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Ramos-Horta

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2001-01-26
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2017-09-20
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un-security-council

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  1. In Timor-Leste we have responded to the need for truth and the desire for reconciliation with the establishment of the Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, whose work has just ended. They are now preparing a final report. In Timor-Leste the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, with the full legislative and executive powers vested in the United Nations Transitional Administrator of East Timor, created the Serious Crimes Panel, to which Mr. Hasegawa has just referred. Justice comes in a number of forms, criminal prosecution being the most common. Retributive justice demands legal prosecution or punishment, whereby the victim is the State, and the victim a witness for the State. It is adversarial and focused on the past.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  2. Hence, a Commission of Truth and Friendship was established by a decision of Presidents Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Xanana Gusmao and Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri during a meeting of the three leaders in Denpassar, Bali, on 14 December 2004. Allow me to recall that following the events of 1999, both nations have taken actions within their respective jurisdictions to respond to the well- documented reports of human rights violations. In Indonesia, an Ad-Hoc Tribunal on Human Rights Violations in East Timor was established. Its work has not ended. In the meantime, the Indonesian parliament has passed a law establishing its own truth and reconciliation commission.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  3. I am convinced that the Council, in its wisdom, will find the unity and resolve to provide Timor-Leste, through the United Nations and in a secure and guaranteed manner, with the modest but critical means to meet the challenges that lie before us. I wish now to brief the Council on the joint efforts of the Governments of Timor-Leste and Indonesia to resolve some of the issues of our common past, in particular that of the reported human rights violations that occurred in 1999, in the context of the 5 May Agreement between the United Nations, Indonesia and Portugal. More than anyone else, the two Governments are conscious of the need to deal with this burden of the past in a manner that our two peoples may accept.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  4. Therefore we are extremely skeptical when we are asked to rely on bilateral arrangements. Of course, we must pay due tribute to those countries who have really contributed to United Nations Development Programme funding to pay for advisers to assist our Government. But if we were to rely exclusively on bilateral funding, we would be in a very dire situation in my country with regard to ensuring the functioning and capacity-building of our institutions. Our requests and the proposals contained in the report of the Secretary-General are also in line with the recommendations of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/565). In its paragraph 224 the report of the High-level Panel clearly states, "failure to invest adequately in peacebuilding increases the odds that a country will relapse into conflict".

