YouSaid · the spoken record

Zabolotskaya

lines on the record: 103
first: 2020-02-13
most recent: 2023-12-12
sittings or episodes: 13
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The endless promises and vague projections of the past 30 years have only prolonged the process. The instructions of the Security Council must be implemented. That is imperative. Moreover, the judicial docket is empty and the main trials have been concluded. National law enforcement agencies and the Secretariat can deal with remaining issues. In the next report, we expect to see a detailed description of concrete and realistic options for the transfer of the remaining functions that will enable the Mechanism to complete its activities within a concrete time frame.”
2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9502 (2023) · source
“The adoption of such a decision would be objectively justified by the circumstances surrounding the case of Mladić, given his advanced age and poor health. We would like to underscore that in the case of Félicien Kabuga, the Mechanism took into account similar circumstances by staying the proceedings and considering his release on medical grounds. We expect the Mechanism to be consistent and apply the same approach to Mladić as it did to Kabuga. As a last resort, the Mechanism should consider the option of transferring Mladić to Serbia to serve out his sentence there or granting him conditional release on medical grounds. The upcoming 2024 regular review of the Mechanism needs to provide clarity with regard to its timeline for the completion of its work.”
2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9502 (2023) · source
“Hashim Thaçi was allowed to travel to Kosovo to visit his ailing parents, despite the high-profile scandals involving the intimidation of witnesses in his case. In other words, we are witnessing a glaring difference in the conditions of detention for Serbian convicts and for Kosovo Albanians. We believe that the situation can be labelled as discriminatory. We demand that the Mechanism take measures to end such discrimination and ensure that Serbian convicts be provided with adequate conditions for serving their sentences. In particular, given the fact that Ratko Mladić’s health remains extremely poor, we recall article 26 of the statute of the Mechanism. It authorizes the President to decide on pardons and sentence commutations in the interests of justice and the general principles of law.”
2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9502 (2023) · source
“The pretrial detention regime established by that court for eight Kosovo Albanians, including the former so-called President of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, are extremely lenient. They include the right to visit the gymnasium, library and chapel, walk in designated areas and buy goods and services with money from a special account. Punishments for violating the rules of the pretrial detention regime are very mild — warnings, fines and the temporary suspension of certain privileges. The so-called harshest punishment is two weeks of solitary confinement, with no ban on telephone calls. Furthermore, the same detainees were allowed 880 visits by family members and others in 2022 alone. Moreover, in late May and early September 2023, Mr.”
2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9502 (2023) · source
“In our view, the conditions faced by Serbs in detention are in stark contrast to those that were established for Kosovo Albanians accused of committing serious crimes during the 1998 and 1999 armed conflict. Those people had long been at large, and no one was searching for them. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia did not see anything wrong with their actions at all. It was only after the publication of the notorious and scandalous Dick Marty report, stating that they had committed numerous atrocities, including torture, murder and trafficking in persons and human organs, that the so-called Kosovo Specialist Chambers, established by the European Union, became concerned about such acts.”
2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9502 (2023) · source
“The former President of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadžić, was unable to get the British authorities of HM Prison Isle of Wight to provide his cell with normal lighting, according to his daughter. The former Head of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Croatia), Milan Martić, and army general Dragomir Milošević of Republika Srpska have been in isolation in an Estonian prison for years. They are allowed contact with only a few prisoners. They are also being deprived of adequate medical care. The Mechanism refuses to apply the practice of granting early release to Serbs after they have served two-thirds of their sentences. Such petitions from Vlastimir Đorđević and Radivoje Miletić have been denied.”
2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9502 (2023) · source
“The Mechanism is considering initiating a new contempt of court case related to the circumstances surrounding the recently stayed proceedings in the case against Félicien Kabuga. The main trial will therefore not take place. For some reason, however, a case of secondary importance will be taken up by the Mechanism. Is it possible that such a situation raises questions for our delegation only? However, the Mechanism does not approach all its functions with the same zeal as it does in cases of contempt of court. It continues to overlook the disregard for the rules and minimum standards of detention conditions for a certain category of convicts, namely, Serbian convicts.”
