YouSaid · the spoken record

Ramadan

lines on the record: 26
first: 2007-05-22
most recent: 2022-11-16
sittings or episodes: 2
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I would like to express my endless gratitude to the Permanent Representative of Ghana, the President of the Security Council at this meeting, for inviting me to this forum dedicated to world peace and security. May God bless you and make West Africa and the Sahel a better place in which to live.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“Finally, the private sector must be seen as an essential partner to the State in its efforts to provide jobs for young people. We must reform the private sector and create the necessary environment for it to develop and flourish. To this day, the private sector is essentially informal in nature, since, in the formal sector, the State always has a stranglehold on the goose that lays the golden eggs. It is possible that solutions can be found through the private sector and private initiatives. We therefore must create the right conditions for that. (spoke in English) I am very grateful to the Security Council members for taking the time to listen to my briefing on the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“The Sahel is rich in resources, both in terms of soil and under the soil. But the real value added of those resources is to ensure security and stability. Lastly, Sahelian youth are a driving force. They are aware that their numbers — 65 per cent of the population — represent their strength. The young people are highly connected, in a world in which the virtual world has become a reality. Capacity-building efforts should be directed towards women’s groups. Women account for 55 per cent of the population. We cannot ignore them. Women are peacemakers, as are civil society organizations in all their dynamism. The role of civil society organizations as a counterforce to the State must be promoted and strengthened as a bearer of hope for change in the countries of the subregion.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“It has been shown that, for people to turn from radicalization to violent extremism, it takes between six and 18 months. We must therefore focus on prevention. We must shift our approach to counterinsurgency by taking into account the non-combatant aspect of a population-centric approach. We must rebuild the Sahelian State and provide it with the necessary capabilities. The State must be a leader, a regulator, a partner, a protector, a fighter and a strategist. It should not be there waiting. The Sahelian States, individually, are small in relation to the large task. They must work together to make the most of their comparative advantage. There is no alternative to better regional solidarity and broader regional cooperation to realize that vision. Today Africa’s ramparts are being breached on all sides. The terrorist threat is real.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“We must freeze satellite command posts; establish a Force command post, the content and relocation of which to be determined; postpone the rotation of the personnel of the joint theatre command post and continue its activities in their current format until the new concept is adopted. The security solution to the problems of the Sahel is certainly necessary, but it is not enough It is insufficient to establish a lasting culture of peace. The unstable political situation in certain G-5 Sahel countries and the insecurity in the region, the presence of refugees in the intervention zone and the progressive economic decline could lead to conflicts, thereby undermining development efforts. I note that, above all, motivation is the DNA of terrorism. But it also depends on capabilities and opportunities.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“Finally, we must open up the G-5 Sahel to other countries in the subregion that are plagued by terrorism — an approach that involves sharing experience and expertise as well as enhanced cooperation. That link would connect coastal Africa to the Sahel and the Sahel to the Lake Chad basin and would allow everyone to benefit from synergy in this long-lasting struggle that requires assiduous and continuous efforts. I have several recommendations. We must advance the new concept of ownership and support by the G-5 Sahel of bilateral and multilateral operations conducted by the armies of the G-5 Sahel member countries. We must promote bilateral operations.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“It is both unfortunate and regrettable that defence and security forces are often accused of human rights abuses, which often allows the armed terrorist groups to feed their recruitment pipeline on the basis of rancour and revenge. Winning hearts and minds is the first step in the war against terrorism. We must rebuild and equip the joint theatre command posts relocated to N’Djamena, ensure the interoperability of procedures and means and pool the air capabilities of the G-5 Sahel countries. The withdrawal of Mali, a major player in the Joint Force, calls into question the Force’s concept of operations by creating a geographical discontinuity in the area of operations through the isolation of Mauritania. That makes it necessary to redefine a new concept of operations that takes the new situation into account.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“Einstein liked to say that insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results. We must absolutely change the situation and our interpretation of it and understand the grave danger posed by terrorism. Today it has moved from the north to the centre of the continent and poses a serious threat to coastal Africa, moving from the west to the east. In order to ensure the full operationalization of the Joint Force, a number of organizational and operational challenges will have to be overcome. First, we must meet its operational needs, above all its logistical ones, in line with the Force’s standards. We must ensure its sustainability. We must also maintain good relations with the population.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“The weakness of Sahel institutions and the partially dysfunctional role of national security forces, the weakness of national security strategies and the institutional weakness of States, in all truth, do not allow us to contemplate continuous sustainable efforts. The official end of Operation Barkhane and the shutdown of the operational mechanism in place, which was based on the synergy of forces — national forces, the G-5 Sahel Joint Force, Operation Barkhane and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali — requires a review of the operational mechanism of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force, as well as its operational capabilities. We must have the courage to undertake that review. What are the prospects and safe path forward in the short and medium term?”