YouSaid · the spoken record

Salamé

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281
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2017-08-28
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2020-01-30
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un-security-council

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  1. Meanwhile, they continue to strengthen their commitment to a military solution, raising the frightening spectre of a full-scale conflict and further misery for the Libyan people, more refugees, the creation of a security vacuum and further interruptions to global energy supplies. All that is done in blatant disregard of Libya’s sovereignty and the fundamental rights of the Libyan people and in flagrant violation of international consensus and the rules-based international order. I hope that in the coming days the Council can find its unity and its voice to halt Libya’s senseless unravelling. Too much is at stake, including our collective credibility.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  2. Specific endorsement of the Berlin conclusions by the Council through the adoption of a resolution would send a decisive signal not only to the Libyans but also to the spoilers — local and international alike — about the seriousness with which the international community regards this process. However, I must also be candid in expressing my deep anger and disappointment at what has occurred since the Berlin summit. There are unscrupulous actors inside and outside Libya who cynically hint towards efforts to promote peace and piously affirm their support for the United Nations.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  3. In contrast to the malaise that has beset some in Libya’s political class, many other Libyans have not stood idly by in the face of the widespread use of hate speech and divisive rhetoric designed to tear the country apart. I applaud the civil society activists and tribal elders who have courageously raised their voices, particularly in the past few days, in order to maintain social harmony among Libyans. I was heartened to see that a group of young activists in Benghazi issued a New Year’s Day call for a cessation of hostilities and a return to political talks. It is my sincere hope that the momentum created on 19 January in Berlin — genuine momentum — and here today in Brazzaville will be seized by the Council and by the Libyan parties. Libyans need to be given some hope that the international community has not abandoned them.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  4. We have also received reports of summary executions and revenge killings in Tripoli and in nearby Tarhouna, which is under the control of forces loyal to the LNA. The fate of many forcibly disappeared Libyans remains unknown. More than half a year has passed since Siham Sergewa, a member of the House of Representatives, was seized at night from her home in Benghazi. I reiterate that the authorities in eastern Libya are responsible for respecting international human rights law and are legally obliged to establish the fate and whereabouts of Ms. Sergewa. I welcome the joint statement issued by several Member States on 17 January and urge others with influence on the relevant authorities to demand her immediate release and the release of all victims of enforced disappearance and to hold those responsible to account.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  5. I am concerned about credible reports of serious human rights violations in Sirte, including enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention by armed groups since the LNA took the city on 6 January. There are reports of families forced to flee, some due to their affiliation with the Government of National Accord and others due to their association with elements of the former regime, that is, the Al-Qadhafi regime. UNSMIL has received reliable reports of hundreds of prisoners from at least four towns and cities in western Libya, including Tripoli and Khums, being released contrary to Libyan law in order to fight on behalf of the Government of National Accord in exchange for promised freedom following the end of the conflict.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  6. Those returned migrants are among over 1,000 who have left Libya by sea since 1 January, driven in part by the heaviest clashes Tripoli has seen since hostilities began nine months ago. The increase in departures is alarming, given the very limited search-and-rescue capacity in the Mediterranean. On 27 January, UNSMIL and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) issued a joint report on the 2 July air strike on the Tajoura detention centre, calling for accountability for violations of international law and urgent action to prevent a repeat of a similar incident. I regret the recent news that OHCHR has stopped activities at the gathering and departure facility it had established, as it was unable to guarantee safety due to training exercises nearby.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  7. As of 22 January, nearly 120 schools in Ain Zara and Abu Salim in Tripoli remain closed after a number of schools reopened following the truce, depriving at least 70,000 children of their basic human right to an education. A total of 26 health facilities have been damaged to varying degrees due to proximity to the clashes, including 12 that have closed, while another four remain at high risk of closure. At least 953 migrants, among them 136 women and 85 children, were returned to Libya in the first two weeks of 2020. Most were disembarked in Tripoli and all were taken to detention centres, where they are routinely subjected to serious human rights violations and abuses.