YouSaid · the spoken record

Vogt

lines on the record: 113
first: 2011-07-07
most recent: 2013-05-15
sittings or episodes: 5
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“For the United Nations, the role of the Prime Minister as the juridical face of the transition is critical, as that position was the product of an agreement to which everyone had subscribed. We strongly believe that we should not encourage a system of impunity in a situation through which a democratic order is overturned by force of arms, even when confronted with serious governance challenges. The Libreville Agreements were designed to address some of the grievances put forward by the rebels while respecting the democratic framework. The coup d'etat overturned this transitional process towards and forcefully imposed a new order. It is critical that we support the region, ECCAS and the African Union, and regional actors in re-establishing the basic principles of Libreville.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“Experience has taught us that such principles are not merely words, but critical foundations for sustainable peace and security. To establish a credible and enduring political framework following the transition, the foundations must be laid down now. Crucial transitional tasks - such as establishing election-management bodies; defining the electoral constituency; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; security sector reform; regionalization; developing rule-of-law and justice mechanisms; social and economic development and so on - require a representative body that reflects the interests of the entire society, otherwise the transition may result in another round of conflict. That is why we insist on the Libreville Agreements as the legal basis.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“It will also be critical for the regional force to review its strategic objectives and concept of operations to give the force some teeth. A meeting is taking place today precisely to look into the issue. That short-term initiative needs to be quickly followed up by an expanded regional force, possibly coordinated by the African Union and with the support of the international community. However, for the very immediate term, a bridging arrangement is required to stop the current carnage. Through the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic, the Organization has worked closely with the region in defining the parameters for the transition, based on solid democratic principles and legality.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“The presence of such a neutral stabilization force, together with the close political support of the follow- up committee established by the region and the just- established international contact Group to support the transition, is critical in providing a security and political blanket that would enable the authorities to implement the Libreville Agreements and would allow the Prime Minister to play his role as executive head of Government. The international effort would also help to ensure that assistance would not be abused to fuel impunity and authoritarianism. We welcome the current initiative by the Economic Community of Central African States to expand its force to 2,000, which requires the urgent support of the international community.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“That framework provides that all security forces be cantonned/ regrouped, disarmed, demobilized and screened for absorption into a reformed security force. The Security Council and the entire international community must act quickly to protect the people of the Central African Republic from the assault they are under by armed groups. The situation in Bangui is particularly pressing, as the city has the largest population concentration - approximately 1.5 million out of a total population of 4.5 million in the entire country. But that effort should not be limited to Bangui.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“Further assessments are planned in the coming weeks. Additional funding is urgently required to support the humanitarian response capacity. The annual humanitarian appeal for the Central African Republic, totalling $129 million, was 29 per cent funded as of 10 May. It was estimated in March that an additional $42 million was required to respond to the new needs triggered by the crisis. That amount is likely to increase further. I believe that there is an urgent need to help restore security and stability in the Central African Republic. That should be done by deploying a neutral security force that would contain the current state of anarchy and force the rebel elements to conform to the security framework laid down in Libreville.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“While all parties have in principle agreed to facilitate humanitarian access, insecurity is limiting humanitarian actors' ability to reach those in need of assistance, including internally displaced persons, host communities and victims of human rights violations. Despite those constraints, United Nations agencies and programmes are organizing joint assessment missions to the field to identify needs and the humanitarian impact of the crisis. Missions to some provinces have revealed that the humanitarian situation is worsening in the areas ofhealth, water and sanitation, nutrition and protection, food security and education. The most urgent needs are in the food-security sector, where households have altered their diet by changes to their food sources, as well as the need for garbage disposal.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“If seeds are not distributed during the current planting season, coupled with the increase in prices revealed by recent assessments in Bangui, there could be a risk of basic food shortages. That could eventually lead to acute food and nutritional insecurity in both rural and urban areas. With schools closed or occupied and teachers absent, at least 656,000 children currently have no access to education. Difficult humanitarian access due to insecurity and limited road networks is the number one constraint for reaching those in need of assistance. Access has become severely curtailed since December amid the breakdown of law and order, with many humanitarian offices and warehouses around the country having been looted.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“The number of violent attacks dramatically increased in the first quarter of 2013 as a result of persisting insecurity in the country. More than 60 per cent of those attacks are attributed to armed groups. Since the beginning of 2013, at least one person has been attacked every day. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 60 per cent of rural inhabitants, who depend upon agriculture for their livelihoods, are affected by the current crisis. More than 80,000 people, including 57,000 children under the age of 5, are estimated to be at risk of severe food insecurity during the upcoming lean season, from now until September. Those figures are likely to increase with the rise in food prices triggered by the crisis.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“On the humanitarian situation, the latest crisis has exacerbated an already difficult situation for the population of the Central African Republic. Human rights violations against civilians and population movements continue. Over 49,000 refugees have now been registered in neighbouring countries since December, primarily in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Cameroon and the Republic of the Congo. We should not forget that the population of the entire Central African Republic is only 4.5 million. Substantial numbers of refugees continue to arrive in these countries. In addition to the estimated 173,000 displaced since December, another 33,000 persons had already been displaced, bringing the total number of internally displaced persons to over 200,000.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“It is critical that the Council unequivocally pronounce itself on the need for these abuses to stop now and for perpetrators to be held individually accountable for their actions. We believe that the time is ripe for the Council to consider the imposition of individual sanctions against the architects and perpetrators of these gross violations. We do not want a desperate population to be left with no choice but to take the law into its own hands. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is also closely monitoring developments in the Central African Republic, and the Prosecutor of the ICC has issued a statement warning that the crimes committed against civilians were under close scrutiny by her Office. We believe that the Council needs to send a similar message.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“It should include the restoration of State authority, the collection of small arms and light weapons, and community recovery programmes, as well as the reintegration of ex-combatants into formal security and defence forces. The abuses and violations committed by Seleka combatants and other armed elements, including cases of rape, maiming, recruitment of children and forced marriages, are a source of grave concern in terms of the protection of civilians. They constitute serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and the Secretary-General have expressed their concern about the deteriorating security situation in the Central African Republic.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“The destruction of administrative files related to birth and citizenship will undoubtedly create a problem during the registration of voters for the upcoming elections. The Seleka offensive dismantled the policing architecture. National security and defence forces - the gendarmerie, police and national army - have disintegrated, and despite repeated calls for them to resume their duties, to date only a small number of the police and national armed forces officers have resumed their functions. The current crisis underscores the urgency need for security sector reform and to create an effective and inclusive security sector capable of providing security throughout the country. Broader security sector reform should be based on political consensus.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“The distinctive roles and responsibilities of the executive Prime Minister and the Head of the Transitional Government would have to be defined in the framework of a transitional charter that would lay the ground rules for engagement during the period of the transition. With respect to human rights, the Se'leka offensive destroyed much of Central African Republic's justice system. In the 10 jurisdictions of the Republic, Seleka elements have destroyed most of the infrastructure that supported the justice system, including courthouses, appeals courts, court dossiers, prisons, prison registries and prosecutor files. The justice system, including prisons, will need to be rebuilt entirely, after vast resources have been spent on it through the Peacebuilding Fund.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“He insists on his role as President, constantly referring to the decrees naming him President and his appointment of the Prime Minister, whom he claims to have the power to remove, contrary to Libreville. He continues to run the country by presidential decrees. The international community, especially the African Union, the International Organization of la Francophonie and the Security Council, as well as many Member States bilaterally, have firmly declared their support for the ECCAS political framework for the Central African Republic. However, if this is to work, a number of important measures would have to be taken.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“The Transitional Council, which was supposed to be representative of all political persuasions in the country and to assume the legislative role of the National Assembly, fell short of this expectation as controversy surrounded the procedure through which its members were nominated; hence the decision of the Heads of State at the 18 April summit at N'Djamena to expand the membership of that body to 135. The transitional arrangement is to last for a period of not more that 24 months, ending with elections in which the leaders of the transition would not be eligible to present themselves. While Mr. Djotodia openly declared his acceptance of the decisions of the Heads of State of the Economic Community (ECCAS) of Central African States, he has proceeded to do the contrary.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“The various summits held in Libreville, N'Djamena and most recently Brazzaville laid out solid political ground rules for the new regime in Bangui to follow, as well as a clear road map of tasks that must be accomplished to enable the restoration of a democratic dispensation in the Central African Republic. First, all hostilities must cease and the security must be restored throughout the territory of the Central African Republic; and secondly, constitutional order must be restored, pursuant to the January Libreville Agreements, with the Prime Minister assuming executive powers, while the self-proclaimed President Michel Djotodia heads the National Transitional Council and is Head of the Transition. The scenario, as implemented by the de facto authorities, suggests a different setting.