YouSaid · the spoken record

Terence

lines on the record
74
first
1995-08-28
most recent
1996-03-05
sittings or episodes
3
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. We think, Sir, that if you carry on with this momentum, our people, our Government and the other main actors in my country might be in a position to finally reach the ultimate goal - not only the dialogue that we have been proposing and on which we have been insisting, but specifically, and most importantly, the ultimate goal, which is national reconciliation.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  2. On all grounds, we think that a resolution of this type is far more realistic than other options, which might jeopardize all the efforts made in this process towards peace. In conclusion, Sir, upon your assumption of the presidency I congratulated you and also stated how beneficial and important the task you are discharging is. However, I was expecting to have this opportunity to speak of Botswana - of the central role your delegation has been playing for the last six months and of the close ties my delegation and yours have established since my arrival six months ago. Therefore, it is needless to emphasize how thankful we are for the central role your delegation has been playing and for the commendable dedication of Your Excellency to the cause of my country, of Africa in general and of the United Nations as well.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  3. The adoption of this resolution leads me to express, on behalf of my Government, our sincere thanks to all the members of the Security Council for this important development in the process of the search for peace in my country. Some operative paragraphs deserve more praise than others. One of them, operative paragraph 6, deals with the decision of the Council to establish a United Nations radio station. This initiative would have an extraordinarily beneficial impact on public opinion and on Burundi society. We think that this kind of innovation deserves gratitude from my country, and, of course, we hope that the implementation of this paragraph will not remain a dead letter.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  4. In conclusion, the report (S/l996/ 116) of the Secretary-General of 15 February last focuses almost exclusively on the military option and repeats - I emphasize, repeats - other alternatives already contained in presidential statements or earlier resolutions adopted by the Security Council. At a time when mankind is moving inexorably towards the end of this century, towards the threshold of the next millennium, is it not imperative that the international community's proclivity and ability to resolve all conflicts by peaceful means prevail over the tendency to resolve conflicts with weapons? Would it not be better to envisage the creation of a new world for our future generations, of a better human race, given to bringing peace through peace rather than achieving peace by the sword?

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  5. The massive demonstrations organized last week in Bujumbura to pay a resounding tribute and express immeasurable gratitude to all the honourable members of the Security Council for their realism, which dictated the measures contained in this draft resolution are in accordance with national realities, the solemn declarations of vigorous protest against the Secretary- General's proposal by various political groups and civil-society organizations - notably the League of Human Rights and the Economic League - and the stream of messages from many Burundian citizens within the country and abroad constitutes resounding proof that nearly all Burundian people reject in no uncertain terms any military solution to the national problem.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  6. From the Minister of Defence to the Chiefs of Staff of the army and gendarmerie and right on down to the rawest recruits, the thought of an expeditionary force outside Burundi quite literally makes the hackles of the entire military rise. The military response is almost unanimously echoed by civil society.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  7. Under such conditions, bipolar antagonism would become a permanent feature and would sometimes flare in time to the revelations of the two-way traffic in spying between the United Nations contingent based abroad and the army of Burundi operating on its own national territory. Turning now to the national coalition against military boosterism: the Secretary-General's report suggests that the army of Burundi is split into two camps: one, under the influence of Tutsi extremists, which is sworn to total hostility against United Nations troops; and another made up of moderates who are getting ready to welcome them in. In fact, to attribute to any part of the army the intention not only of consenting to but even tolerating a foreign military presence on Burundi's soil would be like saying the ground is up and the sky is down.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  8. In touting the idea of a multinational military force, we are losing sight of the fact that it would give rise to a state of constant alert between the force and Burundi. A miniature cold war would result, like the one between the former ideological blocs. Feeding on the psychosis of fear they induced in each other, East and West were constantly suspicious of and spied on each other and constantly getting themselves ready to wipe each other out. Given that forewarned is forearmed, any open or covert machinations on the official level or concocted in United Nations offices or hatched in foreign capitals would force Burundi and its army to develop parallel plans to review and even bolster its own arsenal and troop numbers and, naturally, to conclude useful alliances in order to deal with any eventuality.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  9. Any military option would lead to the mediation missions - those of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, the OAU, the European Union and the prestigious N yerere-Carter group - being blocked or even blamed. The very special importance that my Government attaches to the roles of those former Heads of State has been publicly highlighted by my ardent plea for an explicit mention of the Carter Center in the draft resolution. I am much obliged to the Security Council for heeding my repeated appeals on this subject. If we turn to the matter of the bipolar antagonism between a United Nations contingent and the army of Burundi, we must all be aware that any political decision of historic scope and international dimensions demands that we examine the most serious possible consequences beforehand.