YouSaid · the spoken record

Straw

lines on the record: 88
first: 2001-11-12
most recent: 2005-10-31
sittings or episodes: 8
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We could, indeed, talk about terrorism and the lack of full application of previous Security Council resolutions by Syria in respect of fighting terrorism - something that was mentioned in the Quartet conclusions just last week. Like all of my colleagues, I look forward to full cooperation by the Government of Syria, in substance as well as in form, with the Mehlis Commission. But I have to say, after what I have heard, that I am not holding my breath.”
2005-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5297 (2005) · source
“Just to be clear about this - and this is why I wholly reject any comparison between the position of the Governments of the United States, of Spain and of the United Kingdom and that of the Government of Syria - the independent commissioner concludes, in paragraph 124, that "There is probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri could not have been taken without the approval of top-ranked Syrian security officials". If Mr. Al-Shara' is suggesting that what happened on 11 September 2001, 3 March 2004 and 7 July 2005 happened with the approval of the Governments of the United States, of Spain and of the United Kingdom, I think that he ought to say so. Otherwise, his comparison is entirely worthless.”
2005-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5297 (2005) · source
“The Commission has not had the opportunity to follow up on these interviews or pursue its investigation regarding a possible Syrian involvement in the crime." The report then goes on to say, in paragraph 35, "The Commission has concluded that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic's lack of substantive cooperation with the Commission has impeded the investigation and made it difficult to follow leads".”
2005-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5297 (2005) · source
“Al-Shara' requesting meetings and cooperation with regard to interviews - that is referred to in paragraph 32 of the report (S/2005/662). He then spells out further details. Finally, he says that the interviews were indeed conducted between 20 and 23 September - but at the Syrian Foreign Ministry. Paragraph 34 states that "Each interview was conducted in the presence of the Legal Adviser to the Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry or another representative of the Foreign Ministry, one interpreter, two note takers and, at times, an additional person whose affiliation was not identified. At the end of the interview process, it was apparent that the interviewees had given uniform answers to questions. Many of those answers were contradicted by the weight of evidence collected by the Commission from a variety of other sources.”
2005-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5297 (2005) · source
“Mehlis spells out as a lack of cooperation on substance, he has found it necessary to refer this matter to the Security Council. Had there been that full cooperation on substance by the Government of Syria, the report by Mr. Mehlis would have been very different, and I am absolutely certain that there would have been no requirement for a ministerial meeting today - probably not even for a resolution. Let me give just one example of the lack of cooperation that, I notice, Mr. Al-Shara' failed to mention in his lengthy speech: lack of cooperation that Commissioner Mehlis spelled out between the Syrian Foreign Ministry and the Commission on the subject of interviewing suspects. Commissioner Mehlis spells out the fact that, in June, he wrote to Mr.”
2005-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5297 (2005) · source
“And I think if any colleagues around this table had any misgivings about making resolution 1636 (2005) a Chapter VII resolution, those misgivings were entirely allayed by the lengthy statement that we have just heard - which appeared to be resisting at each stage, until its closing paragraphs, any suggestion that there would be - in spirit as well as in letter - the full cooperation with the Mehlis Commission that the resolution requires. Commissioner Mehlis makes it clear, and I quoted him, that the presumption of innocence still obtains. But what he is dealing with here is not a medieval inquiry, as Mr. Al-Shara' suggests, but what is commonplace in all proper investigations: the establishment, first of all, of prima facie evidence to see whether a further investigation is required. Because of what Mr.”
2005-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5297 (2005) · source
“I was not going to respond until I heard the Foreign Minister of Syria make what I can only describe as the most grotesque and insensitive comparison between the situation in which the Government of Syria now finds itself and the positions of the United States Government on 11 September 2001, the Government of Spain on 11 March 2004 and the Government of the United Kingdom on 7 July of this year. To compare the state of knowledge or lack of knowledge of those three Governments in the face of those appalling and unprovoked terrorist atrocities with the position of the Government of Syria is at best absurd.”