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  5. We have reluctantly heeded his advice and refrained from projecting our actual requirements over and above the assistance being provided by several bilateral and multilateral partners, and have requested the Council to consider providing only 5 8 civilian advisers. Let me say that one reason why we have insisted we need 68 advisors is because our experience with so- called voluntary contributions provided through bilateral arrangements has not been the most remarkable. When we in East Timor, in particular myself - and I am sure the Secretary-General and some other recipient countries have observed this; indeed we just need to ask our friend Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan and a few other countries - hear the phrase, "voluntary bilateral arrangements", it rarely means that those promises are going to be delivered.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  6. Hence we feel that the retention of the 62 police trainers deployed in those areas where multilateral and bilateral assistance is currently unlikely to become available is essential. I feel that the decision of the Secretariat to reduce the number of police trainers requested by more than a third may not be justified. I would like to briefly outline our requirements for critical civilian advisers to strengthen the institutional capacity of our State institutions. Our own assessment indicates that nearly 68 advisers will be required. However, our friend, Mr. Hasegawa, who seemed to know the Security Council even better than I do, particularly advised me not even to think of asking the Council for any more than the 58 critical advisers currently deployed by UNMISET.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  7. Allow me now to briefly touch upon our request for police trainers. We wish to see the emergence of a professional, ethical, accountable, responsive and dedicated police service in Timor-Leste. We are grateful to several bilateral and multilateral partners who are assisting us in this direction, particularly the initiative taken by Australia and the United Kingdom for the Timor-Leste Police Development Programme, and the United States, China and Malaysia. I am pleased to inform Council members that a significant number of East Timorese police officers will soon receive training in criminal investigation and traffic control in Indonesia. Several areas such as forensics, the specialized units, investigations unit and the like are not covered at present by those initiatives.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  8. Moreover, our own security agencies, particularly the Police Reserve Unit, have benefited from the training provided by the United Nations police and are functioning well in dealing with reports of movements and sightings of ex-militia elements, who are engaged in sporadic criminal activities. The Council will be happy to hear that despite predictions to the contrary from some quarters, the elements of the National Police Reserve Unit have behaved with remarkable discipline and are deeply conscious of promoting and protecting the human rights of all, including those of the former militia and current criminal elements. It was for that reason that we decided not to seek the continued retention of the International Response Unit and agree with the recommendation that it may be withdrawn when the current mandate of UNMISET ends.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  9. While we hear from some friends that Timor-Leste could be more effectively assisted through bilateral arrangements, we are puzzled that so far we have not heard any positive reaction to the very innovative suggestion that some of our closest neighbors provide a stand-by evacuation force that could be activated at very short notice. The negative reaction, or silence, in regard to our creative proposal makes us even more skeptical when we hear about bilateral arrangements in lieu of a multilateral mechanism. Before moving on, I would like to express my sincere thanks to the Council for having stationed the 125-strong Brazilian International Response Unit in Timor-Leste since last May. Fortunately, we have not needed to request its assistance over the last few months.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  10. I must state frankly that if our national security agencies were capable of assuring the safety and security of the liaison officers, we would not be asking for their continued presence at all. We are not, unfortunately, in a position to guarantee their safety and security, and that has been made clear in the letter from Prime Minister Alkatiri, The report of the Secretary-General proposes a 144- strong element for that purpose. On the other hand, I can assure the Council that if any country in the region were to offer stand-by arrangements for evacuation and other logistical support, Timor-Leste would be keen to discuss such an arrangement.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  11. And we have regrettably come to the conclusion that the capacities of the BPU, although developing, need to be further strengthened. Indonesia has made it amply clear that the main security agency on its side of the border will be the TNI - the Indonesian army - as is the case with other land borders of Indonesia. That implies that the training of the BPU needs to be provided not only by police officers but also by military liaison officers, who are most conversant with military matters. It seems clear to us that if the military liaison officers have been given additional training responsibilities, their numbers should be increased or at least maintained at the same level. I have been asked whether the element guaranteeing the security and support of the military liaison officers could be reduced.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  12. I am told that currently the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) has 42 military liaison officers, who are undertaking the facilitation of exchanges between our Border Patrol Unit (BPU) and the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), monitoring developments along the land border that could have an impact on overall security and stability, and providing mentoring and coaching to the members of the BPU. The only legal agreement governing the interaction and exchanges between the border security agencies of our two countries is the military liaison arrangement concluded between the United Nations security force and the TNI. We have not been able to put in place any successor arrangement, as we have been preoccupied with defining our land border as a first step towards cooperative border arrangements.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  13. Therefore, forgive me if I have some disagreements with the Special Representative of the Secretary- General. However, those disagreements are somewhat minor. When I see the reduced figures proposed in the report for continued United Nations assistance, I recall that my Prime Minister, Mr. Alkatiri, had clearly highlighted our minimal requests to the Secretary- General and to the heads of State or Government of your countries. Those requests had been made after a very careful assessment of our situation and our needs. They represent the barest minimum of required assistance secured through assessed contributions. Let me begin with the requirement for a continued presence of military liaison officers.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  14. We trust that under your guidance the Security Council will once again make wise decisions, consistent with the decisions it has made in the past five years, in ensuring that the gains we have seen in my country will continue to be consolidated. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I have a written text - some 11 single-spaced pages - that might take some time to read. Therefore, I shall try to summarize many of my points in order to make the most of the Council's time. First of all, I should like to recall that, when I addressed the Council a year ago, on 20 February 2004, I had the audacity to say that I do not always agree 100 per cent with the reports of the Secretary- General, in spite of our respect and affection for him and for the people around him, just as I would not say that we agree 100 per cent with what the Bible says.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  15. Then an unknown young representative of a national liberation movement, I was there at the invitation of President Mathieu Kerekou to participate in an international conference in solidarity with Benin in the aftermath of an attempted mercenary invasion of the country. When Benin served on the Security Council from 1976 to 1977, it was one of our greatest defenders, and we will never forget that. So it is quite ironic and interesting that, more than 25 years later, you are presiding over the Council at a time when the Council must make some critical decisions regarding the future of the United Nations presence in Timor-Leste.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  16. Before I deliver my written remarks, I should like to express my sincere condolences to the people and the Government of Bangladesh and to the United Nations family for the brutal murder of Bangladeshi peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We particularly feel the peacekeepers' tragic death because we cooperated closely with Bangladeshi peacekeepers in my own country, Timor-Leste, when Bangladesh contributed an army engineer battalion in 2000 and 2001. To the people and the Government of Bangladesh and to the United Nations family, our most sincere condolences. I should also like to say a few special words about your country, Mr. President. You might not be aware that I visited Benin in 1977.

