YouSaid · the spoken record

Wilmot

lines on the record
27
first
1996-05-28
most recent
1998-03-20
sittings or episodes
2
sources
un-security-council

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  1. “Therefore, to retain its legitimacy, the Council ought to take cognizance of the reasoned views and sentiments of the wider membership, which in this case call for an end to sanctions against Libya and the pacific settlement of the dispute over the Lockerbie affair.”

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  2. “In the light of the foregoing, we propose that the Council should, as a matter of urgency, revisit resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) with a view to suspending or lifting the sanctions imposed on one of the parties pending the determination of the substantive issues involved in the dispute between the parties, or pending the establishment of responsibility in accordance with the fair and just compromise proposal advanced by the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. In conclusion, we wish to remind the Council that in exercising its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it does so on behalf of all the Member States of the United Nations, as stipulated in Article 24 of the Charter.”

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  3. “For if, as is evident from the decision of the Court, there is a dispute as to judicial competence to establish responsibility for the tragic incidents, then it was premature for this Council to impose sanctions on one of the parties to the dispute in support of the rival claims advanced by the other parties. We therefore disagree with those who hold the view that the preliminary, or procedural, judgement of the ICJ does not affect the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on one of the parties.”

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  4. “It is the understanding of my delegation that on 27 February 1998 the International Court of Justice in The Hague decided that a dispute indeed exists between the parties concerning the interpretation of the Montreal Convention. The Court decided further that it has jurisdiction to hear the dispute between the parties as to the interpretation or application of the provisions of that Convention. The above decision of the International Court of Justice appears to us to weaken the foundations of the Council's resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993), which imposed sanctions on one of the parties.”

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  5. “Article 14 of the Montreal Convention states: "Any dispute between two or more Contracting States which cannot be settled through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court." Availing itself of this article, Libya applied to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after failing to secure settlement through negotiations or arbitration.”

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  6. “They relate, inter alia, to certain judicial procedures carried out by the other concerned parties and which, among others, call for the surrender by Libya of the suspects in the tragic incidents for trial in the territories of those other concerned parties. Libya's contention, among other things, is that the request for surrender of the suspects for trial in the territories of the other concerned parties infringes on its rights under the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. On the other hand, the Security Council resolution 731 (1992), and subsequent resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) imposing sanctions on Libya, all assume as their point of departure that there is no dispute between the parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention.”

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  7. “We call on the Council to give serious consideration to the proposal with a view to adopting one of the alternatives for immediate implementation in order to secure a speedy settlement of the dispute that would do justice to the victims, the bereaved families - with whom we deeply sympathize - and the suspects. Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) imposed sanctions on one of the parties directly concerned, Libya, on the grounds that it had failed to provide a full and effective response to certain requests made of it in Security Council resolution 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992. What are these requests?”

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  8. “Specifically, these bodies, which together constitute a large section of the international community, have proposed the following options: the first is to try those suspected to be responsible for the tragic incidents in a neutral third country to be designated by the Security Council; the second, that the suspects be tried by Scottish judges - that is, by the judges of one of the parties - at the seat of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, under Scottish law; and the third, to establish an ad hoc criminal court at the seat of the International Court of Justice at The Hague to try the suspects. This proposal was formally presented to the Security Council on behalf of the Organization of African Unity by its current Chairman, His Excellency President Robert Mugabe, when he addressed the Council on 25 September 1997.”

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  9. “In the face of the rival claims and in an effort to advance the cause of justice, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement have all at various times proposed a compromise mechanism that would allow for the determination of responsibility for the tragic incidents in a neutral venue by either a neutral judicial body or a judicial body of one of the parties.”

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  10. “Security Council resolution 731 (1992) rightly condemned the destruction of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie and of UTA Flight 772 and the resultant loss of hundreds of lives, and it sought the establishment of responsibility for the tragic incidents. It is in the search for those responsible that an issue has arisen. The parties directly concerned - namely, Libya, the United States of America and the United Kingdom - have put forward rival claims to exclusive judicial competence to establish responsibility and to do so in their own respective territories.”

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  11. “I follow preceding speakers in expressing the pleasure of my delegation at seeing you, Sir, preside over this meeting, and I convey my gratitude for the opportunity to address the Council as it considers the Lockerbie affair. Ghana condemns international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations in view of the dangers it poses to international peace and security. In particular we condemn all illegal activities directed against international civil aviation or that interfere with international civil air travel. We believe that all those responsible for any such activities must be apprehended and prosecuted in accordance with the relevant international law and conventions and within the framework of the United Nations Charter.”