2005-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5297 (2005) · source
“Failure to cooperate fully and now will oblige us to consider further actions to ensure that the Security Council, through the Commission, can play its part in the Lebanese Government's determination to see justice done. We must not let the Lebanese people down. As Prosecutor Mehlis points out, many still live in fear of a return of Syrian interference and control. Turning our backs on the crime, because it appears politically difficult to solve, will not only lead the Lebanese people to lose faith in this body, it will undermine the Council's credibility and authority and damage our enforcement of the international rule of law. The people of Lebanon have become all too well acquainted with grief. We owe them a better future, and this resolution is one way of providing them with that better future.”
2005-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5297 (2005) · source
“The resolution gives the Commission more time and it allows a further extension, beyond 15 December, if the Commission or the Lebanese Government judge it to be necessary. The resolution also requires full Syrian cooperation. It is clear from the Commission's report that this has not been forthcoming so far. Indeed, if anything - again, as is very clear from the report - the Syrian Government appears to have attempted to mislead Prosecutor Mehlis and his team. That grudging and evasive attitude has to change. I hope and believe that in adopting this resolution we are today sending a strong and unequivocal message to that effect. We are also, correctly, putting the Government of Syria on notice that our patience has limits.”
2005-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5297 (2005) · source
“The report takes us part of the way towards that objective, but the Commission itself acknowledges that it has yet to get to the bottom of who was responsible for the murder. That is despite the exemplary cooperation from the Lebanese authorities, who in their own way have acted resolutely and bravely in arresting a number of suspects identified by the Commission. But for the Commission to stand any chance of completing its task satisfactorily, it needs two things: first, more time to finalize its investigation; and, secondly, the full and unconditional cooperation of Syria. In adopting this resolution today, we have been united in committing ourselves, under Chapter VII of the Charter, to ensuring that both of those requirements are met.”
2005-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5297 (2005) · source
“Having studied the report carefully, however, it is difficult not to endorse its conclusion that there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian official involvement in this terrorist act. Indeed, in paragraph 124, Commissioner Mehlis says: "There is probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri could not have been taken without the approval of top-ranked Syrian security officials and could not have been further organized without the collusion of their counterparts in the Lebanese security services." Let us be clear. The Security Council has only one interest here - the same interest as the Lebanese Government and people - to see justice done.”
2005-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5297 (2005) · source
“The United Nations would be seriously and significantly undermined if we were to turn a blind eye to such activities, which is why the unanimous decision taken today is so important. I would like to congratulate Commissioner Mehlis and his team for their detailed, thorough and courageous work to investigate this horrendous crime. Let it be remembered that not only did former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri perish when the huge explosion took place, but at least 20 other people were killed and many, many more were injured. The evidence accumulated in the Mehlis report (S/2005/662) is both serious and disturbing. The International Independent Investigation Commission rightly recognizes, in paragraph 21 of the report, that until we know the complete story of what happened in Beirut in February the presumption of innocence should stand.”
2005-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5297 (2005) · source
“I am grateful to all my colleagues here for their unanimous vote in favour of resolution 1636 (2005). By its unanimity and by the firm language of the resolution, we are, I believe, sending out a very strong message to the Government of Syria and to elements in Lebanon about the need for them to cooperate fully with the investigation conducted by Prosecutor Mehlis. Lebanon has seen all too much violence in its history - too much bloodshed. Even so, the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on 14 February was profoundly shocking to the people of Lebanon and to the whole of the international community. It seemed to suggest that there were people - and maybe countries - who were ready to resolve political difficulties by resort to the mediaeval practice of political assassination.”
2005-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5297 (2005) · source
“Let me end by commending the report of the Secretary-General on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies (S/2004/616). I look forward to discussing how we can follow-up on its excellent analysis and recommendations in the open debate on the report under the United Kingdom's Security Council presidency next month. These discussions are vitally important, and we need to keep working on building our capacities and partnerships, sharing expertise and continually reviewing our operations to ensure that we really do learn the lessons for the future and put them into practice.”
