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Tiaré

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39
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2022-05-18
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2023-05-16
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un-security-council

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  1. We therefore hope that the recommendations of the Independent High- Level Panel on Security and Development in the Sahel, chaired by the former President of the Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, will receive the necessary attention and support from the international community and all partners in order to ensure a return to peace, security and development in the Sahel so that the Sahelian people can thrive.

    2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source

  2. The message is very clear. We also take this opportunity to thank the European Union for its commitment to working with us to determine the operational support that the European Union can provide to the G-5 Sahel to contribute to meeting the needs of the Joint Force. Although we must act swiftly in the short term to ensure that the serious crisis in the Sahel does not spread to other parts of Africa, it is absolutely vital that we address the root causes of the crisis.

    2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source

  3. There are thousands of children on the streets because schools are now closed. The Council also knows what is happening at the borders of some countries of the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, and what will happen if the situation at the tri-border area is not brought under control. That is why we need to provide an urgent, robust and strong response. To achieve that, a comprehensive and action-oriented strategy is required that draws on existing mechanisms, although those mechanisms have challenges. In that regard, I would like to commend the Secretary-General’s position on the issue, as he recognizes that the G-5 Sahel Joint Force remains an important regional initiative that complements the multifaceted efforts of the United Nations and other international partners in the region and deserves the support of the international community.

    2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source

  4. With regard to climate change, I would like to congratulate Switzerland for adding the issue of climate change to the priorities of the Security Council. Indeed, while already grappling with a deep- seated political, security, social and humanitarian and crisis, the Sahel is considered one of the regions that is most vulnerable to climate change, which has an adverse effect on human freedoms and on keeping the peace, in particular in rural areas. Given the respective positions of Council members, they all know what is occurring in the Sahel. There are hundreds of victims, civilians and troops alike, and millions of internally displaced persons, as mentioned in the Secretary-General’s report, including women and children. All they ask is to be able to return to their villages, live in dignity and return to their traditional jobs.

    2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source

  5. However, in order to be as effective as possible, the Force needs what it has always lacked and has always sought to be operational — sustainable funding and equipment. As we seek to counter terrorism, all our efforts must be geared towards providing a clear response. How do we mobilize all local, national, regional, social, cultural, economic and other forces in order to eliminate the root causes of insecurity, while using military means to stem its effects? In addition to its military strategy, because the G-5 Sahel knows that the fight cannot be won by weapons alone, it also works on other aspects of the issue, such as development, the prevention of violent extremism, climate change and so on.

    2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source

  6. Everything is ready and awaits only the endorsement of the G-5 Sahel Ministers of Defence and Army Chiefs of Staff. The concept of operations will be submitted to the African Union Peace and Security Council for endorsement before being transmitted to the Security Council. Given that the Sahel is at a crossroads, with ever- increasing terrorism, which poses a serious threat to international peace and security, it is absolutely vital that we provide support for the operationalization of the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel, which is now one of the rare forces in the subregion with a strategy and 14 battalions that are ready to engage with armed terrorist groups. When rewriting the concept of operations, military experts laid the groundwork for the Force to achieve optimal results in addressing security issues.

    2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source

  7. Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani, President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, reaffirmed their readiness to preserve and strengthen the G-5 Sahel as an important framework for cooperation and coordination. They welcomed the new structure of the Joint Force and its adaptation to the current environment and expressed their firm willingness to support, through appropriate means, the new configuration of the Joint Force and the implementation of the État-major de Coordination de la Force Conjointe du G-5 Sahel, with Niamey as its headquarters, along with a reduced team of 15 for the time being. The concept of operations has already been finalized at the expert level with respect to personnel, battalions, chain of command and operating budget.

    2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source

  8. In that regard, I am pleased to inform the Council that earlier today, at 10 a.m., at the headquarters of the G-5 Sahel, General Hanena Ould Sidi, Minister of Defence of Mauritania, presided over the opening ceremony of a technical workshop in support of the regional protection of civilians strategy in the G-5 Sahel space. Work has been under way for some days, and participants include officials of the État-major de Coordination de la Force Conjointe du G-5 Sahel, representatives of the G-5 Sahel Women’s Platform, young people and partners within the United Nations system and the International Committee of the Red Cross. As members know, the Heads of State of the G-5 Sahel, at their sixth extraordinary summit, held on 20 February under the presidency of His Excellency Mr.