    2005-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5132 (2005) · source

  17. I believe that, as in the past, the members of the Council will display their habitual wisdom and experience and reach a satisfactory conclusion on the basis of the Secretary-General's report. For us, it is extremely important that the Council - which has been united on the issue of Timor-Leste since 1999 - remain united. But it is equally important that we should not, for the sake of apparent unity, reach a consensus that really undermines the recommendations of the Secretary-General. The substance of those recommendations with regard to maintaining a peacekeeping element in Timor-Leste must not be undermined because of the necessity of unity. I leave it to the members of the Council, with their wisdom and experience, to find a balance between the need for unity and at the same time retaining what is important.

    2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source

  18. On all those occasions, one individual would sit next to me, often here on my right. That individual was Sergio Vieira de Mello. He was our most eloquent, passionate advocate. I recall that the Council always went along with his very persuasive arguments on engaging the United Nations and the international community in Timor-Leste. The job which he initiated with tremendous success, carried on by Kamalesh Sharma with equal competence and dedication, has not been completed. Any miscalculation, for whatever reason, in completely withdrawing the peacekeeping force - a very important political and psychological element - could betray and undermine the tremendous success that has been the United Nations role in Timor- Leste.

    2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source

  19. But can it be said that we are exaggerating the potential threats in Timor-Leste? If we are, maybe it is better and wiser to exaggerate and be over-cautious than, because of other cost-saving calculations, to witness a precipitate, too-early reduction of the United Nations presence in the country. It is for that reason - the respect that the people of Timor-Leste has acquired with regard to a peacekeeping force in the country - that we believe that such a force provides the best deterrence to ensure peace and security and to give the international community and the Timorese Government time and space to strengthen our police force and our defence force, which we believe would be able completely to take over all responsibilities by May 2005. I have spoken here on numerous occasions in the past.

    2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source

  20. Therefore, the Government of Timor- Leste, through our Prime Minister in a letter to the Secretary-General (S/2004/114), has appealed for the continuation of a peacekeeping component in a new United Nations mission in Timor-Leste. We leave it to the Secretariat and the members of the Council to decide on the exact size of that peacekeeping component, but it is our informed view - in the light of the dynamics of the reality on the ground and in the light of our experience, backed up by experience in many other conflict situations - that a peacekeeping component provides the best deterrence against any potential violent conflict. We do not wish to underrate an international police force, but a police force does not have the same credibility or impact as a formed military unit. Obviously, we do not anticipate any external threat.

    2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source

  21. However, as the report of the Secretary-General notes, the two sides - Indonesia and Timor-Leste - have failed so far on three occasions to meet our own deadline for signing an agreement on border demarcation. But there is political will and determination on the part of Timor-Leste and Indonesia to continue the talks and to conclude the border demarcation. On both sides, border demarcation would help resolve some of the issues of illegal cross-border activities. Peace is a reality in Timor-Leste, as the report of the Secretary-General and many observers acknowledge. But it has also been acknowledged - and we ourselves acknowledge - that peace is still very fragile in our country. So are the institutions of law and order and the institutions of the State public administration.

