YouSaid · the spoken record

Rita Laranjinha

lines on the record
26
first
2021-02-22
most recent
2021-02-24
sittings or episodes
2
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un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. “We condemn the attacks on MINUSCA, the EU and other partners and encourage the authorities to consider fighting hate speech as a key priority. In all those efforts, we are more than ever committed to closely cooperating and coordinating with the United Nations, the African Union and the Economic Community of the Central African States, as well as with all partners involved, in particular the Central African Republic’s neighbours.”

    2021-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/187 (2021) · source

  2. “In view of the establishment of the upcoming EU-Central African Republic partnership cycle, we stand ready to continue to accompany the country’s people and future authorities through an agenda of reforms towards a stronger democratic governance and rule of law, and a strengthened, professional, accountable and better-governed security sector, by fighting corruption and impunity; strengthening State authority and credible and accountable institutions; and increasing economic opportunities for all, without forgetting key societal reforms, with a special focus on education, youth and the role of women. One last word on growing disinformation, fed by pan-Africanist, local and some international actors, which contribute to the country’s fragility.”

    2021-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/187 (2021) · source

  3. “We encourage and support any efforts made by the guarantors, the facilitators and the region aiming at reaching those objectives, in close coordination with the Government of the Central African Republic and key partners. As you know, the EU has been, is and will continue to be one of the closest partners of the Central African Republic, working for peace and reconciliation, democracy and recovery, as reflected recently in our decisive support for the elections. With all our instruments and through our multidimensional engagement, we will continue to stand by the Central African Republic through its future challenges by drawing the appropriate lessons from the current crisis.”

    2021-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/187 (2021) · source

  4. “A re-engagement of all parties — Government and armed groups willing to remain or to return in the process — and greater inclusion and participation of civil society and the “forces vives” in the process, especially women and youth, are essential for the agreement to be credible and bring lasting peace, but without compromising on the core of the peace process, and continuing to fight impunity for serious crimes while strengthening proper reconciliation mechanisms such as the truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation commission. That is the only way to restore trust among the population, to pay tribute to all the victims the crisis in the Central African Republic and, finally, to stop the spiral of violence in the country.”

    2021-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/187 (2021) · source

  5. “Two years after its signing, the Peace Agreement needs to be revitalized, starting with a serious and honest evaluation of its implementation aimed at bringing about, if necessary, the reforms needed to improve its effectiveness and bring peace dividends to the people, in close coordination with national stakeholders and international partners.”

    2021-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/187 (2021) · source

  6. “We welcome President Touadera’s commitment to holding an inclusive dialogue, and we encourage the Government and the Central African Republic institutions, political actors and “forces vives” to engage in a constructive dialogue with an open and positive spirit in the interest of the country’s people. Thirdly, and finally, the peace and reconciliation process needs to be relaunched, with the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation remaining the only joint and viable framework for lasting peace. Only a political solution will help achieve sustainable peace, reconciliation and development in the country.”

    2021-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/187 (2021) · source

  7. “We are deeply concerned by the continual reports of serious human rights violations committed during the current crisis, including by the country’s security forces. We encourage the authorities to stop and properly investigate. Secondly, a sustainable and agreed solution to the political crisis requires a genuine, inclusive political dialogue, namely, among the Government, the democratic opposition and civil society. The representativeness of the country’s future institutions and governance will need to be strengthened through broad participation and inclusivity.”

    2021-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/187 (2021) · source

  8. “We strongly condemn the attacks and actions of destabilization launched by some armed groups signatories to the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic under the newly established rebel Coalition des patriotes pour le changement, supported by former President Bozizé, that we have been witnessing during the last three months. Violence as a means of raising and resolving grievances cannot be accepted. Those involved in serious crimes and human rights violations will be brought to justice, as demanded more than ever by the population of the Central African Republic. The fight against impunity and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law must remain at the core of stabilization in the Central African Republic.”

    2021-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/187 (2021) · source

  9. “In that regard, we would like to pay tribute to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) for the significant efforts it has made to contribute to security in the country and for the losses it has suffered in doing so. In order to pursue its mission, it is important that MINUSCA can mobilize all necessary means. The EU therefore welcomes the recommendations of the Secretary-General to reinforce MINUSCA with additional military and police resources.”