    2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source

  9. Indeed, since its establishment, in 2017, the Joint Force has been unable to be truly operational because of a lack of sustainable funding and of aircraft and intelligence equipment. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the Secretary-General’s report (S/2023/328), in spite of that, and as other reports have also shown, the Force has achieved results on the ground, notwithstanding the insecurity it faces. With regard to support, the logistical support programme must be commended. The Force benefited from the programme following the 2018 tripartite agreement among the United Nations, the European Union and the Executive Secretariat of the G-5 Sahel, which expires on 23 June, and the implementation of the human rights and international humanitarian law compliance framework.

    2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source

  10. The groups clearly rely not on foreigners but on local actors and leaders, who are based in their area of operations and coordinate all the groups’ actions. Facing this new situation, and looking back, we are prompted to ask if we could have avoided these problems in the area represented by the G-5 Sahel and encompassing the countries of the Gulf of Guinea if we had listened to the many calls to step up the Joint Force’s operationalization and response. We must also acknowledge that the G-5 Sahel is in a particularly difficult situation, among other things because of a poor understanding of that situation and the failure of the international community to draw lessons from it.

    2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source

  11. The fact is that despite the efforts made so far, both individually by the countries directly affected by the crisis and collectively within the regional framework of the G-5 Sahel, the security situation has continued to deteriorate. It is very different from the situation in 2014, when the G-5 was founded, and in 2017, when the Joint Force was established for the specific purpose of addressing the rapid expansion of armed and violent extremist groups and the deteriorating situation in the region. It has become clear that the attacks by armed groups, which have increased over the past years, primarily in the three border areas, have been carried out by two groups — Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.

    2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source

  12. I commend the representatives of the African members of the Council for their important contribution to the debate within the Council on issues related to peace and security in Africa and convey our full support. Lastly, I would like to commend Ms. Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee for her outstanding and informative presentation of the report, which I am sure held Council members’ full attention. The complex situation in the Sahel in general, and in the G-5 Sahel countries in particular, which the Secretary-General accurately describes in his report, is of concern to all of us, especially the Security Council, whose primary responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security.

    2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source

  13. Mr. Tiaré (spoke in French): I would first like to congratulate your country, Switzerland, Madam President, both on its election in June 2022 by the General Assembly to the Security Council and this month on its presidency of the Council for the first time in Switzerland’s history. I wish Switzerland a constructive term and hope it will be re-elected in future. I would also like to thank you for this opportunity to address the Security Council following the presentation of the Secretary-General’s report (S/2023/328) on the operationalization of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel). I thank all the members of the Council for their participation in this meeting, which attests to their interest in the issues at stake in the current situation in the Sahel and in Africa.