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“Public evidence shows that strip mining of the diamond and gold resources of the Central African Republic have exponentially expanded in areas controlled by Sele'ka since the rebellion began. Further complicating the picture is the growing insecurity in the neighbourhood as the conflict now poses a direct threat to the security of its neighbours, especially the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad and Cameroon. These serious threats to the peace and security of the people of the Central African Republic and the Central African region make the re-establishment of security and the rule of law in the Central African Republic the highest priority issue.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“Indiscriminate and often targeted killings, rampant rape, assaults on the innocent population, the flagrant recruitment of children as soldiers, the looting of homes, notjust of the rich but even of already struggling citizens - not even the SOS village was spared, nor were churches or convents. These acts continue, almost two months since Se'le'ka took over the reins of power. The leadership is unable or unwilling either to control the ranks of the militia groups or to rein in local commanders. The leaders of the region have strongly mobilized to fill the security vacuum that the rebellion created and try to contain the situation in the Central African Republic, as the country appears to have become a safe haven for different foreign rebel forces seeking to exploit the natural resources for which the Central African Republic is known.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“The Secretary-General stresses in the report that even at the best of times the State capacity and infrastructure of the Central African Republic were rudimentary, while health services were at emergency levels similar to situations seen in countries that have been in conflict for a long time. Now, even those facilities have all but disappeared. An already challenging human rights environment, marked by systemic violations of rights even by law enforcement officers, has collapsed into a state of anarchy and total disregard for international law as elements of Seleka have turned their vengeance against the population.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“There are expectations that the international community will show solidarity with their plight and decide on some clear steps to bring an end to the impunity with which armed groups have unleashed a reign of terror on the entire population. The report before the Council (S/2013/261) provides an analysis of the situation in the Central African Republic since the launch of the Seleka offensive in December. It underlines the impact of the rebellion on the people; the State's capacity and infrastructure; on security and human rights; on the humanitarian situation, especially where medical matters are concerned; and on access to food, basic needs and services, as well as the high risk of famine if the current situation persists. It also analyses the regional implications of the Seleka rebellion.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“Ms. Vogt: I wish to commend the Security Council for its dedicated attention to the situation in the Central African Republic since the beginning of the conflict there in December 2012, and especially following the coup d'etat on 24 March against the Government of Francois Bozize and the attendant degradation of security in the whole country. The Council's deliberations have been followed with much interest within the country and in the region. Expectations are high among the people of the Central African Republic for the outcome of this particular meeting, since there is a growing sense of despair among the population, who see no immediate reprieve to the ordeal that presently confronts them.”
2013-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6967 (2013) · source
“All that will require international accompaniment and generous funding. I am happy to report that we work very closely on the ground with our partners, the United States representative, the African Union, the European Union, France and the African group of ambassadors. The Secretary-General is paying close attention to the situation in the Central African Republic and has accorded us the same level of priority that he has accorded to Syria, Somalia and others conflicts. I count on the Council to continue to support these efforts, and thank the members of the Council for the solidarity they have shown, especially in the past few weeks, as we have tried in grapple with the current crisis.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“We need to more assertively push for the reform of the security sector and to work with the Bretton Woods institutions to cover post-conflict reconstruction and recovery efforts. We intend to recommend that BINUCA lead a strategic assessment to review our priorities and to redefine our needs. The international community now needs to engage more forcefully, both diplomatically and financially, to pull the Central African Republic back from the brink. Security is fundamental to peace and development. The Central African Republic requires a functional and effective army and security forces. There is a need for a Government that can be present in all parts of the country, with appropirate capacities. BINUCA should be able to support those efforts, and civilian capacities should be built.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“I have in the past called for a clear investment in peace and development to prevent the Central African Republic from falling down a slippery slope. We may be on that slippery slope now. It is also clear that BINUCA and the United Nations presences in the Central African Republic will have to re-evaluate our priorities and capacities to enable us to be more effective partners in the implementation of the agreements that have been signed and as development partners of the country. Plans for the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration must be accompanied by robust political engagement on the ground and within the region to help enhance State authority and capacity. We need to engage more in social cohesion and local mediation.