YouSaid · the spoken record

Richardson

lines on the record: 255
first: 1993-02-22
most recent: 1998-07-13
sittings or episodes: 50
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“This resolution represents a strong but measured response of the Security Council to the continued failure of the Iraqi Government to cooperate with the Special Commission. Since nothing in Iraqi behaviour merits the lifting of the suspension of the sanctions review, this resolution extends the suspension. No one even suggests that after six and a half years Iraqi performance comes close to compliance. Our resolution does not impose sanctions now, but it does start the process by beginning the compilation of names, so if sanctions are imposed there will be no administrative delay. It makes very clear to the Iraqi authorities that the next time they try to block UN SCOM's work the Council will impose sanctions against those individuals responsible for Iraqi failure to cooperate with UNSCOM.”
1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source
“At this point, I would like to commend the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, Mr. Butler, for the fine work he and his staff have done in the short time he has been in his position. Clearly, Mr. Butler has the courage, stamina and dedication necessary to perform his extremely difficult job. The international community owes Mr. Butler and his staff their gratitude. UNSCOM. and the Council have the right and the obligation to hold Iraq strictly accountable for every aspect of all its programmes of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq cannot pick and choose which questions it wishes to answer. We on the Council must do everything we can to give Ambassador Butler the tools and the support he needs to do his job as efficiently and as thoroughly as possible. This resolution, we believe, helps to accomplish that objective.”
1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source
“Blix and his staff, that Iraq lied and concealed an active weaponization programme for years in direct defiance of its commitments under the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its commitments to the IAEA. Iraq has lied about its programmes for too long and too recently for us to settle for anything less than absolute certainty that Iraq's nuclear ambitions have been completely neutralized. When accounting for nuclear weapons, close is not good enough. If you fail to account for just one nuclear device, that could mean the destruction of an entire city. Baghdad has a clear and simple choice. It can comply with its obligations, thus opening the way to lifting sanctions, or it can continue along the path of non- compliance. It cannot do both.”
1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source
“As to biological weapons, the words of the report of the Secretary-General speak for themselves: "This is an area that is unredeemed by progress or any approximation of the known facts of Iraq's programme". [S/1997/774, para. 125] Some of my colleagues have tried to draw attention to the report of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Hans Blix, on Iraq's nuclear programme as an example of Iraqi cooperation. However, even in this area it is clear that Iraq has not answered all the relevant questions necessary to have a full accounting of its programmes. The books cannot be closed. Furthermore, we now know, thanks to the efforts of Mr.”
1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source
“is right to insist that Iraq account for these and other components and clarify the status of Iraq's indigenous Scud manufacturing capability. Until Iraq provides this information, there is no way to determine with any degree of confidence whether Iraq still has the capacity to construct and deploy prohibited missiles. Iraq also wants the Council to believe that it has cooperated with UN SCOM. with regard to chemical weapons. However, as late as September, Iraq was still lying directly to UNSCOM. about its production of VX. Only when presented with absolutely incontrovertible evidence did Iraq "cooperate" by admitting that it had lied in the past. Again, this is too little, too late.”
1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source
“to determine how many or what kind of programmes of weapons of mass destruction it is acceptable for Iraq to maintain, but rather to verify that all of Iraq's programmes of weapons of mass destruction have been destroyed. UNSCOM. cannot complete this task, frankly, because Iraq will not cooperate. Let us take a look at Iraq's so-called cooperation over the past six months. Iraq is claiming that its "cooperation" allowed UNSCOM. to account for most of the Scud missile engines imported into Iraq. But in fact, Iraq refused to let UNSCOM. remove those engines from Iraq for analysis for four months last year. And Iraq still has not explained why many of those engines were apparently stripped of key components before they were destroyed: the same parts critical to the development of an indigenous missile production programme. UNSCOM.”
