YouSaid · the spoken record

Sahovie

lines on the record: 109
first: 2001-06-22
most recent: 2004-01-26
sittings or episodes: 11
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Bearing all this in mind, it might be useful to look at the possibilities of combining the capabilities of the United Nations and regional organizations in the field of assisting post-conflict reconciliation. The United Nations can provide the necessary assistance in the short to medium term, while regional organizations could in many respects be better positioned to engage in such an endeavour on a long-term basis. Such broad international support by the United Nations and regional actors in strengthening institutions and a democratic base can help post-conflict societies to embark on a reconciliation process, to look for the truth and to go through often-needed catharsis.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“The most valuable contribution the United Nations can make to post-conflict societies is helping them to rebuild as quickly as possible functioning political structures that offer the possibility of bridging various competing loyalties. Assistance in strengthening the rule of law in general, and specifically the judiciary, should be among the top priorities. The role of international justice is sometimes unavoidable. However, all efforts must be made to separate the administration of justice from domestic political considerations in countries under the jurisdiction of international tribunals or courts. The newly-established International Criminal Court has a potential to meet this requirement.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“This will should then be translated into a set of activities promoted and guided by the authorities. Civil society also has an extremely important role to play. However, the United Nations and other international organizations can assist in creating conditions conducive to reconciliation. Understanding the nature of a conflict and healing are lengthy processes, sometimes spanning several generations. This fact alone is a serious limitation to United Nations involvement that the Organization needs to overcome if it wants to engage systematically in reconciliation activities. Crises emerge in various parts of the world, shifting attention from one place to another. At the same time, every United Nations operation, from the moment it is launched, contemplates an exit strategy.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“What appears to be clear is that much greater resolve and consistency are necessary on the part of UNMIK in order to begin, first, to create a safe environment for non-Albanians and fully to ensure their human rights, and then to include them meaningfully in political life. Half measures, leaning towards one side and neglecting the other, will just perpetuate the conflict between communities. When a degree of normalcy is introduced, a very long period of sustained, primarily domestically-generated effort will be needed if any reconciliation is to take place in Kosovo and Metohija. Our experience points to several conclusions about the possible United Nations role in reconciliation processes. Reconciliation relies primarily on the existence of a strong political will among the parties to the former conflict to open such a process.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“Of course, their positions changed in a reversal of fortune following the 1999 intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but they are still in confrontation and one of them - the Serbian community - is struggling to survive. Only symbolic numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons have returned and no perpetrators of crimes against non-Albanians have been brought to justice. The underlying problem is that the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has not yet succeeded in creating even basic conditions conducive to the opening of a political debate among the communities about the modalities for their coexistence in Kosovo and Metohija. Again, as in the previous example, there are many reasons for this failure, and they are very complex indeed.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“We therefore believe that internal efforts to administer justice are of vital importance. The domestic judiciary is, in the long run, much better positioned to seek justice for victims. Domestic verdicts would be more easily accepted than those passed by international - that is, foreign - courts or tribunals. It is also necessary for Governments to promote strongly a culture of lawfulness if there is to be a hope of true reconciliation. The second example is the province of Kosovo and Metohija in my country. Now in their fifth year under United Nations administration, ethnic communities remain as far apart as ever.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“The reasons for that are many and complex, and I do not want to imply in any way that all shortcomings are on the side of the Tribunal. For example, some aspects of the Tribunal's activities went beyond the stated aims of resolution 827 (1993), actually entering the sphere of domestic politics. Hence, the Tribunal has been and continues to be largely perceived by our public as a political tool rather than an instrument of justice. As a consequence, the work of the Tribunal has become a high-priority issue on the domestic political agenda, significantly overshadowing its role of bringing the perpetrators of crimes to justice. When political and legal questions mix and individual and collective responsibilities overlap, confusion is created that is harmful to any attempt at reconciliation.