YouSaid · the spoken record

Salim

lines on the record: 149
first: 1997-09-25
most recent: 2008-06-24
sittings or episodes: 7
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Even though, as I said, the Government of the Sudan bears primary responsibility, it would be wrong to assume that on the one hand you have all the nice guys and on the other hand you have all the bad guys. That is not true. In other words, therefore, you have to deal with the nice guys and the bad guys wherever they appear, whether they come from the Government side or the side of the movements.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“Maybe we can say that, although they say that they are ready to negotiate, perhaps in their hearts and minds they are not ready. You cannot argue on that basis; you can only argue on 26 the basis of what is real. I think it is important to reach a stage where the Government of the Sudan will be tested, and they can only be tested in negotiations: What is your position on power sharing? What is your position on wealth sharing? What is your position on the question of security? When we reach that stage, then we will be in a position to say whether or not the Government of the Sudan is cooperating on the question of negotiations. Finally, after my limited experience in dealing with the Darfur question, I will say this: when we talk of incentives and disincentives, they must be universally applied.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“For example, every time that we have gone to Khartoum, we have repeatedly appealed for the non-utilization of aerial bombardment. We have said very clearly that there should be a proportionate response. What do we mean by this? If there is an attack, for example, like JEM's attack, it is logical for the Government of the Sudan to exercise self-defence. However, when one uses air power and the air power affects not only the movements but also ordinary civilians, then there is a problem. That is why we have been insisting on that. Secondly, at this point in time, when it comes to negotiations, it is very difficult to hold the Government of the Sudan responsible, because they say all the time that they are ready for negotiations.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“But the response of the international community has been swift. Going beyond that, one cannot say that a given party should be excluded. I think that it should be the movement itself which excludes itself from the process. You should not start excluding people from the negotiations, especially a movement which has some degree of support - although I understand full well, as was rightly explained, that there is a feeling that JEM's agenda goes beyond Darfur. In specific response to the representative of Costa Rica, I will say this: In both of our statements, we have made it very clear that primary responsibility for the situation in Darfur must be that of the Government of the Sudan. There are areas where the Government of the Sudan has not responded regarding what we expect them to do.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“But basically what we are saying is that the Council must be in a position to do something. I would humbly caution against repeated warnings which have no follow-up action, warnings like "if you do this, something will happen; if you do not do that, something else will happen". And nothing happens. Then not only is the credibility of the Council is at stake, but even the capacity of those who are involved in the peace process becomes somewhat impaired. So I would say that, yes, there is a need for encouragement or incentives, and there is a need also for discouragement or disincentives. On the question of inclusion, I think that inclusion is very important, as Jan said also. We know the position of the Government of the Sudan. We know how they feel after the attack on Omdurman.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“As he said, the Government of the Sudan has told us clearly that they are supportive of the idea of civil society. But in the final analysis, you have got to involve these people, because neither the Government nor the movements can claim to have exclusive representation of the people of Darfur. There are people, whether traditional leaders or civil society organizations, who want peace. One thing that comes out in this situation is that the people in Darfur want peace. Irrespective of their political affiliation, irrespective of where they are located, they want peace. On the question of incentives and disincentives, I think my friend Jan has responded rightly. He used the words "incentives and disincentives". If you go through my speech, you will see that I used the phrase "encourage or discourage".”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“Now there is a danger that if nothing is done to really beef up UNAMID, it will face same problems that AMIS had. I talked earlier about the euphoria of expectations. When we were in Darfur everybody was waiting for UNAMID. Everybody was talking about how important it was to have UNAMID. But the minute they begin to see that, really, the difference between UNAMID and AMIS is very small, there will be a problem. So I think that it is in the interest, not only of the peace process, but also for the credibility of the Security Council, that this question is addressed in an effective manner. The engagement of civil society, I think, is a must, and as Jan has pointed out, initially, both the Government and the movements were totally opposed to any idea of involvement with civil society. Now we have begun to see some change.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“Wherever we went, whatever we discussed, whether it was with the representatives of the internally displaced persons or the representatives of civil society, whether it was in areas I covered in my statement, in Government areas or in areas controlled by the rebels, everybody has been talking about security, security, security. So the issue of security becomes important. Therefore, the question of the rapid deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) becomes important. I want to say one more thing on this point. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was there, and it did a lot under very, very difficult circumstances. But AMIS began to lose credibility because it did not have the required resources and the required equipment.