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  12. “We support the Secretary-General's recommendation on the extension of UNOMIL's mandate, as a step in the right direction, and hope it will be given favourable consideration. Finally, I hope that the outcome of the Council's deliberations will go one step further than previous resolutions and provide for urgently required concrete financial and logistic assistance to ECOMOG, to salvage the Liberian peace process in support of the suffering people of Liberia.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  13. “We therefore hope that all Member States will review their contributions with the aim of augmenting them to a level commensurate with the goals we wish to see ECOMOG achieve, and without conditionalities. The humanitarian consequences of the recent events in Liberia also need to be kept in sight. The international community must give more aid to countries like mine, which have been constrained to grant asylum to additional Liberian refugees fleeing their devastated country. I wish before yielding the floor to express the gratitude of my Government and that of the Chairman of ECOWAS to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his unrelenting support for Liberia. We are also grateful to UNOMIL and to the Special Representative and Special Envoys of the Secretary-General, whose cooperation and encouragement has seen us thus far.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  14. “We are particularly grateful to the United States Government, not only for its keen interest in the Liberian problem, but also for its humanitarian intervention during the recent crisis, the recent offer of $30 million to ECOMOG and the welcome initiative to establish an International Contact Group on Liberia. We also thank the other members of the Contact Group for their continued interest, and hope that through their work, much-needed material support will be forthcoming from the international community - and in good time - to facilitate the fulfilment of our common objective: to return peace to Liberia. While the assistance received so far is deeply appreciated, it is nevertheless grossly inadequate to meet the logistic and other challenges faced by ECOMOG.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  15. “Among other measures it may decide upon, this Council may wish to call on the donor counties that made pledges for the peace process in Liberia at the United Nations-sponsored Conference on Liberia in New York in October 1995 to redeem their pledges now. The Council may also renew its call for strict compliance with its resolution on an arms embargo in relation to Liberia. At this juncture, I wish to express our gratitude to Governments of Member States which have given or pledged assistance so far to ECOMOG and the Liberian peace process.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  16. “Without such a force, our personnel will continue to be thinly spread on the ground and remain easy targets of power-hungry warlords, with consequences desired by none of us here, as seen in the recent past. The time for this Council to act is now, to secure unconditional logistic and financial support for ECOMOG, coupled with humanitarian and development assistance to Liberia, to get the job done. Time is not on our side. A solution now will be cheaper, in terms of lives and material resources, than it will be tomorrow, after ECOMOG is compelled to withdraw as a result of inaction by the international community.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  17. “ECOMOG, as constituted at present, has neither the required number of personnel nor the logistic base to effectively implement its mandate. Whereas only 8,500 troops are currently on the ground, the ECOMOG Commander has estimated that between 12,000 and 14,000 troops are required in order to be effective. The difference has to be made up. In the volatile atmosphere prevalent in the country, ECOMOG needs to be strengthened with more personnel, and logistic and financial resources, to become a credible force that can be a threat to intransigent parties, inspire the respect of the combatants and infuse confidence in the people of Liberia.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  18. “We have offered what we can, but the task facing ECOMOG is not one that can be shouldered by the region alone. The Security Council is aware that under the Abuja and related Agreements the tasks of ECOMOG include the deployment of its personnel throughout Liberia, the sealing of all Liberia's borders, the manning of all sea, land and air borders, the encampment and disarmament of combatants, and the establishment of road and confidence patrols, to create an atmosphere conducive to the holding of free and fair elections. These are no mean tasks. They require adequate military manpower, material and other logistic support. That is why we have repeatedly called on the international community to provide adequate assistance to ECOMOG.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  19. “The ECOWAS Ministers also reiterated what has been said time and again, that the task of ensuring international peace and security is primarily that of the United Nations Security Council and the entire international community. Regional or subregional initiatives can only complement, but not substitute for, the international community's own efforts. Here, we wish to re-echo the call of the Committee of Nine on the international community to assume its rightful duty to Liberia and assist ECOMOG accordingly. Liberia should be given the same assistance and attention as are accorded other conflict situations in the world. With our meagre resources, despite the casualties suffered, we in West Africa have decided to give Liberians yet another chance to put their house in order. The international community cannot turn its back on that country.