2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9502 (2023) · source
“We would like to recall that, in 2012, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda decided to refer the case to the Rwandan courts. We see no possible justification for reviewing that decision 12 years later. We are also wary of the ongoing attempts to artificially increase the number of trials on so-called contempt of court proceedings, which are of secondary importance, not a matter of prosecuting persons suspected of serious crimes under international law. Contempt of court charges can be adjudicated perfectly well by national courts. We see the use of the Mechanism’s resources for that purpose, even against the backdrop of the empty judicial docket, as an artificial prolongation of its mandate. The situation has become absurd.”
2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9502 (2023) · source
“We also recall that, in 2004, resolution 1534 (2004) instructed the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to take all necessary measures to complete the investigations by 2004, the trials by the end of 2008 and its work, as a whole, by 2010. The Tribunal did not meet the deadline. The expectation that the Residual Mechanism that replaced it would make up for the red tape of its predecessors was not met. After 13 years, it not only continues to exist, but as we can already see, expects to be around until at least 2055. We note that paragraph 109 of the report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism makes a passing reference to the possibility of starting new appeals proceedings in the case against Fulgence Kayishema.”
2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9502 (2023) · source
“Some go as far as 2055, and this is despite the fact that the international criminal tribunals, to which the Mechanism is the successor, were established 30 years ago. Thus, the anticipated life cycle of the structure is now 60 years. There can be no rational explanation for such an unusually long life of an ad hoc tribunal. I would like to recall that the Nuremberg Tribunal, which dealt with a category of crimes that is no less serious, lasted one year and a half, having transferred its archives to the International Court of Justice. And, as we know, no residual mechanisms or centres for knowledge and history dissemination were established. It may have been a mistake, of course, but it remains a fact.”
2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9502 (2023) · source
“However, time after time, these lengthy documents received at the Council present an increasing number of reasons to extend the existence of the Mechanism. In the most recent report (see S/2023/566), they describe some steps in the right direction, including the closure of the United Nations Detention Facility in Arusha and the Sarajevo field office, and some cuts to staff, in addition to the planned closure in 2024 of the Mechanism’s office in Kigali. At the same time, the bigger picture has still not been covered. We do not see any specific dates for the drawdown of the Mechanism. There is only a forecast for the conclusion of some of its functions with time frames that are, in our view, outrageous.”
2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9502 (2023) · source
“Ms. Zabolotskaya (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Allow me to start by expressing our gratitude to the President and the Chief Prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals for their briefing to the Council and by also thanking the delegation of Gabon for chairing the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals. Resolution 1966 (2010) created the Residual Mechanism and mandated it to be a small, temporary and efficient structure whose functions and size were intended to decrease over time. Given that the docket of the Mechanism is now empty, the efforts of its leadership should now be focused on drawing down its activities, as called for by the Security Council. That should be the focus of reports from the President and the Prosecutor.”
2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9502 (2023) · source
“In those documents, we hope that we will see a detailed description of the specific measures that will have been taken, or will be taken, in the remaining 10 months of work to expedite the transfer of evidence to the Iraqis and the drawdown the activities of UNITAD. Particular attention should also be paid to the step-by-step process of the drawdown. In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that now is the last opportunity for the Investigation Team to fulfil the remaining part of its mandate by finally handing over all the evidence to the Iraqi authorities, without which we will hardly be able to consider its mission a success.”
2023-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9493 (2023) · source
“We commend the announcement that, in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 2697 (2023), it was possible to expeditiously agree with the Iraqi authorities on the modalities for the transfer of evidence to third countries. We trust that that step will enable ensuring compliance with the conditions necessary to secure Baghdad’s authorization for such transfers in the future. We note, however, that the information in the report on the implementation of the remaining paragraphs of the resolution is insufficient. The most important issue, on the progress made in winding down the activities of the Investigative Team, has not been made known for all intents and purposes. We expect that those shortcomings will be fully addressed in the January report of the Secretary-General and the Special Adviser’s March road map.”
2023-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9493 (2023) · source
“We recall that, at the request of the Government of Iraq, resolution 2697 (2023) extended the UNITAD mandate for one year only, until 17 September 2024. That underscores the need to make the best possible use of the remaining time to complete the Team’s mission. We trust that UNITAD will robustly step up its cooperation with Baghdad. We draw attention to the fact that statements on the shortcomings of national legislation cannot — and should not — be used as a pretext to prevent the implementation of the Security Council’s instructions. We were just alarmed to hear the statement that UNITAD will be unable to complete its work before the completion of its mandate. We believe that the mission should comply with the instructions of the Council.”
