral flight cancellations in the future. I also request the Government to authorize the import of equipment to repair the faulty communications infrastructure at Sana’a airport. On a related note, I wish to recall that the continued functioning of all points of entry for humanitarian cargo and commercial imports, including Al-Hudaydah port, remains crucial to prevent further suffering and a worsening of humanitarian needs.

    2022-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8946 (2022) · source

  17. Female humanitarian workers also face restrictions that limit their movement and impact their participation in the response. Security challenges have also persisted. Despite assurances to the contrary, Ansar Allah authorities have not provided access to the two United Nations staff detained in Sana’a in November. Access to a third detained United Nations worker who was arrested in Ma’rib in December is currently being arranged with Government officials. We will keep the Council informed as those situations develop, and we renew our call for full respect for United Nations privileges and immunities. I also want to reiterate the central importance of safe, predictable passage into and out of Yemen, both for humanitarian workers and supplies, as well as for commercial imports that Yemenis need to survive.

    2022-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8946 (2022) · source

  18. Nationwide assessments are under way now to provide evidence for the 2022 response plan. I call on all donors to sustain and, if possible, increase their support this year. But funding is far from the only constraint. Humanitarian access and security also remain challenges. Bureaucratic impediments persist and include significant delays in approving aid projects, issuing staff visas and facilitating movement. Importing necessary equipment is also harder than it should be. Attempts at interference are also rife — mostly by local authorities in Ansar Allah areas — and include efforts to change beneficiary lists, determine geographic locations or influence the selection of partners. Many of those constraints can disproportionately affect women and girls. Protection programmes, for example, face especially difficult challenges.

    2022-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8946 (2022) · source

  19. In 2021, aid agencies assisted more than 11 million people every month, but that work is being continuously hampered for entirely avoidable reasons. That brings me to my second point. The humanitarian response in Yemen faces far too many constraints. The biggest constraint right now is funding. Last year’s response plan was 58 per cent funded, making it the lowest-funded appeal for Yemen since 2015. In December 2021, the World Food Programme announced cuts in food assistance for 8 million people, owing to funding shortages. Other vital programmes, including water, protection and reproductive health services, have also been forced to scale back or close in recent weeks for lack of funds. We expect this year’s aid operation to need roughly as much money as last year — about $3.9 billion — to help 16 million people.

    2022-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8946 (2022) · source

  20. That manifests itself in myriad ways, including restrictions on basic rights, such as the freedom of movement, reduced access to education and higher rates of illiteracy and poverty. Access to health care is more limited owing, in part, to a lack of female health-care workers in conflict areas and long distances to health facilities. Access to reproductive health care is particularly precarious, with one woman dying every two hours during childbirth from almost entirely preventable causes. Risks of exposure to sexual and gender-based violence have also increased, with some groups particularly vulnerable, including those who are displaced, impoverished, have disabilities or are part of the Muhamasheen community. As people struggle to survive, the humanitarian community is doing everything it can to help.

    2022-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8946 (2022) · source

  21. Hostilities have also resurged in Al-Bayda, while air strikes have escalated in Sana’a and other parts of the country. Civilian casualties continue to be reported at alarming rates. In December 2021, 358 civilians were reportedly killed or injured as a direct result of hostilities — a statistic that is tied for the highest in three years. I once again urge all parties to take constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects, as required by international humanitarian law. As we have reported many times, the war is also causing hunger, displacement, economic collapse and the deterioration of basic services. As in many crises, women and girls are bearing the brunt. Even before the conflict, Yemen consistently ranked at or near the bottom of global gender equality indices, but the war has made the situation far worse for women and girls.

    2022-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8946 (2022) · source

  22. Mr. Rajasingham: I had hoped to deliver some good news at the start of the new year. Unfortunately, recent developments do not give us, or the people of Yemen, much cause for optimism. Today I want to focus on three main points: first, the civilian toll of the crisis, especially on women and girls; secondly, the constraints limiting the humanitarian operation; and, thirdly, how we can deliver a more effective and inclusive response, including by strengthening the economy to reduce people’s needs. Let us start with the impact of the crisis on civilians. Since our previous briefing (see S/PV.8929), fierce fighting has continued along dozens of front lines. Clashes in Al-Jawf, Ma’rib and Shabwah displaced more than 15,000 people over the past month.