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“Of course, there is a tribunal established by the Security Council to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia since 1991. The aim, as stated in Security Council resolution 827 (1993), was to bring to justice those who were responsible for those violations, to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace and to contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively redressed. Some of the aforementioned aims have been achieved. True, some of the persons indicted are still at large and they must be brought to justice. The question is what impact the Tribunal has had so far in terms of reconciliation. In my country, the Tribunal's work and practices have not, unfortunately, contributed much to the promotion of the cause of reconciliation.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“In fact, the improvement of relations with neighbours is a top priority of my Government. The international community is encouraging this approach, which is very helpful. While much certainly remains to be done in order to further improve relations, concrete positive results are already visible. However, on a different level, improvement is not so visible. Mistrust still prevails at the grass-roots level. There are different opinions on crucial questions of responsibility for what had happened. Perceptions differ on who were the victims and who the perpetrators. Basically, within and among the societies in question, an understanding of some sort needs to be reached on the causes and consequences of the conflicts and wars before substantial reconciliation can be sought. In that regard, the role of justice is central.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“A genuine internal process is necessary and local actors must take responsibility for pushing it forward. My delegation aligns itself with today's statement by the European Union. Nevertheless, I would like to elaborate, from my national perspective, two examples relevant to the topic under discussion. The first is the former Yugoslavia. Obviously, this is a complex situation, since peoples that once lived in one multinational society now need to achieve reconciliation in an inter-State context. Indeed, following the end of military operations in 1995, inter- State relations have improved. All countries involved, including mine, share the aspiration of joining mainstream European and Euro-Atlantic integrations. There is a realization that good-neighbourly relations must be developed in this process.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“Certainly, a level of stability has to be introduced before practical steps towards reconciliation are attempted. Establishing security, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, is a basic precondition. Subsequently, in the process of post-conflict governance, institutions need to be put in place, the judiciary should begin to function and economic recovery has to be jumpstarted. There are certainly many other areas that post-conflict societies have to deal with along the way to national reconciliation. However, all these measures should be tailored to the actual needs and traditions of the country in question, taking into account the circumstances that triggered the conflict in the first place. Ready-made solutions cannot merely be imposed from the outside.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“Mr. President, I would like to join other speakers in thanking you for organizing this debate on national reconciliation in post-conflict situations and the role that the United Nations can or should play in that respect. Indeed, the issue of reconciliation is crucial for my country and, for that matter, for the entire region of South-East Europe, parts of which have experienced a series of conflicts over the past decade. Unfortunately, there are also many other areas in the world where, in different circumstances and against a different background, reconciliation must be achieved as an element of post-conflict stabilization. This brings us to the question of whether there is a set of general principles or a number of general steps to be taken in post-conflict situations to facilitate reconciliation and eventually achieve that objective.”
2004-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4903Resumption1 (2004) · source
“If such solutions are imposed, it can only further complicate the situation. On the other hand, only a balanced approach and mutually acceptable solutions can lead to much- needed stability in Kosovo and Metohija and in the region as a whole.”
2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source
“The implementation of the "standards before status" policy is a real opportunity to translate that principle of cooperation into practice for the benefit of all concerned. The implementation plan should also establish a continuous mechanism for transparently reviewing progress in implementing the standards. Such a mechanism must provide for regular and active involvement by Serbia and Montenegro, whose sovereignty over Kosovo and its territorial integrity are basic elements of resolution 1244 (1999). No one should doubt that a stable and democratic Kosovo and Metohija, where human rights are fully respected, is in the best interests of Serbia and Montenegro. To that end, we stand ready to work with the international community. Without involvement by all concerned, including Belgrade, durable and sustainable solutions cannot be found.”
2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source
“Such a plan should devise a set of measurable criteria for assessing implementation of the standards. It should also preclude the possibility of lowering the level of the standards themselves or of allowing for different interpretations of the criteria for their implementation. Serbia and Montenegro emphasizes its willingness to engage constructively in the preparation of the plan. My Government expects to consult regularly and substantively with the Special Representative on this matter, and we seek the Security Council's support in that regard. I am grateful for the comments of the representative of the United Kingdom on this issue. The need for continued and constructive cooperation between our Government and UNMIK was recognized more than two years ago in the Common Document of 5 November 2001.”