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  10. Some of the main actors in the United Nations are trying to justify their stated choice of an expeditionary corps in Burundi by adducing their need to look like Caesar's wife in front of the international community. Using the same handy logic ourselves, I hardly need to prove that our Government and our army too would be absolutely bound to batten down the hatches against the fury and the wrath they would call down on themselves from people and politicians alike in the event of a military adventure, even a far-off or hypothetical one. And for all that, if we do commit national suicide, it would be the people of Burundi themselves who would be blamed for it, because it is in the first place and in the last resort up to them to take responsibility for their fate.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  11. Having been constantly traumatized by chronic threats of military adventures for nearly two and a half years, the population and politicians would find even more difficult the establishment of a foreign stand-by army designed to intervene in Burundi. The Charter would be flagrantly violated, as paragraph 7 of Article 2 prohibits the United Nations from interfering with the national sovereignty of its Member States. In the case in point, this much lauded multinational military force, which has been given a humanitarian cloak to wear, would be tantamount to an affront to the State of Burundi. In the event that the so highly dramatized catastrophe occurs, it would be up to the Government of Burundi and its army to decide when and if to ask for humanitarian assistance.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  12. Amongst the damaging consequences that any military option might have, we have to say that the Government and the country would be put up for grabs by it. Firstly, the armed bands - which have been put to rout and are facing extinction - would do their damnedest to raise the stakes, under the delusion that the deteriorating situation would force the stand-by military contingents to come in. Secondly, some pretenders to power - who are to be found both within the presidential majority and in the opposition - would leap at this godsend and use it as a stick with which to beat a Government standing accused of being in cahoots with the pro-military-intervention lobby.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  13. The various earlier pronouncements by the Security Council and its recent resolution 1040 (1996) of 29 January 1996 strikingly illustrate the Council's constant concern to support the institutions of Burundi which are based on the Convention on Governance. On many occasions, the Secretary-General has emphasized the obvious need to give the coalition Government all the support it requires and to safeguard the Convention on Governance at all costs. The positions of the Security Council and the Secretary-General are in perfect harmony with the socio-political imperatives now obtaining in Burundi. The odds are that military solutions would expose the Government to very great risk and that the Convention on Governance would be seriously jeopardized if not fatally undermined.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  14. Although there can be no excuse for such solutions, even at the high point of a crisis, they would be even more damaging right now, when all the signs are that the forced march towards peace is actually happening. Given this extremely positive development, anyone would say that it would be to the honour of the Security Council and the Secretary-General not only to stay with this process but to use diplomatic, political and financial means to ensure that it succeeds overwhelmingly. The Security Council as a whole supports the Convention on Governance and the Government which resulted from it.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  15. The Burundi Government's opposition to this option is in no way a result of its army's powerlessness to confront it. The army of Burundi is completely prepared to confront any expeditionary corps, regardless of its humanitarian or military label. It is also able to increase its defence and counter-attack capacity with both human and material resources. However, there are countervailing reasons impelling the Government to militate against not only foreign troops but also against any reference to such a possibility. The main countervailing reason is that, at a moment when the campaign of mobilization for peace is in full swing under the direction of our Government and all the political bodies in the country, nothing could be more harmful than a polarization over military options.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  16. As beneficiaries and privileged witnesses of the patriotic dedication of the army, citizens have joined it in the combat against terrorists by confronting them and confiscating their weapons. Thanks to their confidence in the army and to the shining fact that it is their sure and mighty shield, the peasants who have felt threatened are mobilizing against their assailants, in the expectation that security forces will arrive, or they hasten to where the forces are. There is thus a sacred alliance developing between the population and the national army. In the letter which I sent on behalf of my Government to the President of the Security Council on 18 January 1996, I highlighted the war of nerves being waged in Burundi by the chronic mention of the spectre of military intervention.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  17. The President of the Republic, a direct and privileged witness of the army's code of conduct, as its supreme commander, wishing to pay it a well-deserved tribute during a press conference on 16 February 1996, described the army of Burundi as "the most positive institution of all society during this crisis". This praise for the security forces by the President of the Republic is shared by the population itself. Regardless of what its unrepentant detractors may say, the fact is that the army of Burundi is now the most powerful catalyst for democratic institutions. The third phenomenon is the burgeoning alliance between the population and the army. Jealously attached to its security, the population has unhesitatingly stood up to the trouble-makers, tracking them down and beating them up.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  18. Having identified the true enemy and valiantly resisting any incitement to self- destruction, peasants from all national groups have taken charge of their own defence in the various parts of the country where terrorists still dare to act. Acting in good faith - out of ignorance or out of complicity with rebel groups that have poisoned public opinion - various diplomatic and media circles have legitimized the demonization of the Burundi army. Our military corps deserves treatment quite different from the litany of defamation against it, which is promoted by armed bands that are terrified of it.