    2022-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8946 (2022) · source

  23. In that regard, I would like to offer my unqualified support for the Special Envoy’s call for regular and unconditional access to the parties. Peace is the only sustainable solution in Yemen and in order to achieve peace everyone must be willing to talk.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  24. As the economy improves, humanitarian needs will start to reduce. Eventually, the size of the aid operation could start to reduce as well. To be clear, though, we are not there yet. Yemen continues requires a massive humanitarian response, at least through next year. As we deliver that response, we will need adequate funding for all sectors and we will need all parties to ensure an operating environment that facilitates principled aid delivery. We also call on everyone to do more to help Yemen end the crisis for good. That means implementing the United Nations economic framework in parallel with the immediate humanitarian response, helping people both to survive and take care of themselves. It also means moving towards a political solution as quickly as possible.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  25. The Government is keen to work with partners to devise a feasible programme for those injections. I note the recent appointment of a new Governor and Board of Directors for the Central Bank in Aden and I urge Yemen’s partners to work closely with them to improve economic conditions in the country. Other measures in the economic framework, such as lifting restrictions on commercial imports through the Red Sea ports, will require political commitments. Ending those restrictions will help lower commodity prices and import revenue could then be used to pay civil servants’ salaries, which one quarter of Yemenis rely on. The United Nations is eager to work with everyone to find a way to make that happen. The vision is to roll out those and other economic framework activities in parallel with the humanitarian response next year.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  26. As I said last month, there are substantial opportunities for improving the economic situation right away, even before the war ends. Everyone, including donors, Member States and the parties themselves, should act on those opportunities now. The United Nations has developed an economic framework that sets out a way forward. Yemen mostly relies on commercial imports to meet its survival needs; therefore, the framework mostly seeks to boost purchasing power, reduce the cost of imported goods and improve macroeconomic stability. That will require a mix of financial and political investments. For example, funding will be needed to resume foreign-exchange injections through the Central Bank. Such injections would, as in the past, help stabilize the Yemeni rial — a key factor in people’s ability to afford food and other essential goods.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  27. Despite requests to senior Government officials, the United Nations has not been granted access to the person in question. Neither have we received any official information on the arrest, which like those in Sana’a appear to be violations of the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. We call for immediate access to the staff and official information to be shared with regard to the arrests. The biggest challenge for the aid operation, however, is actually not funding, access or security. It is the fact that despite scaling up assistance, the underlying problems just keep getting worse. That is because Yemen’s economy remains in freefall, pushing millions more people into dependence on humanitarian aid, but humanitarian aid is not the way to solve those problems.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  28. We are also extremely disappointed that Ansar Allah authorities continue to detain two United Nations staff members in Sana’a, as the Special Envoy mentioned. That is despite assurances from their leadership, which we conveyed to the Council last month in consultations, that they would be quickly released. To date, we have had no access to the detained staff and have received no official information concerning their arrest. In Government-held areas, aid agencies are concerned about the apparent rise in bureaucratic hurdles, including visa delays and cumbersome procedures to approve aid projects. We have raised those issues with the Government and are working together to resolve them. We are also deeply concerned about the arrest several weeks ago of a United Nations contractor in Marib.