2004-09-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5041 (2004) · source
“We have to address the fact that international political attention for the financing of post-conflict countries tends to wane, or drop off, after three or four years, although studies show that that is precisely when countries are most vulnerable to relapsing into conflict. We therefore need to find better ways to mobilize long-term support for post-conflict countries in transition. I hope that the High-level Panel will propose some options for doing so. It is also not just a matter for us; it is a matter for the world media, because as their attention drops off, so inevitably - in all the countries that we represent - does the attention of our voters and then the attention of our Governments. We have to try and turn that around.”
2004-09-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5041 (2004) · source
“We have all seen examples of that, where well-meaning individuals and Governments take programmes down off the shelf, do not adapt them to local circumstances and end up creating more, not fewer, difficulties. There is much to be learned from the trust fund models that we have seen in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Liberia and elsewhere. My fourth point concerns local priorities, and it relates to the point I have just made. We can no longer impose structures that will collapse as soon as the international community leaves. Instead, we have to work to priorities agreed in and by the country concerned and develop the local capacity to implement them. The Afghan Transitional Administration is a commendable example of that necessary local leadership. Fifthly, and finally, there is the question of long- term engagement.”
2004-09-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5041 (2004) · source
“Regional organizations can often mobilize resources more quickly and have special, local legitimacy, which is why I greatly welcome the contribution made earlier this morning by the representative of the African Union. It is the African Union that is playing a crucial and leading role in the resolution of the conflict in Darfur. The European Union's capacities and partnerships with the United Nations are growing, too, and our partnership also needs to be with civil society and non-governmental organizations. I welcome the recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations - the Cardoso panel - on this. Linked to all of this is a need to better coordinate our actions. In post-conflict environments, competing, conflicting or inappropriate programmes can often do more harm than good.”
2004-09-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5041 (2004) · source
“We need to help the Secretariat deploy civilian staff more quickly and improve our own capacities - as the United Kingdom is doing through a new interdepartmental, post-conflict reconstruction unit between the British Foreign Office, the British Department for International Development and the British Ministry of Defence - so that we are better able to give civilian support to United Kingdom and international operations abroad. Secondly, we need better financing for the civilian parts of peace-support operations. I am not necessarily arguing for an increase in the scope of assessed contributions, but we have to find ways to generate more funding for civilian peace-building activities, especially in the vital first year after the end of a conflict. Thirdly, we have to build stronger partnerships.”
2004-09-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5041 (2004) · source
“Let me suggest briefly five areas on which we need to focus: earlier action, better financing, stronger partnerships, local priorities and long-term engagement. First, on earlier action, we have got to plan and implement civilian processes early so we are able quickly to lay the foundations for stability. To take the example of Iraq, Prime Minister Alawi has made clear that it cannot simply be a case of security first and elections later. Elections are themselves vital to building security.”
2004-09-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5041 (2004) · source
“We are learning the importance of supporting programmes which originate locally and which reflect local cultures, such as the Loya Jirga in Afghanistan. I think we are getting better at burden-sharing. Last year, for example, the European Union police mission in Bosnia took over from the United Nations- led International Police Task Force there. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a European Union- led force helped to prepare the way for United Nations troops. Alongside that, we are working more closely across institutions, such as the United Nations and the World Bank are doing in Iraq, the Sudan and Liberia, and together with the Inter-American Bank and the European Commission in Haiti. All those improvements show the direction in which we need to go in future.”
2004-09-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5041 (2004) · source
“It may involve stabilizing a fragile peace, restoring public order, reintegrating combatants, acting on women's issues, ending impunity, and rebuilding local institutions for security, governance, justice, democracy, economic growth and for social welfare. Acting across all these areas presents us with big challenges, made all the more acute by the need to act quickly in the brief period following the end of the hot conflict. Acting quickly is vital, as we know, for success. But as well as being quick, we have to be coherent, across a range of issues and a range of actors. I think that, over the last decade, we all have been on a very steep learning curve. We are agreeing more comprehensive mandates, for example for the operations that we have determined in Liberia, in Cote d'Ivoire, in Haiti and in Burundi.”