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“The Joint Force is struggling to become operational due to a number of challenges, including logistical, financial, strategic and human. Since security is a matter of State sovereignty, by always having recourse to partners, do the G-5 Sahel countries not run the risk of falling into the trap of financial dependence? Indeed, in the context of the hybridization of the threat and the resilience of armed terrorist groups, relying on one’s own means to counter terrorism is as unrealistic and unsustainable as not having the means to implement one’s politics. The third weakness is institutional.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“Moreover, the member States of the G-5 Sahel, most of which are poor, are unable to ensure their statutory contributions towards the operation of the Force. Constantly turning to external funding, for which the amount and especially the regularity are beyond our control, for large-scale military operations raises the question of the sustainability of efforts and the capacity of States to ensure their own security. I would like to underscore three areas of weakness. The first weakness of the Joint Force is political, as it does not have an extremely robust mandate from the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, which would have provided guidance, more focus and much more resonance. The second weakness is capability.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“Member States are therefore obliged to turn time and time again to technical and financial partners for logistical support. In addition, the annual budget for the Joint Force was set at €423 million. From 2018 to date, the Joint Force has received just over 50 per cent of what was supposed to be its annual budget. A distinct impression emerges that, despite the good intentions and promises made at the donors conference in Brussels, the amount needed to operationalize the Force has not been effectively mobilized. The Joint Force suffers from permanent budgetary uncertainty, especially because the continued commitment of technical and financial partners itself remains uncertain. We also fear donor fatigue for long- term operations.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“Moreover, the ability of the soldiers of the Joint Force to fulfil their mandate to fight terrorism and cross-border crime is severely limited by the lack of, or obsolete means of, transport for tactical air and ground logistics, as well as the ineffectiveness of the intelligence of the G-5 Sahel States. It is also worth noting that, even before the emergence of terrorists, our armies were not well equipped. The armies were established and have evolved in a spirit of traditional security and were surprised by the emergence of terrorists, who wage asymmetric warfare. Our armies were not prepared for that challenge — either in terms of equipment or training. Logistical support for the Joint Force therefore remains a permanent challenge given its size — 5,000 to potentially 10,000 troops — and the range of its area of operations.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“Of course, the situation has evolved rapidly. Some requirements have been met, such as the establishment of the unified command posts, the definitive joint theatre command posts in Bamako, the construction of satellite command posts in Wour, more than 20 operations by the Joint Force, as well as the strengthening of their capacity through training. We are operating in a zone that is 5,500 kilometres by 1,000 kilometres. In my view, that result is certainly noble but falls short of expectations and is not commensurate with the terrorist challenge. Let us look now at the limitations of the Joint Force and the obstacles it faces. The Force has been unable to obtain a robust Security Council mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“In that regard, the mission of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force is to conduct operations in accordance with the mandate of the African Union Peace and Security Council in order to contain the terrorist threat. As the Assistant Secretary-General explained, the Joint Force extends across three zones from Mauritania to Chad: the eastern zone includes the Niger and Chad, the central zone includes Mali, Burkina Faso and the Niger and the western zone includes Mali and Mauritania. With regard to the Joint Force’s track record eight years after the establishment of the G-5 Sahel and five years after its deployment, in my opinion, while the Joint Force has had noble intentions, the results it has achieved to date seem to be mixed, or indeed inadequate. The States have been unable to put in place the means for their goals.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“On 20 November 2015, the Heads of State of the G-5 Sahel announced the formation of a joint anti-terrorist military force, which was established on 6 February 2017 as the G-5 Sahel Joint Force. Its concept of operations was adopted by the African Union and by the United Nations through resolution 2359 (2017). The Security Council authorized the immediate deployment of a force for a period of 12 months, subject to renewal, with the goal of combating terrorism, drug trafficking and human trafficking in order to create a secure environment by eradicating terrorist and armed group activity and restoring security and peace in accordance with international law.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“Starting from that period, terrorist groups gradually established themselves throughout the Sahel and from bases in the Sahel as a result of the hotspot that Libya had become. Shortly after Operation Serval’s intervention, the five countries — Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger and Chad — felt the urgency and necessity of creating a regional mutualization framework for responding to security threats, which had become cross-cutting and hybrid. The G-5 Sahel was therefore created in 2014 to provide a concerted response to all the economic, social, environmental and security problems that characterize the region. The G-5 Sahel opted for a three-pronged approach focused on governance, development and security. The Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel is therefore a commendable tool for security cooperation.