YouSaid · the spoken record

Williamson

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252

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2002-01-30

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2003-07-07

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30

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un-security-council

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1. “Following Papua New Guinea's independence in 1975, large segments of the population on the island of Bougainville continued to feel separate from Port Moresby owing to historical, cultural and ethnic concerns. The development of the copper mine in the 1980s became a complicating factor. In 1989 fighting broke out, and during the 1990s bitter separatist fighting took place on the island of Bougainville that claimed thousands of lives. In 1998, after nearly a decade of conflict and with nearly 10,000 dead by some accounts, the parties admirably chose to resolve their differences through negotiation. Since its creation, in 1998, the United Nations Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB) has played a valuable role in facilitating the return of stability to the island.”

   2002-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4647 (2002) · source

2. “Compare this to a vast country like Afghanistan, with its 20 million people, and the point becomes clearer. Seventh, the local population always has had a strong cohesive sense of national identity less driven by ethnic and religious strife than elsewhere. And eighth, the lack of lust for revenge and reprisal among the Timorese has enabled a smooth return and reintegration of the vast majority of refugees who fled the violence in 1999. While the combination of those circumstances may be unique, collectively they set a standard of success that future United Nations operations should seek to follow. Over the next 18 months we look forward to UNMISET continuing to be a success, a success with lessons upon which we should draw and, most important, a success that will bring a better life to the people of Timor-Leste.”

   2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source

3. “Third, both peacekeeping missions - the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and UMISET - have had a clear end game. For UNTAET it was political independence. For UNMISET it has been to provide the training wheels to help the Timorese build their own functioning administration, civil service, police and security force. Fourth, after the initial intervention there were no major armed groups for the peacekeepers to disarm. Fifth, the peacekeeping force was highly professional and operated under robust rules of engagement. There was no prospect of Blue Helmets becoming human shields. Sixth, the relatively small size of Timor-Leste, with a population of under 1 million and a land border with only one neighbour made the logistics of establishing security and administration more manageable.”

   2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source

4. “First and foremost, the brave people of Timor- Leste deserve credit for their dedication and hard work, and for their commitment to achieving independence, to letting democracy take root and to building institutions in the economy necessary for a better future for themselves and their children. The Timor-Leste leaders should be acknowledged for their good work. Any sustainable progress must be constructed on the hopes of the people coupled to their dedication to translate those hopes into reality. Second, however, there was overwhelming consensus and support in the international community and among the Timorese for the initial intervention and the United Nations assumption of administrative powers.”

   2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source

5. “The United States commends UNMISET and the Government of Timor-Leste for their agility and for this progress. The Security Council is united in its commitment to a Timor-Leste with both political independence and the infrastructure of a stable, just and efficiently governed State. The progress has been remarkable. While, as I have noted, there is more that needs to be accomplished, overall Timor-Leste is a great success story, and there are lessons to be learned from this progress. Therefore, six months into UNMISET, we think it is constructive to reflect on the factors behind the good news we have heard today. Why have the United Nations efforts in Timor been a success? A number of reasons come to mind.”

   2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source

6. “The evolving situation in Timor-Leste - continued reduction of the militia threat but delays in the border normalization - highlights the need for constant review and reassessment of United Nations downsizing plans for UNMISET. The United Nations reassessment of the changing situation in Timor-Leste can be a model for the United Nations to follow with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). In the case of UNMISET, the United Nations assessment found a solution that permitted a continuation of its original projected downsizing rate, whereas if additional challenges had been presented the United Nations might have been forced to recommend a decrease in the rate of withdrawal and perhaps to extend the projected mission termination date.”

   2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source

7. “We hope and expect that the Government of Timor-Leste, working with UNMISET, will seriously tackle these areas of concern in the judicial sector. We note that the downsizing of the military component is on track. The United States is pleased that the United Nations is committed to terminating the Mission in the summer of 2004, provided that no significant challenges occur. Indonesia no longer presents a significant threat to Timor-Leste. There have been no recent United Nations military engagements with the militia, or even sightings of them in Timor- Leste. The United Nations has demonstrated its ability to adapt UNMISET'S downsizing plan to an unforeseen delay in the normalization of the border with West Timor.”

