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Rovensky

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69
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1994-06-22
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1995-12-20
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un-security-council

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  1. After all the criticism, let me end on a positive note. The consultation mechanism between the Security Council, troop contributors and the Secretariat is without a doubt a step in the right direction. In fact, most delegations, troop contributors or not, acknowledge this. What is needed, however, is further improvement and refinement of the consultation mechanism so that it is less formal and more effective in ensuring closer communication and exchanges of views between the Security Council and troop contributors. We believe that the proposal introduced by Argentina, which we strongly support, achieves this goal. We thank Ambassador Cardenas and Ambassador Keating for this important and timely initiative.

    1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source

  2. One would hope that Council Members will View these consultations with troop contributors not just as a chore, but as a source of wisdom and as a relevant form of input into the formulation, as well as termination and modification, of peace-keeping-operation mandates. Let us not forget that Security Council members do not always have troops in a given peace-keeping operation, and while they have the ultimate political responsibility for formulating mandates, the practical experience from the field might not always reach them. The consultations with troop contributors give them a perfect chance to get such information firsthand. It is therefore surprising and somewhat disappointing that in several instances some members of the Security Council did not even bother to attend these consultations.

    1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source

  3. We believe that so far these consultations have been rather formal in nature. They tend to be more briefings for troop contributors that are not members of the Council than true consultations. What they lack so far is genuine dialogue. The views and recommendations expressed by troop contributors in the consultations have, in fact, very little impact on the decision-making process within the Security Council. In fact, the end results of these consultations sometimes remind us of a folk tale in which the wolf is fed and the goat remains in one piece. In our statement in the Fourth Committee, we stated, inter alia, that troop contributors are today at the mercy of Security Council members.

    1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source

  4. One of the pledges the Czech Republic made when it campaigned for a non- permanent seat on the Security Council more than two years ago was that, if elected, it would actively encourage greater transparency in the Council's working methods. We have kept that promise. We take part in the Open-ended Working Group on the reform of the Security Council, where, together with other, like-minded countries, we actively support the drive for greater transparency in the Council's working methods. By the same token, last year we supported the initiative of Argentina and New Zealand which resulted in the setting up of a consultation mechanism between the Council members, troop contributors and the Secretariat. This mechanism has been operating for a year or so, and in our View this is long enough to draw some first conclusions.

    1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source

  5. By taking this decision, the London Conference has established a proper framework for the implementation of particularly the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement and is moving the process of reconstruction into its practical phase. The role of the United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina does not end today. On the contrary, it should be revitalized. The United Nations should, together with or in parallel with other institutions and organizations, focus on activities which will contribute most to the advancement of the peace process in Bosnia. In this endeavour it can count on the full support of the Czech Republic.

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  6. They have one year to translate, with the help of the international community, the still-fragile peace into an irreversible process. Despite our great satisfaction over the success of the peace talks in Dayton and the signing of the Peace Agreement in Paris, we are very much aware of the crucial linkage between maintaining and strengthening peace in the region and the urgent need for its reconstruction. We therefore welcome the establishment, at the London Conference on implementing civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement, of the office of the High Representative, who will coordinate the reconstruction effort in the regions devastated by war. The Czech Republic also welcomes the establishment of the Peace Implementation Council and its Steering Board.

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  7. It is also the continuation of the Czech involvement in the United Nations peace-keeping efforts. IFOR, authorized by the Security Council and under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), will be in Bosnia to keep peace at the request of the parties themselves. IFOR forces will be tough and uncompromising in carrying out their mandate. Their one- year mission has clear objectives, and IFOR has the necessary means to fulfil them. The deployment of IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes a serious commitment on the part of the international community to help the peace process. However, let there be no mistake: the main burden of responsibility for the success or failure of the peace process rests squarely on the shoulders of the Bosniacs, the Croats and the Serbs.

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  8. Was it really unavoidable to spill the blood of all those innocent people and to endure all the horrific destruction and suffering, before it dawned on some politicians that true and lasting peace does not come out of a barrel of a Kalashnikov, but is achieved through dialogue at the negotiating table? The resolution that we have just adopted gives a green light to the deployment of the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Among the IFOR contingents that will in the next days pour into Bosnia and Herzegovina will be almost a thousand young men and women from my country. The decision of the Government and Parliament of the Czech Republic to participate in IFOR is an unequivocal expression of my country's deep interest in the establishment of durable peace and stability in the region of the South Slavs.

