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2002-10-22
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2014-10-28
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un-security-council

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  1. Therefore, like others, we were disappointed that the Kosovo delegation was neither representative of the Provisional Institutions nor multi-ethnic. Mr. Holkeri diplomatically described that as regrettable. The meeting could have shown that Kosovo's Government is genuinely committed to normalization and a true multi-ethnic society. They need to show that. The Provisional Institutions now have a key role in the working groups. It is vital that all parties should now constructively engage in those working groups. We would also like to support Mr. Holkeri's proposal to examine the further transfer of competencies that do not prejudice Kosovo's status under Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). However, as Mr. Holkeri said very clearly, that process cannot be linked to the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. Mr.

    2003-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4853 (2003) · source

  2. Like other speakers, I would very much like to welcome the first report of Special Representative Harri Holkeri to the Security Council. I associate my Government with the statement to be made by Italy on behalf of the European Union. Because most of the important points have already been covered in this debate, I will try not to be comprehensive but to touch on just a few points of importance to the United Kingdom. First, I would like to congratulate Special Representative Holkeri on the launch of the Belgrade- Pristina talks in Vienna. He can count on my Government's full support. The direct dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina is an opportunity to normalize the lives of the people of Kosovo irrespective of their ethnicity.

    2003-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4853 (2003) · source

  3. Finally, I should just like to note that, while security in Iraq is indeed a limiting factor at present on the role of the United Nations, we look forward to a continuing productive and cooperative working relationship with relevant United Nations agencies. Following the end of the oil-for-food programme, capacity-building in areas such as procurement, inventory management and transition to private-sector provision will be crucial. In each area, as circumstances permit, the outside expertise and resources of United Nations agencies, as well as of donor Governments, will greatly assist the people of Iraq as we help them move their country towards economic self-sufficiency and prosperity.

    2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source

  4. Perhaps I could just note that a number of contracts were recently received by the Office of Iraq Programme for processing just in the last couple of days. It is not easy for the Authority to produce a definitive final list of contracts that are deemed to have no utility, but we would hope to be in a position in the near future to provide the Office with such a list, which should inform suppliers of the status of their contracts. Throughout this process of transition, starting with the adoption of resolution 1483 (2003), the Coalition has had one objective firmly in mind, and that has been to ensure that the needs of the people of Iraq are addressed through the efficient and effective mobilization of oil-for-food supplies. That will continue to be our primary objective, now and through 21 November and beyond.

    2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source

  5. We would like to continue to make use of these meetings to update Council members on the various strands of our work as we move towards the 21 November deadline. We intend, during a forthcoming meeting of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 661 (1990), to distribute a detailed summary of the Coalition's overall approach to arrangements after 21 November. This will be posted on the Authority's web site and will be accessible to suppliers. We hope that this document will address many of the concerns expressed by the German and Russian ambassadors today. We will continue to ensure that Security Council and non-Council members are kept informed as these plans evolve. A point was raised by Ambassador Pleuger about giving timely notice to suppliers whose contracts are not prioritized.

    2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source

  6. So, in response to Ambassador Pleuger's questions, I want to say that the Coalition is focused on designing a sustainable and predictable goods- authentication system that will pose no problem to suppliers. Measures are in hand for the uninterrupted authentication of deliveries after 21 November. Full details will be available very soon and will be circulated to the Security Council. The issue of transparency is of vital importance to the Authority itself. To that end, we support the regular informal meetings of the Iraq sanctions Committee that have been hosted by the German delegation, which have helped focus Council members on the many important issues related to the transition.

    2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source

  7. We intend to continue consulting United Nations colleagues and drawing on their expertise in key areas to ensure that the transition of oil-for-food projects in the three northern governorates is effective and orderly. Finally, I should like to say a few words on transparency and continuity, including the question of authentication of oil-for-food supplies once the oil-for- food programme is terminated. We understand the concerns expressed by a number of Member States about the lack of clarity on future arrangements and the need to know more about how the Authority will manage this process after 21 November. The Authority also recognizes the need for continuity in the authentication of oil-for-food supplies. We realize that suppliers prefer a familiar system.