    2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source

  22. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) - which have dealt with the situation in Timor-Leste since 1999 - seem to know the situation very well because of their close observation of the conditions and the realities in the country: the weaknesses of our police force and defence force; the dynamics of our politics; the tensions in the border area; the unresolved issue of certain elements of militia gangs; the unresolved issue of the refugees; and the still uncompleted talks between us and Indonesia on the land border. The land border is a porous one. We acknowledge the good will and leadership of the Indonesian side in addressing the refugee problem and, along with us, towards concluding negotiations on land demarcation.

    2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source

  23. We believe that those two areas constitute the foundation for peace and security in our country, for development and for creating a climate of confidence for investors. The report of the Secretary-General recommends a continuation of the United Nations presence in the territory, based on three components. There seems to be no disagreement on two components, but there appears to be some on the continuation of a peacekeeping component in the territory.

    2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source

  24. It refers also to shortcomings in other areas, and we are prepared to accept our failings and weaknesses resulting, first, from the very fact that we have been independent for less than two years; none of us had ever governed a country before, whether in the previous five years or in the previous 500 years under various colonial experiments in our country. Those failings have to do also with the lack of trained personnel for the administration, particularly in the key area where we acknowledge that we are most fragile: the justice sector. With regard to that sector, it is noted that the Timorese side has much to do to strengthen its law enforcement agencies, particularly the police. In the past year and a half, our Government has invested enormous effort in strengthening the judiciary and the public administration.

    2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source

  25. First, I would like to congratulate the Secretary- General and his staff on that outstanding presentation. I myself could not have made a better analysis of the situation in Timor-Leste, and I think the Secretariat deserves high commendation for its professionalism. Because of their having dealt with Timor-Leste for many years, they truly understand the realities, the challenges and the problems that we face - although I would not subscribe to the report 100 per cent. I probably would not subscribe to the Bible 100 per cent, so I hope no one will take it too personally that I subscribe not to 100 per cent of the report but to perhaps 99 per cent of it. The report refers to some key areas where we have made progress, on which I shall not elaborate now.

    2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source

  26. I thank you, Sir, and all the other members of the Council for inviting me to speak here today. I am particularly pleased that it is during your presidency that the Council is once again considering the situation in Timor-Leste. In View of your long involvement in and experience with the issue of Timor-Leste since you came to the United Nations as a young diplomat, we feel even more confident that, under your leadership, the Security Council will once again arrive at a consensus on a continuing United Nations role in Timor-Leste. In View of time constraints - and despite your generosity, Sir, in allowing me additional time for my statement - I shall skip many pages of my written text; the full text will be circulated to members. I shall endeavour to address the substance of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2004/117).

    2004-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4913 (2004) · source

  27. I also remain available at the service of my colleagues in the Portuguese-speaking community within the United Nations to help in whatever limited way I can - as a gesture of gratitude to Guinea-Bissau for its many years of helping us and in gratitude to the United Nations for its many years of helping East Timor. If in some way Timor-Leste can help to contribute to normalization and democratization in Guinea-Bissau, it will be our little bit of reciprocity to the international community.

    2003-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4834 (2003) · source

  28. I must say that I have the fullest confidence that the people - the military leaders - whom I met in Guinea-Bissau do not wish to remain in power. They are not people who staged a coup in order to gain the spoils of victory. They were genuinely motivated by social and economic conditions that had profoundly affected all of them. They deserve our trust, they deserve credit and they deserve an opportunity. The Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) will remain closely supportive of the process in Guinea-Bissau, working with the United Nations and Guinea-Bissau's neighbours. I understand that the CPLP Foreign Minister will soon appoint a senior envoy from Angola who will more closely follow the events in Guinea-Bissau on a full-time basis, to provide whatever assistance is necessary.