2004-09-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5041 (2004) · source
“Let me begin by thanking the Government of Spain and in particular, if I may, my colleague and friend the Foreign Minister of Spain, Miguel Moratinos, for having organized today's debate. Military peacekeeping and political peace agreements bring an end - or they should - to the hot war of conflict. But we can ensure lasting peace in countries recovering from such conflicts only if we help to build civilian institutions and structures, capable government, a strong economy, a functioning civil society. So resolving today's conflicts, which often occur within States rather than between them, is more complex than in the past.”
2004-09-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5041 (2004) · source
“In the light of that and of what I have said, I shall tell the Council that, on behalf of the sponsors of our draft resolution - the Kingdom of Spain, the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom - I am asking the Secretariat to circulate an amendment, which we are introducing, that will specify a further period beyond the adoption of a resolution for Iraq to take the final opportunity to disarm and to bring itself into compliance. But the Council must send Iraq the clear message that we will resolve this crisis on United Nations terms: the terms that the Council established four months ago when we unanimously adopted resolution 1441 (2002).”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“But what we are suggesting is that it is perfectly possible, achievable and necessary for Saddam Hussain and the Iraqi regime to bring themselves into compliance so that, instead of us all admitting - either by our words or by our silence, as we have today - that Saddam is not in full compliance, that he has not taken a further opportunity and the final opportunity, we can say the reverse and can celebrate the achievement of the fine ideals of the United Nations and the upholding of one of the central points of the work programme of the United Nations - that we back our diplomacy, if necessary, with the credible threat of force. As founding members of the United Nations and permanent members of the Security Council, we remain committed to exploring every reasonable option for a peaceful outcome and every prospect of a Council consensus.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“It would be utterly irresponsible and in defiance of our solemn duties to the Council for us to walk into a situation where force was used automatically. And, although the canard has been around that some of us were in the business of using force automatically, the truth is that it is not being used automatically, it should not be used automatically, it will not be used automatically, and nothing to which my Government has ever put its name has ever suggested that that would be the case. What we seek is compliance by Saddam Hussain with resolution 1441 (2002). And I make this point: we are not suggesting that, in a matter of days, Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei would be able to complete all their work - that they would be able to verify the disarmament of Iraq. No one is suggesting that.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“He has shown this week that he does not need more time to comply, he can act with astonishing speed when he chooses to. What is more, he knows exactly what has to be done. He knows this because he is the originator of the information. The Iraqis do not need a Mr. Hans Blix and all his staff to produce 167 pages of forensic questions; they have the answer book already. Look how fast they acted to produce 13,000 pages of a declaration, albeit much of it irrelevant. It may take time to fabricate further falsehoods, but the truth takes only seconds to tell. And I should just like to make something clear on the issue of automaticity, which, again, my good friend Dominique raised. Nothing has ever been automatic about the threat of force or the use of force; it has always been conditional.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“The paradox we face is that the only way we are going to achieve disarmament by peace of a rogue regime that, all of us know, has been in defiance of the Council for the past 12 years - the only way that we can achieve its disarmament of weapons mass destruction, which, the Council has said, pose a threat to international peace and security - is by backing our diplomacy with the credible threat of force. I wish that we lived in a different world where this was not necessary, but, sadly, we live in this world, and the choice is not ours as to how this disarmament takes place - the choice is Saddam Hussain's. Would that it were ours, because it would be so easy, but sadly, it is not. And there is only one possible, sensible conclusion that we can draw: we have to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussain. We have to put this man to the test.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Blix's carefully chosen words, the strong outside pressure is - and let us be blunt about this - the presence of more than 200,000 young men and women of the United States and of the United Kingdom, willing to put their lives on the line for the sake of this body, the United Nations. Dominique also said that the choice before us was one between disarmament by peace and disarmament by war. That is a false choice. I wish it were that easy, because then we would not be obliged to have this discussion; we could all put up our hands for disarmament by peace and go home.