YouSaid · the spoken record

T.S. Tirumurti

lines on the record

281

first

2020-10-26

most recent

2021-08-18

sittings or episodes

37

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un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

1. “These statements will be issued as a document of the Security Council in accordance with the procedure set out in the letter dated 7 May 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council (S/2020/372), which was agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, and reference to the document will be made in S/PV.8838.”

   2021-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/732 (2021) · source

2. “I have the honour to refer to the 8838th meeting of the Security Council, convened on 18 August 2021 under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations: technology and peacekeeping”. The interventions of the briefers and Council members will be published as an official record of the Security Council (S/PV.8838). In accordance with the understanding reached among Council members for the 8838th meeting, the following delegations and entities submitted written statements, copies of which are enclosed: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Rwanda, South Africa, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates.”

   2021-08-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/732 (2021) · source

3. “In accordance with the procedure set out in the letter dated 7 May 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council (S/2020/372), which was agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, these briefing and statements will be issued as a document of the Security Council.”

   2021-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/722 (2021) · source

4. “In accordance with the understanding reached among Council members for this videoconference, the following delegations and entities submitted written statements, copies of which are also enclosed: Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, the European Union, Fiji, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.”

   2021-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/722 (2021) · source

5. “Blinken, Secretary of State of the United States of America; Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France; Eva-Maria Liimets, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Estonia; Ine Eriksen Søreide, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway; Marcelo Ebrard Casaubon, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico; Ben Wallace, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Camillo Gonsalves, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; and Eamon Ryan, Minister for Transport and Minister for Environment, Climate and Communications of Ireland, as well as by the representatives of China and Tunisia, in connection with the videoconference on “Maintenance of international peace and security: maritime security” convened on Monday, 9 August 2021.”

   2021-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/722 (2021) · source

6. “I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the briefings provided by Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General; Ghada Fathi Waly, Executive Director, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; and Christophe Lutundula Apala Pen’apala, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; as well as the statements delivered by Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India; Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation; Uhuru Kenyatta, President of Kenya; Pham Minh Chinh, Prime Minister of Viet Nam; Hassoumi Massoudou, Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Niger; Antony J.”

   2021-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/722 (2021) · source

7. “There is an urgent need to increase humanitarian assistance to all Syrians throughout the country without discrimination, politicization or preconditions. What we need immediately is an active engagement that is both consistent with Syrian independence and territorial integrity and that addresses the urgency of the humanitarian issues to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. There is also an urgent need for concrete steps to address the hurdles that are obstructing the functioning of both cross-border and cross-line operations. As we have mentioned earlier, India has extended developmental assistance and human resource development support to Syria through lines of credit for development projects, the supply of medicine and food, artificial limb fitment camps and capacity - building training programmes.”

   2021-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/506 (2021) · source

8. “We also remain convinced that there can be no military solution to the Syrian conflict and reaffirm our commitment to advancing a Syrian-led, Syrian-owned and United Nations- facilitated political process in line with Security Council resolution 2254 (2015). The briefing by Under-Secretary-General Lowcock has again brought out how grim the humanitarian situation remains. The scale, severity and complexity of the humanitarian needs remain extensive. The Syrian people have suffered relentless violence and terror. Syria remains torn by territorial fragmentation. Syrian women have been impacted in disproportionate ways. The pandemic and the adverse impact of sanctions on the health facilities and humanitarian operations have only made the situation worse.”

   2021-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/506 (2021) · source

9. “The latest report of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD) also refers to the repeated use of chemical weapons by ISIL against civilian populations between 2014 and 2016. This is a cause for serious concern. The reports of the presence of mercenaries from Syria in Africa is equally worrying. This needs to be addressed with a high degree of seriousness. It is imperative that all parties adhere to their international obligations to fight terrorism and terrorist organizations in Syria, as designated by the Security Council. India firmly believes that long-term security and stability in this region can only be achieved by preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria.”

   2021-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/506 (2021) · source

10. “Against this background, for the United Nations-led political track to move forward, we need cooperation from all major stakeholders in the conflict. Constructive international diplomacy is the need of the hour to bridge existing divides by focusing on measured incremental positive steps. The major stakeholders of the Syrian conflict need to review their long-entrenched positions. They need to act collaboratively, strengthen the hand of the Special Envoy and thereby give a collective push to the United Nations-led political track. We believe that this can be realized if all parties agree to work together. It is deeply concerning that the involvement of external actors in Syria has given a fillip to the growth of terrorism in Syria and in the region. The latest report of the Secretary-General dwells on the threat posed by ISIL.”