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  9. We could almost hear the world sigh with relief that the most terrible conflict to have rocked Europe since the Second World War was at last over. After four years of war, after hundreds of thousands of dead and maimed, after horrific destruction, there is finally a solid basis for peace. Guns must remain silent in Bosnia, and the order of the day for former adversaries must be reconciliation and reconstruction. While today we applaud the political leaders of the South Slavs for the courageous step that they finally took in Dayton and sealed in Paris, we cannot but think of all the death, human suffering and destruction that particularly the civilian population of the region had to endure over the past four years. Was it really impossible to achieve a political settlement that would have prevented this senseless war?

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  10. Since this is the first time my delegation has spoken this month at a formal meeting of the Security Council, let me congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of December. I should also like to express my delegation's deep appreciation to Ambassador Al-Khussaiby of Oman for the efficient way in which he and his delegation guided the affairs of the Security Council during the month of November. The formal signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Presidents of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in Paris yesterday is the most important milestone so far in the effort to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  11. Meanwhile, we trust that both parties will refrain from any military adventures, a thought which, on this particular day, seems to be so far from our minds. But then, military minds have repeatedly demonstrated that they are moved by a different logic.

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3596 (1995) · source

  12. They are willing, we understand, to pass the "hot potato" of details over to the Council and to abide by whatever details the Council might use to fill the rather vast voids in the shell of the overall Agreement. They are thus eager to pass the responsibility for the content of their Agreement to this Council, even while we in the Council have always argued that the prime responsibility for shaping their future must reside, in just about all situations, with the parties in conflict themselves. We recognize the request to establish a Transitional Administration for Sector East and will consider it expeditiously, relying on the Secretary-General's assistance. We will return to the details of this Administration on another day.

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3596 (1995) · source

  13. It subscribes to the basic principles that have been repeatedly underlined in this Council's deliberations in the past years: solving problems through negotiations; respect for human rights; the repudiation of "ethnic cleansing"; and commitment to the territorial integrity of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders. The cornerstone of the Basic Agreement is the setting up of a Transitional Administration in Sector East for one year, possibly two. However, my delegation has noted with some concern the generality of many of the provisions of the Basic Agreement. We have come to understand that the two parties managed to agree on the general language but were irreconcilably divided when it came to the details.

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3596 (1995) · source

  14. The Czech Republic has always considered the relationship between Croats and Serbs within Croatia, as well as between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be a critical one for the entire region. The siege of Vukovar, the shelling of Dubrovnik, the "ethnic cleansing" of Eastern Slavonia and, a couple of years later, of Sectors North and South punctured the monotony of even the bad news coming from the region. The Erdut-Zagreb Basic Agreement between the Government of Croatia and the Serb authorities in Eastern Slavonia punctures the monotony again - this time with hope.

    1995-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3596 (1995) · source

  15. Of course, the bulk of the blame for this situation rests on the Bosnian Serb party, which shows absolute disrespect for human lives, as well as disrespect for the efforts of the international community, including the decisions of the Security Council aimed at ending the conflict. In effect, UNPROFOR is being pushed in the wrong direction. Instead of being a part of the solution to the conflict, UNPROFOR is dangerously close to becoming a party to the conflict.

    1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source

  16. They will be tempted to repeat what they did in Srebrenica in Zepa, Gorazde and other so-called safe areas, knowing that they can do so with impunity. We believe that in the aftermath of the Bosnian Serb aggression against the safe area of Srebrenica the United Nations and its Security Council should reflect on what they want to achieve in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the region as a whole, and on whether there is the necessary capability and will to see it done. If at the end of the day they come to the conclusion that their goals cannot be achieved, either due to the lack of resources or cooperation or due to the lack of determination, they should consider other possibilities. The attitude of the Bosnian parties has made it difficult for UNPROFOR to carry out its mandate.

    1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source

  17. However, past experience shows, and not only in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that unless our demands are underpinned by a genuine resolve and determination to see them through, they will remain unfulfilled. The party to which today's resolution is particularly addressed knows this, and I am sure that its leaders will be very carefully assessing our response to their challenge. If today we have adopted just another resolution full of demands that will not be underpinned by our determination to see them fulfilled, then we will be doing more harm than good, not only to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also to the position of the Security Council. The Bosnian Serbs will be reaffirmed in their belief that Security Council resolutions are just paper tigers.