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  29. An inter-agency evaluation of the Yemen response is currently under way. Results will be out in the new year and findings will be incorporated into the 2022 response plan. Of course, we continue to call on all parties to facilitate principled aid delivery in Yemen, in line with international humanitarian law. Aid agencies continue too often face delays at checkpoints, visa problems, security threats, harassment and other obstacles. Despite some improvements over the past year, many of the most difficult challenges persist in areas controlled by Ansar Allah, including restrictions on the movement of aid workers and unacceptable attempts to interfere with the selection of partners or beneficiaries. That has to stop.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  30. Critical sectors such as water, sanitation, health and shelter have been drastically underfunded all year, receiving no more than 20 per cent of requirements. Camp coordination — which in places like Marib is an absolutely essential service for an effective internally displaced persons response, including the protection of women and children — has received just 9 per cent of requirements. We call on donors to increase their support for Yemen and especially to ensure that their support does not decrease next year. We expect the 2022 response plan to be about as big as this year’s, which asked for $3.85 billion to help 16 million people. Nationwide assessments are under way now to support that. Beyond funding, humanitarian partners are also thinking carefully about how we can improve our own operations.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  31. These programmes are making an enormous difference, but they also face serious gaps in their ability to provide a comprehensive response to the most vulnerable people in Marib and elsewhere. This year’s response plan originally aimed to help 16 million people, or about 5 million more than we have actually managed to reach. Funding constraints are one major reason for the gap and they are about to get worse. Looming shortfalls mean that the World Food Programme must consider cutting back food rations for millions of hungry people in the coming weeks and months. UNICEF may also have to cut back support for hundreds of thousands of malnourished children, as well as water and sanitation activities.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  32. All parties must uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law at all times, including obligations to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure and to facilitate impartial humanitarian relief. We also renew our calls for Ansar Allah to stop the Ma’rib offensive and for the parties to adopt a nationwide ceasefire that will end the fighting everywhere else. In the meantime, aid agencies are doing everything they can to help. In Ma’rib, Hudaydah and Taiz, humanitarian partners have provided emergency aid to about 80 per cent of recently displaced people, and, across the country, the wider aid operation is helping more than 11 million people every month – or about one third of the population.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  33. Fighting also intensified in southern Hudaydah and Taiz following the redeployment of Government-aligned forces that the Special Envoy has just described. More than 25,000 people have been displaced in these areas since the redeployments. Civilian casualties have also increased, including five civilians reportedly killed in an air strike in Taiz on 3 December. In parallel, hostilities have continued along nearly 50 front lines across the country. In recent weeks, this has resulted in civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure following renewed air strikes in Sana’a, heavy clashes in Sa’ada, missiles landing near internally displaced person camps and other incidents.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  34. Mr. Rajasingham: The humanitarian crisis in Yemen continues to deteriorate as a result of conflict and economic collapse. I will focus my remarks today on what this means for civilians, what aid agencies are trying to do about it and, crucially, what the world can do to help. Let us start with the war, which, despite repeated international and domestic calls for a nationwide ceasefire, has escalated along several fronts. In Ma’rib, Ansar Allah forces continue their offensive, which has displaced more than 45,000 people since September. Indiscriminate shelling by Ansar Allah is being reported with alarming regularity in Ma’rib, including missiles that struck a camp for displaced people on 9 December, injuring five civilians.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  35. Perhaps more than everything else I have just described, Yemen needs a political solution to end the war. We can support everything that the Special Envoy has just briefed the Council on. A nationwide ceasefire — with no pre-conditions — would be an excellent place to start.