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  8. Cuts to customs tariffs and taxes are narrowing Libya’s revenue base, making the country entirely reliant on oil exports — which have now stopped — and fees on foreign exchange. Commercial banks are finding it increasingly difficult to operate under the supervision of two competing central banks. A number of commercial banks, particularly in the country’s east, are now either unable to honour transactions or will soon reach that point. While the Mission continues to work to find halfway measures to keep the economy afloat, fully addressing the situation requires a political solution that allows for more fundamental economic and institutional reform. The humanitarian situation remains deeply concerning. More than 150,000 people have been forced from their homes in the Tripoli area since the conflict began in April.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  9. Oil production will soon be reduced to 72,000 barrels per day, coming only from Libya’s offshore sites. The blockade results in losses of approximately $55 million per day in national revenue and, as of today, the cumulative lost revenue as a result of the blockade has reached over $622 million. The 72,000 barrels per day that I mentioned must be compared to the situation two weeks ago, when production stood at 1.3 million barrels per day. Libya’s national debt has now surpassed 100 billion dinars and is spiking upwards. Expenditures on salaries proliferate as competing authorities add to an already bloated payroll. Government subsidies, both hidden and overt, continue to increase as the quality of services diminishes.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  10. Those mechanisms will ensure that the hard work ahead of Berlin continues and that those who obstruct the process — whether inside or outside Libya — can be held to account. The economy in Libya is becoming increasingly unstable due to the conflict. Institutional fragmentation and the inability to enact a unified economic policy are exacerbating existing challenges and creating new ones. On 18 January, the National Oil Corporation declared force majeure on oil exports from ports in eastern Libya following local protests against the ports. On 20 January, the National Oil Corporation extended the force majeure to all onshore ports following pressure exerted by LNA-aligned forces to shut down production at the Al-Sharara, Hamada and Al-Feel oil fields.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  11. On 7 January, UNSMIL convened a second meeting of the second track dialogue between the two branches of the Central Bank of Libya to develop a road map for their eventual unification. The completion of the international audit of the two branches of the Central Bank of Libya remains critical for transparency and creating the conditions for eventual unification. While we have made significant progress and hope to soon begin the audit, there has been no shortage of challenges. We will continue to rely on the strong support of the Security Council in order to move forward with the process. The international follow-up committee to the Berlin conference will get under way in the coming weeks with the formation of four working groups focused on the political, military, economic and international humanitarian law and human rights tracks.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  12. I am pleased to report that, with UNSMIL representatives as witnesses to the process, three House of Representatives districts elected their delegates for the political talks. Yesterday’s efforts sent a positive signal from Parliament to the Libyan people that should be encouraged and replicated in the 10 other districts. UNSMIL continues to be on standby to assist the remaining districts in completing the process. On the economic track, following their first meeting, on 6 January, Libyan experts representing the main national institutions, as well as different economic sectors, are now developing the terms of reference for the Libyan expert economic commission. We have issued invitations to the second economic meeting, which will take place on 9 February in Cairo, and received an enthusiastic response from the participants.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  13. On 10 January, I asked the Presidents of the High Council of State and the House of Representatives to start, on the basis of each of the 13 electoral districts, a process to select representatives of the two houses for the Libyan political forum. I offered the support of UNSMIL to ensure that the process was inclusive, transparent, fair and democratic. On 19 January, the High Council of State completed the selection of its 13 delegates. Deep political divisions within the House of Representatives have been impeding the selection process of its delegates to the Libyan political forum. Yesterday a district-based selection process for the 13 delegates started with the support of UNSMIL.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  14. It is imperative that the Joint Military Commission meet under United Nations auspices to transform the truce — or whatever is left of it — into a ceasefire and discuss the modalities for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism, which I know is of great interest to the Council. The Commission will also seek to reach an agreement on long-term security arrangements, while directly addressing grievances expressed by both sides. The Council’s collective support and engagement in that process is vital. Consolidating the truce is critical for the success of our parallel efforts to start the Libyan political forum, thereby enabling the parties to discuss transitional institutional arrangements. However, the selection process for Libyan delegates to that endeavour has not yet been completed.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  15. As the Secretary-General briefed the Council on 21 January, we received from both parties — on 19 January, in Berlin — the full roster of names of their military representatives to attend the Joint Military Commission talks in Geneva. Those talks form the pillar of the military track and must be launched as soon as possible. I had hoped to be able to brief the Council today from Geneva, not Brazzaville, with the talks having started on Tuesday. The GNA representatives are ready to engage, and I met with them personally in Tunis on Monday to lay out the framework for the expected talks. As of yet, the LNA delegation has been unable to confirm its participation, although I am scheduled to meet General Haftar in Al-Rajma in two days’ time to push for the team to be dispatched without delay.