1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source
“Some here have suggested that the Security Council ought to reward Iraq because it is, in their view, cooperating with UNSCOM. to a greater degree now than it has in the past. They point out that since there were "only" six blockages out of 670 inspections, Iraq is substantially complying with resolution 1115 (1997). Using that logic, if I walked into a bank 670 times and robbed it only six times, I would therefore be a "substantially law-abiding" citizen. Compliance with international obligations is not a voluntary act. Cooperation is not a matter of degree. Either Iraq is in compliance with its obligations or it is in breach of those obligations. The Security Council has not asked UNSCOM.”
1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source
“and the Security Council if the Council imposes new sanctions on Iraq. If carried out, this threat would represent a material breach of Iraq's obligations and demand a strong response. How did Iraq explain these egregious acts? Iraq first attacked the credibility of the Special Commission and questioned its judgement. When this did not work, Iraq resorted to the time-honoured tactics of bullying, burning and blackmailing. UNSCOM. operates as an arm of the Security Council and gets its mandate solely from Security Council resolutions. When Baghdad challenges UNSCOM, it challenges the Council, and the Council has again made clear that it will brook no such challenges. If, after six and a half years, Iraq still does not understand this basic fact, then we must once again consider new mechanisms to make it understand.”
1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source
“For example, Iraqi officials destroyed documents in front of UNSCOM inspectors; Iraqi officials blocked access to sites, documents, and individuals; Iraqi officials - at the highest levels - lied and concealed information about key programmes, even when confronted with known facts by UNSCOM; Iraqi officials physically detained an UNSCOM. chief aerial inspector and photographer; and Iraqi officials interfered with UNSCOM. helicopter operations, endangering pilots and passengers. In addition, the Deputy Prime Minister, in front of the Executive Chairman himself, told Iraqi officials under his authority not to answer questions posed by UNSCOM. And, perhaps most disturbing, the Iraqi Permanent Representative to New York privately and publicly threatened that Iraq will cease cooperation with UNSCOM.”
1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source
“Six and a half years after the liberation of Kuwait, Iraq still refuses to meet its most basic obligations, such as allowing UNSCOM. inspectors to carry out their Security Council mandate without obstruction or harassment. Resolution 1115 (1997) reminded Baghdad - yet again - of its clear obligations in this area, and put it on notice that the Security Council would not tolerate continued Iraqi refusal to give UNSCOM. the access necessary to ensure that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction no longer menace the region. Apparently, this strong warning was not enough. UNSCOM. Executive Chairman Richard Butler's report to the Security Council records a litany of Iraqi harassment, obfuscation, obstruction and deception - all taking place after resolution 1115 (1997) was adopted.”
1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source
“Today, the Security Council agreed to specific travel restrictions on those categories of Iraqi officials responsible for obstructing the work of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). The Council declared its intention to impose such sanctions the next time Iraq violates the terms of Security Council resolution 1115 (1997), and the Council will begin from today the process of drawing up a list of those officials whose travel is to be prevented in such an eventuality. It is amazing to me that, after six and a half years, this body still must consider new approaches to convince Iraq to comply with its international obligations. Only one party is responsible for this very sad state of affairs: the Baghdad regime.”
1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source
“The draft resolution makes clear how the junta can end these sanctions: by restoring the legitimate Government of Sierra Leone. ECOWAS and the Secretary-General's Special Envoy stand ready to mediate. The path is clear. Sierra Leone can return to the urgent task of national reconciliation and economic development. We call upon the military officers in Freetown to meet with the mediators this week in Abuja, to achieve a negotiated settlement, and to restore the constitutional order and the democratically elected Government. This is why the United States strongly supports this draft resolution, which makes it clear that the illegal military regime in Sierra Leone must step down. And this is why this draft resolution imposes sanctions until they do.”
1997-10-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3822 (1997) · source
“An expiration date would require the Council to reapprove its sanctions down the road. It would cause doubt about the Council's future intentions. It would create uncertainty for suppliers and others about the possibility that sanctions would lapse. Most important, an expiration date in, say, six months would encourage the junta in Freetown to try to tough it out, in the hope that in six months and one day the world would have changed, so they would not have to. The call by some Member States to accept less than full compliance in other sanctions regimes might even feed such a pernicious hope. It would be tragic if this led the junta to make the wrong decision. This is why the United States believes that compliance, and not the calendar, should govern the Council's approach.”
