YouSaid · the spoken record

Teixeira Da Silva

lines on the record
27
first
1998-04-30
most recent
2001-06-05
sittings or episodes
6
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. That is why we would prefer funding from the regular budget of the United Nations; that would also have practical advantages with respect to the day-to-day operation of the mechanism: we must ensure that there is no interruption in the funding, because that would be extremely damaging to the functioning of the mechanism. To expand on my earlier remark, the establishment of a general monitoring mechanism for sanctions and illicit trade would not only facilitate synergy in its work, but would also offer significant budgetary savings. In general terms, we share the views of the Committee of Experts on the need to conceive and make use of sanctions as part of a comprehensive strategy for a political settlement of the Afghan conflict. We hope that in coming weeks we will be able to discuss that more general topic.

    2001-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4325 (2001) · source

  2. We would observe with interest that the Committee of Experts has noted that arms embargoes have inherent problems, irrespective of the sanctions regime. Resolving these problems demands the implementation of comprehensive measures at the international level. It would obviously be useful to be able to take advantage of the synergy among the various sanctions mechanisms and panels of experts that are put in place over time. In that spirit, and to make reference to what Ambassador Eldon said, we feel that the monitoring mechanism for Afghanistan would best be established in New York, precisely to foster synergy with sanctions committees and with other existing mechanisms. Finally, let me say a word about financing. Here, predictability is important to enable the monitoring mechanism to function well and independently.

    2001-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4325 (2001) · source

  3. That is true also of proposed measures that are set out in the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, recently adopted by the General Assembly. Most of the proposed measures will be addressed at the forthcoming United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects. Clearly, there is a great deal of work to be done here that lies beyond the mandate of the Security Council but that still complements the Council's work. Thirdly, we fully support the recommendation that the monitoring mechanism could serve as the nucleus for a more general mechanism to monitor sanctions and the illicit trade in raw materials in armed conflict.

    2001-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4325 (2001) · source

  4. The Committee of Experts itself participated in an effort to increase awareness of this issue. We must take the neighbouring States at their word, and must help them overcome the obstacles noted by the Committee of Experts. Secondly, we support the overall structure of the proposed monitoring mechanism. We feel that the structure should be as light, flexible and adaptable as possible. The first task would be to bring the national forces of neighbouring countries up to standard. The proposed general monitoring and disarmament measures are of interest and should be considered in greater depth. Similarly, it has been proposed that new arms-control legislation be enacted and existing legislation strengthened; that would be useful to encourage work now under way in a number of international bodies.

    2001-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4325 (2001) · source

  5. Mr. Teixeira da Silva (France) (spoke in French): I join previous speakers in welcoming Ambassador Menkerios and the other members of the Committee of Experts and in congratulating them on the quality of their report, which was submitted most promptly. I also echo their praise for the leadership of Ambassador Valdivieso as Chairman of the sanctions Committee on Afghanistan. I have four comments to make on the report and on its anticipated outcomes. The prime merit of the report is that it emphasizes the central role of neighbouring countries in the true implementation of the arms embargo and the closure of terrorist training camps. We note the confirmed commitment of Afghanistan's neighbours to implement the embargo and to cooperate with the United Nations to that end.

    2001-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4325 (2001) · source

  6. We recognize the importance of the Commission, and would like to know about the commitment of the parties themselves, the payments made to the Trust Fund and the nature and degree of the support that the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea can contribute to the work of the Commission.

    2001-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4310 (2001) · source

  7. Mr. Teixeira da Silva (France) (spoke in French): I, too, would like to thank Mr. Guehenno for his statement, which contained some good news. I shall confine myself to putting a question to him, echoing what Ambassador Kuchinsky has just said about the work of the Boundary Commission. In paragraph 6 of resolution 1344 (2001), which we adopted a month ago, the Secretariat was asked to provide more detailed information about the financing of the work of the Commission. We would like to know when that information will be available and whether the Assistant Secretary-General would, as of today, be in a position to provide further details about the funding of the work of the Commission.

    2001-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4310 (2001) · source

  8. Humanitarian organizations and the Secretariat have witnessed the scope of the crisis. In two years the number of victims has reached the hundreds of thousands. It is urgent that the parties end the conflict.

    2000-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4207 (2000) · source

  9. It is now the responsibility of the belligerents to take concrete actions in response to this appeal addressed to them at the highest level by the Security Council. The United Nations is no substitute for the parties if the parties themselves do not display their willingness to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the cr1s1s. Let us also recall that the continuation of this conflict, fed as it is by the plundering of the country's natural resources, has brought about tragic consequences for the Congolese people. The massacres of civilians, particularly in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the lack of health-care services and food mean that the conflict in the Congo today is undoubtedly the most serious humanitarian crisis in Africa.