    2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source

  14. I would like to thank the Assistant Secretary-General who has just reaffirmed her great support for this original regional initiative in its fight against the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in our area. It is unthinkable today to imagine a fight against terrorism that would not start in the Central Sahel or would not rely on existing initiatives to limit or even prevent the expansion of terrorism to the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. In the secrecy of the Council’s deliberations, I urge its members to understand the seriousness of the situation and take into account the reality on the ground — a reality that clearly indicates that the hour is grave and that, without a rapid and urgent response, we should fear the emergence of an even greater threat to international peace and security.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  15. Indeed, the opposite is true, as evidenced by the many meetings I have just mentioned, the continued activities of the Executive Secretariat and the Joint Force, and the development of the new development and security strategy and the drafting of the new priority investment programme, which will be the subject of a workshop on 23 and 24 November in Niamey. Our hope is to submit these important documents, as well as the new CONOPS, to the G-5 authorities, which we expect will meet very soon. Before concluding, allow me to insist once again on the urgency and necessity of encouraging the G-5 Sahel and, above all, giving it the greatest possible support.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  16. Mahamadou Issoufou. We strongly hope that this initiative will receive support and assistance from the international community and all partners and friends of the Sahel in the implementation of the strong measures to be recommended by the Independent High- Level Panel. In the meantime, I reiterate the firm commitment of the Heads of State to continue working together because the reasons that justified the creation of the G-5 Sahel and its Joint Force are even more relevant today. This is therefore not the time to give up.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  17. It is obvious that the most ardent wish of all these people, most of whom are women and children, is to return to their respective villages, to live there with dignity, even if they do so in poverty, because what they are experiencing in the camps is unbearable. The countries of the Sahel in general, and the G-5 Sahel in particular, are greatly weakened by multifaceted crises — security, humanitarian, economic, climatic, and so on — even though they are brimming with enormous potential. There are therefore many vast challenges to be met if peace, security, development and inclusive growth are to be promoted in the Sahel. That is why we welcome and place great hope in the Secretary-General’s initiative to conduct a joint strategic assessment on security and development in the Sahel, coordinated by the former President of the Niger, Mr.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  18. This feeling, which is widely shared among the population, has been the main reason put forward by the military to justify unconstitutional regime changes. The political instability coupled with the security crisis is hampering the response initiatives undertaken so far to contain the threat, which is characterized by States losing control over growing areas of their national territories and the displacement of millions of people. That provides me with the opportunity to salute the dynamic actions of the United Nations agencies in the affected countries to help care for the millions of internally displaced persons.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  19. We are all well aware that despite the undeniable efforts of the Joint Force and the large sums of money spent by countries to build capacity and equip their defence and security forces through various means — and at the expense of other basic social sectors — the security situation continues to deteriorate considerably, as stated in the Secretary- General’s report. This deteriorating security situation is undermining the G-5’s development actions, as they simply cannot be carried out. The resilience and hope long nourished by the people of the Sahel to see the end of the tunnel are gradually giving way to anger and frustration towards the public authorities and certain international partners.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  20. Abdel Fatau Musah — a personality well known to the United Nations — declared that ECOWAS has begun to reflect on its role in order to enable it to assist its members on such issues as terrorism and humanitarian action, because, as he said, one cannot talk about a return to constitutional order in a country that is under the control of terrorists and which is experiencing serious humanitarian problems. In particular, he revealed that the next ECOWAS summit will address the issue of the operationalization of a framework to fight terrorism in the subregion and that it will be a matter of seeing, together with the African Union and the United Nations, how to mobilize a force to come to the aid of Burkina Faso, as the problem is regional.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  21. It is clear today that the situation is even more worrisome than it was in 2017, when the joint military force was created to fight terrorism, cross-border organized crime and human trafficking in the G-5 Sahel space. Today the dam that countries such as Burkina Faso constituted has burst, causing terrorism to spread to the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. Again, this is very sad. Fortunately, a few days ago, in Ouagadougou, the ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Mr.