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  19. This triad is allied unshakeably against the real enemy of the homeland: any armed terrorist or violent fanatic. In just a few weeks the campaign to mobilize for peace has already produced very encouraging results, as was attested to by the Government following its special meeting on 7 February last, which was devoted to an evaluation of overall security and as was confirmed in a message from the Head of Government to the Security Council on 18 February. The second of these phenomena is the new and very healthy rallying of the population to work towards peace. After having been the first victim terrorizing, plundering armed bands, the population shook off its torpor and rose up massively in support of peace.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  20. At the very beginning of this year, overcoming certain obstacles that in the past had jeopardized the common good, the members of the Government that emerged from the 12 political parties that signed the Convention on Governance agreed on strategies to be followed in order to restore peace. Combining action and will, under the leadership of the Head of State and the Prime Minister, the Ministers, political leaders, members of the National Assembly and State officials and functionaries have tried to outdo each other in zeal throughout the Republic. In this full-bore crusade, a standard message has been disseminated in public meetings in order to rally the three main actors - the population, the national army and the public administration to a sacred, tripartite union.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  21. It is therefore shocking to impute to them any intention or inclination whatsoever to model the nation's future on the past of Rwanda. Burundi, by its very character, identity and sense of honour, is not able to duplicate that scourge. In predicting disaster of genocidal dimensions, many forget that the Government and the national army formed a coalition to restore peace and security. There are three new phenomena that give us hope that the dynamic of peace will be irreversible, even if there should be new developments. The first of these phenomena is the strengthening of governmental solidarity.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  22. This deadly madness caused dozens of human lives to be lost, both Hutu and Tutsi. However, the progress of such means was broken thanks to the visceral repugnance of almost the entire people of Burundi at such a Nazi doctrine and thanks to the organization, bravery and patriotism of the security forces. Despite the failings attributable to some irresolute Burundis in their desire for political survival even on the ruins of their country, the people of Burundi and the army showed themselves to be utterly impermeable to the lessons of Rwanda. Already hardened to and inoculated against the incitements to genocide of the earlier Rwandese regimes, the people of Burundi, its Government and its army were aware down to their very marrow of the supreme need to reject and repel even more strongly that ignominious model.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  23. Throughout the existence of the two previous Rwandese Republics, persistent efforts to turn Burundi into a sui generis apartheid State resulted in failure; however, the opposition of the coalition of the people always ensured the failure of periodic attempts by Burundi groups seeking that goal. In 1993, all the political entities of Rwanda - some institutional, such as the Government, its army and its party, and others circumstantial, such as the enraged militia - held back nothing. The media in Rwanda, both in print and on the air, spewed their venom in Burundi with a view to the assassination of our beloved President, in order to pit one national community against another. The demonic and excessive means used succeeded in stirring up certain infected groups against innocent people.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  24. For the people of Burundi, this mechanical fusion of the two countries calls its intentions into question and is offensive in many respects. A number of clear facts illustrate how forced this generalization is. In fact, the genocide in Rwanda was spread over three decades. It ebbed and flowed with an intensity that depended on the times and on the country's leadership. The first detonator was discharged in 1959 and the explosion reached full intensity in 1994. Following the initial blast, in 1961, the people of Burundi by no means yielded to the Rwandese trigger, but rather rose up in unity and set an example to the world by unanimously rallying around a single ideal - national unity - and around a single leader, Prince Rwagasore.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  25. In the wake of a flood of highly pessimistic reports, in recent weeks a political and media hurricane has been unleashed upon Burundi from the four corners of the Earth. In his report (S/1996/116) of 15 February 1996, the Secretary-General strongly advocates a multinational military force designed to descend upon Burundi on the smallest pretext, like a vulture upon its prey. This extreme proposal was dictated by a wish to protect Burundi from Rwandan-style genocide. Those who prophesy such an event would have it that its recurrence in Burundi is a near certainty in the light of the geographic environment Burundi shares with Rwanda and because of the ethnic, cultural and social similarities between the two countries, and that it is inevitable that the tragedy that took place in Rwanda in 1994 should be exported to its neighbour.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  26. (spoke in Spanish) I cannot fail to thank His Excellency Ambassador Juan Somavr'a, last month's coordinator of the non-aligned caucus, for his effectiveness, skilful coordination and attentiveness, which I personally experienced and which formed the basis of the draft resolution before the Security Council today. (spoke in English) I am also thankful to the representative of Egypt and his delegation, who have succeeded the delegation of Chile in coordinating the activities of the non-aligned caucus relating to Burundi. (spoke in French) A questioning of intentions, offensive to the Government and the people of Burundi, has been the basis for a series of negotiations in which you, Sir, have been involved.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  27. I am deeply thankful and pleased, Sir, to be addressing the Security Council on behalf of my Government under your presidency of the Council. Your previous involvement in the peace negotiations and your familiarity with African problems and issues will certainly have a positive impact on the Council's debate and its outcome. Your predecessor, Mrs. Albright, offered me several opportunities to deal with her, even at the climax of an issue in which she was personally involved. I am thankful to her for having listened to me several times in relation to the Burundi crisis.