   2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source

8. “Therefore, we are concerned about the shortcomings of the judicial system highlighted in the report: a lack of clarity regarding the separation of powers among the judiciary, the legislature and the executive; the members of the Superior Counsel of the Judiciary have not been appointed, thereby delaying the filling of judicial and prosecutorial vacancies; there is a need for capacity-building for the administrative staff of the Minister's office; there is a need to train prosecutors; and so on. The report said the majority of the prison population is being held for prolonged periods without trial and that on 16 August during prison disturbances nearly 193 prisoners forced their way out of the prison. That is also troubling.”

   2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source

9. “We appreciate the progress achieved in the first six months of the mandate of the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) and the good work done by Ambassador Sharma and his staff. We welcome Ambassador Sharma's assessment that the mission phase-out remains on target for June 2004. Over the next 18 months we hope that the relationship between Timor-Leste and Indonesia will continue to flourish. We encourage both sides to continue their cooperation to delineate their mutual border by June of next year. The United States agrees with the Secretary- General's report that the functioning of the Timor- Leste justice system is of central importance for the stability and development of the State.”

   2002-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4646 (2002) · source

10. “We also encourage States to investigate and prosecute the illegal activities highlighted in the Panel's report and to cooperate with other States in such investigations. My delegation believes regional organizations, such as the African Union, the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community, should use their influence to pressure the parties involved to end the patterns of exploitation. The report of the Panel of Experts clearly demonstrates that further investigations are warranted, especially since the problems posed by illegal resource exploitation and unregulated weapon flows are found not only in the Democratic Republic of the Congo but also in a number of other States in Africa.”

    2002-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4642Resumption1 (2002) · source

11. “Yesterday and today, there are meetings in Interlaken, Switzerland, to approve new rules intended to ensure that diamonds will be certified as untainted. The goal is to prevent illicit diamonds from being used to pay for the weapons used in war throughout Africa, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The United States Government wants to see that legally binding rules for a diamond certification process are in place by 1 January. We encourage all United Nations Members, whether named in the report or not, to respond to the report's findings by seeking ways to encourage transparent business practices that will benefit, first and foremost, the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

    2002-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4642Resumption1 (2002) · source

12. “The Panel has pointed out the need for that Commission to have real authority to investigate, obtain evidence and follow up where the trails lead. The responsibility of Governments to respond to the Panel's report does not fall just on the States in the region, however. The United States Government notes with concern that nine American companies have been identified in the Panel's report. The United States Government will look into the allegations against these companies and take appropriate action. We will not turn a blind eye to these activities. Also, the United States will continue to support work and to provide leadership to efforts to strengthen and to extend the Kimberly Process, intended to prevent African warlords from fuelling their conflicts through blood diamonds, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

    2002-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4642Resumption1 (2002) · source

13. “We commend the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We contrast its actions to the categorical denials of many other Governments whose officials are named in the report. It is the responsibility of all those States whose officials, military leaders or business people are named to take action to fully address the allegations made. This responsibility is especially the burden of the Governments that the Panel has identified as having the most ties to those carrying out this exploitation: Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Where States have named special investigators or created special commissions, there must be a commitment to see those investigations to the end, no matter where the trail of corruption may lead. Uganda, for example, cannot assume that the creation of a Commission to investigate these allegations is enough.”

    2002-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4642Resumption1 (2002) · source

14. “It puts a spotlight on this corruption for the public to see. Where the public is free to express its outrage and concern, the Panel's report gives the public the tools to pressure Governments in the region to act to stop this looting. As an example of this, we note the extensive discussion of the report and its findings in the newspapers and other media in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel's conclusions and its naming of Government officials possibly involved in corruption achieved a primary goal: public scrutiny and debate. This, in turn, has led the Attorney General of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to open investigations into each of the Government and military officials named in the report. It was certainly not an easy step for the Government to take.”