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“Mr. Salim: Like my colleague, I would also like to thank the Council for the opportunity given us, and also for the serious attention with which the Council has been addressing this issue. I shall also be very brief in answering the specific issues that were raised, in particular the link between the political process and the issue of security. Ideally, we would obtain an agreement, and then life would become much more comfortable for everybody, especially for the peacekeepers. But that is the ideal. The reality on the ground is that there is no such agreement. The reality on the ground is that unless you address the issue of security the political process becomes impossible.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“Equally challenging is the task of reducing tension in the region and promoting normal relations. The international community, and more particularly those countries and institutions with comparative advantages, should use their influence with the Sudan and the region to assist in the efforts to end the conflict and promote peace, security and development. But ultimately, the responsibility is that of the Sudanese people themselves.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“These have been five very difficult years for the people of Darfur, who have seen tens of thousands of their compatriots, including their wives and husbands, their mothers and fathers, their children and grandchildren, killed or maimed and millions more displaced in camps for internally displaced persons or as refugees. The challenge before the United Nations and the African Union is how to put an end to this catastrophic conflict, contribute to lasting peace and thereby enable the Darfurians to live in dignity, free of constant threats to their lives. Peace, security and stability in Darfur are crucial not only for the people of that western region of the Sudan but for the Sudan as a whole, inasmuch as the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is vital for the entire country.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“He will certainly have the full support of the two Special Envoys and the Joint Mediation Support Team. Even more crucially, however, he will need the support of the Government of the Sudan and the movements. In the meantime, it is important to underscore the need for both the United Nations Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council to be actively engaged in the process and to send the right signals and strong messages to the parties. They should encourage those who support the peace process and effectively discourage all those who constitute an obstacle to peace. It is now five years since the armed conflict erupted in Darfur.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“Given the current situation in Darfur, with its repercussions in the whole of the Sudan and in the region, this proposal, in our opinion, merits serious follow-up so that it can be realized as soon as possible. As a new approach is required in dealing with this crisis, such a meeting would provide a unique opportunity for reflection, consideration and possible action. Given the enormity of the challenges that lie ahead, the need to have someone following events on daily basis and engaging the parties on a more regular basis is self-evident. That is why Jan Eliasson and I very much look forward to the appointment of a common AU-United Nations chief mediator, who will be based in Khartoum. He will need the active support of the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“It decided on a number of key issues including re-energizing the political process and the creation of an African Union-United Nations hybrid force. In Geneva, in June, a proposal was made and generally accepted, subject to appropriate preparations, recommending the holding of a high-level meeting to be convened by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping to chart the way forward. It is recommended that the participants at the meeting should include the Foreign Ministers of the permanent members of the Security Council, representatives of the Government of the Sudan and regional and international partners.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“Another issue of grave concern which requires urgent attention and action is the flow of arms into Darfur despite the existence of an arms embargo. The Security Council should look into this and should close whatever loopholes exist. On 16 November 2006 a high-level meeting involving a number of States and institutions, including the representatives of the Government of the Sudan and the representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council, was held at the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Abba. That meeting was jointly chaired by the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, and the then African Union Commission Chairperson, President Alpha Oumar Konare.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“The hybrid force will need the cooperation of all the parties in order to effectively discharge its responsibilities. Above all, it will need a peace to keep; hence the crucial importance of the political process. The situation of insecurity in Darfur is made worse by the tense and deteriorating relations between Chad and the Sudan. In the interests of the peoples of both Chad and the Sudan, it is crucial that this situation be defused. The various accords reached between the two countries, including the latest one agreed upon in Dakar, cry out for implementation. Clearly, without the reduction of tension between these two neighbours and the normalization of relations, it is inconceivable that there can be a lasting solution to the conflict in Darfur.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“We all recognize that what is needed in Darfur is a robust, well-equipped force with a reasonable mobile capacity. In this connection, I believe that it is a sad commentary that notwithstanding the existence of thousands of helicopters it has not yet been possible to obtain two dozen or so helicopters for UNAMID. And yet the international community at large has repeatedly called for the rapid deployment of a robust UNAMID. Given these circumstances, it is, in our opinion, important to be vigilant so that the euphoria of expectation among Darfurians does not yield to despondency. At the same time it is evident that UNAMID per se, even when fully deployed with the necessary equipment and logistical backup, will not translate into peace and stability in Darfur.