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Blix said in his opening remarks that the changes may well be due to strong outside pressure. That is absolutely right. In his remarks, Dominique de Villepin described a lot of diplomatic pressure by the Non- Aligned Movement, the European Union, the Arab League and many others. I greatly welcome all of that diplomatic pressure. Dominique went on to say that the forces of the United States and of the United Kingdom lend support to that pressure. With due respect for my good friend, I think it is the other way around. What has happened is that all that pressure was there for every day of 12 years. In Mr.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“But if we are to achieve that, we have to recognize that the progress which has been reported represents only the tip of a very large iceberg of huge unfinished business required of Iraq. Just as I welcome the progress about which we have heard, I say to the Council that there are very serious lessons for us to draw from what has been reported. Let us consider what has changed. Why has there been this sudden bout of activity when there was no progress at all for weeks before, and when for months and years before that, Saddam Hussein was re- arming under our noses? It is not our policy which has changed. It is not international law which has changed - there have been from the beginning the clearest instructions to Saddam to disarm. No, what has changed is one thing and one thing only: the pressure on the regime. Mr.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“To find a peaceful solution to the current crisis, the Council must not retreat from the demands it set out clearly in resolution 1441 (2002). What we need is an irreversible and strategic decision by Iraq to disarm; a strategic decision by Iraq to yield to the inspectors all of its weapons of mass destruction and all relevant information, which it could and should have provided at any time in the past 12 years; a strategic decision like that taken by South Africa when it decided freely to abandon its secret nuclear programme. I greatly welcome the progress the inspectors have reported. My earnest wish, and that of my Government, has all along been to achieve the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, if humanly possible by peaceful means.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“I must say, with all due respect to good colleagues, that it defies experience to believe that continuing inspections with no firm end date, as I believe has been suggested in the French, German and Russian memorandum, will achieve complete disarmament if - as the memorandum acknowledges - Iraq's full and active cooperation is not immediately forthcoming. The memorandum is not even a formula for containment, given Iraq's proven ability to exploit the existing sanctions regime to continue to develop weapons of mass destruction. We knew nothing about the missile engines. We knew nothing about the rest of this - imported under our noses in breach of the sanctions regime - until we passed resolution 1441 (2002).”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Iraq under-declared the number of missile engines it - illegally - imported. It declared 131 engines but imported 380. Iraq also falsely declared that the missile had a maximum range of 150 kilometres when it was designed - it was not an accident - to fly considerably in excess of that. We know that Iraq's agreeing to the destruction process, necessary as it is, is a calculation that it can satisfy the Council with a partial response in only one of the 29 categories of unresolved disarmament questions.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“We know for a fact that all of those 12 - and all prospective interviewees - were threatened and intimidated by the Iraqi regime beforehand and told that their exchanges were being recorded. The interviewees were not being recorded by bugs and tape recorders that they were told to take into the meetings. But they were told that they were going to be recorded in any event by bugs placed in the walls of the recording halls. I understand that scientists most likely to have the most incriminating evidence have been locked away by the Iraqi security services. There have been no interviews in the safe havens outside Iraq - not one. And the restrictions placed on the interviewees is itself the most incriminating evidence that Saddam has something to hide. The Al Samoud 2 episode further confirms Iraq's familiar tactics.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“It is not something for which they need the assistance of inspectors or ground-penetrating radar. It is something they could and should have done back in October 1991 and that, notwithstanding all the pressure, they are still refusing to do. Then we come to the issue of interviews. As Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei have reported, Iraq has done everything possible to prevent unrestricted, unrecorded interviews. There have now been 12 private interviews between the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency against a United Nations Special Commission list of 3,500 people previously associated with weapons of mass destruction programmes.