    1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source

  18. It demands that the Bosnian Serbs immediately and unconditionally release all detained UNPROFOR personnel. It also makes a number of demands. It demands that the Bosnian Serbs cease their offensive and immediately withdraw from Srebrenica. It demands that the Bosnian Serbs immediately and unconditionally release all detained UNPROFOR personnel. It also demands unimpeded access to the refugees. It calls on both parties to respect the status of the safe area of Srebrenica and the agreement on the demilitarization of Srebrenica of 18 April 1993, which, regrettably, neither of the parties has respected in the past. The demands contained in the Security Council resolution which we have just adopted are fair and should be met.

    1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source

  19. Past experience shows that the status of the safe areas is imperfect - the whole concept is unclear - but they constitute an important part of our policy aimed at the protection of civilians affected by the terrible conflict in Bosnia. The latest offensive by the Bosnian Serbs shows yet again that in their quest for more territory that does not belong to them, the suffering of thousands of innocent civilians has no meaning for them. The Security Council cannot ignore such an attitude. How the Council will respond to this situation is therefore of great significance. Very rightly, the resolution that we have just adopted condemns the Bosnian Serbs for their offensive and for detaining UNPROFOR personnel. It also makes a number of demands. It demands that the Bosnian Serbs cease their offensive and immediately withdraw from Srebrenica.

    1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source

  20. At the same time, we salute the brave soldiers of the Dutch battalion of UNPROFOR who, in a very courageous way, resisted the assault by overwhelming Bosnian Serb forces and who are now providing humanitarian assistance to the refugees from Srebrenica. The significance of the Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica for the overall situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the neighbouring regions, and its impact on that situation, cannot be overestimated. This attack constitutes a grave escalation of the Bosnian conflict. For the first time, a United Nations-declared safe area has been occupied. By occupying it, the Bosnian Serbs have crossed a new and dangerous threshold. It is clear that they are testing the patience and resolve of the international community, to see how far they can push and bully with impunity.

    1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source

  21. As this is the first time my delegation has spoken in a formal meeting of the Security Council this month I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for July. The Czech delegation strongly condemns the offensive by the Bosnian Serb forces against the safe area of Srebrenica. During the fighting the Bosnian Serb forces occupied the town of Srebrenica, attacked with heavy weapons United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) positions and detained a number of UNPROFOR personnel. More than 20,000 civilians fled Srebrenica in the face of the Bosnian Serb onslaught, and they are now at the centre of a grave humanitarian crisis. The attack by the Bosnian Serbs against Srebrenica is totally unacceptable, and we strongly condemn it.

    1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source

  22. Finally, my delegation would like to pay special tribute to the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Rwanda, the Force Commander and the personnel of UNAMIR for their outstanding and tireless work, which greatly contributes to the cause of peace and stability in Rwanda.

    1995-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3542 (1995) · source

  23. This is a very disturbing development, which, if unchecked, could very seriously threaten the still fragile stability of the country and could create a new crisis. We therefore welcome the fact that resolution 997 (1995) calls on States neighbouring Rwanda to ensure that arms and other military materiel which might be used in Rwanda do not fall into the wrong hands. In this context, we also welcome the proposal to station United Nations military observers in the countries neighbouring Rwanda, and we strongly urge their respective Governments to cooperate fully with the United Nations in this matter.

    1995-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3542 (1995) · source

  24. With respect to the long-term solution of the various problems which Rwanda is currently facing, it is clear that a regional approach is needed here. My delegation therefore welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to explore the possibilities of convening the regional Conference on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region. Although the security environment in Rwanda has improved over the past year, thanks to the efforts of the Rwandese security forces and of UNAMIR, the overall security situation is clearly still far from ideal. There are persistent reports of the rearming of elements of the former Rwandan regime and of an increase in cross- border armed incursions by these elements into Rwanda.

    1995-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3542 (1995) · source

  25. This is why it is imperative to set up as soon as possible with international assistance an effective national judicial system and to get the International Tribunal for Rwanda fully operational. Another important element of stability is the economic situation of the country. Rwanda's economy and infrastructure have been devastated by the vicious civil war. Rwanda cannot by itself cope with this huge problem, which, inter alia, further complicates the speedy return and reintegration of refugees. Not enough has been done by the international community so far to improve the situation. It is therefore imperative to accelerate the disbursement of international economic assistance pledged to Rwanda, which will help it in its short-term economic recovery.