    1996-03-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3639 (1996) · source

  28. It is true that the draft resolution focuses on reactivating the dialogue between the various political partners. My Government welcomes that deeming it to be a positive approach. I therefore reiterate my Government's appeal for an interpretation of paragraph 8 (a) on the "ban on the supply of all arms and related materiel to Burundi". (S/J 996/56, para. 8 (a )) We stress that phrase in particular because it would be strange to treat a lawful Government, one endeavouring to establish peace and security, on the same footing as the perpetrators of the violence that is threatening the peace.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  29. For the sake of its own credibility, the Security Council should refrain from behaving like a kind of bogeyman and avoid adopting measures that would violate Burundi's national sovereignty and the United Nations Charter. For all of these reasons, my Government appeals to the Security Council to amend the disputed paragraph. If it does not do so, Burundi will oppose it and feel itself in no way bound by the subparagraph in question. We feel that there is a strange paradox here. In this draft resolution, the Security Council remains silent on the needs for which my Government requested the assistance of the United Nations system and the international community. These needs are listed in the letter of 18 January 1996 that I addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of my Government.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  30. Since the Security Council is supporting all the State institutions established by the Convention of Government - and, thus, is supporting first and foremost the Government - it would be contradictory to threaten an arms embargo while that Government is making superhuman efforts to restore peace and security. On the other hand, the Security Council would be acting consistently not only by threatening but by immediately decreeing a ban on the delivery of all illegal weapons to those who disturb peace and security and all fanatical adherents of violence. Treating the Government on an equal footing with such persons and penalizing it for its determination to neutralize outlaws would be to turn the world on its head and to anger and further traumatize the defenders of peace; it would also lead precisely to outcomes that we seek to prevent.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  31. Mr. Terence (Burundi) (interpretation from French): At the beginning of my statement, I requested the honour of stating the position of Burundi since it was not possible for me to obtain an exact interpretation of what has become paragraph 8 (a). Since draft resolution S/ 1996/56 relates to Burundi, my Government has the right to ask the sponsors of the text what its exact meaning is so that Burundi will know what it is dealing with. In Burundi's view, paragraph 8 (a) may be somewhat confusing and susceptible to various interpretations.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  32. I wish to note that I shall be obliged to ask to speak on the draft resolution if the way it is interpreted should appear to penalize Burundi or undermine its national sovereignty.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  33. The priority concern must be to protect the United Nations and its most prestigious organ, the Security Council, against any diminution in value resulting from setbacks. To defuse the crisis in Burundi it is important to stress the pre-eminence of judicious diplomacy over military intervention: such intervention, in nearly all cases, is nothing but a mitigation of the failure of diplomacy, which is to say, an admission of diplomatic capitulation. In broad terms we can say that it is completely in the interest of the Security Council to opt for diplomatic solutions and therefore to reinvent figures like Talleyrand, Ralph Bunche, Nelson Mandela, Henry Kissinger, Yasser Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin: in other words, prodigies who are able when necessary to work political and diplomatic miracles.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  34. In conclusion, Burundi favours the primacy of a judicious democracy. In my letter dated 18 January 1996, by which I communicated to the President of the Security Council the official position of the Government of Burundi, I stressed the need to protect the honour and prestige of the United Nations. I must reaffirm today that the primary task facing the bodies that devise and propose initiatives and those that take the decisions is to serve the United Nations as a strong shield against failure and its attendant criticism. It is therefore most important to the major actors in the United Nations hierarchy that one of the sine qua non conditions for ensuring the world Organization's success is the ability to give diplomacy pride of place over military action and to devise solutions commensurate with the problems.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  35. It is unrealistic because the best rule for converting political leaders and countries to democratic ideals is to give them access to the international hubs of democracy and to facilitate their direct personal contacts with foreign figures who are steeped in and who practice the ideas and principles of this political system. It is contrary to international law because no Government has the right to demand that all countries copy foreign democratic procedures: the hard realities on which democratization is based vary from nation to nation. Let us consider the hypothesis that the Government of Zaire, by the principle of reciprocity, were to react by forbidding access to its territory by the nationals of States that had enacted similar measures. This would be a harsh boomerang against the very authors of the measures.