    2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source

  8. Vital to the Coalition's work in developing transitional arrangements for the three northern governorates is the provision by United Nations agencies of dossiers for the oil-for-food projects that will continue after 21 November. Those dossiers are essential from the perspective of programme administration, for rewriting contracts and providing the Authority with financial data essential for budgeting purposes. I am bound to note that dossiers from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health Organization are still outstanding, despite repeated requests from the Coalition. We very much hope that those agencies will transmit those dossiers to the Coalition as rapidly as possible.

    2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source

  9. Approximately $800 million in projects - projects such as electricity plants and the construction of schools and hospitals - will continue to be overseen after the 21 November deadline until their completion. A project oversight board, led by Iraqi officials and linked to a central Iraqi authority in Baghdad, will take over programme management functions that were previously held by United Nations agencies. In that context, it is worth noting that the local authorities in the north have this month been handling the distribution of food, supervised by the World Food Programme, and they are on schedule to take over full responsibility by 21 November.

    2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source

  10. Coalition and Iraqi Ministry officials are currently engaged in developing an effective transition strategy to ensure the efficient delivery of goods as well as adequate warehousing and inventory management. We want to confirm that the Authority will continue to honour its existing commitment to support the fulfilment of all prioritized contracts. We continue to rely on the United Nations agencies involved to retain their focus and stay on track to complete the renegotiation of all prioritized oil-for- food contracts by 21 November. Delays in doing so would simply undermine the reconstruction effort in Iraq. I should like to say a few words on the three northern governorates. A similar tripartite process has looked at oil-for-food projects destined for those three northern governorates.

    2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source

  11. Benon Sevan expected, be completed on time and in an effective manner. I wish to make some comments about the contracts process. As we have heard from Mr. Sevan, the tripartite review process has prioritized more than 3,100 contracts worth over $6.3 billion. We are concentrating on these contracts, working closely with our Iraqi counterparts to ensure the timely delivery of these contracts in Iraq. In doing this, we have been guided by the advice of Iraqis on the ground, not the more remote processes of the past of decision-making in New York. The prioritization process has been based solely on the assessment of whether the goods were of relative utility - the criterion contained in resolution 1483 (2003).

    2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source

  12. That has been our approach from the beginning of this process, and it will continue past 21 November, when all operational responsibility for the oil-for-food programme is transferred to the Coalition Provisional Authority. Since the adoption of resolution 1483 (2003), a significant amount of work has been done - not just by the Authority, not just by United Nations staff, but also by Iraqi officials, to ensure that successful arrangements are in place for the termination of the oil- for-food programme. That tripartite process, which is spelt out in resolution 1483 (2003), has produced real progress. We acknowledge that there is still significant work to be done between now and 21 November, and we recognize that there have been difficulties along the way. But we are confident that the oil-for-food transition will, as Mr.

    2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source

  13. Sevan and his colleagues in the Office of the Iraq Programme, as well as other collaborators in other United Nations agencies, have brought to their task - in challenging circumstances - of ensuring a successful transition consistent with the objectives that the Council set in resolution 1483 (2003). They all deserve the Council's gratitude. I want to focus on a limited number of aspects of the coalition's work under resolution 1483 (2003), in particular questions to do with contracts, questions to do with the three northern governorates, and issues surrounding transparency and continuity. The coalition has approached these questions with the sense of pragmatism, realism, flexibility and focus on the needs of the Iraqi people that Mr. Sevan emphasized in his briefing.