2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source
“With regard to the issue of privatization, we continue to request full respect for the rights of owners and users and for the rights of the Republic of Serbia in the privatization process and in defining the status of public and commercial debts. Serbia is a major creditor to companies in Kosovo and Metohija; it provided guarantees for foreign loans granted to them. It should be quite obvious that those companies cannot be put up for sale without the consent of major creditors. We expect that issue to be properly addressed in the near future. UNMIK's cooperation with Serbia and Montenegro in the preparation of the "Standards for Kosovo" document was insufficient and lacked substance. That should not be the case in the future, especially with regard to the standards implementation plan called for by the Security Council.”
2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source
“It seems necessary to recall that the original standards/ benchmarks require the KPC to thoroughly comply with its mandate as a civilian emergency organization. However, according to the extensive UNMIK/Kosovo Force investigation, 12 KPC officers are suspected of involvement in the terrorist bombing of the railway bridge in Loziste in April 2003. Given that fact and the general security context in the province, it is difficult to believe that those officers were essentially offered a six-month paid leave pending the results of a police investigation. We are not aware of any similar examples of tolerance for that kind of activity anywhere else. Furthermore, we do not consider it to be an auspicious beginning for the establishment of security for all and the rule of law in the province.”
2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source
“However, that has not yet happened, and the reason has nothing to do with the elections in Serbia, but solely with the refusal of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government to take part in the process. We therefore look forward to the results of the calls by the Security Council, the Contact Group and the European Union for the start of working group meetings. Once again, we reaffirm that Serbia and Montenegro is fully prepared - as has been the case from the very beginning - to engage in discussions on practical issues of mutual interest that would improve the daily lives of all inhabitants of Kosovo and Metohija. I should also like to reiterate that the composition of the Pristina working groups must be multi-ethnic. I now turn to the issue of the KPC.”
2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source
“In a related development, we have yet again witnessed an attempt by the Kosovo Assembly to overstep its authority and to encroach on the Special Representative's reserved responsibilities by challenging the UNMIK definition of applicable law in Kosovo and Metohija. We welcome the fact that the Special Representative promptly declared the Assembly's decision to be invalid, and we look forward to further information on steps taken to avoid that kind of action in future. Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina is one of the standards envisaged in the original UNMIK standards/benchmarks as well as in the new "Standards for Kosovo" document. The launching of the dialogue on 14 October in Vienna foresaw the speedy commencement of expert-level talks in four working groups.”
2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source
“As the Government of Serbia stated on 8 December, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) rejected, inter alia, the proposals to make the unconditional and progressive return of refugees and displaced persons a key standard for Kosovo and Metohija, to require full protection of cultural heritage and to list measures to reform the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Our Government considers the last-minute deletion, under pressure from the Provisional Institutions of Self- Government, of the introductory paragraph of the "Standards for Kosovo" document to be an equal cause for serious concern. How can one justify the removal of the reference to resolution 1244 (1999), the Constitutional Framework and other applicable law and the original standards/benchmarks as the basis for that important document?”
2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source
“Once again, I should like to emphasize my Government's principled support for the "standards before status" concept, including the sequence of events that it clearly defines. Democratic standards leading to a multi-ethnic society based on the rule of law and respect for human rights must be achieved before a political discussion aimed at determining the final status of the province is considered. However, the "Standards for Kosovo" document, submitted a week ago by Special Representative Harri Holkeri as the first stage of the implementation of the "standards before status" policy, raises serious concerns. Primarily, the document failed to define the standards in a way that would open up prospects for the creation of a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo and Metohija.”
2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source
“At the outset, I should like to congratulate Bulgaria on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I should also like to take this opportunity to say that we highly appreciate the fact that you, Sir, are personally presiding over the Council's deliberations today, which is a sign of the great importance that Bulgaria attaches to regional issues. In addition, I thank Under-Secretary-General Guehenno for his detailed briefing. The current stage of making the "standards before status" policy operational signifies a new and exceptionally important step in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), which is the basic framework for addressing the issue of Kosovo and Metohija.”