2023-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9493 (2023) · source
“We believe that, had the Investigation Team, from the very start of its work, faithfully fulfilled the mandate conferred upon it to support the national efforts of Iraq’s law enforcement and judicial authorities by providing them with comprehensive evidence, the Iraqi judicial system would have completed the process of bringing terrorists to justice today. Seven years is a long time. We recall that the Nuremberg trials were completed in only one and a half years. We demand that any and all materials collected by the Investigation Team, including in digitized form and the supporting analytical reports, be handed over to the Iraqi authorities without delay or preconditions, as stipulated in resolution 2379 (2017) and reaffirmed in resolution 2697 (2023).”
2023-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9493 (2023) · source
“Khan openly disregarded the mandate, merely going through the motions, as we now understand. As far as we can see, Iraq received nothing at all from UNITAD during that period. What we want to hear about today is how many proceedings involving terrorists there have been in Iraq on the basis of evidence gathered by UNITAD. Has there even been one such trial? Well, we would not expect anything else from the United Kingdom national Mr. Khan. Even at his new place of work, he continues to successfully prioritize and de-prioritize individual investigations in following the will of his Western patrons.”
2023-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9493 (2023) · source
“From time to time we hear that thanks to UNITAD’s assistance, various individuals are being brought to justice in third, largely Western, countries. But were individual trials held abroad the foundation of UNITAD’s mandate? Its main task, as established by the Security Council, is the provision of assistance specifically and primarily to Iraq in prosecuting members of ISIL. The indecision regarding the question of handing over the evidence accumulated to Baghdad has resulted in ensuring that thousands of terrorists have yet to receive due punishment. As we understand it, much of the blame for this unfortunate state of affairs lies with the current Special Adviser’s predecessor. While we have observed some progress in the implementation of the core mandate of the Investigative Team during Mr. Ritscher’s tenure, for years Mr.”
2023-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9493 (2023) · source
“We are encouraged by the fact that finally, if only in the seventh year of its work, the Team has shared with the Iraqi authorities some of the material compiled on terrorists’ manufacture and use of chemical weapons, as well as information on sexual violence. Considering that the end of UNITAD’s mandate is less than 10 months away, we are surprised that Iraq has received only a paltry share of what the Team has managed to accumulate. And we do not completely understand why that evidence was not consistently provided to the Iraqi authorities. Why has it only just happened? It leaves us with a legitimate question, which is that if the Iraqi judiciary system cannot receive all of this evidence, for whom and why was it compiled?”
2023-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9493 (2023) · source
“Ms. Zabolotskaya (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation attaches great importance to the question of countering terrorism and holding terrorists accountable for their crimes, which is an integral component of our shared efforts to counter terrorist threats. In that context, we have been carefully monitoring the activities of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD) in Iraq. We note the efforts of the Team in the latest reporting period to contribute to the holdings of evidence of the crimes of Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in all areas of its investigations, including crimes against national communities, killings in Tikrit and Sinjar, the destruction of cultural property and Da’esh/ ISIL’s financial flows.”