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  16. At the same time, foreign fighters who support the GNA have been flown into Tripoli by the thousands and deployed in forward locations, alongside Libyan forces. During this period, the GNA forces, supported by a foreign sponsor, established advanced air defence systems throughout the western region — to put it bluntly, Hawk anti-aircraft defence systems. As recently as Tuesday, the presence of foreign naval assets, including warships, was witnessed off the coast of Tripoli, in addition to cargo ships. All those manoeuvres to resupply the two parties threaten to precipitate a new and much more dangerous conflagration. They violate the spirit and the letter of the Berlin conference. I urge the parties and their foreign sponsors to desist from reckless actions and instead renew their expressed commitment to work towards a ceasefire.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  17. The warring parties have continued to receive a sizeable amount of advanced equipment, in addition to fighters and advisers from foreign sponsors — in brazen violation of the arms embargo and the pledges made by representatives of those countries in Berlin. The LNA has reinforced its forces along the front lines in Tripoli with arms, equipment and infantry elements, including foreign fighters. Meanwhile, there has been a notable increase in heavy cargo flights — several per day — to Benina airport and Al-Khadim air base in eastern Libya delivering military equipment to the LNA. Yesterday three boats were in Tripoli and Misrata delivering new weapons in the west, while two cargo planes landed at Al-Khadim air base in the east.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  18. On 22 January, the LNA further extended that no-fly zone southwards towards Gharyan and Tarhouna and threatened to shoot down any military or civilian aircraft approaching Mitiga airport. Since that time, Mitiga airport has been shelled on three occasions, resulting in civilian casualties, damaging the civilian airport’s infrastructure and temporarily halting air traffic. On 28 January, two days ago, GNA forces reportedly downed an LNA drone in the vicinity of Misrata. Since 12 January, the Mission has recorded more than 110 reported violations of the truce. I am also deeply worried about the military reinforcements received by both sides, raising the spectre of a broader conflict engulfing the wider region.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  19. In the last two days alone, four children — all under the age of 12 — perished as a result of shelling in the Al-Hadaba area of Tripoli, two of whom died at the scene of the attack, while the other two died in intensive care; the last one died just yesterday afternoon. We are also witnessing severe fighting outside Tripoli. On 26 January, the Libyan National Army (LNA) launched an offensive against Government of National Accord (GNA) forces in the Abu Qurayn area, south of Misrata, prompting heavy clashes with dozens of casualties on both sides. Those clashes were accompanied by fixed-wing strikes conducted by the LNA and drone strikes by both sides. As I speak, the battle for Abu Qurayn is ongoing. On 8 January, the LNA extended its unilaterally declared no-fly zone to include Mitiga airport.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  20. Following the 12 January commencement of the truce, there was an initial reduction in violence, which provided the residents of greater Tripoli a much-needed respite from the suffering of war. But with recent developments on the ground, I regret to report that the truce holds only in name. Artillery exchanges have significantly increased in Tripoli in recent days, with an associated increase in civilian casualties due to the use of indiscriminate shelling. Since 6 January, we have verified at least 21 civilian casualties —18 deaths and 3 injuries — of conflict-related incidents in and around Tripoli.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  21. The final 55-point Berlin communiqué comprehensively tackles the full range of issues underpinning the Libyan problem set. It is buttressed by the detailed operational plan of United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), which forms the basis for the Mission’s work in the coming period. The Berlin conference was a serious effort to try to unify a discordant international community and to give hope to the beleaguered Libyans in the form of the provision of a protective international umbrella by the summit participants. That umbrella will allow Libyans to restore a measure of their plundered sovereignty and come together to chart their way forward. The summit was held against the backdrop of the truce called for by Presidents Putin and Erdoğan on 8 January and accepted by both parties to the conflict.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  22. When we started preparatory consultations for the Berlin conference in September 2019, at the peak of the war, we were under no illusions about the challenges of the task that lay ahead. We also knew that we had to mobilize in order to prevent Libya’s further downward spiral into chaos and civil war. I wish to express my gratitude to Chancellor Merkel and the Federal Republic of Germany for working relentlessly with us in the months leading up to the 19 January leaders’ gathering. At the Berlin conference, representatives of countries concerned and regional organizations, some of which have directly or indirectly fuelled the conflict, agreed not to interfere in Libya’s internal affairs and to abide by the United Nations arms embargo.