    2002-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4642Resumption1 (2002) · source

15. “We congratulate Ambassador Kassem and the other members of the Panel for identifying those suspected of involvement in exploiting the Congo's natural resources - diamonds, copper and cobalt. It takes great courage to speak the truth to those in power. The Panel has done that. We commend it for that. The report is convincing in the connection it makes between the money flows from the illegal exploitation and the continuation of the violence in the Great Lakes region. That illegal exploitation threatens to derail the progress achieved in the peace process. That cannot be allowed to happen. Corruption thrives in darkness. It takes root behind doors closed to public inspection and media scrutiny. The naming of those involved and the description of how they work is, in and of itself, a valuable tool.”

    2002-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4642Resumption1 (2002) · source

16. “In the light of this, the United States is especially pleased by this open meeting of the Security Council to discuss the report of Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2002/ll46). The independent Panel of Experts has produced a valuable and detailed report, outlining issues of key concern to the United States. My delegation is still studying the report. We are listening closely to the comments being made on the report in the Council today by interested Governments. We intend to factor them into our conclusions on how to move forward. In that regard, I would like to share a few of my Government's initial thoughts on the report.”

    2002-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4642Resumption1 (2002) · source

17. “It is agonizing. This conflict must end. In that regard, we must continue to support the various political efforts to end the warfare, including the inter-Congolese dialogue, the Pretoria Agreement, the Luanda Agreement and any other efforts that might constructively contribute to the path to peace. We must also be mindful of the various things that ignited this conflict and prolonged it. Refugee flows, ethnic hatred, regional insecurities and the lust for power and land are among the factors that have inflamed this terrible struggle that has imposed such a horrendous cost in terms of human lives lost and humanitarian suffering endured. Another significant reason why the conflict has gone on for so long and imposed such a terrible cost is greed - the quest for money from the illegal exploitation of resources from the Congo.”

    2002-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4642Resumption1 (2002) · source

18. “The Security Council quite properly has devoted a great deal of time and attention to the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is among the most costly anywhere in the world. The terrible conflict continues to destabilize the Great Lakes region of Africa and the horrendous toll in human suffering is staggering. Millions of people have lost their lives as a result of that war, both those killed in violent clashes and those who have died due to the consequences of war - disease and famine. That bloody conflict has created millions of internally displaced people and refugees. As described in the Security Council last week by Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Deputy Carolyn McAskie, the humanitarian suffering is staggering.”

    2002-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4642Resumption1 (2002) · source

19. “And we support the High Representative's comprehensive rule of law programme, which we are supporting with considerable resources. Is the EUPM. ready, in terms of resources and organization, to take over this critical function? Finally, we would like to ask Mr. Klein whether he sees any problem between now and the end of the year in bringing UNMIBH's operations to a close. As we have indicated, we are satisfied with the considerable progress that has been made in UNMIBH's operations, but we would like to hear his assessment of any developments that will receive special attention in the transition period between IPTF and EUPM.”

    2002-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4631 (2002) · source

20. “If local governments do not take appropriate action, will the High Representative use his Bonn powers to remove Dayton obstructers - including those found to have transferred military items to Iraq, which would constitute a violation of requirements to keep the Stabilization Force (SFOR) informed regarding exports of military items, but which also is in violation of the United Nations sanctions agreed to by this Council. Secondly, is the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) ready to take over the residual police tasks from the International Police Task Force (IPTF), especially in the critical areas of counter-terrorism, organized crime and trafficking in persons? We congratulate Jacques Klein on the successful completion of UNMIBH's mandate.”

