YouSaid · the spoken record

Tetteh

lines on the record: 84
first: 2014-11-18
most recent: 2023-11-06
sittings or episodes: 6
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“That requires a permanent ceasefire and a political process to end the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF. Yet given the multiplicity of conflicts in the Sudan, we believe that the international community should pursue a comprehensive political strategy dealing simultaneously with the conflict in the Sudan, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and paving the way for talks on Abyei’s final status. My Office will continue to engage with the authorities of both countries and the relevant Sudanese and South Sudanese stakeholders, in addition to the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, to advocate for a comprehensive process that leaves no conflict unaddressed and is in line with resolution 2046 (2012), giving due attention to Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“The armed movement claimed that those military operations were necessary to protect the civilian population from the insecurity caused by the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF. In an attempt to close the opening of a second front in addition to the conflict with the RSF, General Al-Burhan has sought President Kiir’s mediation to stop the fighting. To the best of our knowledge that has not yet produced a favourable outcome. In the meantime, the security situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile continues to deteriorate because of the clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF in those two territories. The conflict in those two areas cannot be addressed without negotiations on their final status.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“It has also reignited a conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)-North, led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, which had been frozen for the past few years. In addition, South Kordofan and Blue Nile have also been a theatre for clashes between the SPLM-North and the RSF. The SPLM-North took over several Sudanese Armed Forces bases in South Kordofan, notably in the area south-east of Kadugli, in June and July, while in Blue Nile it took control of several villages in the Al-Kurmuk locality. The Sudanese Armed Forces reacted to the SPLM-North’s military offensive with air strikes on its positions in the Dilling and Kadugli localities.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“On the humanitarian front, the Sudanese conflict, coupled with intercommunal violence between the Ngok and the Twic, has already compounded Abyei’s difficult humanitarian situation. The influx of displaced persons, who continue to arrive daily, has overwhelmed host communities, stretching already limited food supplies and hiking market prices in Abyei. Clashes between the Twic and Ngok have hampered farming activities in southern Abyei, which will have further implications for the humanitarian situation. If I may now turn to the two areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF has aggravated an already tense security situation and dire humanitarian conditions in those two territories.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“The violence displaced some members of the Ngok population from their villages located along the boundary with Warrap and has led to the destruction of property and livelihoods and losses of life on both sides. There are indications that the tensions may persist, as grievances of both communities over those areas remain unresolved. Meanwhile, the South Sudanese co-Chair of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee has expressed disappointment that the resolutions reached by President Kiir during his visit to Warrap in March this year were not adhered to by the communities. In that regard, I will continue my engagement with representatives from Abyei and the Government of South Sudan to advocate against violence and hate speech, while encouraging community-based reconciliation.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“However, as the AU High-Level Implementation Panel’s proposal has not been accepted by the Sudanese authorities or endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council, any progress on the final status of Abyei would require, as I impressed on the Committee’s members, a decision of the AU Peace and Security Council that would provide clarity as to whether the AU High-Level Implementation Panel’s recommendations have indeed been adopted by the African Union. In addition to the uncertainties of Abyei’s final status, the people of Abyei are concerned about the deteriorating security situation following the continued violence and the cycle of retaliatory attacks between the Twic Dinka and the Ngok Dinka over land ownership and income-generating hubs in Anet, Agok and Athony.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“Nevertheless, representatives of the Abyei communities, very much aware of the adverse consequences of the Sudanese conflict for the prospects for resuming talks on Abyei, expressed the importance of maintaining the Abyei issue on the agendas of the United Nations and the African Union (AU), and specifically their respective Security Councils. The South Sudanese Abyei High-Level Committee, led by Minister Deng Alor Kuol, met with me in Addis Ababa on 4 October, together with members of the South Sudan Abyei committee, and proposed that Abyei’s final status could be part of a broader framework of political negotiations addressing the Sudanese conflict. The Committee also reiterated its commitment to implementing the African Union High-level Implementation Panel’s proposal on the final status of Abyei.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“With the conflict in the Sudan, the conditions are not conducive to talks on the final status of Abyei. And indeed, as Under-Secretary-General Lacroix mentioned, the progress that had been made was unfortunately not something that we could build on. Key Sudanese and South Sudanese leaders have not expressed a desire to engage on these topics. And with its military offensive in West Kordofan, the RSF is getting closer to Abyei and controlling parts of the border with South Sudan. Previously, General Hemedti was indeed the head of the Sudan’s Abyei Committee and was engaging with the United Nations and his South Sudanese counterparts on the status of Abyei.