    2021-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/187 (2021) · source

  10. “First, restoring security in the country is a priority, particularly in view of the remaining steps in the electoral process, notably the next rounds of legislative elections, which are scheduled for 14 March. As a partner of the country and a major donor to the process, we consider the holding of free, fair and transparent elections to be of paramount importance for a viable solution to the current crisis. That is why we think that they must take place in the best possible conditions in order to allow Central African Republic voters to participate in the vote and guarantee the inclusiveness and political stability of the next five years.”

    2021-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/187 (2021) · source

  11. “I am honoured to address the participants of this very timely meeting on behalf of the European Union (EU). It takes place at a crucial time for the future of democracy, peace and stability in the Central African Republic. Two months after the elections of 27 December 2020, the Central African Republic remains in a critical situation indeed, with continued significant post- electoral political tensions and a new security crisis that has further worsened the humanitarian situation. In our view, our collective efforts need to be further pursued in three directions by drawing all together all the necessary lessons learnt and overcome the current crisis.”

    2021-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/187 (2021) · source

  12. “The EU therefore welcomes a 10-month renewal of the mandate to allow space for discussions on the shape of a post-2021 mission to take place. With regard to the EU, while we continue to call on all partners for a more balanced donor structure, the EU’s commitment to support peace, stability and development in Somalia is long-term. Discussions with our member States on a follow-up instrument to fund African peace support operations beyond 2021 are ongoing. That process will be informed by the parameters for Somalia’s security architecture post-2021, which are yet to be determined in more detail.”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  13. “It should allow the AU the necessary time, space and ownership to consider and act upon the conclusions of the various processes, such as the revised Somali transition plan and the independent assessment, as well as its own forthcoming analysis and assessment. We therefore encourage the AU to use this opportunity to set out its own vision and the requirements and commitments needed to ensure that a new mandate contributes to building Somalia’s ability to manage its own security in the medium term. With the appropriate political will, that will help ensure that Somalis take leadership and ownership of the country’s recovery efforts. The AU’s independent assessment and the Peace and Security Council mandate renewal in May should set a direction that can be captured in a new Council draft resolution at the end of December 2021.”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  14. “Allow me therefore to pay tribute to the ultimate price paid by the African troop- and police-contributing countries of AMISOM for the sake of peace and security in Somalia. The discussions today in the Security Council on the AMISOM mandate create an opportunity to generate a shared vision and should lead us further to explore national, regional and international expectations for Somalia’s political and security landscape post-2021. The steps that will be needed in 2021 to prepare for the implementation of the Somali transition plan, with a revision to the concept of operations and a reconfigured AU mission in 2022, must be clear. The EU considers that the renewed AMISOM mandate in the Security Council should support the Mission in this reconfiguration process.”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  15. “There is broad agreement within the international community that continued support from an international mission is necessary, that more accountability from all stakeholders is needed and that the AU is best placed to continue to provide that. Strong political engagement by the AU in Somalia will be necessary to support delivery on both political reforms and security. We recognize that, until its full drawdown, the AU will have to continue to play an important role in supporting the security transition process. Collective efforts are more needed than ever for peace and security in Somalia and the region, as well as to safeguard the progress made over the years. That progress has been possible only due to the sacrifices made by Africa’s sons and daughters.”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  16. “That requires regional and multilateral cooperation, and we welcome the leadership role of the AU in that connection, in close coordination with the United Nations and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The EU will continue to support broader engagement among partners across the wider region and wholeheartedly encourages more dialogue in that regard. Our fourth and last message is about the work ahead in 2021 and the need to define a post-2021 security framework. In building and supporting Somalia’s vision, as expressed in the Somali transition plan, we need to take into account the situation on the ground.”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  17. “Furthermore, the EU’s contribution of €23 million to the Joint Police Programme, also implemented by UNOPS, complements donor contributions from Germany and the United Kingdom. Additionally, our support of the United Nations Mine Action Service is enhancing local resilience and capacity to address the problem of explosive hazards in Somalia. Our third message is linked to the need to rebuild the former regional political consensus that existed when AMISOM was launched 10 years ago. The future stability of Somalia lies in robust and honest political engagement, both within Somalia and in the region. It should be aimed at reaching a lasting political solution with the continued engagement from regional players to serve as a positive enabler.”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  18. “The EU has also extended for another two years its Common Security and Defence Policy missions, the European Union Capacity-Building Mission in Somalia and the European Union Training Mission for Somalia, which continue to support the capacity-building of Somali security forces, both on land and at sea. Additionally, Operation Atalanta’s mandate was expanded to include the secondary executive and non-executive tasks of countering trafficking in weapons and narcotic drugs and monitoring various illegal activities at sea. With those adjustments, Operation Atalanta will support the United Nations arms embargo on Somalia and the ongoing fight against Al-Shabaab and its funding streams, while at the same time maintaining its core effort to counter piracy and protect the World Food Programme and other vulnerable shipments to Somalia.”