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Vale De Almeida

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2015-11-10
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2019-07-09
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un-security-council

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  1. Mr. Vale de Almeida: I am honoured to speak on behalf of the European Union and its 28 member States. The following countries align themselves with my statement, of which a longer version will be distributed in the Chamber: the candidate countries Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania; the country of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Area country Liechtenstein, member of the European Economic Area; as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia. First, I would like to commend the United States for holding this debate on peacekeeping and the implementation of resolution 2378 (2017).

    2018-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8349 (2018) · source

  2. As ever, the Coordinator of the Joint Commission stands ready to work with United Nations bodies and Member States in order to support the objectives of the JCPOA.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  3. Should the momentum on the JCPOA's preservation and implementation be lost, that would be very detrimental to Iran, all other remaining JCPOA parties and the wider international community, and it would damage the trust in the effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy and the non-proliferation architecture. That is why the European Union once again calls on the international community to support this internationally endorsed common engagement. All remaining signatory parties need to implement the JCPOA in full and resolution 2231 (2015) in all its dimensions. We need to continue to build on this achievement of multilateral diplomacy, which is the best hope for security and stability in the region.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  4. To that end, our outreach efforts will continue, together with colleagues from the Security Council secretariat and the Facilitator. Member States' governmental export-control stakeholders should continue supporting the engagement of their companies in any new transfers, through only the official channels. Noting the challenges relating to the procurement channel in the wider JCPOA framework, we have no time for complacency. Immediate action is required to find a sustainable solution on overall trade with Iran, since that would also have an important impact on the procurement channel. I wish to conclude my briefing with two further comments.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  5. It also intensified efforts to be as transparent as possible, without compromising confidentiality, by reaching out to United Nations Member States and promoting a better understanding of its aims, objectives and its review process, which are embedded in the JCPOA'S multilayered system of checks and balances. Impressive outreach activities have been conducted over the past few years, and countries around the world are aware of the procedures of the channel. Therefore, it is regrettable, as reported by the Secretary-General, that some exports of listed items have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). We see the need to further familiarize countries and potential exporters with the procurement channel.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  6. In that context, on 8 June the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group submitted to the Facilitator, on behalf of the Joint Commission, its fifth biannual report. The report aims to provide the Facilitator and Security Council members with an overview of the work undertaken by the Procurement Working Group from 1 December 2017 to 12 June 2018. The report has been circulated in document S/2018/601. During this period, the Procurement Working Group continued to discuss relevant topics, including end use, common outreach messaging and procedural aspects relevant to the smooth processing of the proposals.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  7. After the United States withdrawal, the Group met twice in the new format of E3/EU+2 and Iran, and mandated the Working Group Coordinator to continue the work of the Channel as the only alternative to attempts for irregular transfers. It is a fact that confidence in the Channel can be built only if new proposals are officially received and reviewed. I therefore find it positive that the Channel currently has five proposals under review. Transparency remains a guiding principle and cornerstone of the JCPOA. According to paragraph 6.10 of annex 4, the Joint Commission reports to the Security Council every six months on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  8. Let me continue in this spirit by focusing on the reporting related to annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular on the work of the Procurement Working Group, which is responsible for reviewing proposals by States seeking to engage in activities with Iran that are for nuclear and non-nuclear civilian end uses. The procurement channel is a key pillar of the JCPOA. The procurement channel and the Procurement Working Group will continue their activity in the same spirit as our continued implementation of the other parts of the JCPOA. Since implementation day, the Procurement Working Group has been in full operation, with the EU reaching out and coordinating its meetings with the aim of promoting the Channel as the only mechanism for legitimate transfers of Nuclear Suppliers Group-listed items to Iran.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  9. We continue to engage with Iran in a number of concrete projects focused on nuclear safety and research, and we look forward to a civil nuclear liability seminar, to take place in Vienna in mid-July, and to the third high-level seminar on nuclear cooperation and governance, scheduled for November, building further on the concept that civil-nuclear cooperation and adherence to international norms on nuclear governance have to go hand in hand. While implementing projects on the ground and conducting research, Iran is also taking steps towards its accession to the international nuclear regulatory framework. Those steps need to be encouraged and supported further. All of the foregoing are significant measures that enhance the credibility of the international community with respect to the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  10. Walking away from a robust non-proliferation agreement will not provide a solution to regional tensions or ballistic missile proliferation. In addition to Iran's nuclear obligations, which are laid out in annex l of the JCPOA, and to elements related to sanctions-lifting, contained in annex 2, allow me to reiterate the need to further engage on the basis of annex 3 of the JCPOA, which foresees civil-nuclear cooperation. The European Union sees this annex as key to the overall balance of the agreement and essential to the overall objective of ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  11. Those actions feed regional tensions and threaten the safety and stability of Yemen's neighbours, freedom of navigation and global sea trade. As the Council is aware, the European Union has a long-standing track record of expressing its concern at the regional military build-up, including Iran's missile programme. We have repeatedly called upon Iran to refrain from activities that may deepen mistrust, such as ballistic missile tests, which are inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015) and the statements associated with it. The situation in the region, including the proliferation of ballistic missiles, needs to be addressed as a priority. But those issues are distinct from the JCPOA. Dismantling a nuclear deal that is working would certainly not put us in a better position to discuss other issues.