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“The RSF was invited but did not participate in the consultations. The participants called for an immediate cessation of hostilities in the Sudan and urged the warring parties to resolve the crisis peacefully. On 29 October, a group of signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement issued a follow-up statement, condemning RSF abuses and underscoring the Sudanese Armed Forces’ legitimate defence of the country. However, the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Army Faction subsequently distanced themselves from that statement. The Presidential Adviser on Security Affairs, Tut Gatluak, stated that President Kiir had directed all relevant institutions to prepare the ground for possible peace talks between the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“President Salva Kiir Mayardit, who has also been actively engaging with the Egyptian authorities on a political solution to the Sudanese conflict, offered to mediate between the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces and proposed face-to-face talks in Juba, but that did not materialize. Meanwhile, South Sudan continues to publicly exercise neutrality amid concerns over the security of the oil installations and pipeline used to export South Sudanese oil through Port Sudan. As a guarantor of the Juba Peace Agreement, South Sudan also remains concerned about the agreement’s relevance. In that regard, the Government of South Sudan held a consultative meeting with the parties to the Peace Agreement on 24 and 25 October to evaluate its implementation and consult with the parties on peace negotiations between the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“On the political front, given the risks posed by the Sudanese conflict for South Sudan, the Government of South Sudan continues to engage with regional leaders and the warring parties to support efforts to de-escalate the conflict, secure a ceasefire and promote dialogue. On 4 September, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, the Chairperson of the Sudan’s Transitional Sovereign Council, visited Juba and discussed efforts to resolve the conflict. Other Sudanese stakeholders, notably Malik Agar, the Deputy Chairperson of the Transitional Sovereign Council, and RSF leaders, have also met with the South Sudanese leadership in Juba as part of the South Sudanese mediation efforts.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“Indeed, in addition to the thousands of Sudanese fleeing the conflict, more than 353,000 registered returnees and refugees from the Sudan have crossed into South Sudan, in a country where two thirds of the population is already in need of humanitarian assistance. With the military developments in the Sudan, and most recently the RSF seizure of the Belila airport and Belila’s oilfield, the military confrontation between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF is getting closer to the boundary with Abyei and the border with South Sudan. Given the proximity of a number of Misseriya groups to the RSF and the recruitment campaigns by warring parties, those military developments could have adverse consequences for Abyei’s social fabric and the already fragile coexistence between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“Ms. Tetteh: I thank members for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the progress in implementing resolution 2046 (2012), which relates to the outstanding bilateral issues between the Sudan and South Sudan and the situation in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. I am also very grateful to my colleague Under-Secretary-General Lacroix for the critical issues highlighted in his briefing. The unprecedented conflict that erupted in the Sudan on 15 April between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is now entering its seventh month, with significant humanitarian, security, economic and political consequences that are a matter of deep concern for the South Sudanese political leadership.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“My Office will also continue to offer its support and work with colleagues in the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan and UNMISS on those issues, including the resolution of the issues pertaining to the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“The priority now obviously is to stop the fighting and to start constructive negotiations between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces that will hopefully lead to a permanent ceasefire and the return to a transitional civilian Government, however distant that prospect immediately seems. That would be the prerequisite for meaningful engagement to resume with the SPLM-North Al-Hilu faction, both for future engagement on Abyei and to address the outstanding bilateral issues between the Sudan and South Sudan. My Office will continue to engage with the Governments of both countries, the AU and IGAD and work to create more fortuitous circumstances conducive to the return to regular dialogue towards the settlement of the issues provided for in the 2012 cooperation agreements.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“In South Kordofan, humanitarian activities have been suspended or restricted due to the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces will only deepen the mistrust between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, and the Sudanese military actors regarding the comprehensive peace negotiations on the two areas. In January, there was no concrete outcome from the meeting in Juba between General Al-Burhan and SPLM-North’s Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, despite the call by President Kiir for the non-signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement to join the peace process in the Sudan.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“However, both agreed to continue their discussions and to better prepare for the next meeting, which was planned to take place in Juba before the end of April. However, in the light of the current developments, it will take time to recover the momentum that had been building in respect of the discussion of those issues. I would now like to turn to the developments concerning the two areas of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile. Like most of the Sudan’s states, Blue Nile and South Kordofan have been affected by the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, with deteriorating security and humanitarian situations. In Blue Nile, clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces have been reported, and the conflict has displaced some of the civilian population.