    2021-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/506 (2021) · source

11. “We take note of the holding of presidential elections in Syria, which is a constitutional obligation of the State to its people, within the purview of its sovereign decisions. We also note that the elections scheduled for today are distinct from the United Nations-facilitated, Syrian-led political process. The security situation in Syria has been relatively calm, with stable front lines for over a year now. However, frequent eruptions of violence have continued to occur, reflecting military tensions among the forces in various parts of the country. The fundamental principles of international law, such as non-interference in the internal affairs of States and respect for territorial integrity and independence, have been repeatedly violated in Syria owing to the continued presence of foreign armies on the ground.”

    2021-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/506 (2021) · source

12. “Allow me to begin by thanking Special Envoy Pedersen and Under-Secretary- General Lowcock for their briefings. As things stand presently, the political track has not moved any further since our last discussion four weeks ago. The Constitutional Committee has an onerous task of preparing and drafting, for popular approval, a constitutional reform, which will contribute to the political settlement in Syria and the implementation of Security Council resolution 2254 (2015). It has been 20 months since the establishment of that Committee. We hope that the Special Envoy will succeed in bringing about an understanding among all three groups on the workplan and methodology, paving the way for convening the sixth meeting.”

    2021-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/506 (2021) · source

13. “India remains committed to supporting Libya and the Libyan people in their endeavour to bring about lasting peace in the country. To that end, we look forward to working with the Government of National Unity in providing capacity-building and training assistance in mutually identified areas.”

    2021-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/498 (2021) · source

14. “We look forward to an early deployment of the ceasefire monitoring component of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), as approved by the Security Council through its resolution 2570 (2021). Fifthly, it is important to plan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups and non-State armed actors. We appreciate the fact that UNSMIL is prepared to render assistance to Libya in that process. Sixthly, we must ensure that terrorist forces and organizations not be allowed to thrive in Libya, since that may lead to a cascading effect throughout the region. The international community must speak with one voice against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. India has traditionally enjoyed close and mutually beneficial bilateral ties with Libya, reinforced by close business and other links.”

    2021-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/498 (2021) · source

15. “We hope that all the parties concerned will engage sincerely in that endeavour. We also urge the international community to support such a process. Fourthly, it is a matter of concern that provisions of the ceasefire agreement continue to be violated, in particular those relating to the withdrawal of foreign fighters and mercenaries. The continued presence of foreign fighters poses a serious threat not only to Libya but also to its neighbours and the region as a whole. It is imperative that the coastal road be opened at the earliest possible time as an important element of the ceasefire agreement. Besides integrating Libya, this will also be a visible symbol of the commitment of the global community to the ceasefire agreement and the peace process.”

    2021-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/498 (2021) · source

16. “In that regard, I would like to emphasize the following points. First, the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya need to be safeguarded. The peace process must be fully Libyan-led and Libyan- owned, with no imposition or external interference. Secondly, it is imperative that elections be held smoothly on 24 December in a free and fair manner. For that, the Government of National Unity needs to provide the necessary administrative support, including the provision of an adequate budget, and the House of Representatives needs to clarify the constitutional and legal basis for the elections and then enact legislation, as necessary, by 1 July. Thirdly, sustainable peace requires an inclusive and comprehensive national reconciliation process.”

    2021-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/498 (2021) · source

17. “I would like to thank Special Envoy Ján Kubiš for his briefing to the Security Council. I also welcome His Excellency Mr. Taher Elsonni, Permanent Representative of Libya, to this meeting. We are happy to note that, more than a decade since the start of the conflict in Libya, there is now reason for cautious optimism. The Government of National Unity, charged with the conduct of elections on 24 December, is moving ahead with purpose and the ceasefire agreement is largely holding. However, as we heard from the Special Envoy, despite the progress, there are still causes for concern and the possibility of spoilers hindering the political process. It is incumbent upon the international community, and the Council in particular, to provide support to Libya as it embarks on its journey towards peace and stability.”

    2021-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/498 (2021) · source

18. “The Committee received two letters from the Libyan Investment Authority on various aspects of the assets freeze. Lastly, during the reporting period, the Committee received two implementation reports from India and Mexico. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate the Committee’s commitment to contributing to the promotion of peace and stability in Libya.”