    2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source

  14. I begin by associating my delegation with your remarks, Mr. President, and those of the Secretary-General, condemning the attacks that took place yesterday in Baghdad, including those against the offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Such terrorist attacks will not deflect the international community from its determination to assist the people of Iraq in the reconstruction of their country. I also want to express my warm appreciation for the briefing that Mr. Benon Sevan has given us today. The detail, the complexity and the many challenges that that account revealed provides further evidence of the commitment that Mr.

    2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source

  15. The United Kingdom is working closely with Australia on possible projects in policing assistance, and we hope other countries will also assist in this area.

    2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source

  16. The second area is the continuing weaknesses in the judicial sector described this morning by Mr. Sharma. In relation to the Ad Hoc Tribunal, we agree with the Secretary-General's statement in his report that the perpetrators of human rights abuses must be brought to justice, and we would be interested in Mr. Sharma's suggestions as to how this would be best achieved. We welcome the progress made by the serious crimes unit and look forward to receiving, in due course, the United Nations recommendations on how serious crimes should be handled after May 2004. Finally, a further area for attention is the continued capacity-building of the Timor-Leste police force. Mr. Sharma has described the considerable challenges.

    2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source

  17. Meanwhile, despite all the effort already under way, we must look for further maximum effort to achieve what can be achieved in UNMISET's remaining seven months. This will require significant commitment by the Government of Timor-Leste, the United Nations and by other development partners. The United Kingdom would single out three areas for particular focus but these are not intended to be exhaustive. The first area is border delimitation. We are concerned at the delay in finalizing border delimitation. It is important that this be completed before UNMISET goes. We look to Indonesia and Timor-Leste to continue to develop their relations. We hope the commitment made by both sides to finalizing agreement on border delimitation will lead to a speedy resolution.

    2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source

  18. As we move to the end of the peacekeeping phase, we must first ensure a smooth transition to peace-building, with continuing international assistance. Secondly, we must identify solid arrangements in advance for that international engagement. Thirdly, there must be clarity about the part to be played by the United Nations in that international engagement, a United Nations role that we believe will be essential. The Secretary-General's report in early 2004 must therefore set out clear proposals to the Council for the further development of Timor-Leste in the final months of UNMISET, and then after the drawdown. We look forward in the coming weeks and months to continue dialogue with Mr. Sharma and his team, as well as with interested countries both inside and outside the Council.

    2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source

  19. The United Kingdom fully shares the thoughts of, and the statement to be made by, Italy as the presidency of the European Union. I have just a few comments to make in my national capacity. My first comment is to welcome and congratulate both the Government of Timor-Leste and the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), under Mr. Kamalesh Sharma and his team, for their achievements since we last heard from Mr. Sharma, not least in enhancing the capacity of the public administration and the police force. We agree with the Secretary-General's remark quoted this morning by Mr. Sharma that peacekeeping and peace- building are two sides of the same coin. After UNMISET, international assistance will be essential for the peacekeeping now under way to be successful.

    2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source

  20. So, it was good to hear from Ambassador Sinclair and to have confirmed by our colleague from Papua New Guinea the commitment of the Papua New Guinea Government to moving forward briskly on arrangements for autonomy, on the finalization of the constitution, on the transfer of resources to Bougainville and on preparations for early elections. As both Ambassador Sinclair and the representative of Papua New Guinea have underscored, these too, in addition to weapons containment, are essential to building the self-sustaining peace to which we all look forward.

    2003-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4805 (2003) · source

  21. As Ambassador Sinclair said, that must be a source of concern to all. We welcome the efforts of all concerned, including the United Nations Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB), in trying to bring Francis Ona and his supporters on board the peace process. It will be right to continue to try to do so, but I join France and Germany in agreeing that this must in no way delay the peace process. My second point is an obvious one. It is the need for continued and exclusive focus on delivering progress and momentum in stage III. We do not wish to see any further delays in that process, which means that there are a tight four and a half months within which to work.