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“No one should be taken in by that as a concession. Iraq was ordered on 2 October 1991 - I have here the instruction from the Council - to enact legislation, in conformity with international law, to do precisely what it is now saying it intends to do. What is more, what it has so far done covers not the operations of the State but only those of private individuals and mixed companies. So 12 years on, 12 years after the world saw that Iraq had developed, under the world's nose, weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems - nuclear systems, biological systems, chemical systems - Iraq is still refusing to pass a law saying that such activity by members of State Government authorities is illegal. This is not something for which they needed to search.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“As a result, UNMOVIC has not been able to resolve any substantive issues outstanding from 1998. As we all know - this is a point to which I shall return shortly - Iraq refused to admit inspectors for three years after resolution 1284 (1999) was adopted, agreeing to them only under threat of enforcement action and in an attempt to frustrate resolution 1441 (2002). Iraq has dragged its feet on as many elements of procedural and substantive cooperation as possible. I would like to draw attention to just one aspect, which is often overlooked. Mr. Blix referred to the fact that Iraq recently informed us that following the adoption of a presidential decree prohibiting private individuals and mixed companies from engaging in work related to weapons of mass destruction, further legislation on this subject is to be enacted.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“It has not so far taken this final opportunity. If anybody in the Chamber or outside has any doubt about that conclusion, then I commend to them the so-called clusters report on the outstanding issues concerning Iraq's proscribed weapons programme, which, as a member of the commission behind the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, I have already had the privilege of reading. As Mr. Blix knows, I have read all 167 pages of that report in every particular. It is a painstaking piece of work and I thank Mr. Blix for publishing it. But it is also a chilling read about the failure of Iraq to comply with successive resolutions of the Council each day of the past 12 years. There has not been active cooperation in the areas which matter.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“We are all agreed that Iraq must be fully disarmed of weapons of mass destruction and that Iraq's failure to cooperate immediately, unconditionally and actively with the inspectors has to be dealt with. As we negotiated resolution 1441 (2002), the evidence was there for all to see that Iraq had been and remained in material breach. All 15 members voted to give the Iraqi regime a final opportunity to comply with its obligations. The first question before the Council, therefore, is this: has Iraq taken this final opportunity to disarm? I was very much struck, while listening with care to all the statements - and of course people have different points of View - by the fact that nobody - not one minister in the Council - said, in my hearing, that Iraq is now fully, actively and immediately in compliance with resolution 1441 (2002).”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“I would like to begin by congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency, and by wishing you well at a very important moment. I also echo and underline the thanks which you so generously gave to Vice-Chancellor Joschka Fischer and Ambassador Gunter Pleuger for the excellent way in which they chaired the Security Council during the month of February. I would also like to thank Mr. ElBaradei and Mr. Blix for their reports and to place on record my Government's appreciation for their work and the work in very difficult circumstances of all the staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). I have listened with very great care to what my colleagues speaking before me have said.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“If we send out the message to proliferators the world over that defiance of the United Nations pays, it will not be peace that we will have secured.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“But I also say this: in our efforts to secure a peaceful conclusion to this crisis, as we must, I know, and I think everybody else here knows, that we have reached this stage only by doing what the United Nations Charter requires of us, which is to back a diplomatic process with a credible threat of force and also, if necessary, to be ready to use that threat of force. If we back away from that - if we decide to give unlimited time for little or no cooperation on substance - then the disarmament of Iraq and the peace and security of the international community, for which we are responsible, will get not easier, but very much harder. This issue is notjust about Iraq - it is about how we deal with proliferators elsewhere across the globe.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“And the period after the inspectors were effectively kicked out by Iraq at the end of 1998 until 8 November will hardly be described as the best in the Security Council's history, because Iraq was in open defiance of the United Nations and nothing effectively was being done about its weapons of mass destruction. I am proud that, with the United States, the United Kingdom took the initiative on this issue and tabled what became resolution 1441 (2002). I am glad to note the progress on process that has been made. I am glad to note that, notwithstanding the clear statement by the Government of Iraq on 10 September last year that inspectors would never go back into Iraq, inspectors have now gone back into Iraq. We note the progress on process that has been made.