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  23. Mr. Salamé: I am pleased to be joining the Security Council from Brazzaville, where I attended the eighth summit of the African Union High-Level Committee on Libya at the level of Heads of State and Government, hosted by the President of the Republic of the Congo, His Excellency Mr. Sassou Nguesso. In my intervention, I reiterated the Organization’s strong partnership with the African Union as we work together in the pursuit of peace and stability in Libya. On 21 January, the Secretary-General briefed the Council on the outcomes of the Berlin conference and, most important, on the collective efforts ahead in order to peacefully resolve the Libyan conflict. I will briefly update the Council today on what has occurred since the Secretary General’s briefing.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  24. Options for a temporary and longer-term constitutional framework exist. Electoral legislation has been produced before. It is all eminently possible. All that is needed now is for the international community to come together to provide the necessary umbrella under which the Libyan parties themselves canjoin hands to end the conflict and resume dialogue. The United Nations is and will remain in Libya to support the Libyan people on their journey.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  25. It is somewhat of a cliche to say that the weeks ahead will be critical, but once again it is true for Libya. External investment in the conflict risks surpassing the amount of national involvement, taking control of Libya's future away from the Libyans and placing it in the hands of foreign parties. Once invited in, foreign intervention is the guest that settles in and seizes control of the house. It is in the interests of all Libyans to reject outside interference in their country's affairs, and I look to them for their support in calling for external actors to adhere to the arms embargo and commit tangibly to ending the conflict on the ground before it is too late. Ending the conflict and agreeing to the way forward is a realistic prospect. The parties are known. The outlines of the agreement are known.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  26. In southern Libya, the United Nations country team continues to support the Ahali population displaced from Murzuq, very few of whose members have returned to their homes. UNSMIL has continued to meet with Ahali and Tebu leaders to resolve the underlying grievances between the communities and enable the safe and dignified return of the Ahali population. I regret to inform the Council that there are no new developments in my appeal for more information regarding the 10 August attack, which killed three United Nations staff members and severely injured two others. A board of inquiry sent from Headquarters arrived some days ago, and I call on all Libyan parties to cooperate positively with that body. Our two injured staff members continue to recover. We are committed to remaining in Libya to serve the Libyan people.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  27. More than 24 per cent of health-care facilities are closed owing to the conflict, electricity cuts or structural damage, and services are interrupted in many other health-care facilities. Children are unable to reach schools, dozens of which have been destroyed. Nearly 30 more schools are being used as shelters for displaced persons. The United Nations and its humanitarian partners have reached more than 310,000 people with humanitarian assistance this year. Unfortunately, the humanitarian needs exceed the means at our disposal. To date, less than half of the appeal for $202 million under the Libya humanitarian response plan has been funded. I encourage donors to help us shrink the funding gap.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  28. Migrants and refugees continue to be at risk of unlawful killings, torture and other ill-treatment; arbitrary detention and unlawful deprivation of liberty; rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence; slavery and forced labour; and extortion and exploitation. Serious concerns also continue with regard to the transfer of migrants intercepted at sea by the Libyan Coast Guard to official and unofficial detention centres, including to the Zawiya detention centre and the Tajoura detention centre, which the authorities reported on 1 August was to be closed. A health-care sector assessment conducted in October 2019 revealed a sharp increase in unmet health needs, particularly for women and girls.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  29. More than 135,000 civilians remain in front-line areas, and an additional 270,000 people live in areas directly affected by conflict. Since the beginning of 2019, Violence in Libya has had a devastating impact on health care in the country; 60 attacks against health- care facilities, medical personnel, and ambulances have been registered. We have observed a clear pattern of precision air strikes targeting the medical facilities of Government of National Accord forces. Intentionally directing attacks against medical facilities and personnel, as well as the wilful killing or harming of sick or wounded people, may constitute war crimes.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  30. In addition, both detained and non-detained women migrants and refugees in Libya are at risk of rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, sexual exploitation and forced prostitution. On a positive note, I am pleased to report that Libyan women have been were recognized for their peacebuilding efforts. On 16 October, the BBC named Ms. Rida Al Tubuly - a peace campaigner and the Co-Founder and Director of the Together We Build It organization, and whom the Council will have a chance to hear from today - one of the 100 most influential women of 2019. In Tripoli, the effects of the conflict continue to impact the civilian population. More than 200 civilians have been killed and more than 128,000 people have fled their homes since the conflict began on 4 April.