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“Another meeting, previously referred to by my colleague, was held by the Abyei Committee chairpersons in Khartoum on 9 and 10 April, with the participation of Major General Benjamin Sawyerr, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei Force Commander and Acting Head of Mission, and myself, which was the first time since I took on this role that the parties had met in that format to discuss the future of Abyei. They did not reach agreement on the prioritization of the issues to be discussed, with the Sudan emphasizing that the improvement of the security situation in the Area and the provision of humanitarian assistance and services should precede discussions on Abyei’s final status, whereas South Sudan was at the time only interested in discussions on the final status.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“Meanwhile, a meeting of the JPSM, co-chaired by the Ministers of Defence of the two countries, took place in Juba on 18 January. Among other decisions, the JPSM directed the Military Chiefs of Staff to form a joint committee to monitor the implementation of the resolution of the previous JPSM meeting regarding the redeployment of their respective forces outside the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and to develop a concept of operations to work on the decision by their Heads of State concerning the deployment of a joint force across the Sudan-South Sudan border. The meeting also urged the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC) to resume its work within one month, including by holding regular meetings to ease tensions among communities in the Abyei box. It should be recalled that the AJOC last met in 2017.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“Subsequent to that visit, there was also an announcement by South Sudan’s Presidential Adviser on Security Affairs, General Tut Gatluak, of the readiness of the two sides to discuss the implementation of the previously negotiated four freedoms agreement. The efforts of the Sudanese as guarantors of the Peace Agreement have been complemented by the efforts deployed jointly by the African Union (AU), IGAD, the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), as well as by the engagement of Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, with both leaders. Concerning the final status of Abyei, the two countries agreed during their meeting in Khartoum on 24 October 2022 to meet again every three or months on the issue.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“The two countries signed agreements relating to economic and technical arrangements on oil, including arrangements concerning the transportation, processing and export of South Sudan’s crude oil, as well as the arrangements for crude oil lifted by the Sudan to supply the Um-Dabakir power station and the Khartoum Refinery, in addition to dealing with other financial issues. On 13 March, as guarantor of South Sudan’s Peace Agreement, the Sudan dispatched to Juba a high-level delegation led by a member of the Sovereign Council, Lieutenant General Shams-Eddin Al-Kabashi, and accompanied by the Minister of Defence, Lieutenant General Yassin Ibrahim Yassin, as well as the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Elsadig Ali, to help unblock the deadlock between President Kiir and First Vice-President Riek Machar.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“General Al-Burhan reiterated the commitment of his Government to working with the signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement to fully implement the matrix in view of the desire for sustainable peace in the Sudan. In late February, a high-level South Sudanese delegation — comprised of Mr. Benjamin Bol Mel, presidential envoy on special programmes; Mr. Dier Tong Ngor, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning; Mr. Puot Kang Chol, the Minister of Petroleum; and Mr. Johnny Ohisa Damian, Governor of the Bank of South Sudan— travelled to Khartoum for negotiations on oil and other economic matters.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“General Al-Burhan and President Kiir also agreed to deploy joint patrols to halt the uncontrolled flow of arms and ammunition across the border and to institute regular meetings between their respective national security agencies to share intelligence and coordinate actions to address potential threats. On 19 February, they closed the workshop that evaluated the Juba Peace Agreement in the Sudan, ending with the signing of the third amendment to the implementation matrix. At the same workshop, President Kiir also urged the non-signatory rebel movements — the SPLM-North faction, led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, and the Sudan Liberation Army faction, led by Abdul Wahid Al-Nur — to join the peace process in order to bring about sustainable peace within the Sudan and within the two countries.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“President Salva Kiir Mayardit’s decision on 3 March to dismiss the Minister of Defence and Veterans Affairs, Angelina Teny, and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition appointees have sparked tensions, members of the international community have made engagements to seek to reduce the impact. As has been the case over the past few years, high-level engagements have featured prominently in the countries’ bilateral relations. In January, General Al-Burhan and President Kiir agreed to establish a joint security force along their countries’ borders to prevent the infiltration of illegal weapons and combat negative forces and their activities.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“Before the fighting erupted, relations between Khartoum and Juba were stable, characterized by regular bilateral meetings, including at the highest level, with General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan visiting Juba in January and February. The countries also held a meeting of their Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM) in Juba in January, but no other joint mechanisms provided for in their 2012 cooperation agreements have so far been reactivated. While the Sudan is experiencing this conflict, South Sudan is still grappling with a fragile security and political situation.