    2000-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4207 (2000) · source

  10. There are four points, which were recalled in the statement (S/PRST/2000/28) adopted by heads of States and Government at the Security Council Summit in September: first, an appeal to the parties to cease hostilities and to fulfil their obligations in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement and Council resolutions; secondly, an appeal to speed up the withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan forces, as well as all other foreign forces, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1304 (2000); thirdly, an appeal to all the Congolese parties, and in particular to the Government, to engage fully in the national dialogue; and finally, an appeal to all the parties to cooperate with MONUC so that its deployment will be possible.

    2000-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4207 (2000) · source

  11. The Security Council is deciding today to extend the MONUC mandate by two months. France, along with the Secretary-General, hopes that the parties will make good use of this extension to show that they are committed to advancing the peace process in the Congo. The message sent once again to the belligerents is clear.

    2000-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4207 (2000) · source

  12. Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), adopted four months ago, insisted "that Uganda and Rwanda, which have violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, withdraw all their forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo without further delay, in conformity with the timetable of the Ceasefire Agreement and the 8 April 2000 Kampala disengagement plan". (resolution 1304 (2000), para. 4 (a)) The Council also demanded that all the parties, and in particular the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, cooperate in the MONUC deployment by lifting all restrictions on the freedom of movement of its personnel and by ensuring its security. Unfortunately, the Council's demands have not been heeded by the parties.

    2000-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4207 (2000) · source

  13. Mr. Teixeira da Silva (France) (spoke in French): Last February, in resolution 1291 (2000), our Council authorized the phase two deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Nine months later the implementation of this peacekeeping operation remains blocked by the persistence of hostilities, in particular in the Equateur province, and by the parties' lack of cooperation with the United Nations. On several occasions, our Council has had to remind the parties of their obligations.

    2000-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4207 (2000) · source

  14. Annabi provide more information regarding the training of local police, since, indeed, the goal here was to have local police take over from the international police units? My second comment is to supplement the question raised by Ambassador Eldon concerning the problem of financing the UNTAET Trust Fund and the World Bank trust fund. There is a third pillar here which we must not forget: the peacekeeping budget, the special budget of UNTAET. Any indications regarding the state of contributions and the gap between the necessary budget and contributions would be most welcome, because above all this mission needs to function. Does the present state of contributions not represent an obstacle to the proper functioning of this mission?

    2000-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4147 (2000) · source

  15. Regarding incidents that have taken place, I heard Mr. Annabi mention police intervention. What is the particular task of the military troops of UNTAET, and are there clear criteria for the division of tasks between the international police and units that are specifically military? Any clarification here would be most welcome. We note that UNTAET decided to reduce the military contingent by 500 men by October; that seems to us a step in the right direction. Beyond October, are there other plans to further reduce the military element, or is it thought that there is a need not to move too quickly in View of the situation? But to correctly assess that, we need to have a rather clear View of the division of labour between the police units and the military units. My last point in this area: could Mr.

    2000-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4147 (2000) · source

  16. But the problem here is that international attention and interest have again declined. I have two sets of comments and questions for Mr. Annabi, in addition to those already made by the two preceding speakers. I will address the security issue first. Mr. Annabi spoke of a crime rate that remains high: is this common crime, economic crime, or acts that have a political motive, committed by isolated elements or by organized anti-independence militia elements? My second question regarding security is about the division of labour between the army and the UNTAET police. This is a problem we have faced in other operations - I am thinking in particular of Kosovo - where in stabilizing some situations the line may seem a bit fuzzy between the competence of international police and the competence of military units.

    2000-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4147 (2000) · source

  17. Mr. Teixeira da Silva (France) (spoke in French): My delegation would like to associate itself with the two preceding speakers in thanking Mr. Annabi and also in pointing out that we are quite aware of the magnitude and the difficulty of the tasks the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) is facing, as well as of the undeniable progress that has been made. The pace may seem slow, but this can obviously be explained by the state in which East Timor finds itself and also by the difficulties of mobilizing both human and financial resources. This is particularly true since after the tragic events of last year, East Timor is no longer on the front pages of the newspapers or seen in broadcast news, precisely because there is no tragedy.

    2000-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4147 (2000) · source

  18. But above and beyond that, these meetings should also offer us an opportunity to lend our full support to United Nations missions, in particular by supporting their activities on specific points. Two particularly noteworthy matters are addressed in the report before us today. The first has to do with the difficulties encountered in canton 7, Mostar, and the second with the recruitment of police from minority groups in the Republika Srpska. On those two points it seems to us that the Council should call on those responsible to ensure that they act in accordance with their obligations within the shortest possible period of time.

