YouSaid · the spoken record

Reitano

lines on the record
14
first
2018-11-06
most recent
2018-11-06
sittings or episodes
1
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un-security-council

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  1. “In conclusion, organized crime is a threat to the three pillars on which the United Nations system is based - human rights, peace and security, and good governance and development. If we are to prevent conflict more effectively and build sustainable peace, then we need a more comprehensive and effective response to organized crime. We therefore urge the Security Council, with its leadership, to move this issue from the margins to the mainstream of the United Nations work, and particularly its work in the field.”

    2018-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8393 (2018) · source

  2. “In a context where peacekeeping is as much about introducing, reintroducing or reinforcing the rule of law as it is about keeping warring factions apart, the role of policing in these missions is critical. Tackling organized crime in conflict zones is an integral part of tackling organized crime holistically at the global level. The two are closely connected. From the Global Initiative's perspective, there is little doubt that the United Nations system needs a more coherent, streamlined and strategic approach to addressing organized crime and bringing its tools to bear to counter its impact. Counter-crime initiatives need to be linked to and reinforced by interventions in the recovery and development space, which are required to address the socioeconomic underpinnings of the illicit economy.”

    2018-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8393 (2018) · source

  3. “As a result, they attempt to use structures and strategies designed for dealing with non-State conflict or engaging legitimate political actors without necessarily addressing the way in which organized crime underpins those theatres of operations. A poorly framed response to illicit markets can have highly detrimental impacts on human rights, the legitimacy of some local actors, the protection of civilians and the size and strength of criminal groups themselves. We therefore acknowledge and welcome those instances where senior, highly experienced police officials are working alongside or even replacing their military counterparts, who have traditionally taken a lead role in designing and, thereafter, implementing peacekeeping operations.”

    2018-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8393 (2018) · source

  4. “Similarly, there is no guidance module on organized crime for the United Nations system disarmament, demobilization and reintegration framework, although one is envisaged. Peacekeeping missions should also be able to draw upon the benefits of the experience of the whole United Nations system in understanding and responding to criminality in a conflict zone. but currently there is no systematic linkage between peacekeeping missions and the specialized agency for organized crime - the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - or for others with expertise in specific forms of organized criminality. That may mean, therefore, that peace operations are working without the much-needed understanding of the forms of criminal governance or the criminal ecosystem in which they operate.”

    2018-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8393 (2018) · source

  5. “Expanding the analytical capacities of peace operations by providing information-gathering task forces with sufficient resources is an essential first step towards accomplishing those aims. Integrating a political-economy approach - one that extends into the political side of mission mandates and encompasses the illicit economy in its considerations- is a second step. A sustainable response must address the often- documented challenge of political actors at all levels who profit from illicit flows. Otherwise there is a risk of rewarding bad behaviour and allowing governance itself to become criminalized. There is currently no written guidance for peacekeepers or United Nations mission staff that has been prepared or provided by the system with regard to addressing organized crime.”

    2018-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8393 (2018) · source

  6. “Instead, the way in which criminal actors have become embedded in conflict zones suggests that policing must be a strategic consideration at all stages of a mission's planning and deployment. Even if peace operations are not intended to actively fight crime, they need to be crime-sensitive and ensure that criminal groups do not threaten the security of the mission or become long-term peace spoilers. More regional approaches, including stable neighbouring States, can provide a buffer to respond to the cross-border, transnational threats posed by fragile and conflict- affected countries. In a peacekeeping setting, the United Nations system as a whole needs better situational awareness of criminal networks, organized crime and the illicit economy in order to provide a basis for policymaking and programming.”

    2018-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8393 (2018) · source

  7. “But what global experience in addressing organized crime has clearly shown us is that while policing is critically important, it cannot alone successfully fight organized crime, address its drivers or mitigate its impact. The policing function needs to be part of an integrated response. However, as the 2016 external review of United Nations policing observed, in most contexts the police component has been insufficiently integrated with the political and other functions of the peacekeeping missions, and significant underresourcing hampers the division's ability to perform a more integrated function. Furthermore, except in a few recent missions, the United Nations police have been seen as the bedrock of a mission's exit strategy rather than as a critical part of the central planning and peacekeeping functions.”