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“However, those opportunities will be lost if advantage is not taken of the opportunity to put in place an efficient an efficient and effective Government that is capable of addressing the many challenges that the country faces. I have made that very clear in our consultations with all the parties. It is not just about giving people posts, but about ensuring that we have a Government that really works. The follow up to the first Libreville Agreement, as well as the inclusive political dialogue, stalled only partly due to the lack of political will. While that is indeed true, it is also true that the Central African Republic has been an aid orphan. Many of our core activities have remained underfunded.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“We were very happy to host her during the fact-finding mission that she undertook to the Central African Republic, and we have provided details of her visit. BINUCA looks forward and stands ready to work closely with her office and, of course, the entire United Nations system in the Central African Republic to implement the undertakings contained in the two memorandums she signed during her trip to the country. In conclusion, as dramatic as the events of the past few weeks may have been, they have presented emerging opportunities to get the partners to undertake dialogue and to consult on how to pull the country back from the brink. The Council may recall that many of our reports have been replete with calls for dialogue.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“Constrained humanitarian access due to insecurity continues to be a major challenge, and I was told that humanitarian partners want us to underline to the parties - and I have done so with my own engagement with them - the importance of respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law, including as regards immediate humanitarian access, the protection of children against recruitment into the armed forces and protection against sexual and gender-based violence. We made sure that those provisions are very clearly underlined in the ceasefire agreement. I am pleased to note that Ms. Zainab Bangura, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, will brief the Security Council today.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“We have registered incessant looting of the offices of humanitarian organizations and stores. The World Food Programme warehouse in Bria has been practically emptied out, the United Nations offices, including BINUCA offices in Bambari and Kaga-Bandoro have also been affected, and the UNICEF office in Kaga- Bandoro has also been looted by the rebels. Humanitarian access has been constrained, and we estimate that 800,000 people are living in the affected areas and need emergency assistance as soon as we are able to get it to them. The difficulty now is to help create that space for us to get to them.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“The coordination of monitoring activities has been enhanced with BINUCA, the Government, the African Union, the World Bank and the international LRA working group, which we established here in Bangui. The deployment of two consultants by BINUCA to the LRA-affected area, funded by the World Bank, has also greatly helped. I would like to briefly say something about the humanitarian conditions, because I had asked our colleagues to send me the latest input on the humanitarian situation. As of today, the humanitarian conditions remain dire, as the displacement of the population fleeing their homes into the bush continues. That is why one of the provisions in the ceasefire agreements, which calls for an immediate withdrawal of the rebels from the cities, is particularly important, as that will hopefully allow people to go back home.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“During the period under review, there were consistent reports of an increase in LRA activity in the south-east region of the Central African Republic. Up to the moment the report was issued, 48 presumed LRA attacks had been carried out, leading to 24 deaths and 85 abductions. There are 21,000 internally displaced persons and 2,400 refugees. In its efforts to counter the LRA threat, the Government has committed to deploy a battalion to fight the LRA, with about 350 troops actually deployed at any given time - the others will be rotated in and out - before the upsurge in conflict in the north-east. Of course, the upsurge there has completely detracted from that plan.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“The rebel success was more a factor, in our view, of the failure of the national security forces than of the capacity of the rebels. We are hopeful that the agreements that were signed today in Libreville will contain the immediate f lair-up, calm the situation in the Central African Republic and enable us to recalibrate the disarmament process. However, we believe that a failure to go further to discuss the reasons for the lack of implementation of previous agreements and to correct those factors may lead to another meltdown a few years down the line as a result of expectations frustrated and not met. We were comforted by the statement by the mediator to the effect that he remains engaged and that the discussions would continue to look at those fundamental issues. Allow me to now turn to the issue of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“Any disarmament effort in that region would require the cantonment of those forces, in a region where there is practically no Government presence, and the identification of who is Central African or foreign would be difficult. Such an exercise would only be successful through a regional approach - and we were aware of that - that involves the neighbours of the Central African Republic. While we have been monitoring and reporting on the increasing incidence of military activities by different armed groups, including dissident groups of the CPJP and deserters ofthe presidential guard, we did not anticipate that an organized rebel assault on some key locations would lead to such a quick overrun of half of the country.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“It will be recalled that we have been reporting on the dissent within the armed forces and deep divisions among the political leadership, which were partly engendered by rumours that the President planned to change the Constitution to remain in power beyond the end of his constitutional mandate in 2016. The rise of active rebellion may not be unconnected to the frustration of some who had nursed succession ambitions. Besides, it is clear that the DDR process in the north-east is unlikely to benefit all the fighting forces. The region is vast and sparsely populated and most of the rebel movements have within their ranks militia groups from Chad and the Sudan.