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  12. I regret that I have to stress again that the situation in the region has clearly worsened over the past few months. Regarding the situation in Yemen, the European Union is seriously concerned about the recent intensification of military operations, in particular in Al-Hudaydah, and we have urged all parties to the conflict to ensure the protection of civilians and fully respect international humanitarian law. The European Union has also engaged in a regional dialogue with the stakeholders to urge the parties to support the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and resume political negotiations. We note with concern the findings of the Secretary-General's report and the Panel of Experts on Yemen report (see S/2018/68) regarding the proliferation of ballistic missiles and technology.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  13. On the nuclear side, under the JCPOA Iran is undergoing the most rigorous monitoring and verification regime in the world. The IAEA issued on 24 May, as I mentioned earlier, its eleventh report since implementation day, which acknowledges once again Iran's full compliance with its commitments undertaken under the J CPOA. That is further reflected by the large number of inspections on the ground. It goes without saying that, at this juncture, it is critical to strictly follow the terms of the deal. That is essential to upholding the agreement and continuing to build trust. While the JCPOA deals with nuclear non-proliferation aspects, a number of serious issues outside of the deal continue to cast a shadow over our overall relationship with Iran.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  14. The measures that we are putting in place at home are designed to allow those businesses and investors to continue to do their work, as governed by international and European law. We are of course aware that within Iran a difficult debate is being held on the JCPOA and on the benefits that it brings to the country and its citizens. I am convinced that those benefits continue to be tangible, even though I cannot hide the fact that there will be a number of companies that do not see themselves in a position to continue their current engagements in Iran. The European Union continues to explore with Iran the possibilities of preserving legitimate trade and investment and continuing our overall bilateral cooperation, which has taken place since 2016.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  15. Their support in facing the global challenge of nuclear proliferation through the hard work of multilateral diplomacy cannot be overstated. The remaining parties to the JCPOA have held a number of discussions on how to preserve the deal. We recognize that sanctions-lifting is an essential part of the agreement, and the Iranian people have a very understandable expectation that the benefits of the deal will continue to be felt. The European Union, together with its partners, will continue to employ its best efforts to preserve legitimate financial and trade flows, preserving the interests of businesses acting in good faith and with the endorsement of the Security Council.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  16. Such an arms race is in no one's interests. There is no positive alternative to the JCPOA, which is the fruit of more than 12 years of negotiations and constitutes a lO4-page document that is endorsed at the highest level by the international community. Undoubtedly, it remains the standard of a multilateral nuclear non-proliferation agreement to which other initiatives still have to live up. The EU has taken the position that, as long as Iran implements its nuclear-related obligations, we will remain firmly committed to the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA. That has also been echoed by the other remaining participants at the highest level, and in that regard I would like to express sincere thanks to the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China for their unwavering commitment to the nuclear deal.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  17. The European Union (EU) and all other remaining JCPOA participants have expressed deep regret at that decision, including at the last meeting of the Joint Commission on 25 May. The preservation of the JCPOA is a key security interest not only for the European Union, but also for the international community as a whole. The unanimous endorsement of the JCPOA by the Security Council confirmed the importance of the JCPOA in ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. The recent messages of support expressed by an overwhelming number of partners around the world - in Africa, Asia, Latin America and in the Pacific - are yet another signal that the JCPOA needs to be preserved and fully implemented. The full implementation of the JCPOA will prevent a nuclear arms race in the region.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  18. I would also like to note my appreciation for their work in the preparation of the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/602) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Last, but not least, I would like to thank Under- Secretary-General DiCarlo for her briefing today. We are in a difficult situation, which had not been foreseen back in July 2015 when resolution 2231 (2015) was unanimously adopted by the Security Council (see S/PV.7488). While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed as recently as 24 May - for the eleventh time in a row - that Iran is respecting its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, United States President Trump announced on 8 May that the United States will withdraw from the agreement.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  19. Mr. Vale de Almeida: I thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the floor and the opportunity to brief the Security Council. I am honoured to once again address the Council on behalf of Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). First, I would like to thank Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and the Ambassador of the Netherlands, Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their excellent cooperation. Let me also express my gratitude to our colleagues of the Secretariat and the Security Council Affairs Division for their unwavering support, in particular regarding the running of the procurement channel.