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  36. 2) The paramount role among the facilitators falls to the States of the Great Lakes region. Paradoxically, in foreign circles, a certain new political approach threatens to deprive Burundi and our region of the statesman in the best position to make a broad contribution to settling the intra-Burundi conflict: His Excellency Mr. Mobutu Sese Seko. Owing to his personal prestige and his great political stature and vast political experience, President Mobutu is a true adept at regional, African and international affairs alike - whether or not his detractors agree. Hence, to try to ostracize or marginalize a political leader of Mr. Mobutu's stature - a leader who, furthermore, heads so vast a country blessed with such exceptional resources, despite its temporary problems - is both unrealistic and contrary to the norms of international law.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  37. There is another reason I am dwelling on the positive aspects of the Government, the parties and their leaders: timeliness and a wish to show that the Security Council, the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the European Union, Presidents Julius Nyerere, Jimmy Carter and Amadou Toumani Toure, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and all the other facilitators have achieved successes. They need only put these successes to good use, with good intentions, to fulfil the noble and wise mission the Security Council will assign in the draft resolution before it today: "to facilitate a comprehensive political dialogue with the objective of promoting national reconciliation, democracy, security and the rule of law in Burundi". (S/Z 996/56, para.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  38. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the political class, of civil society, of the business world, of youth, of the university community - in short, the elite of Burundi - is in fact working for their common destiny and for national reconciliation. By highlighting the major common denominators shared by the protagonists in the political arena in Burundi, my delegation can prove that, despite appearances, the crisis has by no means reached a point of no return.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  39. In Burundi, political leaders, regardless of ideological allegiance, meet, talk and participate side by side at public and social events, stand next to each other and socialize at official receptions, and are often invited to visit each other in their offices and in their homes, in a mutually respectful and convivial atmosphere. The conciliatory judgment that I am expressing regarding the political protagonists in my country is in no way designed to whitewash all of them. Unfortunately, some of them, deliberately and even viciously, out of political blindness or professional inexperience, have stood in the way of peace and the democratic process.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  40. In fact, the parties can even be credited with a number of positive joint actions: the negotiation and conclusion of the Convention on Government; the coalition Government; negotiations between various conventional bodies; the follow-up committee; and the framework for concerted action. It is no small accomplishment to have been able to involve political enemies in negotiations. It took six months to bring them together at the same negotiating table, as the Secretary-General rightly commented when addressing the joint meeting of the opposition parties and the presidential movement on 16 July 1995 in Bujumbura.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  41. So too - contrary to certain prognostications made privately by certain foreign parties - the coalition Government unanimously rejects military intervention in Burundi, as attested to by its second message sent to the President of the Security Council on Sunday, 28 January 1996, which I transmitted to him by fax at approximately 7 p.m. yesterday. What is the situation regarding the political parties? Through various ups and downs, the relationship between the presidential sphere of influence and the opposition since the eruption of the crisis has been uneasy, to be sure, but it has never reached breaking point or a point of no return.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  42. Although politically heterogeneous, since it is made up of 12 political parties, our Government has been able to retain the essential elements of solidarity. A few key facts illustrate this. Under the aegis of the President of the Republic and the leader of the Executive branch, all Government members joined together against the warmongers. Following the example of the Head of State and the Prime Minister, every Minister has travelled all over the country in order to alert the people to the imperative need to work hand in hand for peace, together with the security forces and the public administration, against armed bands. By means of this campaign devoted to peace and security, the Government is sending the same message throughout the country.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  43. By taking the opposite tack, by affirming that man learns everything from history, each member State of the Security Council will recall a universally accepted reality. At one time or another in the course of their historical development, all countries have had to cope with internal conflicts, with civil wars, even with inter- State or world wars. Never has full unanimity been achieved within Governments or among chiefs of staff called upon to decide on policies to be adopted or strategies to be used. In most cases, positions were so entrenched and cacophony so dominant that, even with the survival of their nations at stake, political and military leaders were forced to resign or go into exile, or were even executed. Compared with such cases, many in number, Burundi could rather be put forward as a model.