YouSaid · the spoken record

Sheard

lines on the record
7
first
2011-12-21
most recent
2011-12-21
sittings or episodes
1
sources
un-security-council

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  1. “For the time being, however, Iran has given us no reason to believe that our engagement in negotiations on their nuclear programme will be reciprocated in a meaningful way. It has not even responded to Baroness Ashton's latest letter on the subject. Iran must know that unless it returns to meaningful negotiations without preconditions, it faces further and deeper isolation.”

    2011-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6697 (2011) · source

  2. “It should focus on designating individuals and entities that have violated sanctions and it should clarify what Member States need to be doing to implement sanctions by publishing advisory implementation assistance notes. It is also important that Member States be equipped with the knowledge and expertise to identify and act upon suspected violations. We therefore welcome the efforts by the Panel of Experts to raise awareness of those steps, which all Member States are required to take in order to implement sanctions and foster greater general knowledge-sharing and collaboration among States. We remain committed to engaging Iran and to addressing the international community's genuine concern regarding its nuclear programme.”

    2011-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6697 (2011) · source

  3. “Sanctions are a key tool to convince Iran to engage seriously in response to the offers on the table. The Council needs to engage constructively to ensure that the sanctions in place are effective in changing the calculus of the Iranian regime. The Iran Sanctions Committee needs to act more constructively to ensure that sanctions play an effective part in that dual-track strategy. It should start by agreeing to the publication of the Panel of Experts' independent report. Withholding that report is to deny the wider membership comprehensive insight into Iran's activity to circumvent sanctions. It is a report that every United Nations Member has paid for and has a right to see. They should be allowed to form their own judgments on its value. In parallel, the Committee needs to act on the recommendations in the report.”

    2011-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6697 (2011) · source

  4. “It is difficult to understand why an Iran pursuing only civilian nuclear power would have rejected those offers. The E3+3 has made those serious, good-faith attempts to present Iran with an alternative to sanctions and isolation. It is Iran's intransigence and its rejection of such offers that has resulted in the intensification of sanctions agreed upon by the Council. Iran says that it wants a peaceful nuclear programme, but the facts do not bear that out. The rejection of the deal designed to provide Iran with reliable civilian nuclear fuel and other incentives, combined with IAEA evidence, can lead us to only one conclusion: Iran is determined to develop nuclear weapons capability. Now more than ever, the dual- track strategy of pressure and engagement is necessary.”

    2011-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6697 (2011) · source

  5. “Indeed, there remains on the table a generous offer from the E3+3, with which Iran has decided not to engage meaningfully. In January, the Istanbul offer made it clear that if Iran verifiably suspended its enrichment and reprocessing activities and heeded the relevant Security Council resolutions and IAEA obligations, it would be able to pursue peaceful civilian nuclear activity. In addition, Iran would enjoy increased political, economic and energy cooperation. That is just the latest in a series of serious offers made to, and rejected by, the Iranian Government since June 2008. In October 2009, the original offer was enhanced by a confidence-building proposal to provide fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor in exchange for Iran's enriched uranium.”

    2011-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6697 (2011) · source

  6. “The evidence is compelling in its description of both the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme and Iran's evasion of IAEA scrutiny. In particular, it is worth highlighting the report's findings that Iran has carried out "activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device" (5/2011/695, annex, para. 43), that "While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications, others are specific to nuclear weapons" (ibid., para. 44), and that some of those activities "may still be ongoing" (ibid., para. 45). Some argue that sanctions are a hindrance to further negotiations. That is not the case. Iran has been presented with a series of offers over the years.”

    2011-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6697 (2011) · source

  7. “Ijoin others in thanking Ambassador Osorio for his briefing to the Council today and for his report on the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and its Panel of Experts. Five years have passed since the Security Council adopted resolution 1737 (2006), in December 2006. Despite the sanctions imposed since 2006, however, the Iranian nuclear programme has continued to develop in direct contravention of the Council's resolutions and Iran's obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. No one following those issues can be in any doubt that Iran's clear objective is to develop the technology required for a nuclear weapon. The November report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides detailed and unambiguous evidence to support that assertion.”

    2011-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6697 (2011) · source