1997-10-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3822 (1997) · source
“The sanctions have been carefully targeted: prohibitions against the supply of arms and petroleum products, and restrictions on the travel of members of the junta and their families. The draft resolution calls upon all States to cooperate with these measures and authorizes ECOWAS, as necessary and in conformity with applicable international standards, to inspect incoming ships to ensure compliance. The draft resolution does not limit shipments of food or medicines or other basic necessities. It contains provisions for regular review of the implementation and impact of the sanctions. The sanctions are designed to have maximum impact against the illegal junta of Sierra Leone, while imposing a minimum burden on the civilian population. Some members of the Council have argued that these sanctions should have an expiration date.”
1997-10-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3822 (1997) · source
“With this draft resolution, the Security Council makes clear its willingness to exercise the enforcement powers of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in the service of this goal. With this draft resolution, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, the Security Council also joins in the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to try to resolve the crisis as ECOWAS successfully did for neighbouring Liberia. We commend the efforts of the ECOWAS Committee of Five - Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and Liberia - as well as the work of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy to bring about a peaceful restoration of democracy. The Security Council is voting today to support the ECOWAS plan of action for Sierra Leone with concrete measures: sanctions.”
1997-10-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3822 (1997) · source
“At a stroke, they rejected the efforts of the citizens of Sierra Leone and of so many other nations of Africa to emerge from the debilitating cycle of rule by violence. The people of Sierra Leone have refused to accept the regime of the junta. The United States admires their commitment to democracy just as it condemns the abuses of the junta, particularly its overthrow of an emerging democracy and its grave violations of human rights. The United States, in voting for the draft resolution, joins with the citizens of Sierra Leone and with the other Council members to demand the immediate restoration of the democratically elected Government of President Kabbah.”
1997-10-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3822 (1997) · source
“I would like to thank Council members for their kind words regarding the United States presidency during the month of September. The United States strongly supports this draft resolution, which makes clear that the illegal military regime in Sierra Leone must step down. The people of Sierra Leone have suffered greatly during six years of insurgency and domestic terrorism by the Revolutionary United Front. President Kabbah tried hard, with the assistance of the United Nations, to find a way to end this conflict and establish a Government which represented all the people of Sierra Leone in a fair, honest manner. But in May the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the Revolutionary United Front seized power.”
1997-10-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3822 (1997) · source
“In favour: Chile, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, France, Guinea- Bissau, Japan, Kenya, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1131 (1997). The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The meeting rose at 12.50 pm.”
1997-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3821 (1997) · source
“The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations. Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, documents S/ 1997/742 and addendum 1. Members of the Council also have before them document S/ 1997/751, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution (S/ 1997/751) before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. There being no objection, it is so decided. A vote was taken by show of hands.”
1997-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3821 (1997) · source
“Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. There being no objection, it is so decided. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Chile, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, France, Guinea- Bissau, Japan, Kenya, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution, as orally revised, in its provisional form, has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1130 (1997). The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter. The meeting rose at 12.45 pm.”
1997-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3820 (1997) · source
“I should like to draw the attention of members of the Council to the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola, document S/l997/74l. Members of the Council have before them document S/ 1997/750, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations. I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the following revision to be made to the text of the draft resolution contained in document S/ 1997/750, in its provisional form. In operative paragraph 2, the reference should be to paragraph 4 of resolution 1127 (1997). It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution (S/ 1997/750) before it, as orally revised, in its provisional form.”
1997-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3820 (1997) · source
“I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representative of Angola, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. There being no objection, it is so decided. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Van Dunem "Mbinda" (Angola) took a seat at the Council table. The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.”
