YouSaid · the spoken record

Ravindran

lines on the record

64

first

2021-11-12

most recent

2023-11-20

sittings or episodes

15

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un-security-council

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1. “That is a country that has been globally recognized as a sponsor of terrorism and holds the ignoble record of hosting the largest number of terrorists proscribed by the Security Council, to the extent that most of the terrorist attacks around the world today have their origin in some form or another in Pakistan. His Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have been called out for being supporters of terrorists, including Osama Bin Laden, but they continue to carry on down the same path undeterred. We are discussing the protection of civilians today. The greatest threat to civilians comes from terrorists. As we mentioned earlier, the perpetrators of the heinous terror attack in Mumbai in 2008 continue to enjoy the patronage of the State that he represents. Let me be categorical about India’s position.”

   2022-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8953Resumption1 (2022) · source

2. “I am constrained to take the floor once again only because the representative of Pakistan chose to sully the Security Council through his Pavlovian and frivolous remarks against my country. While his statement deserves our collective contempt, it is important for me to set the record straight. This is not the first time that the representative of Pakistan has misused the platform provided by the United Nations to propagate false and malicious propaganda against my country, seeking in vain to divert the world’s attention from the sad state of his country, where terrorists enjoy a free pass while the lives of ordinary people, especially those belonging to the minority, are turned upside down. Member States are well aware that Pakistan has an established history of harbouring, aiding and actively supporting terrorists.”

   2022-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8953Resumption1 (2022) · source

3. “Thirdly, the implementation of arms embargoes entails a gamut of interrelated and complex issues that are best dealt with by specialized United Nations agencies with the necessary mandates, skill sets, expertise and resources. Fourthly and finally, peacekeepers’ core mandated assignment, such as the protection of civilians, will also be impacted adversely if they are given an additional assignment, over and above the principal mandate, without the necessary resources and capabilities. As such, even though we have supported Mexico in its principled pursuit to tackle the menace of small arms, since our concerns remain largely unaddressed in the context of United Nations peacekeeping, we were constrained to abstain from voting.”

   2021-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8942 (2021) · source

4. “That requires extensive consultations with all troop- and police-contributing countries, which for some reason were not initiated. Moreover, the substantive aspect of the issue should ideally have been dealt with in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Secondly, such an additional task for United Nations peacekeepers will have an adverse impact on their own safety and security. Potential changes in the movement of peacekeepers to border and other areas and other conflict zones will spread them thin in conflict zones and expose them to a much higher risk of direct attacks from armed smugglers. United Nations peacekeepers need not be assigned mandates that lie primarily with border security forces and are best left in the hands of the host country’s national security forces.”

   2021-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8942 (2021) · source

5. “Given that India is one of the largest troop- contributing countries to United Nations peacekeeping, we have some core concerns on the approach that today’s resolution (resolution 2616 (2021)) prescribes. It is our considered view that United Nations peacekeeping operations should not be used as a means to implement arms embargoes. That will not only entail a big addition to their existing mandate, but it will also affect their operational efficiency and could possibly even put peacekeepers at risk. I would like to submit our concerns on the following four counts. First, asking peace operations to monitor and trace arms is a major addition to the existing mandate given to United Nations peacekeepers and will have wider implications for the very nature of peacekeeping operations.”

   2021-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8942 (2021) · source

6. “I take the floor to submit India’s explanation of vote. The threat posed by the illicit transfer and illegal diversion of arms to international peace and security is a matter of serious concern to the entire international community. We thank the Mexican delegation for raising awareness about the issue through the open debate organized during its presidency on 22 November (see S/PV.8909). During that debate, India strongly supported the need to address the threat of arms trafficking, the transfer of arms to terrorist groups and the linkages between arms trafficking and terrorism. We highlighted the threat posed by the illicit flow of arms to the safety and security of peacekeepers and called for the effective implementation of Council-mandated arms embargoes by the Member States.”

   2021-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8942 (2021) · source

7. “We need to seriously look into both of those options. In conclusion, the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel is the best hope for the long-term regional ownership of the maintenance of peace and security in the vast Sahel region. The Joint Force needs sustainable, predictable and adequate support to deal with terrorist and armed groups. The countries of the Sahel have shown their resolve and determination to take on terrorism. We need to support them unequivocally. Failure to do so could result in serious political and security implications in the region and beyond.”