    2003-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4805 (2003) · source

  22. I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the two previous speakers in thanking Ambassador Sinclair very much for his careful account of the situation, welcoming the details that the Ambassador of Papua New Guinea has offered us, congratulating the Peace Monitoring Group on their role and urging continuing regional engagement. The picture is an upbeat one. We are pleased, of course, that stage II of the weapons disposal plan has taken place. I think it can be fairly said that the new constitutional arrangements that result are historic for Papua New Guinea, and I would like particularly to congratulate Ambassador Sinclair and his Office for their role. I have just two brief points to draw from this. The first relates to the continuing separation of Francis Ona and his supporters from the peace process.

    2003-08-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4805 (2003) · source

  23. Finally, the United Kingdom recognizes that, even after UNMISET has concluded its mandate, the international donor community will have to provide much support to Timor-Leste. The United Kingdom will play its part in that and urges other donors to do likewise. There must be no hiatus in the progress being made with the international community's support in Timor-Leste when UNMISET closes. So we very much agree with Special Representative Sharma that the Council must begin to think through with UNMISET the next stage in Timor-Leste's development so that the transition is smooth. We look forward to Ambassador Sharma's promised report and proposals to the Security Council on those issues.

    2003-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4744 (2003) · source

  24. We believe that the formation of unofficial village-based security groups could seriously undermine, rather than help, the security situation. We urge that they be disbanded. The United Kingdom believes that there is now a need to focus UNMISET policing efforts on capacity- building in the Timorese police - a point made by earlier speakers - and we believe that donors must remain receptive to long-term support of the policing sector. My Government is ready to do its part in that respect. The United Kingdom supports the proposed revised military strategy and the extension of UNMISET's mandate for 12 months. It will be important for UNMISET to keep up the momentum so that the Mission may indeed conclude successfully in 2004.

    2003-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4744 (2003) · source

  25. With regard to the police, we welcome Timorese ownership of the process of developing the country's police force and the role of Prime Minister Alkatiri and of other senior ministers at the police workshop this month. We hope that a resolution of all outstanding issues can be achieved at the next workshop, in June. We encourage full implementation of the recommendations in the joint assessment mission report, and we urge careful consideration of the sustainability of the Timorese rapid deployment group and of other specialist police groups, given the finite budget available. We support the Secretary-General's recommendation of increased cooperation between the Timorese police and defence forces, and we encourage the adoption of clear definitions of responsibility for both organizations.

    2003-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4744 (2003) · source

  26. We salute the progress made so far by the Government of Timor-Leste, but I should like to focus my remarks on the justice and police and security sectors. We welcome the publication of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on the justice sector. We see a pressing need to identify priorities for future UNDP assistance to the judicial system and to decide on next steps in preparation of the three- to five-year technical assistance programme. So we look forward to early finalization of the justice sector support programme, and we would welcome Special Representative Sharma's giving us an indication of its expected completion date.

    2003-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4744 (2003) · source

  27. Our thanks to Mr. Sharma, Special Representative of the Secretary- General, and his team for all their work. Timor-Leste's international environment is important to its future, and the United Kingdom encourages Indonesia and Timor-Leste to continue working together towards agreement on border delineation by the 30 June 2003 deadline. That target has been described by Ambassador Sharma as "challenging". The economic and social prospects of the country are also clearly crucial. Timor-Leste's economic future looks brighter with the ratification of the Timor Sea Treaty and its potential revenue streams. But no less important is the development of the quality of government in Timor-Leste itself.

    2003-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4744 (2003) · source

  28. As a member of the European Union, the United Kingdom has workedjointly since 1998, with France in particular, in developing European crisis management capability, and we very much welcome the beginnings of a United Nations dialogue with the European Union in this area.

    2003-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4739 (2003) · source

  29. Finally, turning to my third area of questions, on relationships: exchanging information and building capacity will be valuable. But beyond this, we think there may be scope for further developing understandings about how such capacities can be employed. Is there scope for the United Nations to develop general, formal understandings with regional organizations about how they are most likely to be able to add value to the Council's efforts? Structured dialogue between regional organizations and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs, for example, could build understanding of how traditional Council capabilities can be complemented by the resources of regional organizations.