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“And there is the sheer banditry and criminality perpetrated by some armed groups. It is indeed no exaggeration to assert that Darfurians in general have been eagerly waiting the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), and have great expectations that its full deployment will make a great difference in their daily lives. Such a deployment will certainly go a long way in helping to create a favourable climate for the launching of the peace process. It is therefore all the more regrettable that such a deployment has been agonizingly slow in the face of numerous difficulties, some due to the position of the Government of the Sudan on such matters as the composition of the force and others due to the failure of the international community to act decisively.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“In short, the political process has reached an impasse and, as it was stressed in a meeting we held with regional and international partners earlier this month in Geneva, there is a need to rethink the strategy on the way forward. As the Security Council reflects on this rather gloomy picture and considers the way forward, I believe it is important to take into consideration the following factors, among others. The number one concern of Darfurians - as eloquently expressed to us whenever we met with them, in towns or villages, whether in Government areas or in rebel strongholds - is the question of security. There is fighting involving the Sudanese armed forces and some of the movements. There is fighting between some movements themselves. There is the terror that continues to be unleashed by the Janjaweed.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“The reality on the ground is therefore that there is still division among the movements, and in some instances within them. Another sad reality is that some of the movements are not prepared, or are unwilling, not only to enter into substantive negotiations but are even against taking part in any formal or informal talks. Some insist on preconditions that are clearly unacceptable, even though some of their legitimate demands as such should form a basis for negotiations. Others claim an exclusive monopoly on representation and are dismissive of all other movements. Still others seem to vigorously pursue a military option, as manifested by J EM's unfortunate attack on Omdurman, which has drawn universal international condemnation. To compound the situation, the process of fragmentation has not been completely halted.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“Subsequent to the commencement of the Sirte process in October last year, and drawing from the lessons of Sirte, which, inter alia, necessitated the postponement of the talks due to the absence of some of the major players, efforts 08-3959] were intensified aimed at forging some degree of unity and cohesion. The emergence of five groups - instead of having to deal with about two dozen factions or so - is to be welcomed. Of course, ideally we would have liked to have the situation that prevailed at the beginning of the Abuja Talks, namely, only the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement. Regrettably, however, for the present that remains a mere ideal. Furthermore, it is important to recall that the process of fragmentation within the movements started in earnest while the Abuja Talks were still taking place.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“We did so in the firm belief that such unity would contribute immensely to the peace process and that, conversely, continued fragmentation was inimical to peace and stability in Darfur. In our efforts and initiatives we interacted and consulted closely with regional partners. We also had the support of international partners. The Arusha consultations in August 2007 provided a ray of hope. Regrettably, however, that optimism was shattered with the division that occurred within the leadership of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) soon thereafter.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“We did so because, first, we believe that, as part of the Government of National Unity, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) can, and should, play an important and constructive role in the achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the Darfur crisis. Secondly, we believe that the SPLM's own experience and its historic relations with some of the movements in Darfur would be helpful in encouraging them towards the process of negotiations. We spent a considerable part of our time, energy and the limited resources at the disposal of the joint mediation encouraging and supporting efforts by the movements aimed at bringing about unity, or at the very least the attainment of common positions.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“We underscored the fact that the Government has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of security, and consequently should take deliberate and sustained steps aimed at de-escalating violence, including exercising restraint and refraining from aerial bombardments, which invariably have terrible consequences on innocent civilians. We also urged the Government to be more proactive and flexible on the fundamental issues that constitute the current divide between them and the movements in respect of the future dispensation of Darfur. In Juba, we also met on several occasions with top leaders and officials. We supported and encouraged their efforts aimed at promoting the unity of the movements.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“One of the shortcomings of the Abuja Peace Talks was to confine the entire process to the Government and the armed movements. This time, we were determined to rectify that by ensuring that the broadest range of stakeholders were involved, or at the very least consulted. In Khartoum, during our consultations with Government leaders and officials at various levels, while welcoming the Government's preparedness to enter into negotiations, we urged them to take concrete measures to allay the concerns and fears of the movements, which have a very deep distrust of the Government.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“In other words, we were to create propitious conditions for the parties in conflict - that is to say, the Government of the Sudan and the armed movements - to engage in a more inclusive political dialogue leading to a more acceptable, and therefore more durable, political settlement of the Darfur problem. During this period, we travelled many times to Sudan. In particular, we visited Khartoum, Darfur and Juba. In Darfur we visited extensively several different areas to meet with the leaders and commanders of the armed movements. During those visits we consulted extensively with stakeholders, including signatories and non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement, traditional leaders, leaders of political parties, representatives of internally displaced persons, civil society organizations, women's and youth groups and intellectuals.