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“Juba has been at the forefront of mediation efforts between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces leaders, including as part of the 16 April regional proposal made by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for the Presidents of South Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti to urgently travel to Khartoum to engage with the parties; as part of the joint South Sudanese-Egyptian call for a ceasefire and proposal of joint mediation; and in a standalone South Sudanese engagement which, we note, resulted in a commitment in principle by Sudanese military leaders to a seven-day cease fire, which was announced by South Sudan’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The conflict in the Sudan is putting in jeopardy the incremental progress achieved by the two countries in addressing their outstanding bilateral issues.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“The fighting in the Sudan is also affecting the daily commercial activities and delivery of food and other basic goods from the Sudan to South Sudan and could potentially put oil exports from South Sudan through Port Sudan at risk. Based on our consultations, the Government of South Sudan is wary of the consequences of the Sudanese conflict for South Sudan’s stability and security and has been particularly proactive in engaging with the Sudanese parties.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“The unstable situation has already seen the return of South Sudanese refugees being hosted by the Sudan, as my colleague Assistant Secretary-General Pobee mentioned, and we could potentially see more than 200,000 South Sudanese refugees hosted by the Sudan returning if stability is not restored soon. That would be a challenge for a country where two thirds of the population already require humanitarian assistance. As the Sudanese authorities are not currently in a position to protect their borders effectively, the insecurity at the border between the Sudan and South Sudan could increase with the cross-border movements of armed and criminal groups.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“Ms. Tetteh: I thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the progress in implementing resolution 2046 (2012), which relates to outstanding bilateral issues between the Sudan and South Sudan, and the situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. The unprecedented conflict that erupted in the Sudan on 15 April between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in addition to its devastating impact on the Sudanese population, is also having a profound effect on the bilateral relationship between the Sudan and South Sudan. The humanitarian, security, economic and political consequences of the developments in the Sudan have raised concerns among the South Sudanese political leadership.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“My office will continue to engage with the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan, as well as the African Union and IGAD, to maintain the international community’s support for fully normalizing the relationship between the two countries. We will also continue to offer assistance to the parties as they take these encouraging steps to find ways of working towards a definitive resolution of Abyei’s status.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“They referenced the meeting held on 24 October and noted their commitment to using this opportunity for re-engagement to meet regularly on issues relating to Abyei on a quarterly basis. In conclusion, progress in improving bilateral relations between the Sudan and South Sudan has been positive, and we believe that it will have a stabilizing effect on the dispute between the two countries. Nevertheless, a renewed commitment regarding the implementation of transitional arrangements, as well as the dispute resolution over Abyei’s final status, cannot be set apart from the fragile internal situations in both countries.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“On 24 October, a delegation led by Mr. Gatluak, in his role as Chairman of South Sudan’s Abyei Committee, met with General Dagalo and members of the Sudan Abyei Committee in Khartoum. Both countries agreed to jointly expedite the provision of services to the citizens of Abyei and activate joint mechanisms to provide the necessary humanitarian services by creating an appropriate environment for the communities in the Area. They also agreed to encourage social peace and community dialogue among communities in Abyei as a gesture of trust- building. Earlier today, I met with senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Sudan, the Minister of Defence and General Dagalo, who all confirmed to me their commitment to working closely with their South Sudanese counterparts on the final resolution of the status of Abyei.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“As previously stated, when the African Union Peace and Security Council met on 29 September to consider the political and security situation in the Abyei region, it appointed a facilitator for the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee. We hope that all of those collective efforts will help the parties to re-engage proactively to address existing challenges within the region, but also to find a solution to the status of Abyei. Ahead of that meeting, I visited Juba on 19 and 20 October and had a meeting with President Kiir, who confirmed to me his determination to work cooperatively with the Sudan to expeditiously resolve the issue of the final status of Abyei. He also stressed that conflicts are better settled through peaceful means to enable communities and their respective countries to enjoy healthier relations.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“In the meantime, since May, working with the Chairperson of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel, I have been holding separate consultations with the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities to find a way out of the stalemate in the settlement of the final status. In addition to the communities, our consultations involved Mr. Deng Alor, Minister of East African Community Affairs of South Sudan and head of the Ngok Dinka delegation, Mr. Francis Deng, former South Sudan Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and Mr. Luka Biong, an eminent Abyei academic and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei. We are currently working to achieve a face-to-face engagement between the two communities at the request of one of them, and both Governments have been informed accordingly by the High-Level Implementation Panel.