    2003-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4834 (2003) · source

  29. The Bretton Woods institutions must show more pragmatism and compassion, and maybe even observe a moratorium on payments to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other institutions by the treasury of Guinea-Bissau in order to give the country breathing space while the economy recovers. The country has tremendous potential. God has blessed it with enormous rainfall and enough land. If properly managed and given an opportunity to develop, it could be a breadbasket for the entire region. I congratulate the Security Council for remaining seized of the matter and keeping the situation under review, as well as for giving the military and others who are today in charge in Guinea-Bissau the benefit of the doubt.

    2003-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4834 (2003) · source

  30. I wish to congratulate the United Nations for the outstanding job it has done in Guinea-Bissau as a mediator, conciliator and focal point to which many political leaders of differing persuasions could turn to either voice their complaints against one another or against the Government, and vice versa. That was a very useful role by the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau, whose mandate I hope will be extended. If for no other purpose, the mere presence of the United Nations in Guinea-Bissau as facilitator and conciliator will help create the conditions for elections that we hope will take place. As has happened in conflict situations, such as those in my country and many other countries, the electoral process is only one step. The country is in dire need of economic assistance.

    2003-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4834 (2003) · source

  31. What I was able to observe in Guinea-Bissau, which was most heart-breaking and very touching, was an extraordinary sense of dignity and pride among the people of Guinea-Bissau. For over a year, thousands of civil servants had been working without receiving their salaries. Soldiers and officers also did not receive their pay for many months. It was raining inside the barracks of the military officers I visited. Ironically, in the West African region, which has been very much shaken by violence, Guinea-Bissau was an oasis of tranquillity and of the absence of hatred, including even towards those who had mismanaged their country. The people of Guinea-Bissau have displayed enormous strength, tolerance and a spirit of solidarity.

    2003-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4834 (2003) · source

  32. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Community of Portuguese- Speaking Countries - like the Security Council, the Secretary-General and the international community - regretted the event that brought about the changes in Guinea-Bissau. However, as the Assistant Secretary- General for Political Affairs has quite eloquently reported, conditions in Guinea-Bissau were conducive to the situation that did in fact take place. We can only be pleased about the fact that there was no violence, that not a single shot was fired and that there are now formal pledges by those in charge that there will be a return to normalcy and constitutional arrangements and the holding of elections for a new legislature and President.

    2003-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4834 (2003) · source

  33. In addition, everyone had the expectation that there should be changes. Even though President Kumba Yala assured me in my private discussions with him that he would honour whatever result the elections produced, were the elections to be held on 12 October they would not necessarily produce a better relationship between the presidency and a new Parliament. Instability would therefore continue. I left Guinea-Bissau with the conviction that military intervention would take place in a matter of days, that is to say, that such an eventuality was not a question of "it" but, rather, a matter of "when". It seems that the military intervention that brought down President Kumba Yala was welcomed by all of Guinea-Bissau's society.

    2003-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4834 (2003) · source

  34. I spent a total of one week in Guinea-Bissau, where I met with the now former President Kumba Yala, many Government ministers, all parliamentary leaders, all the top leaders of the armed forces, the police, the diplomatic corps - in particular the representatives of Portuguese-speaking countries and of Guinea-Bissau's neighbours - church leaders, the private sector, union leaders, students and academics. I had two private discussions with President Kumba Yala. The day I left Guinea-Bissau, 16 August, I left without the certainty that I had wanted to obtain, namely, that there would be no military intervention. In my discussions with all political parties, members of the church - including protestant and Muslim leaders- and the private sector, I encountered a general, profound disappointment with the governance of Guinea-Bissau.

    2003-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4834 (2003) · source

  35. It was with a sense of humility and weighty burden that I accepted the responsibility bestowed upon me by my colleagues, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, meeting in Coimbra in July 2003 to act as Special Envoy in assisting with the preparations for elections scheduled for 12 October and to promote national dialogue in Guinea-Bissau in order to ensure that the elections are held in a climate of tranquillity and faith in the system.