    2021-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/498 (2021) · source

19. “The Committee received five inspection reports on five vessels and three reports on the attempted inspections of three vessels from the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI. With regard to the assets freeze, no negative decision was taken by the Committee in relation to two exemption notifications, invoking paragraph 19 (a) of resolution 1970 (2011), submitted by Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In connection with three additional notifications, invoking paragraphs 19 (a) or 21 of resolution 1970 (2011), submitted by Belgium, Bahrain and Canada, the Committee determined that none met the scope of the provisions stipulated in the paragraph invoked. The Committee also received a letter from Liechtenstein in follow-up to a notification previously submitted under paragraph 19 (a) of resolution 1970 (2011).”

    2021-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/498 (2021) · source

20. “Eighteen Member States, including Libya, and three regional organizations participated in the closed video-teleconference. The purpose of this event was to continue to strengthen the dialogue on the effective implementation of the sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council in relation to Libya. In addition to participating in the meeting, the Syrian Arab Republic also conveyed a note verbale to the Committee dated 9 May 2021. With respect to the arms embargo, the Committee received letters from Egypt and Greece, respectively, on different aspects of that measure. The Committee approved a request for exemption, under paragraph 9 (c) of resolution 1970 (2011), submitted by Malta.”

    2021-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/498 (2021) · source

21. “The publication of the Panel’s final report was preceded by leaks to the media of some of its contents, as well as the spread of misinformation. Committee members expressed their concern and dismay in that regard. In terms of agreed follow-up action, the Committee dispatched letters to Libya on matters pertaining to migrants, asylum seekers and detainees, including the killings at Mizdah, and aspects of the assets freeze in relation to the Libyan Investment Authority. At a technical working level, members of the Committee discussed, but agreed to take no further action on, two further aspects of the assets freeze highlighted by the Panel. The Committee also updated some identifying information on its sanctions list. On 10 May, the Committee and invited participants heard a briefing by the Panel of Experts.”

    2021-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/498 (2021) · source

22. “During the closed video-teleconference, Committee members commended the work of the Panel. They expressed concern over the reported violations of the arms embargo, urging all States Members of the United Nations to respect the embargo. They also expressed concern over the continued presence of foreign forces and mercenaries in Libya, despite the signing of the ceasefire agreement on 23 October 2020, and called for those forces’ and mercenaries’ immediate withdrawal. They further underlined the Panel’s reporting on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses in Libya, including the events in Tarhouna and Mizdah, and the plight of migrants in general. Committee members agreed on follow-up action in relation to the nine recommendations addressed to the Committee.”

    2021-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/498 (2021) · source

23. “Allow me to begin by recalling resolution 2571 (2021), adopted by the Security Council on 16 April 2021 (see S/2021/382), in which it extended the timebound authorizations and measures aimed at preventing illicit exports of petroleum from Libya, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, to 30 July 2022. The arms embargo, the travel ban and the assets freeze were not timebound and continue to apply. The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Libya to 15 August 2022. On 14 May, the Secretary-General appointed six individuals to serve on the Panel. On 5 March, the Committee heard a presentation by the Panel of Experts on its final report (see S/2021/229) submitted in accordance with resolution 2509 (2020). Since the report is publicly available, I will not summarize its findings.”

    2021-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/498 (2021) · source

24. “In accordance with paragraph 24 (e) of resolution 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011, I have the honour to report to the Security Council on the work of the Committee established by the same resolution. I will report on developments since the beginning of my term as Chair, 1 January 2021, to the present date, given that the Committee’s annual report for 2020 (S/2020/1256), covered the period from my predecessor’s last briefing (S/2020/879, annex II) on 2 September 2020, to the end of 2020. During this period, the members of the Committee met twice in the “informal informals” format via closed video-teleconference and conducted additional work using the silence procedure.”

    2021-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/498 (2021) · source

25. “We have also assisted in capacity-building through our scholarship programmes and have extended humanitarian assistance by supplying food and life- saving drugs. India remains committed to supporting the Sudan and its people in this important phase of political transition.”

    2021-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/495 (2021) · source

26. “With an integrated country team and in collaboration with partners like the African Union, UNITAMS should remain committed to working closely with all components of the transitional authorities. In conclusion, as the Sudan makes confident strides towards a brighter future, let me recall an important aspect of India’s long-standing bilateral relations with the Sudan. At India’s National Defence Academy, in Pune, the administrative block named “the Sudan Block” —constructed in the 1950s — stands tall to this day as a testimony of historical ties with the Sudan. It was gifted by the Government and the people of the Sudan. Over the years, India has implemented several projects in the Sudan in the sectors of energy, transport and agro-industry through concessional lines of credit.”