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  20. “The Mechanism, copies of which have been made available for the attention of this Council, requires the Liberian parties to take steps that would, among other things, restore the cease-fire, restore Monrovia to its safe- haven status and return looted property. It would ensure reconciliation and inclusiveness of the National Transitional Government, a return to the programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants and, most importantly, a return to the programme of democratization that would lead to free and fair elections. Implementation of the Mechanism will be closely monitored by the Committee of Nine, which will assess from it the commitment of the Liberian people to peace and report thereon to the ECOWAS Summit in August 1996.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  21. “After intensive deliberations, the Ministers concluded that the Abuja Agreement remained the best framework for peace in Liberia and that ECOMOG should continue its efforts to seek its implementation. They emphasized the fact that the ultimate responsibility for peace rests with Liberians themselves, notably the Government and faction leaders, who need to demonstrate in specific terms their commitment to implement the Abuja Agreement and their commitment to peace in their country. In pursuit of this objective, the Ministers established a Mechanism for Returning Liberia to the Abuja Agreement, which, if implemented by the Transitional Government during the coming three months, would demonstrate convincingly their continued attachment to the peace process.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  22. “At the outbreak of the fighting in Monrovia, His Excellency the President of Ghana, in his capacity as Chairman of ECOWAS, took immediate steps to contain the situation. He dispatched personal envoys for urgent consultations with key ECOWAS partners and for talks with the parties to the conflict. After strenuous efforts, the envoys obtained the agreement of the Liberian parties to lines of action aimed at restoring the Abuja Agreement, through a cease-fire, the redeployment of ECOMOG for security throughout Monrovia, the withdrawal of all armed fighters from the city, and the release of hostages. The ECOWAS Chairman's efforts culminated on 7 May 1996 in the seventh meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the ECOWAS Committee of Nine on Liberia, in Accra.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  23. “In spite of these setbacks, and with little material support from the international community, ECOWAS and ECOMOG persevered, taking casualties on the way. We continued to give to the brotherly people of Liberia the best of our resources and the lives of our most gallant sons, in the hope that a return of peace to that country would strengthen peace in the whole subregion, and thereby international peace and security in general. Regrettably, despite these efforts and sacrifices, the Liberian conflict escalated into fighting in Monrovia, a safe haven, on 6 April 1996, following an internal rift in the ULIMO-J faction, the reported deposition of its leader, General Roosevelt Johnson, and a subsequent order by the Council of State for his arrest for murder.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  24. “Among these was a change of status of the Council of State to that of a collective presidency, creating a situation where Liberia virtually had six Presidents, each availing himself of the full trappings of presidential protocol. Other problems arose, which I need not recount for lack of time. Efforts continued to address these, and in mid-December 1995, while still faced with serious personnel and logistical constraints, ECOMOG started the first phase of deployment in some cities held by the various factions. The initial success was, however, short- lived, when ECOMOG suffered an unprovoked surprise massive attack by one of the factions on 28 December 1995. This senseless attack against ECOMOG and innocent civilians was covered by the Secretary-General's report of 23 January 1996, and was condemned by this Council.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  25. “The Abuja Agreement had political and military aspects, encompassing a wide array of activities that would lead, through disarmament of the factions, to free and fair elections in August 1996. In keeping with the schedule of implementation, the cessation of hostilities came into effect during the night of 26/27 August 1995, paving the way for the installation of a new Council of State on 1 September 1995 and subsequent appointments to the Cabinet and other high offices of State. Even though there was some delay, caused by the lack of logistical support for the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the peace process took off on the right track. However, certain actions of the Council and faction leaders soon started to undermine the Abuja Agreement.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  26. “It is therefore with great sadness that I agree with the Secretary-General's observation in his report that by the events of the last few weeks the faction leaders have clearly demonstrated their disregard for the aspirations of the Liberian people for peace and have shown wanton disrespect for the international community. On assuming office as Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1994, His Excellency Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, President of the Republic of Ghana, lost no time in taking up energetically the search for peace in Liberia. Following earlier efforts by his predecessors in the ECOWAS chair, success finally came with the signing in August 1995 of the Abuja Agreement to supplement the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements, as subsequently clarified by the Accra Agreement.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  27. “I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of office as the President of the Council this month. I also thank you for giving me the opportunity to address the Council on the tragic developments in Liberia, as detailed in the report of the Secretary-General now under consideration. My Government is naturally disturbed and disappointed by the recent resurgence of fighting and mayhem in Monrovia. We had hoped that after the series of mediation talks, culminating in the Abuja Agreement of 19 August 1995, the faction leaders in Liberia would rededicate themselves to the objectives of peace and return their country to normalcy, in the interest of their people.”

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source