    1995-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3542 (1995) · source

  26. Obviously, there can be no genuine national reconciliation unless a climate of stability, tolerance and trust is created which will encourage the 2 million refugees and displaced persons to return home. To create a climate conducive to the return of the refugees is the primary responsibility of the Government of Rwanda. It has to do its utmost to prevent abuse of the returning refugees, and if such abuse does take place it must punish those responsible according to the law. It is clear that the success of national reconciliation is directly linked to the process of bringing to justice the people responsible for the genocide and other criminal acts which were committed during last year's civil war. The longer it takes, the longer and less successful will the process of national reconciliation be.

    1995-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3542 (1995) · source

  27. Another important task will be the provision of assistance in the training of the Rwandan national police force. UNAMIR, which will be substantially reduced in strength, will carry out its mandate with full respect for the Rwandan Government's sovereign authority. The improvement in the overall situation in Rwanda is the result of great efforts exerted by the Government of Rwanda, with the assistance of other member States of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the international community in general. However, despite all the positive achievements, a lot still needs to be done before Rwanda returns to normal and before there is true national reconciliation, which is a crucial prerequisite for the long-term stability and prosperity of the country.

    1995-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3542 (1995) · source

  28. Resolution 997 (1995) adjusts the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda so that it reflects in a better way the present situation prevailing in that country, especially the improved security environment. On the basis of this adjusted mandate, UNAMIR will concentrate on a confidence-building role rather than on peace-keeping. It will assist the Rwandese Government with the process of confidence- building, with the reintegration of the returning refugees into their home communities and with the distribution of humanitarian aid. Furthermore, UNAMIR will be entrusted with the task of protecting the personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and the various non-governmental organizations performing humanitarian activities in Rwanda.

    1995-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3542 (1995) · source

  29. The Secretary-General in his report on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) indicates that a climate of relative stability has prevailed in Rwanda and that the country, which last year was stricken by genocide, is now largely at peace. The long and arduous process of recovery has begun. It is clear from the report that the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda has so far been a success. Over the past year UNAMIR has assisted the Rwandan people in achieving and maintaining peace, and it has also made a significant contribution to the normalization of the situation in Rwanda. It is also clear that the continuing presence of UNAMIR in Rwanda is essential if the process of stabilization and confidence-building in the country is to continue.

    1995-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3542 (1995) · source

  30. Mr. President, first allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I should also like to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Merimee of France and his delegation for the excellent way in which the affairs of the Council were guided last month. Resolution 997 (1995), which the Council has just unanimously adopted, marks the beginning of a new stage of United Nations involvement in Rwanda. At this juncture, therefore, it would be fitting to consider how successful the efforts to bring peace and stability to that long-suffering African country have been.

    1995-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3542 (1995) · source

  31. We urge both parties to create, with the assistance of international humanitarian organizations, conditions which would facilitate the return of thousands of displaced Angolans to their homes. In conclusion, I should like to convey our deep appreciation to the Secretary-General, the troika of observer States - Portugal, the United States of America and the Russian Federation - and the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, for having contributed greatly to the success of the negotiating process.

    1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source

  32. III is an encouraging sign of confidence in the process of national reconciliation in Angola. We are grateful that this confidence is reflected in the language of our resolution. We consider it important that the resolution was drafted very carefully and that the Security Council took into consideration all important elements needed not only for an early launch of this new peace-keeping operation, but also for its effective functioning and its successful conclusion. We also underline that, in accordance with this resolution, the Security Council will be ready to review the role of the United Nations in Angola if the cooperation required from the parties is not forthcoming or is substantially delayed. We do not forget the fact that many Angolan civilians are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance.

    1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source

  33. After the flourishing of peace and democracy in Mozambique, successful national reconciliation and the strengthening of democracy in Angola would represent another positive example for Africa, which presently is the theatre of more internal conflicts than any other part of the world. Based on the Secretary-General's overall positive evaluation of the situation in Angola, as indicated in his report, the Czech Republic, whose military observers actively participated in UNAVEM. II operations, fully supports the deployment of UNAVEM. III. We expect in particular at this stage that the cease-fire arrangements will be meticulously implemented by both sides in good faith. The fact that a number of countries have expressed their readiness to contribute their personnel and material to UNAVEM.