    2003-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4834 (2003) · source

  36. Mr. Ramos Horta: I have appeared before the Security Council on numerous occasions in the past, but on another subject matter, namely, the situation in my country. This is the first time that I participate in a discussion pertaining to an issue other than my own country. I do so with a sense of friendship and solidarity with the people of Guinea-Bissau, with whom we share centuries of common history.

    2003-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4834 (2003) · source

  37. But in the short term, East Timor will need the Council's assistance, and we ask, on behalf of the second Transitional Government and the entire country, that this Council endorse the concept of a successor mission, which has been carefully thought out and planned by my UNTAET colleagues. In this way, the gains that have resulted from the Council's tremendous commitment to East Timor will be consolidated and maintained in the crucial years to come.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  38. Family houses are being rebuilt everywhere. New shops are opening all the time. Agricultural output has reached the level of 1999, and more children are now enrolled in schools than before 1999. In 2001 we enjoyed 18 per cent economic growth in real terms. The previous year we posted 15 per cent growth. However, economic growth will slow down considerably in the course of this year. We are confident, nevertheless, that East Timor will have a viable, sustainable economy. Reference was already made to the potential revenues from oil and gas. Tourism will also thrive once we have created the necessary infrastructures.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  39. The Secretary- General has invited all countries around the world to attend. We hope that all will attend, but if everyone actually attends, that could pose the worst logistic nightmare for East Timor, because we are not exactly Mauritius or Fiji or Namibia, with infrastructures. But, at the same time, we would like everybody to respond positively to the Secretary-General's invitation. We would not go so far as to say to bring sleeping bags and lunch boxes, but we will do our best to welcome everyone, in our poverty and modesty, but with the greatness of the hearts of the people of East Timor. A great deal has been achieved in the very short time of two years, since UNTAET was put in place. Anyone who visited East Timor in 1999 or 2000 would be amazed at the progress we have made. Reconstruction has begun.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  40. The Foreign Ministry is working in close consultation with other Ministries, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor and United Nations agencies to prioritize and prepare the necessary steps. It is our intention, at independence or shortly thereafter, that East Timor will accede to the greatest possible number of international human rights treaties. In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation is closely watching the drafting of the Constitution to ensure that nothing in the Constitution violates any of the treaties to which East Timor is likely to become a party. As Sergio Vieira de Mello mentioned, we want East Timor to join the United Nations as soon as possible, either on the first day of independence or soon thereafter. Planning for independence is under way. Celebrations will take on 20 May.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  41. We have now initiated formal contacts with our ASEAN neighbours and the ASEAN secretariat, hoping that East Timor will be able to sign the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South- East Asia on independence day or soon after that. I would also like to mention that on the day after our independence, on 21 May, we will be hosting in Dili, for the first time, a meeting of the heads of State and Government of the Portuguese-speaking community. Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea- Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe and Portugal have been with us for the past quarter of a century. On 21 May 2002, East Timor will formally join the Community of the Portuguese-Speaking Countries. We are also working hard in the process of identifying international treaties to which East Timor should accede once it attains independence.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  42. This, in large measure, is also a tribute to our brothers and sisters in Indonesia. We are also grateful to Australia and Indonesia for inviting East Timor to be part of the South-West Pacific forum, which is yet another indication of the willingness on the part of Indonesia and Australia to embrace East Timor. On the issue of justice and accountability for others in Indonesia responsible for the violence in East Timor, we are encouraged by the steps taken so far by the Government of President Megawati Soekarnoputri. In the wider region, our neighbours of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) continue to offer very important support to East Timor's reconstruction and development, capacity- building and security.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  43. I should like simply to add that, in the history of decolonization, seldom has there been, in post-war relations between two countries that separate from each other, such a quick process of reconciliation and normalization of relations. In some cases it has taken generations to heal the rift between some newly independent colonies and the former colonial powers, and in some cases it has taken many years for even formal relations to be established. In this regard, we can say, with a sentiment of enormous friendship towards Indonesia, that the Indonesian side has shown its maturity and its grandeur in also putting the past where it belongs and in forging a new relationship with East Timor. If we remember the past 25 years, then we will understand the remarkable success that the two sides have achieved.