    2018-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8297 (2018) · source

  20. Looking ahead, it will be vital that we all continue to play our respective roles and show our support for the Force, including by providing ongoing support to MINUSMA. In so doing, we must also ensure coherence in our pledges and assistance to the Force and work with full transparency and full respect for the authority and participation of the G-5 Sahel. Rest assured of the unflagging support of the European Union as we stand shoulder to shoulder with our neighbours in the Sahel.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  21. The European Union is also a strong supporter of the Sahel Alliance, which was set up to promote, expand and accelerate this integrated approach to security and development and to deliver tangible results. However, we must be clear. There can be no lasting progress if no concomitant headway is made on the political track. We must more than ever before use all forms of leverage at our disposal to encourage the Malian parties to fulfil their commitments. Allow me to conclude by noting, as the Secretary- General rightly points out in his report (S/2018/432), that just one year after the African Union Peace and Security Council authorized the deployment of the Joint Force, our collective efforts have made it possible to achieve significant progress in the mobilization of resources and support for the G-5 Sahel Joint Force.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  22. We believe also that this will help to ensure that the desired results are achieved and ensure appropriate protection for the civilian population. The security-capacity-building missions of the European Union in Mali and the Niger are focused on the setting up by the authorities of Mali and the Niger of police components within the Joint Force, in coordination with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and other partners. It is also important not to lose sight of the security dimension of the European contribution to the economic, social and political development of the region. In this respect, the European Union has provided 68 billion in aid to the Sahel over the past seven years.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  23. In addition to the financial and institutional support that I have just outlined, European efforts to build defence and security capacities in the region, particularly in Mali and the Niger, are currently being reviewed in order to extend such efforts to include training and advisory functions to the Joint Force, with full respect for the prerogatives and authority of the G-5 Sahel. To that end, we are working in very close cooperation with the Commander of the Joint Force, General Dacko. The European Union is also a strong supporter of the development and operationalization of the police component of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force. We believe this to be the key to ensuring to ensure a sound legal framework for any efforts to counter organized crime and terrorism.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  24. In addition, the European Union will continue to manage the coordination hub for as long we deem it necessary, in order to help the Joint Force and the Permanent Secretariat of the G-5 Sahel to organize and ensure coherence in the voluntary international contributions to the Force. The hub meets once a month in Brussels, with the participation of G-S Sahel representatives and all international partners, to take stock of existing support and identify shortfalls. It is also in contact every two weeks with the G-5 Sahel Permanent Secretariat in Nouakchott, the G-5 Sahel presidency in Niamey and the Joint Force in Bamako.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  25. The EU has therefore pledged €5 million to support the G-5 Sahel in the operationalization of its trust fund and the establishment of the support and steering committees and the Defence and Security Bureau of the Permanent Secretariat. We welcome this new dynamic, which bodes well for the ongoing leadership and integration of the G-5 Sahel at the national and regional levels. We welcome the efforts made in that respect by Mr. Sidikou, whose presence here today I welcome. In this respect, it is vital to bear in mind the recent memorandum of understanding concluded recently between the African Union and the G-5 Sahel, which gives the African Union a coordination role and sees the Joint Force as part of the larger African peace architecture.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  26. This is key, as the kind of support that MINUSMA can provide on the ground to the Joint Force cannot be delivered directly by any other means or channel, including bilateral ones. The European Union is also preparing a €10 million contribution for the establishment and implementation of a human rights and international humanitarian law compliance framework. We have also provided €70 million for the provision of equipment, infrastructure and services to the Joint Force. The European Union is convincedthat the Joint Force must be firmly embedded within a broader political and institutional framework to guide its operations and to ensure that is but one part of a broader regional strategy.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  27. Since the conference held in Brussels on 23 February, at which the international community pledged more than €400 million, and with the technical arrangement between the G-5 Sahel, the United Nations and the European Union now set up, the G-5 Sahel now has the international support necessary to make headway in the deployment and operationalization of its Joint Force. We hope that the disbursement by the European Union of €10 million euros to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) will allow for the rapid rollout of effective support for the Joint Force. We invite other partners to use this fully operational mechanism to channel their own financing to MINUSMA.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  28. We firmly support these cooperation efforts in all their dimensions. Allow me to focus my remarks on the European Union's support for the operationalization of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force. That support is at the heart of not only our bilateral relations with the region, but also of the strategic partnership between the European Union and the United Nations on the maintenance of peace and crisis management. It is also a key component of the trilateral cooperation between the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  29. I wish to thank for you for providing the European Union with this opportunity to address the Security Council at this briefing. This meeting is a further clear expression of the international community's support for the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-S Sahel) and for the fight again terrorism in the Sahel. The European Union and its member States have long enjoyed close ties of friendship with the G-5 Sahel countries. We are neighbours, and as neighbours we share not only challenges but also hopes. For that reason, the European Union will continue to play its full part, standing shoulder to shoulder with our neighbours in the Sahel. On behalf of the European Union, I should like to pay tribute to the efforts of the G-5 Sahel countries to foster regional cooperation in the framework of the G-5 Sahel format.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  30. In that context, the European Union commends the tireless efforts of the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, to facilitate the implementation of all relevant resolutions. The European Union will spare no efforts in support ofa peaceful solution to the Syrian conflict.