1997-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3820 (1997) · source
“The Council urges all parties to cooperate fully with UNTAES and looks forward to the report of the Secretary-General due no later than 6 October 1997. as requested in its resolution 1120 (l997)." This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/1997/45. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The meeting rose at 515 pm,”
1997-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3818 (1997) · source
“In this context, the Security Council notes the recent information provided by the Croatian Government on intended steps to address some of these issues and urges the Croatian Government to implement these steps without delay. "The Security Council emphasizes that the prompt completion of the tasks outlined above, as well as the fulfilment by the Croatian Government of its obligations under the Basic Agreement (S/1995/951), the agreements between the Croatian Government and the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastem Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), as well as the letter of the Croatian Government of 13 January 1997 (S/1997/27, annex). will determine the pace of further devolution of executive authority for the civil administration to the Croatian Government as well as further Council action.”
1997-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3818 (1997) · source
“"In this regard, the Security Council calls upon the Croatian Government to meet its obligations and commitments and to take immediate action in the following areas: to remove all administrative and legal obstacles to the two-way return of all displaced persons as well as to the return of refugees; to ensure security and social and economic opportunity including property rights for all returnees; to take effective measures to prevent harassment of returnees; to implement measures to establish effective local government administrations; to ensure the regular payment of benefits to all pension and welfare recipients and open Croatian pension offices in the region; to ensure further economic reintegration; to initiate a country-wide public programme of national reconciliation and curb media attacks on ethnic groups; and to implement fully and fairly the amnesty law and cooperate fully with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.”
1997-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3818 (1997) · source
“Eitel (Germany) took the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber. The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations. Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council: "The Security Council expresses its deep concern at the lack of substantial progress by the Government of the Republic of Croatia in fulfilling the conditions and tasks that are key to the transfer of executive authority to the Republic of Croatia in the territories of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, as noted in its resolution 1120 (1997) and the 23 June 1997 report of the Secretary-General (S/1997/487).”
1997-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3818 (1997) · source
“The members of the Council observed a minute of silence. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in Croatia The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Croatia and Germany, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. There being no objection, it is so decided. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Drobnjak (Croatia) took a seat at the Council table; Mr.”
1997-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3818 (1997) · source
“At the outset of the meeting, I should like, on behalf of the Security Council, to express deep sympathy to the Governments and the people of Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, and to the bereaved families of the victims of the tragic crash in Bosnia and Herzegovina of a United Nations helicopter, which was carrying members of the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and of the Office of the High Representative. The Council pays tribute to them for their ultimate sacrifice in the cause of peace. On behalf of the Council, I wish the survivors a full and speedy recovery. I now invite the members of the Council to stand and observe a minute of silence in memory of all those who so tragically lost their lives.”
1997-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3818 (1997) · source
“This is why we cosponsored this resolution and why we voted in favour of it: to let the people of Iraq know that we stand behind them, and that we will protect them as best we can from the cynical and callous actions of their own Government and leaders. I resume my functions as President of the Council. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter. The meeting rose at 3.50 p.m.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3817 (1997) · source
“The resolution specifically emphasizes its support for the Iraqi people when it endorses the responsibility of the Secretary-General to monitor the actions of the Government of Iraq with respect to the needs of vulnerable groups. It lays the groundwork for a more efficient procurement of emergency humanitarian supplies by stressing that contracts for the purchase of goods under resolution 1111 (1997) must be for items that appear on the approved distribution plan. The Government of Iraq should know that, in implementing resolution 1111 (1997), the Security Council intends to remain vigilant in safeguarding the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. We will act on their behalf even if, unfortunately, their own Government deliberately will not.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3817 (1997) · source
“Contrast this spirit of cooperation here in New York with the arrogant attitude of denial in Baghdad and you should understand better my Government's determination to keep ambiguous language on the sanctions Committee out of this resolution. The Government of Iraq bears sole responsibility for the situation that necessitated this resolution today. and the Council has recognized this. The Iraqi Government, by refusing to sell oil, is using the Iraqi people as a pawn to pursue political ends at odds with those of the international community. This resolution tells the Iraqi Government that such behaviour is unacceptable, and it tells the Iraqi people that we care about them and support them.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3817 (1997) · source
“It was the Government of Iraq that submitted hundreds of flawed, incomplete and inaccurate contract applications to the sanctions secretariat and the Committee, thus bogging it down in a deluge of dubious documents Many contract requests were for items that were not even on Iraq's own distribution list. And it was the sanctions secretariat and the Committee that diligently worked to approve these applications, and that have just as diligently continued to streamline its procedures, so that today almost 99 percent of the money set aside for humanitarian purchases has been allocated to approved contracts.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3817 (1997) · source