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  22. Taking these shortcomings into account, the Secretary- General made proposals to the Security Council, some of which remain relevant because the United Nations must provide operational, tactical and strategic logistical support to the Joint Force, funded by assessed contributions — and for good reason. The observations in the Secretary-General’s report make it very clear that the growing persistence of terrorism in the Sahel constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. Indeed, the Secretary- General has said this on several occasions. It has always been the message of the leaders of the G-5 Sahel. The struggle they are waging is not for the benefit of the G-5 Sahel countries alone.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  23. With respect to the implementation of the tripartite technical agreement between the United Nations, the European Union and the G-5 Sahel, we welcome the continuity of MINUSMA’s operational and logistical support for the Joint Force battalions, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. Even if this continuity was achieved without the need for a tripartite meeting, it would be good to consider holding a formal meeting between the three parties after the validation of the new CONOPS. Indeed, Council members will recall that at least one survey on the perception of MINUSMA’s support for the Joint Force was conducted, and suggestions were made following the identification of shortcomings.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  24. In order to strengthen military action to protect civilians, the Executive Secretariat has, working alongside the Joint Force, initiated a process for developing a regional protection-of-civilians strategy with the technical support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights through its project to support the Joint Force in the implementation of the compliance framework. This strategy, which we hope to see finalized as soon as possible, will be translated into an operational action plan that, when implemented, will help strengthen collaboration and trust among the defence and security forces and the populations to benefit from their actions.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  25. These operations, conducted with strict respect for human rights and with the support of international partners, the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and many others, have had mixed results given the magnitude of the threat. Today the Joint Force has distinguished itself by significantly improving the protection of civilians in its operations and by living among the civilian populations in its areas of operation.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  26. Since the mandate stipulates that the Force must have preventive and investigative police who can support military action, the judicialization of the field of operations of the Joint Force is now a reality. It is reflected in the growing numbers of people who have been captured, handed over by the provosts to the specialized investigation units and transferred to the specialized judicial units of the G-5 Sahel States for criminal proceedings. Over the past two years, more than a hundred people have been apprehended, the majority of whom were arrested in 2022 alone.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  27. In the meantime, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union has been seized with extending the fifth mandate of the Joint Force, a mandate endorsed by the Security Council. During the current mandate, and despite many difficulties, the Force has been able to conduct operations, as indicated in the report. The positive results have contributed in various ways to improving the security environment in the area of operations. Armed terrorist groups have been neutralized, a number of their members have been arrested and hundreds of weapons and thousands of rounds of ammunition and large quantities of drugs have been seized. All of that was handed over to the national administrative authorities of the territory where the judicialization operation took place.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  28. However, because the G-5 has to continue its mission with the other countries, it was necessary to conduct a review of the CONOPS, and the strategic consideration process for a new reconfiguration of the Force began in Niamey with the fourteenth extraordinary meeting of the Defence and Security Committee on 21 September and a meeting of the Ministers of Defence on 22 September. A number of decisions were taken on the new format of the Joint Force and a road map was drawn up, providing for a meeting of military experts in Ouagadougou and a meeting of ministers in N’Djamena, which was to be held no later than 31 October. Unfortunately, due to the events in Burkina Faso and Chad, those two meetings could not be held. However, the meeting of military experts is now scheduled to take place on 5 December in Nouakchott.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  29. It will not have escaped the Security Council’s attention that Mali’s withdrawal on 15 May from all the G-5 Sahel entities, including its Joint Force, plunged our subregional organization into an institutional crisis, the effects of which are being felt even more strongly by the Joint Force. The consequences of the withdrawal include the relocation of the headquarters from Bamako to N’Djamena, the suspension of support for the operations of the Joint Force by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the impossibility of carrying out joint operations in the three axes, as provided for in the strategic concept of operations (CONOPS).