    2002-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4631 (2002) · source

21. “As Lord Ashdown himself has said, we should judge parties by their deeds, not their words. We believe that the international community and the Council should continue to demand active cooperation with the ICTY, not just meaningless gestures, by parties which have long-standing associations with persons indicted on war crimes, such as Radovan Karadzic. For its part, the United States is concerned about the presence of obstructionist parties in Government and in bureaucracies that have triggered legal restrictions on assistance to the Republika Srpska. Let us hope that this does not need to be extended to an additional and different level.”

    2002-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4631 (2002) · source

22. “I would like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Klein, and High Representative Ashdown for their presentations. I have three questions to ask, but first, as the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) comes to a close, I would like especially to praise Jacques Klein for his dedication, resolve and tenacity. His leadership has made a positive difference in Bosnia. Now to my questions. First, what will be the response of the High Representative if coalitions emerge from the October elections that include nationalist parties that have refused to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)? My Government does not subscribe to some of the views of some in the international community that have accepted certain outcomes as inevitable.”

    2002-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4631 (2002) · source

23. “With Angola at peace and foreign troops withdrawing from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African region merits praise. If the momentum for peace can be maintained, then the fragile nature of the Central African region can be improved. Now the regional actors must look to the hard work of creating the constant conditions for peace. This is the hard work of developing functioning States that ensure the security of all their citizens. This includes the necessary task of welcoming back those displaced by war. In these endeavours, they have our full support.”

    2002-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4630Resumption1 (2002) · source

24. “Finally, I note that there are six separate Special Representatives or Envoys of the Secretary-General in the Central African region. I ask that we use this discussion to step back and look at the mandates of those offices to ensure that United Nations activities in the region are coherent and effective. I would ask the Secretary-General to brief the Security Council on the goals of those offices and on the benchmarks he would look to in fulfilling those aims. I also would ask for a specific benchmark regarding the recent call by the Security Council urging the use of the good offices of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to serve as a mediating influence in Uvira, the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

    2002-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4630Resumption1 (2002) · source

25. “There will need to be impartial third-party verification of the safety of former combatants in order for there to be full reintegration. At the same time, we cannot be complacent and take recent progress for granted. We need only look to the recent violence in fighting in Uvira, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, between the Mai Mai, the RCD-Goma and other armed groups, which has increased instability and tensions, as well as the risk of spillover violence in both Burundi and Rwanda. This is why it is imperative that the parties cease hostilities immediately and without preconditions. The United States Government calls on the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of Rwanda to exert their influence on all the parties to refrain from any action that would further inflame the situation.”

    2002-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4630Resumption1 (2002) · source

26. “Last year, the United Nations spent $296.5 million on its peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone, of which the Government of the United States of America contributed $83.4 million. In addition, the Government of the United States spent $34 million last year on assistance to displaced persons in the Central African region, not including assistance to Angola. These are large sums and I cite them because they are indicative of the dimensions of the problems facing the region as a result of conflicts. The United States takes this occasion to encourage those countries faced with the reintegration of former combatants to work with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant agencies to monitor the security and safety of returning combatants.”

    2002-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4630Resumption1 (2002) · source

27. “In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the recent peace accords have made specific and detailed provisions for the return of foreign troops to their countries and for former combatants to return to their home regions. The success of these plans means more than the separation of forces; the individuals returning home after many months or years must be made welcome if their reintegration is to be permanent. The last thing that the region needs is thousands upon thousands of the permanently displaced. We are all acutely aware of the staggering cost of warfare and conflict in the Central African region, in terms of both human suffering and monetary value.”

    2002-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4630Resumption1 (2002) · source

28. “But we must be upfront; regional cooperation can be built only on the solid foundation of healthy and wholly functioning States. These are nation-States with cohesive and transparent forms of government based on the rule of law, an active independent judiciary and a professional military distinct from civilian life. Robust regional cooperation among the Central African States can truly come only about when all nations within the region reach this threshold of domestic stability and integrity, and when each nation provides security for its entire citizenry. Ultimately, we cannot provide effective bilateral or multilateral assistance unless and until each nation functions and thrives. The Central African region is now faced with the complex and essential challenge of making way for peace.”