“Instead - and not for the first time -- the Government of Iraq has defied the clear conditions of a United Nations resolution and made a callous decision to put at risk the well~being of its people in order to seek to score propaganda points. We regret that one delegation cannot support this resolution. We and our co-sponsors have worked tirelessly to achieve a consensus text, but we simply cannot accept the notion of introducing language into this resolution that seeks to blame the United Nations for actions solely the fault of the Government of Iraq.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3817 (1997) · source
“We acted out of overriding humanitarian concern for the Welfare of the Iraqi people, who would have paid the price for the inexcusable delays in delivery of humanitarian goods that would have resulted from Baghdad's refusal to sell oil until the first 90-day period of resolution 1111 (1997) had almost expired. Let me stress that the Baghdad regime's decision to delay oil sales was not required by any of the relevant Security Council resolutions or by the memorandum of understanding with the United Nations, a point that was Security Council 38l7|h meeling Fiftyaseeond year l2 Septembfl 1997 made to the Permanent Representative of Iraq by the President of the Council in July.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3817 (1997) · source
“The Council today acted to reorganize the two distinct periods of time specified in Security Council resolution 1111 (1997) during which Iraq is permitted to sell up to $2 billion worth of petroleum, while keeping the 180-day time-frame of resolution 1111 (1997) intact. This will permit Iraq to export the full $2 billion permitted by resolution 1111 (1997) within the specified time-frame in order to purchase the full amount of food, medicine and other humanitarian goods. What the Council has done today is a one-time exception intended solely to prevent unnecessary suffering among the people of Iraq. The time limits for the sale of Iraqi petroleum under any successor resolutions to 986 (1995) and 1111 (1997) will be strictly adhered to. The resolution is also specific on this point. Our action is the right and responsible thing to do.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3817 (1997) · source
“I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document 8/1997/709. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Chile, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, France, Guinea- Bissau, Japan, Kenya, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America Against: None Abstainirtg: Russian Federation The President: There were 14 votes in favour, none against and 1 abstention. The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 1129 (1997). I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting, I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the United States.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3817 (1997) · source
“I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/ 1997/690, which contains the text of the letter dated 4 September 1997 from the Charge d'affaires ad interim of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a letter dated 4 September 1997 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to vote on the draft resolution (S/l997/709) before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote. There being no objection, it is so decided. 3817th meeting 12 September 1997 I shall first give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3817 (1997) · source
“The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations. Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 111 l (1997), document S/ 1997/685, and the letter dated 8 September 1997 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait addressed to the President of the Security Council, document S/ 1997/692. Members of the Council also have before them document S/l997/709, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3817 (1997) · source
“In favour: Chile, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, France, Guinea- Bissau, Japan, Kenya, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1128 (1997). The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The meeting rose at 11.30 am.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3816 (1997) · source
“Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Tajikistan, documents S/ 1997/686 and addendum 1. Members of the Council also have before them document S/l997/708, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. There being no objection, it is so decided. A vote was taken by show of hands.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3816 (1997) · source
“I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Tajikistan in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. There being no objection, it is so decided. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Alimov (Tajikistan) took a seat at the Council table. The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3816 (1997) · source
“May I take it that the draft report as corrected is adopted by the Council? There being no objection, it is so decided. This decision will be reflected in a note by the President of the Security Council, to be issued as document S/ 1997/706. The Security Council has thus concluded its consideration of the item on its agenda. The meeting rose at 11.25 am.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3815 (1997) · source
“Consideration of the draft report of the Security Council to the General Assembly The President: The Council will now proceed to the consideration of its annual report to the General Assembly, the draft of which has been prepared by the Secretariat. Members of the Council have before them the draft report of the Security Council to the General Assembly for the period from 16 June 1996 to 15 June 1997, as circulated by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs on 27 August 1997, and a corrigendum thereto. I should like to express appreciation to the Secretariat for the work it has undertaken in preparing this factual report. I now call on Assistant Secretary-General Fall to make an explanatory statement.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3815 (1997) · source
“As this is the first meeting of the Security Council for the month of September, I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to His Excellency Sir John Weston, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, for his service as President of the Security Council for the month of August 1997. I am sure I speak for all members of the Council in expressing deep appreciation to Ambassador Weston for the great diplomatic skill with which he conducted the Council's business last month. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted.”