    2018-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8244 (2018) · source

  31. At the Brussels Conference, $4.4 billion were mobilized in support of operations to address both the worsening humanitarian situation inside Syria and the enormous needs of refugees and their hosts across the region this year, as well as multi-year pledges of $3.4 billion for the period 2019-2020. In conclusion, the momentum of the current situation should be used to reinvigorate the process to find a political resolution to the Syrian conflict. The European Union repeats that any sustainable solution to the conflict requires a genuine political transition, in line with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communique, negotiated by the Syrian parties within the United Nations-led Geneva process, and we remain committed to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian State.

    2018-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8244 (2018) · source

  32. We concluded on a strong message of broad international support for relaunching the political process, under United Nations auspices, in Geneva to solve the Syrian crisis, in line with the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2254 (2015), and the Geneva communique (S/2012/522, annex). We reiterate that the European Union will be ready to assist in the reconstruction of Syria only when a comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political transition, negotiated by the Syrian parties in the conflict on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communique is firmly under way.

    2018-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8244 (2018) · source

  33. In that respect, the European Union deeply regrets the multiple Russian vetoes of the renewal of the OPCW- United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism mandate in November 2017, and urges the Security Council to rapidly re-establish an independent attribution mechanism to ensure accountability for perpetrators of chemical weapons' attacks. We support the current efforts led by the Security Council to recreate dialogue and move forward on all tracks of the Syrian conflict. The European Union held the second Brussels Conference on supporting the future of Syria and the region, co-chaired with the United Nations.

    2018-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8244 (2018) · source

  34. We strongly condemn the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria and their continued and repeated use by the regime, in violation of resolution 2118 (2013) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, including the latest attack on Douma, which was a grave breach of international law and an affront to human decency. The EU fully supports the ongoing investigation by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OCPW) Fact-finding Mission into that devastating chemical attack. The EU reiterates its strong commitment to combatting the re-emergence of chemical weapons and is supportive of all efforts aimed at the prevention of the use of chemical weapons.