    2002-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4630Resumption1 (2002) · source

29. “The recent Summit of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa in Libreville, which addressed the situation between Chad and the Central African Republic, is an example of what regional organizations can contribute to conflict resolution in the region. We urge the continuation of such efforts, and we will consider ways to assist the efforts of these organizations to achieve peace throughout Central Africa. But we would be fooling ourselves if we failed to recognize that conflict between the States of this region is still a threat and that several States remain hobbled by a lack of good governance, the absence of a rule of law and a fundamental disregard for human rights. One of our aims here today is to strengthen cooperation between regional organizations, the international community and the United Nations system.”

    2002-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4630Resumption1 (2002) · source

30. “Although neighbouring Central African States are moving toward peace, subregional conflicts like that in Uvira, Democratic Republic of the Congo, are locally a source of fear and violence and could cause renewed fighting among Central African States. Finally, I would like to comment on a point made in the background paper distributed by the presidency which takes note of the myriad United Nations offices in the region and the six different representatives of the Secretary-General with mandates there. Central Africa today is undergoing considerable change. Neighbouring States to the Democratic Republic of the Congo have recently withdrawn their troops from that country. Angola is coming out of a decades-long period of internal war.”

    2002-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4630Resumption1 (2002) · source

31. “I would like to discuss some of the challenges faced by the Central African region and underscore that regional stability can be built only on the foundation of thriving nation-States. Several of the Central African nations are coming out of a period of instability and even of open warfare. While historic steps have been taken to bring formerly warring factions and neighbours to peace, there remain many challenges ahead. One such significant challenge is the reintegration of former combatants into their home countries or their hometowns. The challenge of repatriation and reintegration of former combatants, who in many cases have become internally displaced persons, is a great one that the Security Council may become increasingly compelled to address.”

    2002-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4630Resumption1 (2002) · source

32. “We look forward to working with other States in continuing to fulfil the enforcement of all small-arms embargoes created by the Security Council.”

    2002-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4623 (2002) · source

33. “C6te d'Ivoire's neighbouring States - some of which are also unstable because of their own inability to control the flow of small arms - are contributing to instability by allowing the illicit trade and passage of small arms across their borders. The view of the United States is that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration provisions are an important element of negotiated peace settlements, such as we have seen in Sierra Leone, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Angola. The United States has a history of demonstrated commitment to finding practical and effective ways of curbing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, such as our own strict export/import controls on small arms and the significant financial support we have given to other States.”

    2002-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4623 (2002) · source

34. “It is crucial that ECOWAS members themselves take the necessary steps to effectively enforce their own moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of light weapons. It is disappointing that only half of the member States have created such moratoriums. The crisis in Cote d'Ivoire is an example of the bleeding of weapons between military forces and civilian populations, which is exacerbating divisions within society. The United States urges the parties in Cote d'Ivoire to negotiate a peaceful solution to the current crisis. Yet the responsibility to control small arms cannot be placed on a single State alone.”

    2002-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4623 (2002) · source

35. “Just this week, the report to the Security Council of the Panel of Experts on sanctions against Liberia confirmed that the Government of Charles Taylor continues, in flagrant abuse of the Security Council's arms embargo, to procure weapons- including machine guns, missile launchers, mines and small arms - through black-market, illegal arms deals. That continued influx of weapons threatens the tentative stability that has been achieved in Sierra Leone. The Panel's report notes that, in many cases of illegal imports to Liberia, the end-user certificates used as cover for weapons diverted to Liberia were all from member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).”