2023-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9493 (2023) · source
“Our country remains open to constructive cooperation for prompt and efficient resolution of both substantive and organizational challenges faced by the 1540 Committee.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9478 (2023) · source
“We note that resolution 2663 (2022), adopted last year, underscores the difference in the mandates of the three Committees and reaffirms the maintenance of the previous frameworks for potential cooperation, information sharing and coordination on visits to States. We believe that the annual joint briefings of the three Committees are sufficient to achieve those goals. We should also bear in mind that the resolutions refer exclusively to cooperation among the Committees themselves. There is no mention of direct interaction between their Groups of Experts. Given the specific nature of the Committees’ mandates and, in the case of the 1540 Committee, the strict accountability of its Group of Experts, including in terms of external contacts, all possible proposals in that regard should be considered by the Committees on a case-by-case basis.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9478 (2023) · source
“Shifting the focus of the 1540 Committee to counter-terrorism runs the risk of diluting the non-proliferation aspect of its activities and altering the nature of resolution 1540 (2004) itself by introducing elements that were not initially stipulated into the process of its implementation, including attribution and interference in the internal affairs of States. Against that background, we view attempts to find some kind of synergy and overlapping of competences among the 1540 Committee, the 1267, 1989, 2253 Committee and the 1373 Committees as unnecessary and counterproductive — first and foremost, from the point of view of achieving the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004) itself.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9478 (2023) · source
“It must be taken into account that the Committee should not forcibly impose any service on members of the international community. Its approaches, including in the provision of assistance to States, must be tactful and ensure sufficient levels of confidentiality. Turning to the scope of today’s briefing, I would like to highlight that the activities of the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council participating in meetings are clearly delineated. The 1540 Committee, as a preventive non-proliferation and monitoring body, has neither the mandate nor the technical capacity to carry out activities to identify terrorist threats or respond to them — those are vested in the specialized Security Council Committees.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9478 (2023) · source
“Resolution 1540 (2004) remains relevant as a universal international document aimed at ensuring cooperation among and assistance to States in the establishment of effective barriers at the national level to prevent weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials from falling into the hands of non-State actors. We consider the pursuit of work within the Committee in a spirit of cooperation to be fundamentally important to ensuring the comprehensive and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States. We consistently stress that the key areas of work of the 1540 Committee should remain monitoring the implementation of the provisions of the resolution and coordinating global activities in the field of providing technical assistance in that process to States upon their request.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9478 (2023) · source
“At the same time, we expect that the reports of the Monitoring Team will be as objective as possible and rely only on verified sources of information. We consider country visits by the Monitoring Team to be an important factor in our work. We consistently underscore the need to prioritize Team visits to those countries engaged in armed resistance against international terrorists and States that are tackling terrorist manifestations head-on. We note the continued proactive work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the efforts of its Chair, the Permanent Representative of Ecuador, Mr. Hernán Pérez Loose.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9478 (2023) · source
“There is focus on terrorist activity in a number of African countries, which is largely due to the socioeconomic consequences of the colonial and neocolonial policies of Western countries, as well as on the efforts of leaders in the region to overcome terrorism-related challenges. We emphasize the need to continue to focus on the issue of foreign terrorist fighters who are inscribed on counter-terrorist sanctions lists in order to prevent and curb their criminal activity and address the matter of their possible repatriation. We support the effective work of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, the reports of which are a cornerstone of the work of the Committee. We call on all Member States to closely cooperate with those experts.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9478 (2023) · source
“We are heartened by the fact that the key provisions thereof are reflected in the guiding principles for the work of the 1267 Committee. We are closely monitoring the dynamics of the development of modern terrorist threats around the world, including in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, in South and South-East Asia and on the African continent. Despite the efforts undertaken by the de facto authorities, the Afghan wing of ISIL remains one of the key factors in the destabilization of the situation in the country. That danger is compounded by its expanding ideological, propagandistic and recruitment activities, with the skilful use of information and communications technologies. We see the group’s continued presence in the country as a threat to Afghanistan’s neighbouring States in Central Asia.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9478 (2023) · source
“We express our gratitude to the Maltese chairpersonship of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities for its leadership and willingness to adopt a constructive approach to resolving various issues. We value the work of that Committee, which we consider to be one of the most effective mechanisms of the Council in the area of counter-terrorism. We prioritize questions concerning the effective implementation of Security Council resolutions on the counter-terrorism sanctions regime against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al-Qaida.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9478 (2023) · source