   2021-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8903 (2021) · source

8. “Secondly, the Council consistently reiterates its support for African solutions to African issues. The Council must walk the talk and support the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel, including by providing the Joint Force the necessary financial support through United Nations-assessed contributions. Thirdly, the Council has discussed how to best support the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel. We have witnessed the limitations of the logistical support MINUSMA can provide. That approach has burdened MINUSMA, thus adversely affecting the implementation of its core tasks. The Secretary-General is now presenting two proposals — first, an advisory office to the G-5 Sahel Executive Secretariat and, secondly, a dedicated United Nations support office in the Sahel, a suggestion that the Secretary-General has been making for the past few years.”

   2021-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8903 (2021) · source

9. “The countries of the Sahel region look to the Security Council to enable them to more effectively fight terrorist groups. In that regard, I would like to make three points. First, we all acknowledge that the security situation in the Sahel has become more complex and volatile in the recent years. The role of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) continues to be critical in supplementing the efforts of the Malian authorities to bring stability to the volatile northern and central regions of the country. At the same time, the operational support provided by MINUSMA to the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel has proved insufficient. It is therefore important that traditional peacekeeping be complemented by regional operations to neutralize terrorist groups and entities.”

   2021-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8903 (2021) · source

10. “I would like to recall the Council’s recent visit to Mali and the Niger and the interactions with the leadership and various stakeholders, who unequivocally mentioned that addressing the threat of terrorism is a precondition for achieving sustainable peace in the Sahel region. Countering terrorism in the Sahel is not just the responsibility of the countries of the region, it is an obligation of the international community as well. For the past three years, the Council has been grappling with the issue of support to regional security initiatives such as the Joint Force of G-5 Sahel and has remained divided on the ways and modalities to support regional security initiatives. Unfortunately, the Council’s indecisiveness has allowed terrorist groups to expand their area of influence. The threat of terrorism in the Sahel is real.”

    2021-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8903 (2021) · source

11. “The accounted civilian toll from those attacks in the Niger alone is estimated to have surpassed 600. Earlier this month, 69 people were killed in the western region of Tillabéri in the Niger. In June, more than 100 people were killed in a village in Burkina Faso. The recent report of the Secretary-General on the threat caused by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, also known as Da’esh (S/2021/682), also highlighted that terrorism in Africa continues to expand in strength and in its area of control. We heard the same from Mr. El-Ghassim Wane, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, two weeks ago in the Council’s meeting on the situation in Mali (see S/PV.8893).”

    2021-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8903 (2021) · source

12. “I would like to thank the Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, for his briefing today. I also thank the Permanent Representative of Chad for presenting the views of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel). The Chadian contingent has been playing a key role in the G-5 Sahel, and we value the inputs provided on the practical challenges that the G-5 Sahel is facing on the ground. I also thank Ms. Fatimata Ouilma Sinaré for her insights. The security situation in the G-5 Sahel countries, particularly in Mali and the Liptako-Gourma tri-border area shared by Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger, continues to be a matter of serious concern. Attacks by terrorists and armed groups have increased in recent months.”

    2021-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8903 (2021) · source

13. “To that end, good working relations, based on mutual trust between MINUSCA and the authorities of the Central African Republic, is critical. We expect MINUSCA leadership to pursue those tasks purposefully. We also hope that the mid-year assessment of MINUSCA in 2022, as provided for in the resolution, will allow the Council to reflect on the evaluation of the performance of all components of MINUSCA, that is, the uniformed, civilian and mission leadership components.”

    2021-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8902 (2021) · source

14. “I take the floor to explain India’s position on resolution 2605 (2021), just adopted. The Central African Republic is at an important juncture in its tenuous journey towards peace. The announcement of a ceasefire few weeks back, ongoing efforts for the national dialogue and preparations for the local elections of 2022 indicate the firm commitment of the Central African Republic leadership to putting in place a democratic framework based on the rule of law and credible State institutions for a successful post- conflict recovery. Those efforts need the support of the international community and the Security Council. We believe they are priority tasks that the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) needs to focus on.”

    2021-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8902 (2021) · source