    2021-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8878 (2021) · source

  36. Water, sanitation and hygiene programmes have received only 12 per cent of the funds they need this year; health programmes have received just 15 per cent. Similar gaps persist in shelter and other sectors. We are calling on everyone to do everything possible to sustain the momentum we have built over the past several months and keep famine at bay. That means increasing support for all humanitarian sectors in Yemen right away and — crucially — working hard to ensure the level of support does not drop next year. Agencies are committed to doing their part to help donors maintain their support. In the coming months, we will publish an impartial, nationwide needs assessment and evidence-based response plan for 2022. Council members’ continued support will be crucial for that work, and we will certainly keep them updated as we progress.

    2021-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8878 (2021) · source

  37. Aid agencies are now helping nearly 13 million people across the country. That is about 3 million more people than just a few months before. Our best assessment is that this expansion has considerably pushed back the immediate risk of large-scale famine. That is a major success and a direct result of more donor funds coming in over the past few months. That generosity is making an enormous difference. But that success may prove short-lived, as aid agencies do not have enough money to keep going at the scale required. In the coming weeks and months, up to 4 million people could see their food aid reduced. By the end of the year, that number could rise to 5 million people. Funding for water delivery and hospitals will also run out by the end of November.

    2021-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8878 (2021) · source

  38. That means ensuring all Yemen’s ports are fully open, including by lifting import restrictions on Al-Hudaydah and Saleef. It also means paying civil servants’ salaries. A quarter of the population depends on those salaries. They are also essential to keeping afloat basic services, such as water, sanitation, health care and education. And it means taking steps to remove other barriers to business. Those include measures such as issuing bonds to lower insurance premiums, which drive up the prices of imports, as well as expanding programmes to clean up mines and other explosives that have been strewn across the country. There are workable proposals on the table to achieve all of that. The impact would be both quick and transformative. The United Nations is eager to help. In the meantime, we remain focused on the humanitarian operation.

    2021-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8878 (2021) · source

  39. The Yemeni rial is now trading around 1,270 rial to the United States dollar in Aden; that is nearly six times higher than before the war. At the same time, fewer essential goods are reaching key ports in the first place. In Al-Hudaydah and Saleef, commercial food imports in September were 8 per cent below last year’s average. Fuel imports were an alarming 64 per cent lower. There are several immediate steps that could curb Yemen’s economic collapse and so help reduce the pressure on the people of Yemen and the aid agencies trying to help them. Foreign exchange injections through the Central Bank would quickly bring down prices, just as they did in the past. The Government is ready to work with everyone to devise an effective programme for that. It is also time to loosen constraints on economic life.

    2021-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8878 (2021) · source

  40. International law requires effective accountability for serious violations. In that context, it is unfortunate that the mandate of the Group of Eminent Experts, the only independent international entity investigating and issuing public reports on human rights in Yemen, was not renewed last week. While conflict and instability are endangering civilians’ lives, livelihoods are also under attack. As Under-Secretary-General Martin Griffiths said in August (see S/PV.8840), it is Yemen’s economic collapse that is driving most needs in the country, including the risk of famine. Because nearly everything must be imported, people and businesses are extremely vulnerable to changes in global prices, and to especially exchange rates and import taxes.

    2021-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8878 (2021) · source

  41. All parties to the conflict must uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law, including taking constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects throughout military operations. Likewise, the parties are required to facilitate humanitarian access. Aid agencies need safe, timely and sustained access to all affected communities in Ma’rib and elsewhere. We also urge all parties to ensure the freedom of movement of civilians, including safe passage for those fleeing conflict areas. Like the Special Envoy, we are also gravely concerned by the pervasive human rights violations that the conflict is fuelling — including the shocking execution of nine individuals by Houthi authorities in Sana’a last month following proceedings that do not appear to have met the standards of a fair trial or due process under international law.

    2021-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8878 (2021) · source

  42. That is almost eight people every day — the second-highest figure in two years. The fighting in Ma’rib is taking a particularly heavy civilian toll. Last month, almost 10,000 people were displaced in Ma’rib — the single-highest figure so far this year. Since late September, Houthi forces have encircled Al-Abdiyah district, in south-west Ma’rib, which is home to nearly 35,000 civilians, many of whom previously fled there to escape fighting in other areas. Several recent mass-casualty incidents have also shocked the world, including a missile attack in Ma’rib on 3 October, attributed to Houthi forces, which killed three children and injured 21 other civilians.

    2021-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8878 (2021) · source

  43. I will focus my remarks today on these three issues: growing conflict and instability, economic collapse and the aid operation, and what they mean for civilians. Yemen is growing more violent, not less. Over the past few weeks, Houthi forces have intensified their brutal offensive in Ma’rib, taking more territory there and in neighbouring parts of Shabwa governorate. In Aden, clashes between rival armed groups also erupted earlier this month, leading to several days of violence, which shut down parts of the city and raise grave concerns for the future. Fighting, shelling and air strikes have also continued in Sa’ada, Hajjah and Al-Hudaydah and along nearly 50 other front lines. The impact on civilians is grim. Hostilities in September killed or injured 235 civilians across the country.

    2021-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8878 (2021) · source

  44. Mr. Rajasingham: As we sit here today, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen continues to deepen. More than 20 million people — two thirds of the population — need assistance from aid agencies. The most immediate cause of that suffering is the war. In recent weeks, conflict has intensified. Yet a ceasefire and all the benefits that it would bring remain elusive. In parallel, Yemen’s economy is collapsing, leaving millions destitute. That collapse is a direct result of the war and, more indirectly, a result of the perverse incentives the war has created. Hemmed in by violence and with fewer chances to take care of themselves, millions of Yemenis are looking to humanitarian organizations for help. But aid work is about to become much harder in Yemen, mostly because agencies are once again starting to run out of money.