    2021-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/495 (2021) · source

27. “We encourage the transitional Government to take measures to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel and its premises. With respect to the drawdown of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), we take note of the high level of coordination between the Sudanese joint task force and UNAMID, as well as the commitment to facilitate the administration process. We hope that all efforts will be made by the Sudanese authorities — at both the central and state levels — to make this drawdown and liquidation an example of effective collaboration between the United Nations and the Sudan. India supports the rapid operationalization of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) as part of continued United Nations support for the Sudanese transition.”

    2021-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/495 (2021) · source

28. “With domestic reforms under way to improve the Sudan’s investment climate, there are real opportunities emerging in infrastructure, mining, regional connectivity, agriculture, food industries and energy. On the security front, the transitional Government has been swift in addressing the continuing and worrisome intercommunal clashes in Darfur. It has also enhanced security measures, including through the deployment of joint security forces. These are positive developments that reflect the broadening of governance structures and the sustained commitment of the authorities to implement the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians. During the most recent reporting period, there were incidents of criminality targeting the United Nations and its personnel.”

    2021-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/495 (2021) · source

29. “We hope that they will soon be resolved and that the threshold of 40 per cent representation by women in the Transitional Legislative Council will be met. On the economic front, we welcome the reforms undertaken and hope they will bring stability to the economy and address social issues effectively. The Sudanese authorities have also launched a cash-transfer programme — a noteworthy development — to shield the most vulnerable segments of the population from the impact of the removal of subsidies. The support of the international community will be crucial in ensuring the Sudan’s peaceful and sustainable future. In that regard, we welcome the financial assistance extended by the Sudan’s international partners. We also welcome France’s hosting of an international conference earlier this month to support the Sudanese transition.”

    2021-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/495 (2021) · source

30. “It is encouraging that another Sudan Liberation Movement faction has joined the Juba Peace Agreement. The non-signatory groups, such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North Abdelaziz Al-Hilu faction, have agreed to engage in negotiations. The Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid faction has also shown willingness to engage in peace talks. We recognize the important role of South Sudan in these efforts. Nonetheless, there have been delays in the implementation of the transitional agreements, particularly the establishment of the Transitional Legislative Council, and there has been limited progress in the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, particularly with respect to the security arrangements.”

    2021-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/495 (2021) · source

31. “Let me begin by thanking Mr. Volker Perthes, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, for his detailed briefing on the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan centred around the Mission’s four strategic and interrelated pillars. The Sudan, as illustrated by the positive developments in the past three months, is making confident and steady progress in its democratic transition. The authorities have outlined broad parameters of the federal system, in line with the Constitutional Document and the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan. The expanded transitional Government has also announced its strategic vision, focusing on five priority areas. Furthermore, the Sovereign Council has established the National High Committee for Monitoring the Implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement.”

    2021-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/495 (2021) · source

32. “India has always been willing to extend and expand its capacity-building assistance to the armed forces of the affected countries to support them in their fight against terrorism. India’s recent initiatives in that regard have been to include Chad in our Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation training programme, including 10 military training slots last year, and to provide a specialized in situ training programme in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism for nearly 200 Nigerian army personnel this year. We believe that it is important that the Council continue to extend all possible assistance and support to the Joint Force for the G-5 Sahel in the overarching interest of peace, security and stability in the region.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

33. “Finally, security measures need to be complemented by addressing issues associated with instability in the Sahel with regard to the lack of development, poverty, poor governance and loss of livelihoods. We are happy to note that those issues are being addressed through initiatives such as the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) and the Sahel Alliance’s G-5 Sahel Priority Investment Programme. The recent appointment of the Special Coordinator for Development in the Sahel to oversee the implementation of UNISS is a positive development. In conclusion, let me reiterate India’s support for the G-5 Sahel initiative and its related regional security initiatives.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

34. “The terrorist groups in the Sahel have strong links with international terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaida, ISIS and others with similar radical ideologies. Just as there cannot be any justification for terrorism, we cannot be half-hearted when it comes to resolute action by the Council in addressing counter-terrorism issues. The Council needs to take effective measures, including by supporting regional and subregional organizations in their security initiatives. We appreciate the decision of the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States and the G-5 Sahel countries for the deployment of 3,000 AU troops to reinforce the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