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  31. This is a welcome first effort to implement resolution 2250 (2015) on youth, peace and security in the Libyan context. Let me take this opportunity to raise once again the case of Ms. Siham Sergewa, a member ofthe House of Representatives who was abducted from her home on 17 July. For over four months, authorities in the east have been unable to produce information about the fate of that woman legislator and outspoken rights activist. Ms. Sergewa's fate is part of a larger pattern of Violence against women across the country. The Mission is documenting instances of killing and forced disappearances, including the case of a 70-year-old Libyan woman who was abducted from her home in Benghazi after she was accused of practicing witchcraft.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  32. I recently met with the chairperson of the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections, who assured me of the readiness of the Committee to resume municipal elections once the legal basis is restored. On 4 November, the Sabha Court of First Instance validated the results of the municipal elections in Sabha that took place on 27 April. While another legal challenge against the results remains pending and while the petitioner has announced that the validation ruling will be appealed to the Supreme Court, this is nevertheless a welcome and important development for the largest city in southern Libya. In northern Libya, in Sirte, United Nations agencies launched a project to support youth and adolescents in becoming active agents of change and peace.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  33. Over 120 Libyans - including 23 women - attended those meetings, the aim of which was to establish a national network of mediators that would include tribal leaders, elders, representatives of civil society, youth and women activists, academics and businesspeople, all of whom enjoy the credibility and respect of their various constituencies. Municipal elections remain on hold following a court ruling in June that cancelled the electoral regulation administering the elections. It is a positive reflection of the democratic spirit in Libya that many mayors are nevertheless requesting to renew the expired mandate of their councils by way of elections.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  34. These are all positive developments that reflect a will and a commitment to ending the conflict and returning to the political track to end the crisis in the country. In parallel with our efforts at the national level, we also continue to work directly with Libyan communities. To address the polarization in the country, we have now hosted two workshops to stem the incitement of and the use of hateful rhetoric in the media. The workshops have brought together journalists, editors and social media activists, as well as instructors in human rights and representatives of social media platforms. Our ultimate goal is to conclude a code of conduct for the media in Libya. At the grass-roots level, in mid-October we held the last ofa series ofthree events to support local mediators.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  35. The anger and frustration at the conflict and the strong desire for it to end emerged clearly from these discussions. I am pleased to report that efforts continue to support the political process. The Egyptian Government has been working with members of the House of Representatives to try to unify that body. As a group of western members continues to meet independently in Tripoli, we are in permanent contact with the various factions in the House of Representatives and have been encouraging them to maintain the integrity of their assembly. Partner organizations have also held second- track consultations, in which participants have again emphasized their desire for a peaceful resolution to the conflict and proposed ideas for a way forward.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  36. Let me stress once more that the endorsement of the Berlin communique does not mean the end of the process, but rather marks the beginning of the most important part of our journey to put Libya back on the path to peace and stability. In support of the Berlin process, I have engaged extensively with Prime Minister Serraj and the commanders of the Government of National Accord forces. I have also met with General Haftar and politicians who support him. There is scope for agreement on ending the conflict and a basis for returning to the political process. UNSMIL has also engaged in extensive outreach to Libyan constituencies, including in the diaspora. These meetings have involved commanders ofunits engaged in the fighting, their civilian representatives and political constituencies from across the country.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  37. The committee would also support the necessary disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process for groups across the country. I have been actively engaged with Member States on a bilateral basis. I was, in particular, grateful for the visit to Libya of Mr. Heiko Maas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, to brief Prime Minister Serraj on the Berlin process on 27 October. I also travelled to Cairo last week for very positive meetings with Mr. Sameh Hassan Shokry Selim, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, and other high-level officials. International unity and agreement are essential to stopping the violence and pursuing the resolution of the crisis through political dialogue. I have high hopes that the Berlin process will end in success.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  38. It also serves as the bridge to the intra-Libyan political dialogue, which will be launched under United Nations auspices immediately following the Berlin summit. One of the tangible outcomes of the international summit would be the establishment of a follow-up committee that would work with UNSMIL to implement the outcomes agreed in the final communique. Such a committee would play a fundamental role in terms of ensuring respect for a ceasefire and the better implementation of the arms embargo. It would contribute to supporting a return to the political process, the implementation of agreed economic and financial reforms and practical ways and means to ensure that there is no impunity for Violations of international humanitarian law.