    2021-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8878 (2021) · source

  45. Unless civilians can return to normality and farmers can access their fields, famine will take an even tighter grip on Tigray. We welcome the Government’s announcement today of the formation of a high-level mechanism to solve access problems and challenges in real-time, and we look forward to working together to make sure that we immediately reach people. There can be no reason for the ceasefire to fail and humanitarian convoys to be blocked. We hope that this mechanism can be operational within next 48 hours so as not to waste any more time and lose any more lives. I conclude by asking the Security Council and all those with influence to help us save lives and prevent famine and further suffering by ensuring these fundamental requests are fulfilled.

    2021-07-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8812 (2021) · source

  46. In short, without fuel, humanitarian operations will not be possible and lives will be lost. We have repeatedly said that the only way to stop the humanitarian situation from further deteriorating is peace. The welcomed announcement, as I mentioned, by the Government of Ethiopia of a ceasefire must be the beginning of this peace — for the sake of millions of innocent civilians. The conflict has already caused enormous suffering to the civilian population. It must stop now. The ceasefire has raised expectation amongst the population, and we now need to reach people throughout Tigray with humanitarian assistance to prevent a spread of famine and, as I mentioned before, an outbreak of cholera. But humanitarian assistance alone is not enough. We are not the solution.

    2021-07-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8812 (2021) · source

  47. We also call on the Government to see to the immediate return of the communications equipment confiscated from the offices of humanitarian organizations by the Ethiopia National Defense Forces. Trucks commandeered from humanitarian organizations must also be returned by those responsible. We also urge the Government of Ethiopia to restore and maintain electricity, communication networks and banking services in Tigray, without which we cannot effectively reach populations, as well as to allow the free flow of essential commercial goods, including fuel at scale. Without fuel we cannot transport food and people will starve. We cannot run water pumps providing clean water and prevent cholera, which kills. Hospitals cannot operate and people will suffer.

    2021-07-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8812 (2021) · source

  48. This means that we need to be able to fly, and I welcome the information received today that the Government of Ethiopia has approved our request for an United Nations Humanitarian Air Service flight to Mekelle tomorrow. We hope that this will not be a one-off but will continue and be extended to all airports in Tigray. I also call on all parties to provide security assurances for these humanitarian air operations. Fourth, we need to be able to bring in and use all appropriate communication equipment, such as very- small-aperture terminals, very-high-frequency radios and satellite phones, for humanitarian purposes. These are critical for the safety and security of humanitarian workers. We use these all over the world. We ask that the Government of Ethiopia fast track all requests made by humanitarian organizations.

    2021-07-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8812 (2021) · source

  49. Secondly, we must be allowed to use the fastest and most effective route to get humanitarian supplies to the people in need. We need immediate, unhindered and sustained access from both Kombolcha and Semera to Mekelle, and from Gondar to Shire. I am deeply alarmed by yesterday’s destruction of the Tekezé River bridge and the reported damage to two other bridges, which has cut off our main supply route from Gondar to Shire, which we use to bring in food and other life-saving supplies. We call on the Government of Ethiopia to immediately repair these bridges and, by doing, so help prevent the spread of famine. Thirdly, we must also be able to use the fastest and most effective modality to deliver supplies and transport humanitarian staff.

    2021-07-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8812 (2021) · source

  50. While inside Tigray, we may now be able to reach areas that were difficult to reach before; it is essential that we act fast and without any further obstruction. What we need first and foremost is for all armed and security actors to provide guarantees for safe road access for humanitarian workers and supplies to and from Tigray, as well as to and from the most remote parts of the region. This means not stopping us from getting through checkpoints, but rapidly letting us proceed in all directions. As we speak, there are five UNICEF trucks loaded with life-saving water and sanitation supplies blocked in Afar. Earlier this week a convoy of Word Food Programme trucks was prevented from entering Tigray from Gondar. All these trucks must immediately be allowed to proceed.

    2021-07-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8812 (2021) · source