    2002-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4623 (2002) · source

36. “The paper submitted by the Government of Colombia in advance of this session thoughtfully focuses on the issue of arms embargoes. The United States supports almost all of the recommendations - both political and financial - made by the monitoring group established by resolution 1390 (2002). Exchanging information on the status of existing arms embargoes is of great value to the Security Council in deciding how best to establish and enforce Security Council arms embargoes. The lack of success of some of those embargoes is due to porous borders, to weak enforcement and to a lack of political will on the part of national Governments.”

    2002-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4623 (2002) · source

37. “The United States has contributed approximately $100 million in assistance to improve small-arms controls in Russia, in the Caucasus, in Central Asian and Eastern European States, in the United Arab Emirates, in Sierra Leone, in Uganda, in Liberia, in Rwanda, in Ethiopia, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Angola, in Sri Lanka, in Timor-Leste, in the Philippines and in Colombia. We remain ready to continue that support. The United States strongly supports effective export and import controls, restraint in trade to regions of conflict, strict observance and enforcement of Security Council embargoes, strict regulation of arms brokers, transparency in exports, improving the security of arms stockpiles and the destruction of excess.”

    2002-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4623 (2002) · source

38. “Individuals convicted of violating our export control laws are subject to statutory debarment, to fines up to $1 million and/or to incarceration for up to 10 years. The United States has also been active internationally in stemming the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. We offer bilateral financial and technical assistance to help countries to develop national export and import controls, to improve border security against arms smugglers and to secure and destroy illicit stocks of small arms and light weapons in conflict-prone regions.”

    2002-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4623 (2002) · source

39. “The United States has one of the strongest systems in the world for regulating the export of arms, with extremely rigorous procedures. All commercial exporters and brokers of significant military equipment- including small arms and light weapons- must be licensed and must submit each transaction for approval by the Department of State. That includes automatic rifles, machine guns, shoulder- fired missiles and rocket systems, as well as light mortars. All transactions are conditioned on United States authorization for re-export. We rigorously monitor arms transfers and routinely investigate suspicious activities. In the past six years, we have interdicted thousands of illicit arms and have cut off exports to countries that failed to comply with United States law.”

    2002-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4623 (2002) · source

40. “The United States recognizes the agonizing consequences of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, especially in areas of conflict, where the problem is most acute, such as in Sierra Leone, in the Central African Republic - where there are three guns for every citizen - and in Guinea-Bissau, among other countries. The United States believes that solutions to the problem of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons must be practical and effective. The most effective way to prevent small arms and light weapons from getting into the hands of those who would misuse them is through strict export and import controls, strong brokering laws, ensuring the security of small arms and light weapons stockpiles, and destroying excess.”

    2002-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4623 (2002) · source

41. “Iwant to thank the Permanent Representative of Colombia for drafting the non-paper on the subject of arms embargoes that has informed our current discussion. Ambassador Valdivieso's chairmanship of the Sanctions Committee on Afghanistan, which deals with arms embargoes, among other things, has been exemplary. He has been fair, businesslike and effective, and that the Sanctions Committee has made a significant contribution to the war against terrorism in curbing the financing of terrorists and in working on arms embargoes. Sadly, these weapons are contributing to violence and suffering around the world.”

    2002-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4623 (2002) · source

42. “Finally, I will make a brief comment on these lessons. Regarding peacekeeping missions, a key lesson is that we must give missions the appropriate rules of engagement, force size and mandate for the situation on the ground.”

    2002-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4577 (2002) · source

43. “My delegation takes away several such management lessons from the United Nations experience in Sierra Leone: first, the need for careful matching of the resources and mandate of peacekeeping missions with the risks involved in the operation; secondly, the importance of frequent consultations with troop-contributing countries on the rules of engagement for any peacekeeping mission; thirdly, the need to find a mechanism for donor group coordination and follow-up, and the need for the reintegration element of any disarmament, demobilization and resettlement programme to be undertaken as part of a peace process; fourthly, the requirement for better coordination of humanitarian assistance between peacekeeping operations, international aid agencies and humanitarian groups; and finally, a strong special representative of the Secretary-General is critical to the success of a peaceful operation to ensure good coordination among the peacekeeping, humanitarian and, if necessary, judicial elements of a mission.”