2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source
“My Government is actively undertaking efforts in various areas of cooperation, as I indicated earlier. Whether the cooperation is full or not is a question of perception, much like the question of whether a glass is half full or half empty. I want to emphasize that, in the past three years, we have filled the glass significantly; we will continue to fill it until it is full. It is a process, and to complete it successfully, we also need constructive engagement and understanding on the part of the Tribunal, especially the Office of the Prosecutor.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“Serbia and Montenegro complied with that request, which was related only to documents of the Supreme Defence Council. Unfortunately, however, the report failed to mention the 19 June decision of the Chamber relating to the same case, rejecting the prosecution's request for general access to State archives. Therefore, it was the Chamber itself - not our Government - that limited this kind of general access to the Prosecutor. Regardless, Serbia and Montenegro is continuing to search for modalities to facilitate the Tribunal's access to the State archives. I should like to conclude by stating that Serbia and Montenegro stands ready to cooperate further with the ICTY. I agree with the Prosecutor that our cooperation with the ICTY is complex; it is so for many reasons. However, I cannot agree that our cooperation is not proactive.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“Fourthly, regarding requests for documentation, Serbia and Montenegro has, inter alia, handed over to the ICTY all existing transcripts from the Supreme Defence Council meetings; verbatim records from all closed sessions of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia; and 74 confidential documents of the Counter- Intelligence Service of the Yugoslav Army. Altogether, we have handed over to the Tribunal more than 7,000 classified documents since the beginning of 2001. Permit me in this context once again to draw the attention of the Council to the mention in the report of the June 5 decision of the Trial Chamber pursuant to rule 54 bis, granting the prosecution's request for a binding order requiring Serbia and Montenegro to produce certain documents to the Tribunal in connection with the Milosevic case.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“We therefore find it necessary to point out that the voluntary surrenders are also the result of decisive efforts on the part of the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro to cooperate with the Tribunal, and lead to the same results as do the arrests of indictees. Hence, with all due respect, the transfer of a former President, a former head of State Security and several army officers should not be qualified as a mere "assisting with some voluntary surrenders". Thirdly, with regard to access to witnesses and suspects, 130 individuals - including three former heads of State - were released of the obligation not to disclose State, military or official secrets in order to testify before the ICTY. Proceedings are under way to release a further nine individuals from the same requirement. The process will continue.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“Proceedings are under way for the surrender of Vladimir Kovacevic, a former officer of the Yugoslav Army indicted for crimes in Dubrovnik. It is our hope that this list will serve to clarify possible misunderstandings arising from the data offered in the ICTY report. Namely, the chapter on the activities of the Prosecutor states that only one indictee - Veselin Sljivancanin - had been arrested, leading to the Prosecutor's conclusion that "Unfortunately Serbia and Montenegro apart from assisting with some voluntary surrenders, has failed to act upon most of the outstanding Tribunal arrest warrants" (S/2003/829, p. 52). We do not really understand why the Prosecutor seems to be saying that voluntary surrenders of the accused, followed by their transfer to the ICTY, are somehow of lesser value than arrests leading to the same transfers.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“All internal legal obstacles to full cooperation with the ICTY were thus removed. Secondly, in the past year, Serbia and Montenegro transferred the following indictees to the Tribunal: Milan Milutinovic, former President of Serbia, who voluntarily surrendered on 20 January 2003; Vojislav Seselj, President of the Serbian Radical Party and member of the Federal Parliament, who surrendered on 24 February 2003; Franko Simatovic, former commander of the State Security Special Units, was arrested and transferred to the Tribunal on 30 May 2003; Miroslav Radic, former officer of the Yugoslav Army, indicted for crimes in Vukovar, surrendered on 17 May 2003; Jovica Stanisic, former head of State Security of Serbia, was arrested and on 11 June 2003 transferred to the ICTY; Zeljko Meakic, former commander of the notorious Omarska camp in Bosnia and Herzegovina, surrendered on 4 July 2003; Veselin Sljivancanin, former officer of the Yugoslav Army - the last of the so-called Vukovar Three - was arrested and transferred on 1 July 2003; and Mitar Rasevic, indicted for events in Foca, Bosnia and Herzegovina, surrendered on 9 August 2003.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“First, I want to reiterate the position of the Government of Serbia and Montenegro that the individual responsibility of all perpetrators of war crimes committed during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia should be established in proceedings before both the ICTY and national courts. In this context, I would also like to state my Government's full commitment to implementing Security Council resolution 1503 (2003). Secondly, I will now offer a brief update on the results of my country's cooperation with the ICTY since the matter was last debated before the Council. First, the Law on Cooperation with the Tribunal was amended in accordance with the ICTY Statute. Article 39 of that law, preventing the surrender of any accused indicted by the Tribunal after the passage of that Law, was deleted.