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  30. Mr. Tiaré (spoke in French): At the outset, I would like to congratulate Ghana on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I also want to thank Ambassador Agyeman for his invitation to brief the Council on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) and all the members of the Council for their attention to my briefing today in this particular context, in which we are considering how to better contribute to combating terrorism in the G-5 Sahel area. I would like to congratulate the Secretary-General on the quality of the report (S/2022/838) just presented, and to thank him sincerely for his commitment and his steadfastness in support of the G-5 Sahel cause.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  31. Nevertheless, we still believe that anything is possible, in the good sense of the phrase, and we are therefore appealing to the United Nations to become even more involved in supporting the G-5 Sahel in its fight against terrorism and for development, for the risks of the security crisis spreading to the Gulf countries are very great — and they are already visible.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  32. On the political level, the unconstitutional changes that have taken place in three of the five G-5 Sahel countries, as well as the sanctions imposed on some of those countries, have in no way contributed to harmony within the G-5 Sahel family. Tensions have even arisen with certain partners. One of the consequences of that internal crisis within the G-5 Sahel is the difficulty in convening the organization’s bodies, in particular the eighth summit, in February, during which Mali should have assumed the rotating presidency. We are now facing an unprecedented and unexpected situation with regard to the decision of the Malian Government to withdraw, and the leaders of the other member States will certainly take initiatives in the coming days in order to address that diligently.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  33. Despite challenges and limitations, the Joint Force has been able to carry out numerous operations in the centre, east and west areas since the end of 2019. The new campaign plan currently being approved provides for a total of eight major operations in the three areas. In total, 26 operations have been carried out since the end of 2019. In the context of progress in its implementation, permanent operational procedures for internal investigations have been established. And a compliance framework has been put in place to guide the Joint Force so as to ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. The G-5 Sahel countries are waging a fight on two fronts — security and development.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  34. In 2021, the Council even visited the Niger and worked with Major General Bikimo, who recalled the challenges facing the Joint Force. The most recent visit by the Secretary-General to West Africa, at the beginning of May, notably to the Niger again, made it possible to come to grips with the realities of the Sahel and served as the occasion to appoint the former President of the Niger, Mr. Mahamadou Issoufou, to lead the independent high-level group in charge of the joint strategic assessment. The G-5 Sahel will participate in that assessment and hopes that its main components will enable it to better define a better security, governance and cooperation architecture in order to ensure the optimal use of resources.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  35. We thank the Secretary-General for the support that he has always provided to the G-5 Sahel and the Joint Force within the Security Council, in which he has always underscored the need to provide material and financial support in order to strengthen the G-5 Sahel. The Heads of State of the G-5 Sahel have always appealed to the United Nations to support the Joint Force because our countries are fighting not only in our own interests, but also in the interest of international peace and security. Within the Security Council itself, the three African countries that are non-permanent members have always advocated for a positive stance towards the Joint Force that would allow it to meet the challenges, as the support provided by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali remains below our expectations.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  36. In the area of combating terrorism, G-5 Sahel Joint Force was established in 2017 — as noted by Ms. Pobee — under the Malian presidency, with general headquarters in Bamako. According to its concept of operations, it conducts joint operations in the central, western and eastern areas and consists of approximately 55,000 troops grouped into seven battalions. In the past, it had been supported in the centre region by an eighth battalion, the Chadian battalion, based in Téra, in the Niger, which withdrew at the beginning of April. Given the way it operates and the new context in the G-5 Sahel space with the ongoing deterioration in the security situation, a review of the concept of operations has been considered; however, the military body has not yet been able to meet.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  37. In the area of development, the relevant main G-5 Sahel implementation programmes and projects include the security and development strategy and the Priority Investment Programme, the first phase of which covers the period 2019 to 2022. To complement that — given the deterioration in the security situation in the G-5 Sahel space — an integrated priority action framework was adopted in February 2020 to provide greater efficiency, with the aim of carrying out swift, realistic, measurable and flexible efforts on security and development aspects in priority areas, including in the humanitarian, governance and reconciliation areas. However, despite the goodwill of our partners and their support, growing insecurity and the coronavirus disease pandemic have hampered our ability to carry out such activities.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  38. We are deeply saddened by this regrettable decision to fully withdraw rather than suspend its participation, because the G-5 Sahel is a family of five countries — Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger and Chad — that has been working together since the signing of the 19 December 2014 convention. I note that the G-5 Sahel is an institutional regional coordination and monitoring framework — with the voluntary participation of each of its member States — that pursues two main objectives: combating terrorism and ensuring socioeconomic development in the G-5 Sahel space. This original idea is based on the understanding that no country alone could combat terrorism and promote development unless it pooled its human, financial and material resources with others.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  39. Mr. Tiaré (spoke in French): At the outset, I join the members of the Security Council in expressing our sincere condolences to the United Arab Emirates following the passing of its President. It is a pleasure to take the floor to brief the members of the Council on the latest developments in the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) countries. In a communiqué dated 15 May, the Government of Mali made known to the international community its decision to withdraw from all of the bodies of the G-5 Sahel. That decision was a great surprise because Mali had noted that it would suspend its participation in the bodies of the G-5 Sahel, including the Joint Force, if there were no progress on the issue of Mali’s presidency of the G-5 Sahel.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source