35. “Moreover, since those initiatives involve multiple nationalities and backgrounds, for them to be effective, mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure effective internal coordination, cohesion and training and unified command-and- control structures. We need to strongly support African counter-terrorism operations through sustainable financing, including assessed contributions. Fifthly, it is important that when it comes to terrorism, we first clearly acknowledge the nature of the problem before we can start addressing it. Otherwise, we will address it in fits and starts — a recipe for failure. That is all the more important at a time when terrorist forces are only getting stronger and spreading to more parts of Africa, as has been repeatedly acknowledged in the Council’s reports and discussions.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

36. “The impediments that the Mission faces in providing logistical support to the Joint Force beyond Mali need to be addressed. Fourthly, we believe that it is high time that regional security initiatives, such as the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel, be provided with adequate and sustainable resources, training and logistics support. A resource-constrained counter-terrorism strategy can be a recipe for failure. Therefore, the proposal for establishing a United Nations support office dedicated to providing logistics assistance to the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel has our support and requires the Council’s immediate collective attention.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

37. “We appreciate the capacity-building and logistics assistance being provided to the Joint Force by various countries, as well as by MINUSMA. Thirdly, the current model of support for the Joint Force is inadequate and unsustainable, a reality that has been highlighted by the Secretary-General in his recent reports (S/2020/1074 and S/2021/442). Assistance to the Joint Force through MINUSMA under the existing mechanism also has its own limitations. Overstretching MINUSMA’s responsibilities can adversely affect its core mandate of securing peace in Mali. At a time when the terrorist threat is rapidly growing in Mali and spreading towards the southern part of the country, it is all the more crucial for the Mission to focus on containing the threat in Mali.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

38. “First, on the security front we appreciate and support the efforts of the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel, the national forces of the G-5 Sahel countries, the French Operation Barkhane and Task Force Takuba. Those efforts, along with the peacekeeping efforts of MINUSMA, have contributed to combating terrorism in the Sahel. We take note specifically of the progress made by the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel in stabilizing the Centre Sector between Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger, thereby creating conditions for the return of the national armed forces and local authorities. Secondly, the Joint Force continues to be plagued by multiple challenges, such as the lack of training and equipment, transport and logistics and sustainable and predictable financing —all of which have hampered its full operationalization.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

39. “The Libyan crisis that caused instability in Mali and the larger Sahel a decade ago continues to adversely impact the region. The presence of foreign fighters in Libya is also negatively affecting the region. The incidents in Chad provide clear evidence of that aspect of the problem. The overall security situation is therefore tenuous and extremely worrisome. Clearly, the situation in the Sahel is complex and must be addressed with a comprehensive response. Achieving political stability and socioeconomic development and establishing governance structures should become the top priorities for the Sahel region. In that regard, I would like to submit the following for Council’s consideration.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

40. “It is a matter of great concern that those groups use improvised explosive devices, which resulted in the killing of several peacekeepers of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and of civilians. The threat of the spread of those groups to the Southern and Western African coasts remains high. It is also worrisome that the reporting period has seen attacks spreading to the borders of neighbouring countries. Al-Qaida and groups linked to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) and Boko Haram have also continued to expand around the eastern and northern shores of Lake Chad. More than 2 million people are internally displaced and the situation has forced 900,000 people to take refuge in neighbouring countries.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

41. “We also recognize the important contribution of Chad to the G-5 Sahel initiative. It is a matter of concern that the security situation in the G-5 Sahel countries is deteriorating rapidly, which is evident from the recent attacks by terrorists and armed groups. The reporting period has witnessed several serious incidents, including in the Tahoua region of the Niger on 21 March, which resulted in the killing of 137 civilians. The national and regional forces, including the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel, have increasingly come under attack. The Liptako-Gourma tri-border area has remained a hotspot. Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, affiliated to Al-Qaida and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, has expanded its activities.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

42. “At the outset, let me begin by thanking Under-Secretary-General Lacroix of the Department of Peace Operations for his briefing on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) and related developments. I also thank Ambassador Fathi Ahmed Edrees, in his capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, and Brigadier General Oumarou Namata, Force Commander of the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel, for their briefings. I also welcome His Excellency Mr. Oumar Ibn Daoud, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Chad, to the meeting. At the outset, I would like to offer my tribute to the former President of Chad, Mr. Idriss Deby Itno, who sacrificed his life in the fight against the rebel groups. President Idriss Deby’s contribution to regional stability and combating terrorism was significant and will be remembered forever.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

43. “In conclusion, I reiterate India’s strong support for the just Palestinian cause and our unwavering commitment to the two-State solution.”