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“But this will require a dramatic and immediate change by Saddam, and that will be achieved only if we, the Security Council, hold our nerve in the face of this tyrant, give meaning to our words and to the decisions that we have already collectively taken, and make ourselves ready to ensure that Iraq will face the serious consequences that we all decided would have to happen if Iraq's defiance did not end. I want to close by saying this. The period of 12 years since resolution 687 (1991) was adopted on 3 April 1991 has, frankly, been a period of humiliation for this body - the Security Council - and for the United Nations, as games have been played with the Council's authority.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“Blix, picking up a phrase from his report of 27 January, whether he believes that Iraq has yet come to a genuine acceptance of the disarmament that has been demanded of it. The issue before us is of the authority of the United Nations and of the defiance of United Nations resolutions. On 8 November, we said unanimously that Saddam was to have a final opportunity. Can anyone say - does anyone truly believe here - that he has yet taken that final opportunity? Like every other member of this Council, and, I believe, of the international community, I hope and believe that a peaceful solution to this crisis may still be possible.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“As for the nuclear dossier, how many of its open issues has the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) been able to close through Iraq's cooperation? I thought that the most significant point made by Mr. Blix in his report, which has subsequently been echoed by everyone who has spoken so far, was in his closing remarks, when he said that three months after the adoption of resolution 1441 (2002), the period of disarmament through inspection could still be short if the immediate, active and unconditional cooperation with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and IAEA were to be forthcoming. I take those words to mean that Iraq has yet to be forthcoming with that immediate, active and unconditional cooperation. I would like to ask Mr.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“Blix think that Iraq has refurbished equipment like the engine casting chambers at Al Mamoun and the chemical processing equipment at Al Falujah, both of which were destroyed by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) because they were prohibited? Since the last report, how many interviews have taken place with the officials that the inspectors have asked to interview, and how many in places to which the inspectors are sure are not subject to electronic interception and bugging by Iraq? Has any of the outstanding material identified by UNSCOM. in early 1999 - the missing 8,500 litres of anthrax, the 1.5 tons of VX nerve agent, the 6,500 chemical bombs - been satisfactorily dealt with by Iraq? Do recent documents provided by Iraq give any serious evidence of this?”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“They have failed to cooperate fully and actively on substance, as well as on process, with the inspectors. And they have failed substantively to meet the obligations imposed on them. I have listened with very great care to my colleagues who have spoken so far. We all agree on the importance of resolution 1441 (2002), and it is striking that nobody who has spoken so far - and, I warrant, nobody who speaks after me - has suggested for a second that Iraq is fully and actively complying with the obligations that we imposed on them on 8 November of last year. So, Iraq's material breaches, which we spelled out on 8 November, are still there. In that regard, I would be glad to put the following questions to the inspectors: Why did Mr.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“Well, they have lied; they have concealed; they have played games - the game of catch as catch can, as Mr. Blix told us on 27 January. Saddam said for four years that he had no biological weapons programme, no anthrax bacillus, no smallpox virus, no VX nerve agent. And indeed, the inspectors found absolutely nothing. It took the defection of Saddam's own son-in- law to uncover Saddam's biological weapons programme, more terrible than anybody had thought. To bring us up to date, as Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei spelled out in their report on 27 January, Iraq has failed to account for thousands of tons of chemical weapons and precursor chemicals, of shells and bombs for anthrax, for mustard gas and for VX nerve agent. They have failed to make a full and complete disclosure, as required of them, on 7 December.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“It is worth just reminding ourselves that Iraq is the only country in the world that has launched missile attacks on five of its neighbours, invaded two of its neighbours - both Muslim - and killed without any justification hundreds of thousands of innocent people in Iran, in Kuwait and in Iraq itself. In his report, Mr. Blix referred to the decisions that were made in 1991, and he said that regrettably the high degree of cooperation required by the Council of Iraq for disarmament through inspection was not forthcoming in 1991. It is worth reminding ourselves, when we discuss this issue of time scales, that on 3 April 1991, this Council gave Iraq 90 days to disarm - by 2 July 1991. In the 11 years, 7 months and 12 days- quite a lot of time - since the Council's deadline to Iraq ran out, what is it they have done?”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source