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  19. “Since 2014, our support has amounted to almost €1.6 billion in development and humanitarian assistance. Our investment in the security sector has been substantial, totalling more than €2.1 billion to AMISOM since 2007. We have secured €100 million for AMISOM until the end of June 2021. In parallel, we have scaled up our support to provide non-lethal equipment to the Somali security forces engaged in transition operations alongside AMISOM — amounting to €40 million for 2019-2020. This has been implemented by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  20. “And how will bilateral engagement support the overall vision? A reinforced mechanism for bringing the different Somali actors and international security providers together to ensure a joined approach seems essential. A more balanced approach should further emphasize the prevention and countering of violent extremism and organized crime, including financing, as a complement to the military engagement — both on land and in the maritime domain — to counter the evolving threat. Pivoting to a more comprehensive approach to security and stabilization also requires strengthening basic service provision, justice, law enforcement and public administration, especially public financial management. The EU remains committed to Somalia’s State-building efforts.”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  21. “We further acknowledge the conclusion of the independent assessment mandated by the Security Council. Together, those milestones give us an indication of the various options to boost the current security and State-building operation. They offer a better view of what is required to counter the threat from Al-Shabaab and the various other challenges to security and State-building. Bolstering the capacity of Somalia’s security and governance actors in order to enable them to assume the responsibility for protecting their people must remain a key objective of all of Somalia’s partners. However, it is essential to address key questions and details. With regard to force generation, how many is sufficient and for what purpose? With regard to training, who will conduct it, to what standard and for what purpose?”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  22. “In that regard, we look forward to considering further details at the forthcoming force generation conference, as well as through the revised concept of operations, concerning the ways and means required to realize the plan’s ambitions. The vision set out in the revised Somali transition plan is a testament to the success of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in rebuilding Somali security and the capability of its security forces. It means that, over the coming years, the Somali authorities will increasingly need support to enable their own activities rather than rely on external forces. The revised Somali transition plan is clear that a reconfigured AU mission is best-placed to provide that support, and also recognizes that a reconfigured mission will need to retain the ability to fight Al-Shabaab.”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  23. “We encourage the Federal Government to finalize its review and formally endorse the Somali transition plan at the National Security Council, with the full participation of the Federal Government and the high-level Security and Justice Committee. Through the process of reviewing the Somali transition plan, Somalia has communicated its strategic vision. Having a plan for the future that shows a credible path to transition to Somali-led security is the best way to ensure predictability and stability for Somalia and the region, as well as to tie down donor support. However, to continue to support that ongoing process, we need to be able to understand how the Government will extend control across Somalia and what resources will be required.”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  24. “Now is therefore the time for us, together, to reinforce our commitment towards a more comprehensive political and stabilization approach. Only that can be a meaningful basis for allowing space for Somalia to lead its security post-2021 and for the African Union (AU), neighbours and partners to continue providing support. Secondly, we need to continue progress on security. Against the backdrop of multiple drivers of conflict within Somalia and across the region, we welcome the progress made in the Federal Government of Somalia-led review of the Somali transition plan in collaboration with international partners.”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  25. “All the parties must come together without delay to reduce further tensions and seek to break the current political deadlock over the holding of elections. The people of Somalia deserve the full dedication of their leaders to their safety, well- being and progress. Any progress on the security side can only underpin a political settlement, not deliver it. Conversely, sustainable security relies on a political settlement. The Government and the federal member states must reconcile and work together to achieve the best prospect for stability by addressing the root causes as well as the symptoms. If Somalia’s leaders fail to come to political arrangements, Al-Shabaab and other spoilers will benefit. The gains made to move Somalia to debt relief also risk being squandered.”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  26. “I thank you, Madam President, for the invitation to make this statement on behalf of the European Union (EU). Today we have four messages to deliver. First, it is critical to put politics at the centre. The constitutional four-year mandate of the President of Somalia ended on 8 February without a political agreement on how elections should be conducted. That is a risk for Somalia and, if not urgently addressed, it will become a risk to regional security. We urge the Somali leaders to resume dialogue and work in a spirit of compromise to overcome the last political hurdles to inclusive elections as soon as possible, respecting the agreement that they reached on 17 September 2020. Together with other partners, we have called for calm and restraint by all parties following armed tensions in Mogadishu over the weekend.”

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source