    2018-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8244 (2018) · source

  35. In view of the upcoming events in mid-May and the risks of a flare up of tensions and violence on the ground, the priority must be to avoid further escalation and loss of life. We urge the parties to show restraint and avoid provocative rhetoric and acts that would risk fuelling further tensions. The European Union and its member States will continue to respect the international consensus on Jerusalem embodied in, inter alia, resolution 478 (1980), including on the location of their diplomatic representations, until the final status of Jerusalem is resolved. Allow me to turn briefly to Syria, where the conflict has entered its eighth year.

    2018-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8244 (2018) · source

  36. That will have serious security and humanitarian consequences not only in Gaza, but also in the West Bank and neighbouring countries. The extraordinary Ministerial Conference held in Rome on 15 March, at the initiative of Sweden, Jordan and Egypt, was an important occasion to mobilize both political and financial support for the Agency and find ways to assure sustainable forms of financing for UNRWA. Collectively, the European Union and its member States are among the largest contributors to the Agency, and that will continue. We call on all donors to continue or increase their support and on those that have cut funding to rethink their decision. The European Union reiterates its support for Israel's legitimate right to exist, as well as Palestine's legitimate aspirations to statehood and sovereignty.

    2018-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8244 (2018) · source

  37. Gaza and the West Bank must be reunified under one single and legitimate Palestinian Authority. That is an important element for achieving the two-State solution and a viable and sovereign Palestinian State. All parties must take swift steps to produce a fundamental change in the political, security and economic situation in the Gaza Strip, in accordance with resolution 1860 (2009), including the end of the closure and a full opening of the crossing points, while addressing Israel's legitimate security concerns. The European Union remains deeply concerned over recent significant reductions of funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which is facing its most difficult financial situation since its inception in 1949.

    2018-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8244 (2018) · source

  38. The European Union co-chaired a donor conference for the Gaza desalination plant, which received pledges of €456 million, €77 million of which came from the European Union. The plant, which will address the human right to water in Gaza, will take some years to build, but some of its components will have an immediate positive impact. The efforts of the international community in Gaza can bear fruit only ifthere is also responsible leadership on the ground. We expect all Palestinian factions to work together to address the needs of the Palestinian population. That will require a serious engagement in good faith, under Egyptian auspices, to implement the agreement of 12 October 2017, allowing the Palestinian Authority to resume its full responsibilities in Gaza.

    2018-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8244 (2018) · source

  39. Those leading the protests and the de facto authorities in Gaza must avoid any incitement to violence, ensure that the protests remain strictly non-violent and not exploit them for other means. The situation in Gaza could have significant consequences for regional and international peace and security, as demonstrated by three conflicts over the past decade. Therefore, the Security Council must contribute to de-escalation efforts, including through an appropriate public expression. The European Union has made important efforts, together with its partners, in recent months to improve the situation for the people in Gaza and support the return of the single legitimate Palestinian Authority to Gaza.

    2018-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8244 (2018) · source

  40. The European Union takes note of the fact-finding assessment mechanism established by the Israel Defence Forces to review its own actions and specific incidents that have taken place on the Israeli-Gaza border since 30 March. Facts must also be established regarding reports about violent attacks against Israel under the guise of the protests. The most immediate priority for all sides must be to prevent any further escalation and loss of life. We call on all sides to act with utmost restraint and responsibility, while respecting the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. Israel must respect the right to peaceful protests and ensure the use of proportional measures when protecting its legitimate security interests.

    2018-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8244 (2018) · source

  41. The European Union remains fully committed to its known positions on parameters for a two-State solution, on the need to avoid any steps that are eroding the viability of the two-State solution, as laid down in the Quartet report of July 2016, including in particular continued Israeli settlement activity, which is illegal under international law and remains an obstacle to peace, as reaffirmed by resolution 2334 (2016), as well as incitement and violence. The European Union has followed closely the recent protests and violence at the Gaza border fence. Over 30 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli live fire, including minors andjournalists. Thousands have been injured. That raises serious questions about the proportionate use of force, which must be addressed through independent and transparent investigations.

    2018-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8244 (2018) · source

  42. Our overarching objective remains to restore a political horizon and an appropriate framework for political progress, together with our regional and international partners, starting with the Middle East Quartet. The European Union appreciates the United Nations role in that regard, including in particular the role played by the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Peace Process, Nikolay Mladenov.