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“We also listened to the statement of Chief Prosecutor Ms. Carla Del Ponte with great interest and attention, as always. I must say that I disagree with some of the points she made, although I do agree with others. What I mostly disapprove of is the manner in which the Prosecutor passes judgement, basically of a political nature, on the authorities of Member States here in the Security Council. That is not helpful. I spoke in some detail this morning in the General Assembly about the report of the ICTY, and I will try to save the Council's valuable time by limiting my statement to just a few points.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“I wish first of all to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency for this month and to thank you for having convened this very important meeting. I wish also to express our appreciation to Judge Mase and Prosecutor Jallow of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). My delegation would like to thank the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Judge Theodor Meron, for his comprehensive briefings - yesterday on the referral of war crimes cases to national jurisdictions, and today on general aspects of the Tribunal's work, both in the General Assembly and here in the Council. We appreciate Judge Meron's assessment that the cooperation of my country with the Tribunal has improved, although much more needs to be done. We are fully aware of that.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“We expect that the talks, within the framework of resolution 1244 (1999), will help to improve the security situation in the province, enhance human and minority rights and, consequently, step up the returns process. Mr. Holkeri's role in those talks is extremely important, as is the support of the Contact Group and the European Union in this process. In conclusion, I want to emphasize that Serbia and Montenegro has recently reconfirmed at the highest parliamentary level its commitment to the implementation of resolution 1244 (1999) and its fundamental aim of building a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo and Metohija, one in which all inhabitants can have a peaceful and normal life based on substantial autonomy and meaningful self- government.”
2003-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4823 (2003) · source
“Serbia and Montenegro is looking forward to the Contact Group's further activities. In that context, we wish to establish regular dialogue with the Group in order to continue to contribute to the implementation of resolution 1244 (1999) as well as, more broadly, to the stabilization of the region. The Security Council, the Contact Group and Special Representative Holkeri are calling for an early start of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. Serbia and Montenegro stands fully ready to engage constructively in all discussions of importance to the daily lives of all citizens of Kosovo and Metohija, regardless of their ethnicity.”
2003-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4823 (2003) · source
“Perhaps it was on the basis of renewed hope for minority protection that the 200 remaining Serbs in Cernica - the venue of the aforementioned attack on 31 August * decided to stay in the province. However, we fear that, if crimes and terrorist acts continue with impunity, any future decision by the Serb community to leave Kosovo and Metohija permanently may be irreversible. My Government welcomes the renewed engagement of the Contact Group on the issue of Kosovo and Metohija. We find particularly important the Contact Group's confirmation in Moscow of the relevance of the principle of "standards before status" and of the need to make the benchmarks concept operational, as well as the emphasis on continuous international control of the implementation of related requirements.”
2003-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4823 (2003) · source
“It is encouraging that the international community has demonstrated, at several high-level meetings during the last few days, a common dedication to ending the cycle of violence and extremism. In that regard, we are looking forward to concrete measures against the Albanian National Army (ANA), which in April was proclaimed by UNMIK to be a terrorist organization, as well as to the findings of the special UNMIK/KFOR board set up last spring to coordinate action against suspected extremist infiltration in the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). It is our sincere hope that that decisiveness with regard to improving the security situation will boost the thus far highly unsatisfactory pace in the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.”
2003-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4823 (2003) · source
“Holkeri's priorities to establish the rule of law, ensure basic rights and freedoms, fight organized crime, build multi-ethnic institutions and enhance economic development as basic preconditions for lasting stability in the province. In particular, my Government welcomes the new Special Representative's commitment to promptly address the security situation, especially violence against the Serb community. We share his view that the motive for the latest attacks was to send the message that multi-ethnicity would not be allowed to take hold in the province. We support Mr. Holkeri's position that the international community must be resolute in its stand that it will not be intimated from fulfilling the mandate of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).”