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  44. However, the envoys of States and of international organizations must place in their proper context preferences and opinions that are merely personal in nature, when they are expressed during informal conversations - even by Heads of State or Government, their Ministers or political leaders. These differ from the collective positions of the Government, which bear an official seal. Moreover, would it not be unjust to demand of the Government of Burundi the same political miracle that has failed to materialize in all the other countries facing crises that are just as horrendous as, or even more so than, ours? According to the great German philosopher Hegel, history teaches us that man learns nothing from history.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  45. United Nations troops are described in glowing terms, and credence is given to the notion that they are working for the salvation of the people of Burundi. Meanwhile, however, the obvious truth is ignored: that the genocide in Rwanda was carried out in the presence of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which not only stood by, powerless, but then hastened to pack up and leave. In his letter contained in document S/l996/36 of 16 January 1996, the Secretary-General refers to a certain difference of opinion within the Government of Burundi regarding the deployment of military contingents. This sentiment was echoed by a number of foreign dignitaries, following their separate meetings with several high officials of our country.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  46. In Burundi, the country's army and the coalition Government, which represented national communities and 12 political parties, banded together against the terrorist groups that were determined to carry out Rwandese-style genocide. However, a parallel does exist between the techniques used by the former Rwandese regime to remain in power and those employed by Burundi terrorists in their quest for such power. The favourite targets of these terrorists are the State's Convention on Government, which stipulates the division of power, the coalition Government itself and all other political institutions stemming from this multipartite agreement. The Government and the army of Burundi have together been actively working to thwart the access to, and the use of, power through the revolting practice of genocide.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  47. Thanks to the redoubled vigilance and effectiveness of the forces of law and order, those who wanted the President of the Republic to step down and the organizers of the strike faced the impossibility of implementing their plans. All acts of violence were nipped in the bud, and no major incidents occurred. With respect to the analogy between Rwanda and Burundi, in certain national and international circles the tendency to raise the spectre of genocide has taken precedence over the determination or ability to root out its causes. A fundamental distinction needs to be made between the perpetrators of the genocide carried out in Rwanda and the followers or authors of that scourge in Burundi. In Rwanda, the Government and the Rwandese armed forces conceived, planned, organized and carried out the genocide against the Tutsi community.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  48. I declare to the entire world that the Burundi Army has no general, unless someone was promoted in honour of Mrs. Albright's visit. I turn to the question of political disturbances. Imputing continued lack of security to a lack of firmness on the part of the Government, several opposition political movements withdrew their confidence in the President of the Republic and several trade unions called a strike in the capital. These initiatives call for the resignation of the Head of State. On the other hand, three opposition political parties have withdrawn their backing for the attacks against the President of the Republic, and the strike had only weak support and lasted for only a few working days.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  49. Behaving like a new explorer of terra incognita, exactly 125 years after the historical meeting between Livingston and Stanley in 1871 in the outskirts of the capital of Burundi, he studs his article not only with falsehoods, but with monstrosities. Thus he claims that there are 15 per cent Tutsis and 85 per cent Hutus, while in living memory Burundi has never, unlike other States, had such a census of its national make-up. In another paragraph he claims that Hutu rebels occupy parts of the territory, while in fact these rebels and armed bands do not even occupy a single square kilometre. In yet another paragraph he claims that Mrs. Albright - when one speaks of the sun, one sees its rays, and I see her coming into the Chamber now - met with generals of the Burundi Army.

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source

  50. Nevertheless, it is far from having culminated in an apocalyptic summit. Certainly, armed bands have threatened to jeopardize the work of humanitarian organizations. In answer to the letters from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, an avalanche of media fantasies has descended on Burundi. The article by Thomas L. Friedman published by The New York Times on 24 January 1996 constitutes the archetype of this type of systematic propaganda campaign directed against my country. In his sensationalism, the author headed his article: "The next Rwanda - Burundi on the edge of an abyss".

    1996-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3623 (1996) · source