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“In his presentation today, Special Envoy Eliasson has given a detailed and elaborate account of our joint activities. Those include intensive consultations, road maps, work plans, programmes and strategies that the Special Envoys, assisted by the Joint Mediation Support Team, put in place, with the full support of regional and international players, aimed at bringing the parties in conflict to the negotiation table. I fully share what he has said. Sixteen months ago, the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission entrusted us with a specific mandate, namely, to re-energize the political process.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“During the Inter- Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur held in Abuja in 2005 and 2006, during which I was the African Union Special Envoy and Chief Mediator and which culminated in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, I had occasions to brief the Council. This time, however, I do so jointly with Special Envoy Eliasson, manifesting our teamwork and eloquently displaying in practical terms the growing cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in our collective quest for peace and security and, more specifically, in our collective determination to contribute to ending the tragic conflict in Darfur. As Mr. Eliasson rightly observed, 12 days ago both of us had the opportunity to brief the African Union Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“Mr. Salim: I am honoured to have this opportunity to address the Security Council. I am particularly pleased, Sir, to do so under your presidency. I am aware of the significant efforts made by your country in the search for an end to the conflict in Darfur and the achievement of a just and durable settlement. I am particularly conscious of the active support given to both my colleague and friend Jan Eliasson and me by the United States and other international partners in the discharge of our mandate as Special Envoys of the United Nations and the African Union on Darfur. I am not a stranger to the Security Council as far as the issue of Darfur is concerned.”
2008-06-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5922 (2008) · source
“While we unequivocally support the Tripoli Agreement, it remains our hope that everything will be done to contain the problems identified, as most of them have some direct bearing on the efforts we are making in Abuja, as the negotiations for a ceasefire agreement have revealed. In conclusion, I leave the Council with the message once again that we are in the final stretch of concluding the Darfur peace agreement. The mediation is ready and, we believe, the time is right for the parties to move beyond arguments to decisions. I am confident that, once we table our proposals, we shall receive the unequivocal support of the United Nations and the encouragement of this Council to the parties to sign on to the package without delay.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“For me, since I was privileged to have participated in the process of United Nations reform, that kind of continued engagement by the United Nations with a regional organization- is gratifying. I am happy to be part of a concrete manifestation of it with respect to our common efforts to resolve the conflict in Darfur. The challenges for this Council include not only to continue being seized of the crisis of today and our peace process, which is still incomplete, but also to seek ways of engaging with the post-conflict challenges that lie ahead. I hope that this Council will also continue to help the Republic of Chad and the Sudan to find a solution to the problems that have been developing for quite some time now.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“Our progress has been facilitated by the support of the partners, who continue to be well represented. We consult them at every turn. Our friend Mr. Jan Pronk, the Special Representative of the Secretary- General for the Sudan, is a frequent visitor to Abuja and his team is intimately involved in all aspects of our work. I pay tribute to his energy and dedication. These partnerships have been instrumental to the progress we have made thus far. They will be even more instrumental as we move towards implementing the agreement subsequently reached. I would like to personally express, as an African, my appreciation for and satisfaction with the continued attention and support that we have been receiving from Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the United Nations family.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“On 10 March 2006, the African Union Peace and Security Council adopted a resolution indicating that it wished to see a comprehensive Darfur peace agreement before the end of this month. We are working full steam ahead to meet that deadline. Certainly, we shall put our proposals on the table in the coming days. The presence of Vice-President Ali Osman Taha and the SPLM. delegation has certainly provided additional momentum to the process. The presence of the leaders of the movements in Abuja is also an encouraging sign and a sine qua non for a successful resolution of the conflict. I sincerely hope that they will remain in Abuja, in dialogue, without a break, and in spite of the distractions and diversions that have reappeared in the past week.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“Even though the African Union will continue to play a leading role in the political aspects of the peace process and the implementation of the envisaged agreement, the role of our partners will also be important in providing all-round support and encouragement, especially the huge financial, logistics and human resources burdens and expertise, not only for the dialogue itself, but also for assisting in the implementation of the agreements reached. We believe that the healing process in Darfur must begin immediately after a peace agreement is signed, but let us not expect it to be a quick process. The challenge of peacebuilding and reconciliation in Darfur will require our consistent collective engagement well beyond the conclusion of the Abuja talks.