1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3815 (1997) · source
“We congratulate the personnel of MONUA for the work they are doing under trying circumstances. There is no doubt that MONUA is playing a key role in promoting the peace process. I would also like to add a note of thanks to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for his unflagging efforts to promote a lasting peace in Angola.”
1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source
“Savimbi to meet as soon as possible within Angola. They must fulfil their obligations under the Lusaka Protocol, they must settle the dispute over diamond revenues and they must put Angola back on the path of national reconciliation. The United States agrees with the Secretary-Generals recommendation that some United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) military units remain in the country to assist in the event that additional UNITA forces are registered and can be demobilized. However, at their reduced strength, these military units can no longer ensure their own security should hostilities resume and would not be able to separate warring factions. If UNITA does not heed the call for complete demobilization, the withdrawal of the remaining MONUA military units should resume.”
1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source
“We believe that the sanctions are strong, practical and enforceable. The United States stands ready to examine further measures by the Council should UNITA fail to respond. We remind the Government of Angola that it, too, must abide by its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. It must continue to exercise restraint and refrain from any action that could lead to a resumption of the hostilities. We would view any military offensives against UNITA as a reason to propose that the Council discontinue sanctions against UNITA. The Government must also make every effort to bring the remainder of UNITA into the mainstream of Angolan society, allowing it to play its legitimate role as a democratic opposition party and giving full participation to those UNITA officials in the Unity Government. The United States calls on President Dos Santos and Mr.”
1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source
“The United States wishes that the Security Council did not have to adopt the draft resolution before us today. However, according to the Secretary-General's latest report, UNITA has maintained its military force, brought the extension of State administration to a virtual standstill and kept up a stream of anti-Government propaganda through its radio VORGAN. In short, UNITA has refused to commit itself to peace and national reconciliation. Nevertheless, we still hope that UNITA will return to the path of peace. We urge UNITA to make use of the period before 30 September to fulfil its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol. We hope that the Secretary-General will be able to report to the Council before that date that UNITA is in compliance with its obligations. If UNITA does not act now, the sanctions will take effect.”
1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source
“When the Angolan parties came to their historic agreement in Lusaka in 1994, the United States was cautiously optimistic. Our optimism grew as the quartering camps began to fill with former UNITA combatants. Our optimism increased with the formation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation last April. Since then, however, the process has come to a halt. We are gravely concerned that, because UNITA has failed to fulfil some key commitments, the peace process is not moving forward and the possibility of renewed fighting again threatens the people of Angola. We cannot sit idly by hoping that the parties will somehow put the peace process back on track. There is too much at stake for Angola and for peace in the southern African region.”
1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source
“We also believe that the Secretary-General should take steps to increase the United Nations knowledge of developments in the Central African Republic, so that he can provide his own views to the Council. Once again I wish to express the appreciation of my Government for the efforts of the Inter-African Mission to restore peace to the troubled Central African Republic and strengthen its democratically elected Government.”
1997-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3808 (1997) · source