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“Following the African Union Peace and Security Council meeting held on 29 September on the political and security situation in Abyei, President Kiir reconstituted the Committee on 4 October by creating a subcommittee on development and natural resources. Among other things, the subcommittee is mandated to create a cooperation framework for the development of oil and other natural resources in the Abyei Area and to report to the Abyei Committee responsible for pursuing negotiations on the final status of the Abyei Area, through engagement with the Government of the Sudan.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“The discussions also focused on technical and financial arrangements, increased oil production and a review of the challenges faced in implementing previous agreements. On 22 May, at a technical meeting in Khartoum between the Sudanese Minister of Energy and Petroleum, Muhammad Abdullah, and South Sudan’s Undersecretary at the Ministry of Petroleum, Awow Daniel Chuang, the two countries agreed to develop a cooperation framework in the field of petroleum for their mutual benefit. On 27 September, President Kiir reiterated the decision of both countries to use the cooperation framework to resolve bilateral disputes, including over Abyei, and suggested that all questions relevant to Abyei be addressed to the Committee on Abyei that he established in May 2021.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“However, the four border-crossing points of Jebelain-Renk, Meiram, Buram-Timsah and Kharsana-Panakuac have not yet been opened, due to disputes over land attributed to the local communities. Building on the agreement reached in March between President Kiir and General Al-Burhan to resolve their outstanding issues through economic and political cooperation, the two countries have been meeting regularly, including at the technical level. On 12 May, a South Sudanese delegation, led by Mr. Gatluak and accompanied by the Minister of Finance, met with the leadership of the Sovereign Council in Khartoum. They reviewed progress on the implementation of the peace agreements in both countries and the enhancement of economic cooperation, especially in the oil sector and trade, including the border opening to ease trade flow.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“On 24 May, the Sudan’s Minister of Defence, Lieutenant General Yassin Ibrahim Yassin, and his South Sudan counterpart, Angelina Teny, chaired a meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism in Khartoum, at which they agreed to re-establish the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, activate river transport and immediately open border crossings, while controlling and monitoring the movements of citizens at the borders. They also recommitted to withdrawing their forces from the safe demilitarized border zone, as agreed at previous Joint Political and Security Mechanism meetings. On 28 May, Tut Gatluak, South Sudan’s Presidential Adviser on Security Affairs, and Omar Al-Khalifa Abdullah, Governor of the Sudan’s White Nile state, launched the reopening of the river transport route in Kosti, 11 years after it was closed.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“In early August, the Deputy Chairperson of the Sovereign Council, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, travelled to Juba, where he expressed that wish and IGAD’s support for the decision by the South Sudanese parties to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan to extend the transition period to 2025. He urged the parties to maximize the extension by implementing all outstanding tasks. The two countries also meet periodically to address outstanding issues.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“The South Sudan national unified force’s graduation on 30 August allowed President Salva Kiir Mayardit to meet and discuss bilateral issues with General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Chairperson of the Sudan’s Sovereign Council and current Chairperson of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Earlier in the process, General Al-Burhan was instrumental in unblocking the stalemate over the command structure of the unified army by presenting a proposal acceptable to the parties, thereby paving the way for the graduation of forces. The Sudan has expressed interest in training South Sudanese forces on security and defence, the rule of law and maintaining order.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“In South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, the stalemate in talks between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, has persisted. In South Sudan, some progress has been registered in the peace process, that is, in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, as the graduation of forces finally took place on 30 August, nearly three years after they completed their training. High-level engagements between the Sudan and South Sudan are a regular feature of their bilateral relations.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“Ms. Tetteh: I am grateful for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the progress in implementing resolution 2046 (2012), which relates to outstanding bilateral issues between the Sudan and South Sudan. I do not want to repeat the points that my colleague Assistant Secretary-General Pobee has already made, and I will therefore be brief. The Sudan and South Sudan continue to enjoy improved relations and have made some headway through regular bilateral meetings. They also held a Joint Political and Security Mechanism meeting in Khartoum in May this year. However, even as they continue exchanging high-level visits, each country’s priority seems to be its domestic challenges. In the Sudan, the parties have yet to agree on the way forward to restore a democratic transition after the coup d’état of 25 October 2021.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank my predecessor, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, for the commitment he demonstrated to his role and to peace and security in the region.”