    2021-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/480 (2021) · source

44. “We support the diplomatic efforts of the Middle East Quartet and other members of the international community, in particular the countries of the region, to calm the situation and put an end to the ongoing violence and seek to achieve durable peace. Those incidents have once again underscored the need for the immediate resumption of dialogue between the Israeli and Palestinian authorities. The absence of direct and meaningful negotiations between the parties is widening the trust deficit between them. That will only increase the likelihood of similar escalation in the future. We believe that every effort should be made to create conducive conditions for the resumption of talks between Israel and Palestine.”

    2021-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/480 (2021) · source

45. “We urge both sides to show extreme restraint, desist from actions that exacerbate tensions and refrain from attempts to unilaterally change the existing status quo, including in East Jerusalem and its neighbourhoods. Jerusalem has a special place in the hearts of millions of Indians who visit the city every year. It also houses Al-Zawiyya Al-Hindiyya — the Indian Hospice, which is an historic place associated with a great Indian Sufi saint, Baba Farid, and located inside the Old City. India has restored this Indian Hospice. The historic status quo at the holy places of Jerusalem, including Haram Al-Sharif/Temple Mount, must be respected.”

    2021-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/480 (2021) · source

46. “The events of the past several days have resulted in a sharp deterioration of the security situation. The indiscriminate firing of rockets from Gaza against the civilian population in Israel, which we condemn, and the retaliatory strikes on Gaza have caused immense suffering and resulted in deaths, including of women and children. India has also lost one of its nationals living in Israel in the rocket fire — a caregiver in Ashkelon. We deeply mourn her demise and that of all other civilians who have lost their lives in the current cycle of violence. We reiterate our strong condemnation of all acts of violence, provocation, incitement and destruction. Immediate de-escalation is needed to arrest any further sliding towards the brink.”

    2021-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/480 (2021) · source

47. “I thank Special Coordinator Tor Wennesland for his briefing. The Security Council held two closed meetings earlier this week regarding developments on this issue. In both of those meetings, we expressed our deep concern about the violence in Jerusalem, especially at Haram Al-Sharif/Temple Mount during the holy month of Ramadan, and about the possible eviction process in the Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem, an area that is part of an arrangement facilitated by the United Nations. We also expressed our apprehension at the spreading of violence to other parts of the West Bank and Gaza. Today’s open debate has been necessitated by the continuing violence that began in East Jerusalem a week ago and is now threatening to spiral out of control.”

    2021-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/480 (2021) · source

48. “I appreciate the efforts of the United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire on the ground, despite the restrictions, and urge both parties to fulfil their commitments under the Stockholm Agreement, including through participation in the Redeployment Coordination Committee. The elements of the joint declaration, which were again reiterated in the recent Saudi initiative, offer a clear road map for a return of peace and stability to Yemen. They must be pursued without any preconditions. I conclude by reiterating that all parties in Yemen must put politics aside and prioritize the well-being and interests of the Yemeni people.”

    2021-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/465 (2021) · source

49. “We hope that the Yemeni Government and the Southern Transitional Council will be able to work together on the implementation of the Riyadh agreement. This will also have a direct bearing on the political negotiations in the next step. Al-Hudaydah has also been the scene of intense clashes in recent months. The ongoing fighting in the province between Yemeni army forces and Ansar Allah risks unravelling the Stockholm Agreement, which will have serious consequences, both economic and humanitarian. Millions of Yemenis depend on imports from Yemen’s Red Sea ports. The preservation of this lifeline is even more vital now, as famine-like conditions have returned to Yemen, in particular against the backdrop of the coronavirus disease pandemic.”

    2021-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/465 (2021) · source

50. “We commend the efforts of the Yemeni Government to fight terrorism despite the ongoing escalation. It is imperative that Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups be prevented from exploiting the situation. From being relatively stable, Ma’rib’s transformation into a hotspot of military operations, within a span of few months, also underscores the fragility of any ceasefire that is not backed by a political agreement between the parties. The second issue is the need for the full implementation of the Riyadh agreement and the Stockholm Agreement. The formation of the joint Cabinet and its return to Aden was a major milestone in the implementation of the Riyadh agreement. However, recent developments in the south are of concern.”

    2021-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/465 (2021) · source