    2018-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8244 (2018) · source

  43. Mr. Vale de Almeida: I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its 28 member States. The candidate countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, as well as Ukraine, align themselves with this statement. A full version ofmy statement will be circulated. Allow me to make a few remarks. Recent events in Gaza are a stark reminder of how volatile the situation on the ground can be in the absence of a clear political horizon. That is why, in past months, the European Union has consistently kept the Middle East peace process high on the political agenda, at a time when the region faces many other challenges.

    2018-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8244 (2018) · source

  44. In that regard, the modalities for the transition of MINUJUSTH are in our View fundamental. Special attention to respect for human rights in security work, as well as access to impartial justice for all, will be particularly necessary. It is essential that the Haitian National Police and judicial system be effectively prepared to assume in the future all the tasks currently undertaken by the United Nations Mission. Together with the United Nations and the international community, the European Union will support the Haitian authorities so that they can strengthen their commitment and their efforts to ensure a better future of peace, democracy, stability and well- being for all Haitian people.

    2018-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8220 (2018) · source

  45. In that context, the ongoing implementation of the mandate of MINUJUSTH over a period of time sufficient for the transition of responsibilities to the country team to be completed and to deal with all those challenges seems to us essential. That time is necessary to make adequate progress in order to ensure genuine continuity following the withdrawal of the United Nations mission, as well as the irreversibility of the reforms carried out. In conclusion, allow me to express the EU's positive assessment of the contribution of MINUJUSTH in terms of security, conflict prevention and strengthening democracy and the rule of law in Haiti. That contribution is attributable to its entire staff, its commitment and its skills, for which we warmly thank them all. However, we already need to think about the future.

    2018-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8220 (2018) · source

  46. The European Union appreciates and supports the work of MINUJUSTH focusing on the development of the Haitian National Police, the justice sector and the rule of law and on the promotion and protection of human rights. Despite an improvement in the security situation thanks to the political stability over the past year, the European Union believes that the structural causes of instability in Haiti still need to be addressed and that the security situation remains very fragile. We therefore believe that it is essential to complete the task of strengthening and professionalizing the Haitian National Police, to focus on the need for judicial and prison reform and, finally, to strengthen respect for human rights.

    2018-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8220 (2018) · source

  47. As in recent years, the efforts of all actors to ensure the stability and security of citizens will remain necessary to the process of democratic consolidation. As MINUJUSTH notes in the section entitled "Benchmarks for an exit strategy" (see S/2018/24l, annex), consensus-based and profound reform of the electoral system would be key to preventing new crises and to regaining the trust of the population. The European Union remains a committed and faithful partner of the Republic of Haiti. We are resolved to support the country in this sensitive phase, including in the necessary reform process that I have just mentioned, in consultation with all the other partners.

    2018-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8220 (2018) · source

  48. However, while a return to constitutional order is necessary condition, it is not enough to ensure the democratic stability and sustainable development that the country needs. The root causes of the instability persist. In our view, bold reforms of the Constitution, the electoral system and the judiciary are therefore urgent in order to restore the trust of the Haitian people in their democracy and their political system. It is particularly important to ensure true access for all to fair, equitable and effective justice. Signs of a willingness to reform are evident. We must now realize them and seize the historic opportunity provided by this period of relative stability and democratic legitimacy.

    2018-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8220 (2018) · source

  49. The resolution sets out the legal framework for the transition to the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), whose primary objective is strengthening the rule of law and the Haitian National Police, as well as the promotion and protection of human rights. The long cycle of institutional instability that characterized the electoral process in Haiti in 2015 and 2016 finally ended with the election of President Moise and a new Parliament. As a long-standing supporter of the Haitian people, the European Union welcomes the country's return to constitutional normalcy despite the significant challenges facing it. In our view, that is a condition sine qua non for Haiti to be able to deal with the many political, economic, social and environmental challenges that it faces.

    2018-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8220 (2018) · source

  50. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its 28 member States. I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his report (S/2018/241), and Under-Secretary-General Lacroix for his briefing. I also welcome the presence of our colleague the Permanent Representative of Haiti at this meeting. The candidate countries Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania; the country of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina; as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement. On 13 April 2017, the Security Council adopted resolution 2350 (2017), which ended the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti on 15 October 2017.

    2018-04-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8220 (2018) · source