2022-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9020 (2022) · source
“They both emphasize the need to scale up humanitarian assistance to their displaced and vulnerable communities. They both recognize the need for peace on their territories and in the region, which should enable them to foster cooperation as they entertain good-neighbourly relations. My Office will continue to engage with the authorities of both countries and, as appropriate, with key regional actors, including the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, to encourage them to defuse tensions, advance the implementation of all cooperation agreements and consolidate their improved bilateral relations.”
2022-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9020 (2022) · source
“The Al-Hilu SPLM-North faction condemned the military coup and called on its members to support the anti-coup demonstrations. Meanwhile, the Malik Agar faction of the SPLM- North, which was one of the signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement with the Government of the Sudan, has remained within the transitional institutions despite the arrest, imprisonment and subsequent release of its Deputy Chairman, Yasir Aman, by the military in the aftermath of the coup. Clearly, the coup has had a negative effect on the bilateral relations that the two countries had started deepening and are now trying to reboot. It is, however, gratifying that, while each of them is still grappling with its internal conflict, they continue to complement one another in the search for peace and to build on the progress achieved so far.”
2022-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9020 (2022) · source
“While recommitting to its unilateral cessation of hostilities, SLM/A-Al Nur has reiterated its refusal to join the Juba-mediated peace process for the Sudan and renewed its call for an all-inclusive Sudanese initiative that would comprehensively address the Sudan’s multiple problems. Let me now turn to developments concerning the two areas of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. I note with regret that efforts deployed by the South Sudan Mediation Committee to facilitate the resumption of negotiations between the Government of the Sudan and the Al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)-North have not been successful. The Council will recall that the talks between them were suspended on 15 June 2021 for two weeks so as to allow the parties time to consult their constituencies on the outstanding issues.”
2022-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9020 (2022) · source
“The agreement provides for amnesty for the Kitgwang faction, the recommitment of the parties to the ceasefire agreement under the Khartoum declaration of 2018 and the establishment of a coordination office in Juba. In the same spirit, South Sudan continued to exert efforts to convince Abdul Wahid Al-Nur, leader of a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), to join the Sudanese peace process. So far, the efforts have not paid off. On 10 March, Minni Minawi, leader of the other faction of the SLM/A and Governor of Darfur state, visited Juba, ostensibly to meet with Al-Nur. The meeting failed to take place, as Al-Nur accused Minawi of supporting the coup of 25 October.”
2022-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9020 (2022) · source
“Pending details to be worked out by the respective foreign ministries of what unitization entails, the hope is that the proposed approach to peace may be a starting point — not only for addressing the recurrent violence in the Abyei Area but also towards the settlement of the final status of Abyei. Khartoum also continued to play a positive role in seeking peaceful means to resolve intra-party problems experienced by South Sudanese parties. On 16 January, it hosted the signing of an agreement, known as the Kitgwang declaration, between the breakaway faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Government. General Simon Gatwech Dual and his deputy, General Johnson Olony, signed for the SPLM/A-IO, while Mr. Tut Gatluak signed for the SPLM-in-Government.”
2022-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9020 (2022) · source
“President Kiir’s security adviser, Tut Gatluak, and other senior South Sudanese ministers shuttled between Juba and Khartoum throughout the reporting period in order to facilitate a solution between the military and civilian components of the transitional Government and prevent the collapse of the agreement. Although President Kiir and General Al-Burhan did not dwell on the issue of Abyei, they agreed to focus on cooperation along the border between the Sudan and South Sudan, starting with an approach to peace through the development of unitized oil fields, including in the Abyei Area.”
2022-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9020 (2022) · source
“From those discussions, I have understood that bilateral relations between the Sudan and South Sudan are good. The two countries have continued to engage in high-level visits on each other’s territory. Although President Kiir’s last visit to Khartoum was in 2018, Sudanese leaders have continued to visit Juba. On 17 March, General Al-Burhan was in Juba to address the tensions between President Kiir and First Vice-President Machar on account of their disagreement over the sharing of positions within the leadership structure of the future national army. The proposal he submitted on 18 March, as Chairperson of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, was welcomed by President Kiir. For its part, South Sudan continued to follow up on the implementation by the Sudanese parties of the Juba Peace Agreement, which it mediated.”
2022-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9020 (2022) · source