    2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source

  19. My third remark concerns the proposal made by UNMIBH, in the framework of the Stability Pact, to create a police training college for all South-Eastern Europe. The training of police officers is obviously one of the important tasks that has been carried out by the United Nations in numerous missions in the Balkans. We should like to have more details as to the modalities and objectives of such a school. My fourth and last comment is of a more general nature. The French delegation would be interested to receive an appraisal from the Secretariat as to the effects on the work of UNMIBH of regional developments, such as the situation in Kosovo and, as the report notes, the political changes in Croatia. The value of these meetings undoubtedly lies in getting detailed information from the Secretariat.

    2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source

  20. My question is this: could Mr. Annabi give us a precise idea of the timetable and funding envisaged for the establishment of that vital service? My second question concerns the need to reform the judicial structures. This question has already been raised by the Ambassador of the United Kingdom. UNMIBH contributes to that reform by carrying out assessments in the context of a broader programme under the auspices of the High Representative. That work should be completed by the end of this year. What will then be the subsequent stages of that reform process? Is it envisaged that UNMIBH will continue to play a role in the later stages, and, if not, what organizations would be involved in implementing the reform?

    2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source

  21. Unfortunately, the High Representative himself had to impose the law creating the service, since the Parliament had not passed the relevant law. It is obviously regrettable that things happened in this way, and this once again raises the fundamental question - often raised in this forum, even by the High Representative himself - of the need for the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves to take hold of the future of their own country. The Joint Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina has just reported to the Security Council on the implementation of the agreements adopted here on 15 November 1999. This development should be encouraged in order to give real follow-up to the decisions adopted. Despite delays, and thanks to the courageous decision of the High Representative, the Border Service will come into being.

    2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source

  22. France, which provides the International Police Task Force with over 100 police officers, will continue to support the Mission and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in their activities. I would like to thank the Secretary-General for having chosen a French Gendarmerie officer, General Coeurderoy, to lead the International Police Task Force. General Coeurderoy will be determined to build on the achievements of his predecessors, whose activities we would like once again to praise. I would like to make four specific comments and to put some questions to the Secretariat. My first comment relates to the creation of the Border Service. As we see it, the creation of such a service is essential to combat smuggling and to build a genuine State.

    2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source

  23. This is also the purpose of UNMIBH's more recent contribution to the programme of reform of the judicial structures, under the auspices of the High Representative. The aim is for every citizen in Bosnia and Herzegovina to have recourse to the police and the courts in order to exercise his rights, without fear of discriminatory treatment of his case as a result of ethnic origin. This also involves fighting the corruption and the pressures that continue to hamper the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNMIBH continues to run into strong obstructionist forces in implementing its mandate, a task that remains difficult and that requires sustained political and material support. The existence of other crises in the region should not distract attention from the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source

  24. Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): I should like first of all to welcome this opportunity today for some States directly concerned by the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to express their views. I should like to thank Mr. Annabi for the information that he provided. The United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and its main component, the International Police Task Force, are carrying out their activities discreetly but effectively. The task entrusted to them by the Security Council is to establish the main elements of a genuine State of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is the purpose of the International Police Task Force in training local police officers and integrating minority representatives into local police forces.

    2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source

  25. The French delegation hopes that the Security Council can also respond positively to the similar request made by the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for an increase in the number of that Tribunal's judges.

    1998-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3877 (1998) · source

  26. This increase in the number of judges, foreseen by the Council when it adopted resolution 955 (1994), was, in fact, made necessary by the growing number of cases before the Tribunal. The French delegation is pleased that the members of the Council are unanimous in their positive response to the request of the Tribunal President. We will vote in favour of the draft resolution, of which we are a sponsor. We pay tribute to the Swedish delegation for its initiative in preparing the draft resolution. The adoption of this draft resolution will attest to the Council's determination to endow the Tribunal with the means necessary for it to continue its work for justice. Furthermore, we have every confidence that the Tribunal will pursue the efforts it has already made to improve its functioning and procedures.

    1998-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3877 (1998) · source

  27. Mr. Teixeira da Silva (France) (interpretation from French): The Security Council, in resolution 955 (1994), entrusted the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda with the mission of prosecuting, trying and punishing the persons responsible for acts of genocide committed in 1994 in Rwanda. No one can underestimate the importance of this task, nor its difficulty. The judges of the Tribunal are discharging their work in a manner that deserves our particular tribute. The President of the Tribunal requested in August 1997 an increase in the number of judges, to make it possible to establish a third Chamber and to complete the trials in a reasonable time-frame. France supported that request the moment it was presented to the Council.

    1998-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3877 (1998) · source