    2003-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4739 (2003) · source

  30. And how can the United Nations and its Member States help develop the capacity of such regional organizations and of the Council to work with them so that they can do more to address emerging threats to peace and security in their regions? Is there scope not merely for information exchange between regional organizations but also for capacity-building between them. This morning we have heard the offer from the Organization of American States to assist other regional organizations, drawing on its experience. And as a European, I wonder whether the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe could offer more of its experience to organizations in other regions and whether the civilian crisis management component of the European Security and Defence Policy could be replicated elsewhere around the globe.

    2003-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4739 (2003) · source

  31. Turning to my second set of questions, on capacity, we think it useful to understand and develop the capacity available for Security Council action. Similarly, we think that it is useful to understand and develop the capacities for local and regional dispute settlement. Do we as a Council need to broaden our understanding of the range of regional organizations that can help address emerging threats to international peace and security? We as a Council have made heavy use of the Economic Community of West African States and NATO. But are there any entities that we are neglecting: civil society organizations, or regional organizations with election monitoring capacity, or human rights organizations?

    2003-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4739 (2003) · source

  32. How can regional organizations better respond to Council requests for information and cooperation, for example requests for reports on the activities of troops of regional organizations or on the implementation of United Nations sanctions by countries belonging to a regional organization? And there is information flow in both directions between the Council and regional organizations. We think that there is scope for a more regular and more energetic exchange of views and information. So, are there mechanisms we should explore for better liaison, for example more exchange between situation centres? And finally, with respect to exchanges between regional organizations, how can the sharing and transfer of best practice be improved? Are there things that the Council can appropriately do to encourage this?

    2003-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4739 (2003) · source

  33. But we want to encourage examination with the representatives of regional organizations here today of whether the Council is doing enough. So, I turn first to information exchange, because better flows of information should make for stronger decision-making. With respect to the flow of information from the Council to regional organizations, we would like to ask how well informed regional organizations feel about Council discussion and decisions. Is there room for improvement? We send Security Council resolutions to all Member States. Should they go to regional organizations as well? Then there is information from regional organizations to the Council.

    2003-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4739 (2003) · source

  34. Regional and subregional organizations are key players in operationalizing the Council's work. It is important for the effectiveness of the Council's decisions that we strengthen the relationship with regional organizations and, as appropriate, encourage strengthened relationships between them. The Counter-Terrorism Committee's 6 March meeting with regional organizations may offer some models. I wanted to offer some brief questions about how we might do these things, and shall do so under three headings: developing information exchange, developing capacity and developing relationships. In asking these questions, my delegation does not wish to suggest that nothing is happening. On the contrary, we have already heard this morning much that is going on among regional organizations.

    2003-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4739 (2003) · source

  35. As we all deepen our understanding of what is required to deliver security at all stages, from conflict prevention through peacekeeping to reconstruction and peace-building, not least in the face of new emerging threats including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism, the Security Council's task is becoming increasingly complex and broad. We do not underestimate the Council's existing strengths, or the extent to which these have developed in recent decades. But in developing its ability to protect international peace and security, which is what is here for, the Council needs to develop the tools to do this. Therefore, the United Kingdom welcomes your initiative, Mr. President, to hold this meeting and your presence as you lead us in it.

    2003-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4739 (2003) · source

  36. We are willing to consider favourably the Secretary-General's recommendations for rescheduling the downsizing of the United Nations police operation, subject to some clarifications of some of the recommendations. We will pursue those clarifications with the Secretariat. In the same framework, we would also like to pursue further information on the budgetary implications of the Secretary-General's proposals.