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“Some of those States face tremendous difficulties in ensuring the security of their own territory and have more areas that are ungoverned or poorly governed than areas that are under effective State control. Some of those States are therefore confronted with internal strife. In such countries, the construction of the nation State has remained an unfinished project. Worse still, the communities that make up the populations of many of the Sahel States have no common aspirations. The establishment of the G-5 Sahel was therefore a welcome regional cooperation initiative. The collapse of Libya in 2011 had a knock-on effect on the situation in Mali, which was in turn destabilized. The French military’s Operation Serval served at the time as a buffer and prevented Mali from disintegrating and falling into the hands of terrorists.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“The developments in the Sahel over the past 20 years have been characterized by emerging security threats. The Sahelo-Saharan region has faced natural shocks — such as climate change, including drought and floods — as well as regular attacks, including air attacks, and epidemics, pandemics and other hardships. It has also faced political shocks, including coups d’état, rebellions and civil wars and, more recently, terrorism and organized crime. The result is that the States that are geopolitically part of the Sahel — I say geopolitically because there are 22 countries in the greater Sahel and there is also a geographical and geostrategic Sahel, so that they are therefore part of the G-5 Sahel — are weak, fragile, vulnerable and have little human institutional capacity.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“I would like to thank the President, the Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of Ghana to the United Nations, for giving me the honour of briefing the Security Council to provide it my analysis, as an independent expert, on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel), a multilateral force that was born of the need to respond to complex and interdependent security issues in the Sahelo-Saharan region — a Sahel that is dying but refuses to die. I will discuss the type and nature of the threats as well as the characteristics of the States they affect. I will deliver a shortened version of my statement. First, it must be stated that the Sahel’s downward spiral began with the great drought of 1973, which is part of what we are experiencing today.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“Professor Dugard concluded that the real cause of the problems in the Middle East is occupation. Lebanon remains fully committed to fighting the scourge of terrorism and to cooperating with international efforts aimed at eradicating it.”
2007-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5679 (2007) · source
“Israel, however, continues to occupy Lebanese lands, including in Al Ghajar village, and is violating - sometimes on a daily basis - our national sovereignty. It is worth mentioning in this regard that Hizbullah did not exist in 1978, when Israel first invaded my country, Lebanon. Nor did it exist in 1982, when the Israeli invasion reached our capital, Beirut. Hizbullah was only a popular resistance movement in response to occupation. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories, Professor Dugard, speaking in another forum within this Organization, advised the Israeli delegates not to level accusations of terrorism, since they add nothing to the debate and do not solve the real cause of the problems of the Middle East.”
2007-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5679 (2007) · source
“Israel, the State responsible for the ultimate form of terrorism committed against my country in its continued occupation of Lebanese lands since 1978, renewed its aggression against Lebanon during its war in the summer of 2006 - a war that took the lives of more than 1,200 Lebanese civilians, one third of whom were children, left more than 4,000 injured and caused more than $8 billion in material damage. After that war, Lebanon fully committed itself to Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), including the prevention of the flow of arms into its territories without its consent, as affirmed on several occasions by a number of Lebanese officials. Lebanon is also cooperating fully, with assistance provided by the United Nations in this regard.”
2007-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5679 (2007) · source
“Even as we speak, our Lebanese army is relentlessly fighting those terrorist groups, while doing its utmost to safeguard and protect Lebanese and Palestinian civilians. Since the end of October 2004, Lebanon has been the victim of assassinations that have taken the lives of our Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and many others, as well as of attempted assassinations. The Security Council has stood by Lebanon in its firm determination to bring the perpetrators of those heinous crimes, including those who financed and executed them, to justice.”
2007-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5679 (2007) · source
“Lebanon also continues to cooperate fully and in a timely manner with the Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). Today more than ever, Lebanon is in need of the support of this body and of the international community in the face of the ruthless terrorist groups that have been targeting our civilians and armed forces since last Sunday. Seventeen Lebanese Army soldiers were the victims of a surprise attack that took their lives in a vicious and ruthless manner - some of them beheaded while they slept. Our civilians, as well as Palestinian civilian refugees living in Lebanon, have been attacked and their lives have been threatened. Two explosions have disturbed the peace of Beirut, resulting in loss of life and material damage.”
2007-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5679 (2007) · source
“We would like to commend you, Mr. President, for your excellent stewardship of the Council, which has firmly supported my country over the past three years. Lebanon has long been the victim of terrorism in all its forms - from the ultimate manifestation of terrorism in the form of foreign occupation to the terrorist attacks perpetrated against our civilians and armed forces that we have all witnessed over the past two days and the assassinations that have taken the lives of our leaders, journalists and politicians. Lebanon is determined to fight the scourge of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Lebanon is a staunch ally in the international efforts tot eradicate terrorism. Lebanon has signed and ratified 11 of the 13 international conventions on terrorism, in addition to the Arab convention in that regard.”
2007-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5679 (2007) · source