    2018-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8393 (2018) · source

  8. “Yet, we see a strong disconnect between a clear awareness of the problem, on the one hand, and a more limited operational response, on the other. For example, a project by the University of Edinburgh shows that of 1,500 separate peace agreements covering more than 120 countries between 1990 and 2016, only 21 mentioned organized crime. And in mandate design for the Organization's 35 peacekeeping, special political missions and envoys currently in effect, only eight have operational organized crime functions, representing only 23 per cent. The few peace operations that do have mandates to respond to organized crime tend to address the problem exclusively within the mission's policing function.”

    2018-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8393 (2018) · source

  9. “Our third conclusion is that while the Security Council has recognized the growing convergence of criminal activity, illicit markets and conflict, the response across the peacebuilding cycle has not always kept pace. In an analytical exercise undertaken by the Global Initiative, we reviewed each of the 1,113 Council resolutions that were adopted between 2000 and 2017. From that analysis, we found that 35 per cent of those resolutions made reference to some form of organized crime or illicit markets. Significantly, however, we also found that the proportion of such resolutions has been growing. In each of the past five years from 2012 to 2017, more than 60 per cent of the resolutions of the Security Council have mentioned one or more forms of organized criminality.”

    2018-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8393 (2018) · source

  10. “The nature of organized crime activity varies from conflict zone to conflict zone and criminal groups exist on a spectrum from loose networks that can include Government and external criminal actors to hierarchically organized armed groups that engage in criminal activity to sustain themselves and project their influence. In some cases, such networks may seek to control key transport nodes such as ports and landing strips. For others, the control of territory itself is essential, as it allows them to tax both licit and illicit activities in what could be termed criminal governance. Combating organized crime must therefore be considered a significant factor in conflict prevention and resolution, reversing ecosystems that enable criminal governance. Where crime thrives, there can be no sustainable peace.”

    2018-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8393 (2018) · source

  11. “Our second conclusion, however, is that these non-State armed groups and combatants collectively receive only a very small fraction of the sum total of all illicit finance flows generated by organized crime in or near conflicts. By far the larger share ofthe $31.5 billion goes to political actors at all levels and associated transnational criminal networks. These, therefore, are the main beneficiaries of instability, violence and lack of State capacity for enforcement, and they thus retain an interest in the perpetuation of conflict.”

    2018-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8393 (2018) · source

  12. “While there is obviously margin for error with this figure - as with any estimate of the illicit economy - all evidence suggests that the scale of illicit markets is staggering and that their intersection with contemporary conflict is incontrovertible. The sources of revenue that fund non-State armed and terrorist groups are diversifying. They are increasingly based on criminal activities, and that phenomenon is sustaining conflicts worldwide. The illegal exploitation and taxation of gold, oil and other natural resources are sources of income that are overtaking traditional threats to finance sectors, such as kidnapping for ransom and drug trafficking.”

    2018-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8393 (2018) · source

  13. “In a collaborative project with INTERPOL and the RHIPTO Norwegian Center for Global Analyses, we analysed over 1,000 major global smuggling and trafficking routes associated with environmental crimes, drugs and people. Those routes and flows represent a confluence of global illicit trade. Not only do they map across contemporary conflicts in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and the Americas, but there also is often a link between those illicit trafficking routes and international terrorism. Based on our field research, we estimate that in the region of $31.5 billion-worth of illicit profits are generated annually in conflict areas.”

    2018-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8393 (2018) · source

  14. “Ms. Reitano: It is a great pleasure and an honour for the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime to address the Security Council today during this briefing on policing in the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. In this statement, we would like to highlight three conclusions from our research and the experiences of our 350-person network of experts. We hope that those insights can potentially strengthen the strategic response of the Security Council to organized crime in conflict zones. Our first conclusion, which we think is now broadly accepted, is that organized crime is a global and accelerating phenomenon and a threat to international peace and security.”

    2018-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8393 (2018) · source