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“The conflict in Darfur requires that we lay the foundation for reconciliation to take place at the community level. To that end, I am happy to inform the Council that we have initiated a process of preparation for the Darfur-Darfur dialogue and consultations. The Council will recall that last year the parties agreed that, after a formal peace agreement has been signed, the people of Darfur should have the opportunity to come together to share and own such an agreement, in order to deepen and strengthen peacebuilding confidence, as well as to work towards communal reconciliation. We shall shortly be putting our final proposals for that process on the table for consideration and possible adoption by the parties.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“It is a road map that covers three quarters of the journey to a comprehensive security arrangements agreement. All of the parties are understandably reluctant to sign on to that ceasefire and embark upon that road until they are sure of the end state. Thus, even as we continue our negotiations on the modalities of the ceasefire, we are seriously engaged in exploring the central issues of the final status of forces, as well as issues of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. We have no illusions, however, that a comprehensive Darfur peace agreement, signed in Abuja, will be the end of the road. There are many years of painstaking work ahead of the people of Darfur - and of their friends in Africa and in the world at large - if they are to restore the social fabric of their damaged communities.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“That problem will become even more acute with the added responsibility that will come with a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. There is no point in calling for the speedy conclusion of an agreement if nothing is done to appropriately prepare AMIS for its expanded mandate. My plea to the Council is not to wait for the transition from AMIS to the United Nations force to take place before strengthening the implementation mechanisms of any agreement to be reached in Abuja. Institutional and bureaucratic arguments must be avoided and real planning done on how to help AMIS in concrete terms. There is too much at stake in Darfur to adopt a business-as-usual approach. The enhanced ceasefire agreement for Darfur currently before the parties is, to all intents and purposes, a ceasefire.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“In particular, I would like to draw the attention of the Council to the important role that will have to be played by the AMIS civilian police in monitoring and policing additional locations in Darfur and in building up a community police capacity where it is non-existent. The African heads of State are ready to assist us with their personal engagement and to contribute troops to Darfur to keep the peace. I am here to plead with the Council to extend maximum support to AMIS to ensure that the ceasefire agreement, once signed, is followed up by the upgrading, capacitation and empowerment of AMIS so as to enable it to cope with the additional responsibilities. I need hardly recall the point - which is repeatedly made - that AMIS, as presently constituted, is not optimally equipped to fulfil its mandate.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“As the security arrangement negotiations progress, we are drawing attention to the challenges of implementing a future agreement, with all of the responsibilities that that will impose on the African Union and the United Nations. The Force Commander of the African Union Mission in the Sudan is currently designing a detailed implementation plan for how he should redeploy his forces to undertake the considerable additional tasks that will arise in the context of the agreement. Clearly, there will be many complex tasks that will have to be performed by AMIS during the early stages of the implementation of the envisaged ceasefire, including verifying force positions on the ground, monitoring the disengagement and redeployment and patrolling demilitarized zones and humanitarian supply routes.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“It is only after each step is satisfactorily completed that the movements would be obliged to take the reciprocal steps of withdrawing and redeploying their forces and accepting limited arms control. In the discussions on the comprehensive security arrangements, which are about to start in Abuja - they will begin as soon as we conclude the ceasefire negotiations - we are also linking the final disarmament of the J anjaweed and militia forces to the assembling of the movements' forces. Similarly, the parallel processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration should go together with the process of the integration of former combatants of the movements into Sudan's armed forces and other security services on the basis of criteria to be agreed to by the parties as part of a comprehensive package.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“Our efforts and those of the international community to provide assurances and guarantees to the movements have yet to yield the desired results in the form of a speedy movement towards an agreement. The proposed enhanced ceasefire agreement stipulates that the control and the neutralization of the Janjaweed and undisciplined militias is a prerequisite if there is to be a ceasefire and a peace agreement for Darfur. Those steps must be in sequence with various stages of the implementation of the enhanced ceasefire agreement. One of the assurances that we have factored into the agreement is that each of those steps will have to be monitored and verified by the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS).”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“Each of those issues requires decisions by the parties if there is to be forward movement so that, at the end of the day, we can achieve a workable ceasefire. There is no quick fix or easy process. However, I am pleased to report that we have started making progress - albeit slow - in some aspects of the security arrangement negotiations. Some of the proposals under consideration are innovative and should make a real difference to enhancing stability and security for people on the ground. The challenge is to take with us the parties - particularly the movements - that harbour a deep and unyielding distrust of the real intentions of the Government and of its sincerity to implement what will be agreed.