    2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source

  37. I listened carefully to Under-Secretary-General Guehenno's description of the current security situation, but we continue to be unconvinced that the security problems in Timor-Leste, as they stand at present, warrant maintaining peacekeeping force troops at the present level all the way to December 2003. We feel that under current downsizing plans there would still be sizeable numbers of troops to deal with the acts of the small armed gangs. Nevertheless, we would be willing to explore the feasibility of rescheduling the downsizing of the peacekeeping force in a less radical manner than is proposed in the Secretary-General's report, and we look forward to exploring that further. On the proposals for a revised policing strategy, we agree that improving the capability of the Timorese police should be the priority.

    2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source

  38. Like previous speakers, the United Kingdom fully recognizes the importance of ensuring that the investments that the international community has made and the achievements that the Timorese people and Government have accomplished are not undermined. We agree with the Secretary-General's report that recent security problems in Timor-Leste, and the way in which they were handled, have lent weight to the argument in favour of adjustments to the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), and we agree that changes should be made. We therefore broadly support the measures outlined in paragraph 22 of the Secretary-General's report (S/2003/243).

    2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source

  39. I would like first of all the thank Under-Secretary-General Guehenno for his briefing and to express gratitude to the Secretary-General for the report on which it was based. We think that it is right for the Secretariat to sound a warning bell, as Under-Secretary-General Guehenno put it, when it judges that to be necessary. Whether or not we agree with the conclusions is a different matter, but it is quite right to express concern about the situation when the Secretariat judges it to be necessary. I should like to concentrate my remarks on the country of Timor-Leste, specifically the recommendations in the Secretary-General's report for the military and police configuration there. But before I do so, I should like to join others in expressing condolences to the Government and the people of the Republic of Korea.

    2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source

  40. There can be no progress towards final status without dialogue between the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and the Government in Belgrade. Initial dialogue should focus on practical issues that directly affect the daily lives of the citizens of Kosovo and of those internally displaced persons who remain outside Kosovo. A key issue will be the rule of law and fighting organized crime, as highlighted in the 25 November 2002 London conference on this subject. Such a dialogue, in a positive, cooperative framework, will help to create a climate of mutual confidence for looking eventually at wider questions of Kosovo's future.

    2003-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4702 (2003) · source

  41. All parties need to work within "standards before status". All parties need to show that they are working towards European standards. Delivering those standards will help to deliver the three priorities that Mr. Steiner has rightly pointed to. All parties need to show that they can carry out their commitments within the existing Constitutional Framework before status negotiations are possible. Prejudging final status, either by declarations in Pristina or Belgrade or by the transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps into an army, is unacceptable. Kosovo needs to show that it is serious about actually running itself and about integrating minority communities into Government. At the same time, those minorities must demonstrate that they are committed to Kosovo's future.

    2003-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4702 (2003) · source

  42. Compliance is an international commitment, and it will be important for Kosovo to show its political maturity and be seen to be acting within common European Union values. Thirdly, there is a further way to go on the establishment of a multi-ethnic civil service. Nearly 60 per cent of senior civil-servant posts remained unfilled at the end of 2002. And there is a continuing, substantial task to achieve returns. The Council's mission showed that hard work by all concerned will be needed if returns are to increase in 2003. My delegation welcomes UNMIK's intention - and Michael Steiner has just confirmed it for us this morning - to transfer further competencies to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. We encourage UNMIK to press on with this. But with power comes responsibility.

    2003-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4702 (2003) · source

  43. To give just a few examples: the recent cycle of violence - including successful and attempted assassinations and attacks on Orthodox churches - seems to indicate that local extremists feel that they can act with impunity. They cannot and must not. Local leaders need to condemn all such acts of violence and to support the efforts of UNMIK police and the Kosovo Police Service in their efforts to clamp down on this selfish extremism, which hinders Kosovo 's development and affects the normal lives of the normal people in Kosovo. We also urge UNMIK and KFOR to tackle this extremism at its roots. Secondly, the Provisional Institutions of Self- Government at all levels must also cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and UNMIK if and when any indictments are presented.