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“The accession of the CPJP to the Libreville Peace Agreement, on 25 August 2012, cleared the final political hurdle to the successful launch of the DDR process in the north-east. Tha was to have take place in January 2013, and was to be facilitated, and will still be facilitated, by funding for the reintegration programme provided by the European Union and the World Bank. We chose January because we needed to wait until the end of the rainy season, as that part of the country is not accessible from June to November or December because of road conditions. Why was this new wave of rebellion launched precisely at the time that the DDR process was to restart?”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“President Bozize, in his closing remarks, invited the opposition and all the parties to return with him immediately to Bangui so that this new Government can be put in place tomorrow. In my most recent briefing to the Council (see S/PV.6687) and in the report under consideration I signalled a marked improvement in the security situation in a large part of the Central African Republic, following the successful conduct of disarmament in the north-east and north-central regions, the beginning of the reinsertion programme in those regions and the repatriation of the Chadian rebel leader, Baba Ladde and his men. It is instructive that the north-west, even in all of this, has not been impacted by the rebel overrun.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“It is expected that the National Assembly will be dissolved one year into the game and that new elections will be held. The Government will also reorganize the security forces and the territorial administration and presumably also help expand Government authority to a greater part of the country, reform the judicial system, actively implement DDR and security sector reform with the assistance of the international community and undertake the reform of the economic and social sectors. It is also envisaged, in this arrangement, that neither the Prime Minister, the President nor members of his Cabinet will be able to run in the next election. Later, the Prime Minister, not the President, would be eligible to take part in the next presidential election. This agreement has just be concluded.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“An inclusive Government of national unity will be established and function for a period of 12 months, renewable, and be tasked with specific responsibilities. The Government of national unity will consist of the presidential majority, the democratic opposition, the politico-military groups that have signed the Libreville Peace Agrement, the Seleka coalition and civil society. The Government shall not be removed by the President during the transitional period. The Government of national unity will be headed by a Prime Minister who will be the Head of Government and chosen from the opposition. The tasks that this Government will be expected to carry out during the year-long period would be to restore peace and security and to organize legislative elections after an anticipated dissolution of the National Assembly.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“The second is the ceasefire agreement, signed by the Government and Seleka, and witnessed by ECCAS and the follow-up committee. That agreement is to come into force within 72 hours of signature. The third is the political agreement on the politico-security situation in the Central African Republic, signed by representatives of the presidential majority, the politico-military groups parties to the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the democratic opposition and Seleka. This agreement defines the modalities of a power -sharing and the political arrangements. In summary, the political agreement establishes that President Bozize shall remain in power until the end of his mandate in 2016. A Prime Minister will be appointed from the opposition, with full powers to run the Government for 12 months, renewable.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“Still, the President, backed into a corner, was forced to make a number of concessions and to make good on his promise to establish a Government of national unity. About an hour or so ago, the summit of ECCAS Heads of State came to a close. In fact, we have just now returned from the closing ceremony. After intense negotiations, in which we were actively involved, and a number of concessions made by various parties, three agreements were signed. The first is the declaration of principles to resolve the political and security crisis in the Central African Republic, which was signed by the Government, the politico-military movements that have adhered to the Libreville Peace Agreement, the Se'le'ka coalition and the democratic opposition, as well as ECCAS and the follow-up committee ofthe Libreville Peace Agreement.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“I understand that the moderator intends to nominate a personal representative to the Central African Republic, who would be based in Bangui, to work with us and other partners in the follow-up mechanism that would be established. Contrary to the skepticism expressed and the insistence of the rebel groups and the political opposition that President Bozize' had lost all legitimacy to remain in office and must be removed, the peace talks commenced with all the parties at the table. The regional leaders appeared determined not to allow a rebel overrun of the Central African Republic - they made that very clear in all their interventions - and to prevent a forceful removal of a democratically elected Government, but were equally hard on President Bozize' for what they described as his lack of openness.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“BINUCA was also requested to airlift rebel groups from the Central African Republic province of Bria, N'Djamena and Yaounde to Libreville. United Nations staff officers were also requested to support the ECCAS secretariat during the talks. In doing all of this, I made it clear that ECCAS was in the lead and that our role was to support and to facilitate. The role played by the United Nations was greatly appreciated. We are also expected to actively participate in the follow-up mechanism that would be established to implement any agreement that would emanate from the Libreville talks. I will be happy to announce later that some important agreements have emanated from the talks.