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“Let us be clear: the war in Darfur is not a conventional war between contending armies, or even a war between conventional State armed forces and a guerrilla movement. Darfur is home to a myriad of armed and dangerous militias, including the Janjaweed, armed movements that are fragmenting, bandits of sorts, foreign combatants and tribal forces. Security arrangements, both for an immediate ceasefire and for long-term final status arrangements, are a complex undertaking. Our mediation team has made proposals on issues such as the disengagement of forces, redeployment, disarmament of the Janjaweed, control and neutralization of militias, policing and enhancing the security of the camps for internally displaced persons, security of nomadic migration corridors and the demilitarization of humanitarian supply routes.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“On wealth-sharing, there are four outstanding issues: the assistance to be provided to internally displaced persons and refugees to enable them to restart their livelihoods, the formula for transfers from the national Government to the states, the seed money for the Darfur reconstruction and development fund, and the compensation for communities and individuals who have been victims of the conflict. The compensation and the money for the Darfur fund are two of the most controversial. Nevertheless, we remain convinced that, with political will and commitment by the parties, all of those issues can be resolved without further delay. Security lies at the heart of Darfur's crisis. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that security arrangements will make or break the negotiations in Abuja.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“The mediation proposals will be informed by the flexibility indicated by the Government and by our understanding of both the movements' legitimate fears and the aspirations of Darfurians in general, as well as the imperative of finding a just and lasting formula to resolve the problems that are at the heart of this terrible conflict in the Sudan. In submitting the proposals, we remain guided, first and foremost, by the principle of fairness. We are committed to ensuring that we do not submit any proposal for power-sharing that does not enable the people of Darfur to enjoy fair and effective representation in the Sudan's national institutions with a view to ending their marginalization.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“Here we have listened to the parties exhaustively on a set of issues concerning Darfur's representation in the presidency, the National Executive and National Assembly, the status of Darfur within the Sudan, and the makeup of Darfur's three state governments. That also applies to the issue of fair representation for Darfurians in the Sudan's national institutions and the commissions envisaged under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Government of the Sudan is beginning to show some flexibility on those issues, and we are hopeful that the differences can be narrowed. We need the movements to head in the same direction as we strive to address their concerns.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“Their deep insights, broad experience and forward-looking ideas have proved very helpful in providing confidence to the movements and a much-needed momentum for the talks. I am personally convinced that we are now in a position to present a far-reaching set of proposals to the parties before the end of April, as urged by the AU Peace and Security Council and the Security Council only a few days ago. Such proposals will cover the issues of power- sharing, wealth-sharing, security arrangements and the Darfur-Darfur dialogue and consultations, as well as implementation mechanisms and modalities. At the centre of our proposals is a formula for power- sharing.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“For the first time, there are intensive bilateral and direct discussions between the parties, as well as meetings facilitated by the mediation, which followed the momentum provided by the initiative of President Sassou-Nguesso and President Obasanjo. The conflict in Darfur, which has caused so much suffering and bloodshed, seems at last to be ripe for resolution, and we in the African Union mediation are prepared to take the parties into that difficult and sensitive final stretch in the coming weeks. On a related issue, I wish to commend the First Vice- President of the Sudan, Mr. Salva Kiir, and the leadership of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) for the engagement of their representatives in and the facilitation of the process alongside Vice President Ali Osman Taha in Abuja.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“Most notably, I had the impression that we might be able to make some progress in the negotiations on security arrangements, such that the final - and, arguably, the most important - piece of the jigsaw puzzle, the final status issues, could be presented in the near future. During the past few days, the Vice-President of the Sudan, Mr. Ali Osman Taha, was with us in Abuja at the head of a high-powered delegation of the Government of National Unity of the Sudan. As a matter of fact, I had to - most reluctantly - leave Mr. Taha in Abuja because of my prior and twice- postponed commitment to brief the Council. The Vice- President's visit has been extremely helpful in moving the process forward. All the leaders of the Darfur movements were also present, together with their senior advisers, when I left.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source
“This time around, I should like to state that the situation is evolving, though not as fast as we would have wished. We continue to be hampered by the unwillingness or inability of the parties to offer significant concessions and by the deep distrust and mutual suspicion that pervades the relations among them. As we enter the home stretch of this marathon negotiating session, the anxieties of the parties are, understandably, intensifying. We can therefore expect further frustrating hesitation as they contemplate compromise and agreement, and, in more general terms, what the future holds for them and their respective constituencies. By the time I left Abuja last Saturday, we had gradually and systematically exhausted all the arguments on the key issues of power-sharing and wealth-sharing baskets.”
2006-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5413 (2006) · source