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  44. We are listening to the comments and criticisms of our friends, so that our very first Constitution in 500 years will be a model one - something of which we can really be proud. On 14 April, we will be holding the presidential elections. In most countries, there is never a lack of candidates. In our country, we have to try to persuade people to run for President. So far we have only one known candidates, but we hope that there will be at least two or three more. I should now like to refer to relations between East Timor and Indonesia. Sergio Vieira de Mello already spoke in detail about some aspects of the question.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  45. The system devised by the United Nations in East Timor was, in retrospect, the best one, in that it favoured the smaller parties as well. Without that system of proportional representation, there would not have been 12 parties. We would not have such an inclusive, multiparty representation in the Parliament. We were worried that, with so many political parties, the Constituent Assembly would be bogged down in endless debate. But so far the work of that Assembly has been, for the most part, going smoothly. We are taking the advice of our friends from around the world in improving the draft that has now been concluded. We are allowing one extra month, so that we can get more input from the people throughout the district.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  46. The Constituent Assembly, as the Council is aware, has 12 politically active parties. We started off with 16 parties. In a country of 900,000, we managed to have 16 political parties. The United States, with almost 300 million, has two political parties. France has, I think, five or six political parties. But in East Timor we had 16. During my travels around the country, our people asked me why we had so many political parties in such a small country. We blame it on Sergio Vieira de Mello and on the United Nations, but we told our people that they themselves were the best judges, that on 30 August, they would go to vote; that some parties would survive and others would not; and that in the years to come, some would emerge and many more would disappear. The people handed down their verdict: on 30 August, only 12 parties survived.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  47. It would be far too easy to look only at the alleged crimes and the violence that took place after 1975. So from the very beginning we have argued that the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission should go back to 1974. We are also optimistic and pleased with the work of the Serious Crimes Panel. Although it had major problems with funding and personnel, the Panel has done outstanding work in terms of indictments and charges. Some have argued - and if we believe my friend Sergio Vieira de Mello's propaganda - it has been more successful than better-funded war crimes tribunals elsewhere, in the Balkans and so on. Although it started with enormous difficulties, such as lack of funding and of resources, the work of the District Court that handles serious crimes has been very impressive in this regard.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  48. We are doing our best to educate and inform our people in West Timor about the reality in the territory. On the question of justice and reconciliation, it has been widely reported that last week members - National Commissioners - of the East Timorese Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation were sworn in. This is an important task. They have an enormous responsibility to establish the truth about the human rights violations that occurred between 1974 and 1999. We emphasize that the Commission will look back as far as 1974, before Indonesian intervention in East Timor. Crimes did not occur only after Indonesian intervention in East Timor. I have said repeatedly that the East Timorese side must have the courage and humility to acknowledge our own responsibility for the tragedy that befell our people.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  49. We are thus very pleased with the proposal made by the Secretary- General in his report to continue the present peacekeeping force and civilian police in East Timor for some time to come. There has been much progress also on the refugee-return front. There are still 40,000 to 70,000 refugees living in camps in West Timor. Mr. Vieira de Mello's assessment is an accurate one in terms of the reasons why there are still so many thousands of refugees in West Timor. There are still some rumours circulating about retaliation against refugees when they return, which is absolutely untrue. In the past two years, since 2000-2001, there have been four or five reported cases of returning refugees being assassinated out of the almost 200,000 who have now returned.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  50. We are an island; we have a large economic zone; we have rampant illegal fishing in our waters; and we also have an obligation to contribute to the region in terms of preventing piracy, human smuggling, drug trafficking and so on. Thus we are making enormous efforts to try to set up a modest navy component to control our waters. Although the downsizing of the peacekeeping force is a positive indicator of our progress a as has been mentioned, by May there will be no more than 5,000 members of the peacekeeping force in East Timor - we are still concerned, and here we have to be realistic, about the ability of some former militia elements to destabilize the country.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source