    1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source

  34. However, we are concerned by indications that, a mere few weeks into the implementation of the Protocol, the process is already slipping behind schedule. It would hardly be acceptable for this trend to continue. It is necessary for the Angolan parties to implement the Lusaka Protocol in accordance with the agreed timetable and even to try to accelerate the whole process. We believe that the OAU has an important role to play in pushing the peace process in Angola forward. Based on lessons from the past, the United Nations and the OAU have to work together to bring peace, stability and development to Angola and the region.

    1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source

  35. It is up to them to make sure that the letter and the spirit of the Lusaka agreements are scrupulously adhered to in the months ahead. The United Nations and its Security Council will of course support them in their quest for lasting peace and reconciliation. However, this role cannot but be a supporting one and should be understood as such by the Angolan parties. The Angolan parties also carry the primary responsibility for the safety and freedom of movement of United Nations and other personnel deployed under UNAVEM. III. We hope that the intended meeting between the President of Angola, Mr. dos Santos, and the leader of UN ITA, Mr. Savimbi, will give new impetus to the peace process. The Czech Republic welcomes the first successful steps taken by both parties in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

    1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source

  36. The resolution which the Council has just adopted marks a very important step forward along this path. By authorizing the establishment of the new United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) peace-keeping operation, the international community - and, on its behalf, the Security Council - has firmly committed itself to aid the process of national reconciliation in Angola. But let me stress that even the best-drafted Security Council resolution cannot in itself guarantee the success of the political settlement in Angola and the return of lasting peace and prosperity to this long-suffering African country. It is none other than the Government of Angola and the leaders of UNITA who bear primary responsibility for the success or failure of the peace process.

    1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source

  37. First of all, let me express my delegation's delight in seeing you, Sir, presiding over today's important meeting of the Council. At the same time, we congratulate your delegation on the assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. You have our full support and confidence. I would also like to express our high appreciation for the effective and business-like manner in which Ambassador Cardenas of Argentina guided the affairs of the Council during January. Finally, let me welcome sincerely the Foreign Minister of Angola and all the members of the ministerial delegation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the Security Council. The signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994 opened the path towards peace and stability in Angola.

    1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source

  38. By successfully completing the task it was authorized to undertake by paragraph 4 of resolution 940 (1994), the multinational force has demonstrated the usefulness, in some circumstances, of the Security Council's entrusting groups of States with enforcement action. We see this as an exceptional measure, to be used when all else fails. But, following the non-implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, we saw that in Haiti all else had indeed failed. In following the progress of the MNF, the Security Council benefited from frequent, detailed and on-the-record reports provided on behalf of the MNF by the United States delegation. We are grateful for this reporting effort. We salute and thank all members of the MNF and wish equal success to the new UNMIH force.

    1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source

  39. These are some of the reasons why we understand the need for a massive infusion of United Nations personnel to take over from the MNF. This step meets with our full approval. Resolution 940 (1994) anticipates that the task of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) will be accomplished no later than February 1996; we hope that this will be long enough for it to complete its job. President Aristide has attained some important political successes, especially in having consolidated his Cabinet. We are encouraged by the definite steps that have been taken towards holding parliamentary elections, and we encourage Haiti's authorities to hold them at the earliest convenient time. We have every expectation that once they take place the United Nations will certify them as having been free and fair.

    1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source

  40. However, a lot remains to be done. The previous regime appears to have been so corrupt that purging the security and judicial apparatus, to name just two examples, of unwelcome elements has led to their almost total collapse. The task of the new Government is thus to build them up from scratch, a task even more arduous than just revamping them. At the same time, all dangers to the country's fledgling democracy have not disappeared. We feel that a truly terrifying quantity of arms is circulating or is cached in the country, and we are uncertain about the paramilitary elements that seem to be hibernating for the moment, perhaps awaiting a more propitious time to show signs of life again. Efforts to disarm them may not have been assiduous enough so far.