    2003-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4702 (2003) · source

  44. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and Michael Steiner leading it, have achieved a good deal over the past three months: UNMIK authority established across the whole of Kosovo; the number of minority judges increased; steps taken by the Kosovo Police Service to assume responsibility for some law-and-order activities; an improved feeling of security on the streets; and easier access across the bridges in Mitrovica. But we have to recognize that we are still a long way from the Security Council's goal of a multi- ethnic Kosovo which could take its place in Europe, along with the rest of the Balkans.

    2003-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4702 (2003) · source

  45. Like my French colleague, I welcome the fact that the Secretary-General was able to be here at the start of this meeting, and I thank him for his report. I am grateful to Michael Steiner for a clear and useful presentation, and I, too, associate my delegation with the statement of the European Union, to be made by our Greek colleague later this morning. I would also like to say a word of thanks to Norway, and especially to Ambassador Kolby, for the role that they played last year, including on the Council mission to the region. We reiterate our support for the priorities set out by Michael Steiner, most recently in his television address to Kosovo on 20 January, especially his reiteration of the principle of standards before status, and the need for all parties in Kosovo to work more seriously.

    2003-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4702 (2003) · source

  46. We would be interested in the views of WFP on the extent to which this crisis is caused by drought and the extent to which it is worsened by Government policy. Mr. Morris made reference to the role that economic policy and Government decisions can play in this area. I have Zimbabwe particularly in mind in this context.

    2002-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4652 (2002) · source

  47. One is to ask whether the World Food Programme is confident that those who need food aid in Africa are receiving it and whether it is satisfied that it has sufficient mechanisms for monitoring this. A second area that we would be interested in exploring is how WFP is coordinating with other agencies to ensure that any potential for conflict in the areas in which it is working is minimized. We would be interested in Mr. Morris's comments on coordination between the World Food Programme and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, for example, on dealing with food insecurity in conflict situations and the handling of food aid in those areas. Lastly, I have a question about the situation in Southern Africa, which is clearly very grave.

    2002-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4652 (2002) · source

  48. Morris was kind enough to make several references to the United Kingdom's investment in basic agricultural development. The point here is that we consider food insecurity to be a symptom of a wider phenomenon - that of poverty. Our increased investments in agricultural production in less developed countries are based on the perception of that link and the recognition, therefore, that poverty and conflict are far too often handmaidens that go together. We need to look at how food, poverty and conflict link together and recognize the need to address those links in our discussions in the Council on peace and security. If I might, I have four brief questions to address to Mr. Morris.

    2002-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4652 (2002) · source

  49. We understand the challenges that the agency confronts when 80 per cent of its budget is directed to humanitarian emergency operations. It must surely be an objective for us all to see that percentage reversed back towards where it was 10 years ago, when 80 per cent of WFP's efforts were directed to development. Part of that effort must lie in addressing the link between conflict and food insecurity. We see a clear link between peace and security, on the one hand, and food security on the other. Conflict can be a major cause of food crises and, at the same time, food insecurity can he sometimes a direct cause and sometimes a contributory cause both of the start of conflict and of its prolongation, be it through refugees and internally displaced persons or through competition for natural resources, such as water. Mr.

    2002-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4652 (2002) · source

  50. May I, at this first meeting, briefly pay a warm tribute to the outgoing presidency of the Council and warmly welcome you, Sir, to the presidency. My delegation looks forward to working closely with yours. I should like particularly to congratulate you on convening this afternoon's meeting. We find it a welcome and imaginative initiative to invite James Morris and the World Food Programme (WFP) here to talk to us. We think that this sort of initiative helps to build a fuller understanding of conflict prevention in the Security Council's work and we see this as a contribution to getting different parts of the United Nations system to work more effectively together. We would like to thank the World Food Programme for its efforts.

    2002-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4652 (2002) · source