2003-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4823 (2003) · source
“We view the further deterioration of the security situation with extreme concern, particularly bearing in mind the fact that neither the perpetrators of the Gorazdevac atrocity of 13 August, the killers of the Serb fisherman Dragan Tonic, who was killed on 11 August in Skulanovo, nor the Cernica bombers, have been apprehended. We also regret that those responsible for the 3 August murder of UNMIK police officer Satish Menon have not been found. The new Special Representative of the Secretary- General, Mr. Harri Holkeri, assumed his responsibilities and clearly difficult tasks against that background. He has yet to settle in Pristina, but we can already discern his resolve to confront the existing problems. We welcome Mr.”
2003-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4823 (2003) · source
“At the outset, I wish to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of September, as well as to thank you for convening this meeting. I would also like to thank Mr. Annabi for his briefing. In recent months the Security Council has held a series of discussions that have mostly been devoted to the escalation of violence and ethnically motivated crimes in Kosovo and Metohija. The need for that was obvious. In July, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) reported an increased number of incidents, stating that the Serbian population was the primary target of intimidation. Regrettably, we witnessed even worse crimes in August, including a bomb attack in the village of Cernica on 31 August that killed Milomir Stakic and wounded four other civilians.”
2003-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4823 (2003) · source
“However, as the Secretary-General stated on the occasion of the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999), what counts is not only the commitment to peace, but also the will to implement it. I can assure the Security Council of my country's willingness to participate constructively in this process.”
2003-06-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4770 (2003) · source
“In the last two and a half years we have consistently demonstrated the political will to constructively participate in its implementation, as evidenced by our support for the electoral processes in 2001 and 2002 and our active participation in formulating the November 2001 common document on cooperation with UNMIK. However, to a great extent, efforts to cooperate with UNMIK have been a one-way process. We expect channels of cooperation to be re- established in the near future. A constructive policy of transparency by UNMIK - including in the privatization process - will be a necessary new element in future communications between our Government and UNMIK. There seems to be common agreement that the work in Kosovo and Metohija is far from done. Stability and prosperity are our shared goals.”
2003-06-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4770 (2003) · source
“According to the Kosovo Trust Agency model, the burden of privatization - primarily a sovereign debt of close to $1.5 billion - first falls squarely upon the budget of Serbia and Serbian creditor companies or owners of soon-to-be privatized businesses in Kosovo and Metohija, then on Serbian guarantor banks and, finally, on workers who are currently displaced. Among other obvious consequences, that model is certain to adversely affect the return of internally displaced persons. However, nothing but the loss of life is irreversible. We expect that those legitimate concerns will be addressed prior to the full implementation of the process of privatization. We stand ready to further discuss these issues with UNMIK. My country has fully complied with resolution 1244 (1999).”
2003-06-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4770 (2003) · source
“On 16 May, we requested an explanation of the legal basis for that regulation from the Legal Counsel of the United Nations. To date we have received no response. My Government is looking forward to the Counsel's response in order to decide on a further course of action with regard to this issue. In any event, our firm view is that the term of the lease for the land in question cannot exceed UNMIK's term of existence. As stated by Foreign Minister Svilanovic' in a letter dated 20 May to the President of the Security Council, it is the position of my Government that the need for privatization in Kosovo and Metohija is undisputable. The method of establishing a privatization model without the participation of the Republic of Serbia as the largest creditor is, however, highly disputable.”
2003-06-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4770 (2003) · source
“By promulgating regulation 2003/13, on land use, UNMIK has in fact taken steps that exceed the authority conferred upon it by the Security Council. The regulation creates consequences of a structural and permanent character. A 99-year land lease is brushed away as a temporary measure that does not merit consultation with the owners of the land. That disregards the basic fact that the measure will by far exceed the term of the United Nations Administration itself. We are speaking here of a permanent transfer of publicly owned property and, to a large extent, the property of the Republic of Serbia. The regulation will also jeopardize the return of property nationalized after the Second World War to their rightful owners.”