    2002-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4577 (2002) · source

44. “In my delegation's view, what we can learn from our experience in Sierra Leone are lessons in how the Security Council and the United Nations can better manage and organize our efforts, be they peacekeeping, diplomatic or humanitarian, to support peace processes in conflict situations in which there is an existing commitment by the parties to resolve the conflict. These lessons are valuable to our work going forth.”

    2002-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4577 (2002) · source

45. “As we look at our experience in Sierra Leone, we can review what those external factors were for guidance and historical understanding, but we are making a mistake if we too readily embrace the view that the events in Sierra Leone provide universal lessons for the United Nations that automatically can be imposed on other situations. To a large degree, each must be tailor-made and adapted to the unique situations of each conflict. Nonetheless, it is important to learn from experience, and therefore let me thank the United Kingdom once again for its leadership in presiding over this workshop.”

    2002-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4577 (2002) · source

46. “In Sierra Leone the crucial factors behind our current success range from the commitment of the United Kingdom to provide military training to the Sierra Leone army to the military weakness of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) following its miscalculation in invading Guinean territory. Other factors were the Security Council sanctions on President Taylor as well as, and most important and decisively, the courage and dedication of the people of Sierra Leone to end violence and to restore democracy. All of these external factors came together in a way that created an opportunity for a stable peace and for the United Nations and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to play an important but supporting role.”

    2002-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4577 (2002) · source

47. “In most cases, the parties themselves must create facts on the ground that will allow the United Nations to contribute to a lasting peace. We neither strengthen the United Nations and the Security Council nor help bring peace to any conflict by overpromising, raising unrealistic expectations or overextending the capacity of the United Nations to deliver on the ground. What the Security Council and the United Nations can do is to stand ready, so that, when the external factors fall into place, we can support the parties' own efforts to make peace. The United Nations and the Security Council also can help to foster an environment that permits peace to take root if the parties want it.”

    2002-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4577 (2002) · source

48. “As we begin our discussion, we need to keep in mind the fact that each conflict situation on the Security Council's agenda has its own causes, its own unique personality and its own geopolitical variables. The successful resolution of any conflict is a matter of these variables aligning in such a way that, if the Security Council is focused and united but realistic about its abilities, the Security Council and the United Nations can help the parties themselves see a hinge of history and push open the door towards lasting peace. But let me be clear: the United Nations and the Council rarely have the ability themselves to ensure a successful peace process. Seldom can the United Nations on its own impose a successful solution.”

    2002-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4577 (2002) · source

49. “There have been unconscionable abuses of women and children. There have been mutilations, murders and terror, as well as the systematic trampling of basic human rights. Tragically, civilians indeed were the deliberate targets of a great many of these horrible acts of violence and abuse. The remarks of our opening speakers have gotten us off to a good start, and I thank both Under- Secretary-General Guehenno and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator McAskie for their insights this morning. Let me start by asking whether there are, in fact, any overarching lessons to be learned from Sierra Leone and how the United Nations and the Security Council can resolve the other conflicts on our agenda.”

    2002-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4577 (2002) · source

50. “Let me begin, Madam President, by thanking you and the United Kingdom presidency of the Security Council for organizing this Council workshop today. The importance of our discussions is evidenced by the presence with us this morning of the Secretary- General. We are honoured to have Foreign Minister Koroma of Sierra Leone here as well, and it is a particular pleasure to have our former colleague and good friend, Foreign Minister Francois Fall of Guinea, back in New York this morning to join us once again around this table. The United States delegation looks forward to a useful discussion of the lessons to be learned from Sierra Leone and of the way forward in the Mano River Union. The wars and civil unrest in the Mano River Union region have taken a terrible toll in lost life, human suffering and lost opportunities.”

    2002-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4577 (2002) · source