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“On my second trip to Libreville, I was accompanied by mediation experts from the United Nations standby mediation team - who have remained with us - and by staff officers, as well as the representative of the AU Commission. The United Nations team helped to structure the mediation, advised on the process, helped to draft a declaration of principles and a draft ceasefire agreement, and helped to prepare other analytical documents. BINUCA worked closely with the ECCAS team that was deployed to Bangui from 27 December to 7 January to prepare for the talks and to manage the deployment of the ECCAS forces. We facilitated their contacts with the rebels in the region, with the Government, the opposition, political parties and civil society.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“Following the N'Djamena decision and the decision to launch peace talks in Libreville, I embarked on an intensive diplomatic effort, together with my African Union colleague, to engage with the parties, the Government, the rebel groups, the political parties and civil society members. I travelled to Brazzaville on two occasions to consult with President Sassou Nguesso on how he wanted to structure the peace talks in Libreville. I offered the President the full technical support of the United Nations, as well as our political advice. I also briefed and consulted with the Cameroonian authorities on options for resolving the conflict in the Central African Republic. These efforts were warmly welcomed, and a coordination team was created in the Congolese Foreign Ministry to manage the mediation efforts of the Presidents.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“The Government also requested the support of troops from South Africa, about 400 of whom were deployed, while the French deployed extra forces, increasing their presence in Bangui to 600 troops. We believe that the decision of the international community to pull out its personnel drove home to the regional leaders the critical security challenges in the Central African Republic and the need to take concrete steps to secure Bangui. It should be recalled that MICOPAX had drawn down its forces to training and police contingents in anticipation ofa final pull-out that was envisaged for 2013. MICOPAX has since changed its mandate, providing its newly deployed troops with a mandate to aggressively defend their positions, and Bangui in particular, and has halted plans to pull out of the Central African Republic.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“However, when the rebels decided to overrun Damara, on 29 December, and following indications from the national security forces that they would not be in a position to guarantee our security, the entire United Nations system, the African Union (AU) and international non-governmental organizations had no choice but to evacuate their staff from the Central African Republic. We evacuated members of staff and families upon the attack on Sibut, with the remaining staff members being evacuated on 29 December following the overrun of Damara. ECCAS heads of State then decided to deploy forces to Bangui to reinforce MICOPAX and help defend the city. Troops from Cameroon, the Congo, Gabon and a new Chadian contingent were deployed within two days over the New Year holidays. We consider that to be a real record.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“For the United Nations Sibut was the red line for our security guarantee. The security management team had designed a contingency plan that would enable the United Nations to evacuate families from the Central African Republic in a reasonable time. The Council will recall that Bangui is a family duty station, so there are many children and families in Bangui. The calculation of the team was that it would take an attacking force about five to six hours to get to Bangui from Sibut, leaving us with enough time to mobilize prepositioned air assets and to assemble families.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“The new Chadian contingent, which was supposed to have been brought under the control of the Mission de Consolidation de la Paix of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (MICOPAX), was unable to prevent the rebels from taking Sibut. Heads of State of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (ECCAS) met in N'Djamena on 21 December in an extraordinary session at which they decided to reactivate the follow-up committee for the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to facilitate peace talks in Libreville among the Government, rebel leaders and the political opposition - talks that were supposed to be moderated by President Denis Soussou N'Guesso of the Republic of Congo. Unfortunately, the N'Djamena summit was followed by another rebel overrun of the town of Damara, which is only 75 kilometres from Bangui.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“The army had lost cohesion and the will to fight; many of the soldiers simply dropped their weapons and melted into the bush. Within a few weeks almost half of the prefectures in the territory had come under rebel control. The leaders of the subregion responded very quickly to the series of crises confronting the Central African Republic. On 17 December, President Idriss Deby Itno of Chad deployed troops to the Central African Republic as an interposition force, supposedly to prevent the rebels from expanding beyond Sibut, which is located at a strategic juncture to Bangui and is a crossroads to many other parts of the country.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source
“Unfortunately, those positive achievements were undermined by the resumption of conflict, wish some rebel groups launching a series of attacks against a number of towns in the north-east. On 12 December, the Convention patriotique pour le salut du Kodro, the Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix, a faction of the CPJP that calls itself Fundamental CPJ P and a faction of the Union des forces democratiques pour le rassemblement established the "Seleka" coalition, which was later joined later by the Front democratique du peuple centrafricain of Abdoulaye Miskine. The Seleka coalition took control of a number of towns, without much resistance from the national army. The failure of the army to repel that aggression is indicative of the depth of decay within the armed forces.”
2013-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6899 (2013) · source