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  39. Those six baskets include the need for the return to the Libyan-led political process and accompanying economic reform; a ceasefire; the implementation of the arms embargo and security reform; and the upholding of international human rights and humanitarian law. Putting the implementation of the arms embargo at the heart of international commitments is essential in practical terms and as a message to the Libyan people. UNSMIL has worked to substantiate an operational annex to the draft communique. The annex has two purposes. It serves to outline the commitments that the members of the Berlin group have made to ending the conflict and advancing the political process through tangible actions that are benchmarked by indicators, which outline the responsibilities for those actions.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  40. My colleagues at UNSMIL and I are fully engaged and have been working tirelessly with Libyans and international partners to prepare for the second and third steps of the initiative I announced on 29 July (see S/PV.8588). I would like to thank the Government of Germany for its work in preparing for an international summit. Three senior officials meetings have already taken place and there will be a crucial fourth meeting on Wednesday 20 November. In their most recent discussion on 21 October, participants worked to agree a draft communique that outlines six baskets of activities necessary to end the conflict in Libya.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  41. Misrata airport, a small mixed civilian- military facility located 250 kilometres east of Tripoli, is now the only exit point for Libyans in the west of the country - who comprise the majority of the country's population - to travel abroad by air. Misrata airport, too, has been targeted at least ll times by precision airstrikes since early September. Mitiga airport in Tripoli needs to reopen as soon as possible. Together with the Ministers of the Interior and Transportation of the Government of National Accord, I am working on a number of practical steps to achieve that goal, including the clear delineation between the civilian and military sections ofthe airport, as well as the establishment of a dedicated United Nations terminal. I am determined to see the end of this debilitating conflict.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  42. In addition, the increasing use of unguided bombs in airstrikes conducted by LNA forces in populated areas of Tripoli caused an increase in the number of civilian casualties. The violence is facilitated by Libya's plethora of Al-Qadhafi-era arms, as well as by continued shipments of war materiel brought into the country in breach of the arms embargo. Reports indicate that everything from spare parts for fighter aircraft to tanks, from bullets to precision missiles, are being brought into Libya in support of different groups involved in the fighting. Mitiga airport remains closed. It has been more than two and a half months now that this key outlet for the civilian population of Tripoli and western Libya has been forced shut due to indiscriminate shelling and airstrikes.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  43. A further escalation of ground fighting in these densely populated areas would lead to disastrous humanitarian consequences. The use of air power and precision technology has become a dominant feature of an otherwise low-intensity conflict the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) estimates the total number of drone strikes in support of Libyan National Army (LNA) forces at well above 800 since the beginning of the conflict. The total number of drone strikes in support of the Government of National Accord is estimated at around 240. It is our judgment that the drone infrastructure and operations are facilitated by parties external to the conflict There were also several incidents of precision airstrikes conducted by unknown aircraft between September and November.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  44. Regardless of whether the attack deliberately targeted the factory or was an indiscriminate attack, it may constitute a war crime. We are working to verify the facts and will update the Council accordingly. Beyond today's tragedy, the front lines in southern Tripoli are highly fluid. The dangers and direct consequences of foreign interference are increasingly evident. To fill gaps in manpower, there is growing involvement of mercenaries and fighters from foreign private military companies. The insertion of these experienced fighters has naturally led to an intensification in the violence. I am gravely worried by the expansion of artillery fire northwards into the city. In recent days, the number of civilians killed and injured has been rising and many families are leaving the areas impacted by the shelling.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  45. Mr. Salame: Seven and halfmonths into the conflict in Libya, and given the recent dangerous escalation of hostilities in and around Tripoli, we find ourselves ever more in a race against time to reach a peaceful solution that would spare many lives. I will provide the Council with an update on the security situation before turning to political developments. I am angry and sad to report that today there was another mass civilian casualty event. A biscuit factory in the Wadi Rabia neighbourhood of Tripoli was hit by an air strike, according to early information. The attack has caused what we currently believe to be 10 fatalities and over 35 injuries. It appears that the majority of the dead were migrants, but that at least two were Libyans.