2003-06-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4770 (2003) · source
“If the aim is truly to establish institutions functioning according to basic principles of democracy, the transfer process should be firmly conditioned on the capacities of the Institutions to responsibly exercise the authority entrusted to them for the benefit of all communities in the province. With regard to the benchmarks, UNMIK itself is actually not contributing to their implementation in some cases. A stated UNMIK benchmark dealing with property rights requires that all property - including land, enterprises and other publicly owned assets - will have a clear and rightful owner. UNMIK regulation 2003/13 is clearly not a step towards fulfilling that benchmark. Rather, it creates additional confusion.”
2003-06-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4770 (2003) · source
“In such overall conditions, UNMIK developed a strategy based on the principle of "standards before status", defining eight basic criteria for assessing progress in achieving the standards. In each of those eight areas - for example, in the area of the rule of law - substantive achievements are almost negligible, yet UNMIK is speedily and systematically continuing to transfer responsibilities to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. We consider it absolutely necessary to make the benchmarks operational, in line with repeated requests made by members ofthe Security Council.”
2003-06-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4770 (2003) · source
“The activities of Albanian National Army (ANA) terrorists within the KPC in connection with the 12 April railway attack in northern Kosovo and Metohija have been confirmed beyond a shadow of a doubt. UNMIK and KFOR demands for data regarding the presence of the ANA within the KPC were met by a very characteristic response from the commander of the Corps, who said that, under his limited powers, he could offer no more information. We fully expect prompt and visible results from the international special investigative civil board formed on 2 June to investigate current and future members of the KPC who may be involved in proscribed organizations or activities.”
2003-06-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4770 (2003) · source
“However, those Institutions have proven to be more efficient at insisting on their right to decide on foreign policy and defence matters and on ignoring minority rights - as witnessed by the law on higher education - on pressuring for independence, and - as in the most recent Assembly resolution, which called for regulating "the status of the fighters for the freedom and independence of Kosovo" - at creating ethnic division. As part of that trend, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), which has been officially designated as a civilian emergency organization, has retained and enhanced its military capacities. It is engaged in tireless efforts to preserve itself as the future army of an independent Kosovo.”
2003-06-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4770 (2003) · source
“Without that outcome, the latest atrocity will be a further setback in creating sufficient confidence to initiate the dialogue on practical issues, whose establishment my Government has consistently supported and called for. Pristina has thus far rejected every initiative in that regard. As we are all aware, UNMIK has its own list of achievements in connection with implementing resolution 1244 (1999). The wave of Kosovo Albanian refugees in 1999 was reversed very quickly. Elections were held and the Provisional Institutions of Self- Government were established, which led to the increasing transfer of responsibilities to local authorities.”
2003-06-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4770 (2003) · source
“If the perpetrators are not speedily brought to justice now - as they have not been in previous cases of inter-ethnic murder since 1999 - the Obilic killing will serve to strengthen the culture of impunity surrounding the violence against minorities. It will also provide further evidence that minorities, and Serbs in particular, do not enjoy the basic human right to life, let alone any other right. We therefore call on the Security Council to see to it that UNMIK, in accordance with its responsibilities defined four years ago, ensures that violence is not yet again confirmed as a legitimate political means in Kosovo and Metohija.”
2003-06-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4770 (2003) · source
“However, given the fact that all forms of violence against minorities, including terrorist attacks, have thus far garnered only verbal condemnation, it is unclear what arguments could be offered to 18 Serb families in Obilic to convince them to reconsider their decision to leave the town forever. Whose ultimate victory will that be? Security, of course, cannot be achieved by words. The fact is that the perpetrators of that atrocity have not been identified, much less brought to justice. It is also a fact that the investigation of the 17 May murder in Vitina of mathematics professor Zoran Markovic has not made any progress that we are aware of. The same is true of the case of 90-year-old Slavko Stamenkovic, who was brutally beaten in his home in Vitina on 21 May, and of the 6 May stoning of a bus driving Serb children near Mitrovica.”
2003-06-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4770 (2003) · source