    1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source

  41. My delegation has been following closely the activities of the Multinational Force in Haiti, and is delighted both with the substantial progress that has been attained and with the way in which it has been attained - that is, largely non-violently. Indeed, it is hard to recall many other changes of a political order as radical as the one that has occurred in Haiti where the level of violence in resolving the crisis would have been as low, especially in View of the high level of violence that prevailed while the crisis itself lasted. We congratulate the Multinational Force (MNF) and the people of Haiti on this remarkable accomplishment. We note with great satisfaction that the situation with respect to the observance of human rights and the security situation in the country has improved immensely over the past few months.

    1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source

  42. Finally, let me express my delegation's conviction that the views and recommendations which will emerge from today's deliberations will contribute greatly towards finding the right approaches and mechanisms for enhancing effectiveness and transparency in the work of the Security Council. This would in turn, without any doubt, boost the prestige of the Security Council in the eyes of the broad membership of the United Nations.

    1994-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3483 (1994) · source

  43. My delegation is therefore of the view that formal meetings of the Security Council with the participation of non-Council members should be convened primarily to debate key issues, such as emergency situations threatening international peace and security or important decisions concerning peace-keeping operations. In this connection, we agree with the statement in the French proposal where it states that there is no question of establishing automaticity in the convening of these meetings. The well-established practice of informal consultations, criticized though it is by some non-Council members, has proved its usefulness and, in the view of my delegation, should be preserved in its present form.

    1994-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3483 (1994) · source

  44. As a non-permanent member of the Council, we wholeheartedly welcome the prospect of appropriate provisions of the Charter and the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council being used to the full extent to facilitate broader exchanges of views between Council members and non- Council members on important issues of international peace and security. In this context, we view most of the suggestions put forward by the French delegation as useful and worthy of consideration. At the same time, we believe that it is imperative that the right balance be struck between the legitimate goal of greater transparency, on the one hand, and the equally important principle of efficiency and effectiveness, on the other. The Security Council's efficiency and effectiveness should, if anything, be improved by the envisaged changes.

    1994-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3483 (1994) · source

  45. There are regular meetings between troop contributors, members of the Security Council and representatives of the Secretariat. Although these steps go in the right direction, they are obviously not sufficient. Further effort is needed to make the routine of the Security Council less rigid, more transparent and, from the point of view of many non- Council members, more democratic. My delegation therefore welcomes the aide-memoire prepared by the delegation of France, which contains several interesting proposals for increasing transparency in the work of the Security Council.

    1994-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3483 (1994) · source

  46. My delegation shares the view expressed by a number of preceding speakers that some of the working methods of the Security Council are outdated and should be revised in order to enhance efficiency and achieve greater transparency in the Council's decision-making process. We are also aware of the fair amount of criticism levelled by Member States at the Security Council's mode of operation, which is viewed as unnecessarily rigid and secretive. On the other hand, we believe that over the past year the Security Council has responded, at least to some degree, to this criticism and addressed the issue of greater transparency in its activities. The practice of regular briefings by the President of the Security Council to non-Council members on the work of the Council has been introduced.

    1994-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3483 (1994) · source

  47. My delegation trusts that the Council will pursue the goal of long-term support for Haiti with the same determination it has shown when considering and adopting this important resolution.

    1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source

  48. We are pleased that the Security Council's actions have the full support of democratically-elected representatives of Haiti, and we are confident that this support will be extended to the group of States which will form the multinational force. By adopting today's resolution, the Security Council has not only launched a new and decisive phase in the effort by the international community to take Haiti out of the hands of the military junta and restore democracy on the island. It has also committed itself to a long-term programme of support for Haiti. We strongly believe that there should be continuous close cooperation and coordination in this respect between the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

    1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source

  49. We are grateful to the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Haiti, which has worked closely and intensively with the members of the Council in considering a number of important and far-reaching issues, which are contained in the resolution. The clarity of the mandate and a clear definition of both phases of the envisaged operation, the role of the United Nations observers in the operation, as well as its time-frame, have been at the forefront of our attention. My delegation believes that all important aspects of the mission should have been addressed in the resolution in a clear and satisfactory manner.

    1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source

  50. 24 The resolution which the Council has just adopted proves them wrong. It sends a clear, unequivocal and final message to the junta: get out or you will be forced out. Resolution 940 (1994) is unique. For the first time in its history, the Security Council has authorized Member States to use all necessary means to restore democracy in a United Nations Member State, and to create conditions for a better and more dignified life for its population. Because of the unique character of this mission, the Security Council members have considered the key parts of the draft resolution with particular attention and care.

    1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source