    2019-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8667 (2019) · source

  46. The idea that war should be given a chance and that a military solution is at all possible is quite simply a chimera. I believe that the Council is capable of more, and I also believe that the Libyans deserve better.

    2019-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8611 (2019) · source

  47. Without the unequivocal support of the Council and the broader international community for an immediate end to the Libyan conflict, I believe that we are faced with two highly unpalatable scenarios. One scenario is a persistent and protracted low- intensity conflict that will see continued fratricide among the Libyans, the immiseration of the population, the exposure of the vulnerable migrant and refugee community to further depredations, the further destruction of the country's already- battered infrastructure and a growing transnational terrorist threat. An equally unsatisfactory scenario is a doubling down of military support for one side or the other by their external patrons, resulting in a sharp escalation that will assuredly plunge the entire region into chaos.

    2019-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8611 (2019) · source

  48. We would like the international community to use that meeting to send a strong message on the need to respect the arms embargo, to commit to non-interference in Libyan affairs, to address the main causes of conflict, as formulated by the Libyans themselves, and to emphasize its clear and active support for whatever political formula the Libyans agree to. An international meeting, with the active support of our partners from the regional organizations concerned, therefore remains a sine qua non to gain the commitment of the main external stakeholders necessary to ending the conflict and resuming a Libyan-owned political process. Many Libyans feel abandoned by part of the international community and exploited by others.

    2019-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8611 (2019) · source

  49. To support that goal, I visited Germany, Malta, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Tunisia. Two days ago, I had lengthy and constructive discussions with leading officials in Cairo. I intend to continue my tour in the days ahead, starting with the Arab Maghreb. I am particularly grateful for the strong message delivered by the Group of Seven major Powers calling for an international conference bringing together all the stakeholders and regional actors relevant to the conflict in Libya, as well as for the recognition that only a political solution can ensure Libya's stability. It remains abundantly clear that, without the commitment of key external actors engaged in Libya, the conflict will continue. The international conference is the second step in my three-point initiative.

    2019-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8611 (2019) · source

  50. Despite the bellicose rhetoric and strong polarization in the country, there is popular support for an end to the violence, including among the actual fighters. In fact, fighters are sometimes more sensitive to the idea of ending the conflict than some politicians. Confidence-building measures among the different groups engaged in the conflict include the exchange of prisoners, exchanges of mortal remains, family visits to prisoners and, in some cases, phone calls to establish proof of life. In parallel, I have started an intensive campaign with international stakeholders in order to reach consensus on holding an international meeting of concerned parties that would contribute - through an unequivocal message - to ending the conflict and resuming the political process.

    2019-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8611 (2019) · source