“At the same time, the topics for discussion in the Committee next year must begin to be determined. In our opinion, an extremely pressing issue is that of the repatriation of foreign terrorist fighters and their families from Syria and Iraq. Another priority is addressing the relationship between terrorism and transnational organized crime, whereby terrorists are supplied with weapons. Regarding the involvement of experts both in meetings on current counter-terrorism issues, including open and closed briefings by the Committee, and in the development of analytical materials, it is important to maintain a balance in the representation of regions and points of view. We would like to ask the Chair of the CTC and Executive Director Gherman to pay special attention to that aspect.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9478 (2023) · source
“We note with satisfaction the high-quality, expert- level support provided by CTED to the Committee. We thank the CTED Executive Director, Ms. Natalia Gherman, for the efforts to enhance the implementation of CTED’s key objectives, namely conducting assessment visits and preparing reports on behalf of the Committee. At the same time, we would like to emphasize the importance of maintaining the balanced nature of assessment tools, and not getting carried away with issues of a secondary nature. We are convinced that the key criterion for the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism remains the ability of States to counter financial and ideological support for terrorists and to ensure the inevitability of punishment for the crimes perpetrated. The CTC’s plans for the current year include holding a number of briefings.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9478 (2023) · source
“We urge the leadership of those States inscribed on the current list for assessment visits by the Committee not to delay the coordination of such visits with the leadership of the CTC and its Executive Directorate (CTED). The benefits of such visits are clear: they contribute to, among others, the identification of gaps in national legislation and law enforcement practices. Recommendations based on the results of such visits allow States to make informed decisions and to bridge such gaps on their own or by requesting technical assistance through the Office of Counter-Terrorism. We believe that, when planning and developing capacity-building programmes, first and foremost, the wishes of the recipient State — as well as the Committee’s expert assessments and recommendations — must be taken into account.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9478 (2023) · source
“The effective establishment of cooperation appears all the more significant in the light of the persistent relevance of the threat of terrorism. Terrorist organizations are adapting and adjusting their methods to present-day conditions. They are capitalizing on conflict situations, and they are exploiting new and emerging technologies for their criminal purposes. It is not enough for the relevant structures of the Council to simply keep up with those new trends — they must try to stay several steps ahead of the terrorists. It is important to focus the efforts of the Counter- Terrorism Committee (CTC) on monitoring States’ implementation of key Security Council resolutions. In addition, particular attention should be afforded to countries in regions with heightened terrorist activity.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9478 (2023) · source
“Ms. Zabolotskaya (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I wish to take this opportunity to thank you, Mr. President, for organizing the traditional briefing of the Chairs of the three Security Council Committees with competence in the area of counter-terrorism. We would also like to thank the Chairs of the three Committees for the reports presented today on the work that has been done and note their personal contribution to the implementation of the objectives set by the Council in the areas of counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. We share the positive assessments voiced regarding the cooperation that has been established between the Committees, including in relation to the organization of joint meetings, monitoring missions and exchanges of information.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9478 (2023) · source
“It is a great pity that this is going on right in front of us and that the high ideals of Nuremberg have been betrayed. The efforts of its corrupt officials have reduced the ICC to a punitive instrument for settling political scores with those who have fallen foul of the collective West. What does this body have to do with justice? We would like to emphasize once again that as a politicized, puppet structure, and on top of that, one established on the basis of an agreement between a limited number of countries, the ICC should on principle not be granted the possibility of intruding on the normal functioning of the United Nations and its bodies. Not a penny of the United Nations regular budget should go to this puppet tribunal, and we demand that the Secretary- General keep a close eye on that.”
2023-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9469 (2023) · source
“You want to distract attention from the Russia-China or BRICS summits? Have another sham warrant. And the opposite is also true. When an investigation harms the interests of the West, it is dropped. We all remember that that is exactly what the current British Prosecutor of the ICC did with regard to the investigations into the United States and United Kingdom’s war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan. In that regard, we pity the Palestinians, who genuinely pinned their hopes on the ICC to the very end. No justice should be expected from this pro-Western puppet pseudo-judiciary, which has been bought and sold. The ICC today is not only a bottomless pit for financial resources and a symbol of empty hopes and wasted time. It has become a living illustration of the degradation and degeneration of international criminal justice.”
2023-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9469 (2023) · source
“The British pseudo-prosecutor lectures us about international humanitarian law, but it is not clear to whom those lectures are addressed. Wake up, Mr. Khan — United Nations agencies are talking about war crimes with uncharacteristic bluntness. Moreover, there is nothing surprising in the inaction of this pseudo-court on the situation in Palestine. If anybody harboured any illusions about this organization, I think that now there should be no doubt. The situation has shed light on any dark spots in this question. The International Criminal Court Prosecutors pretend to be principled only when it is beneficial to the West. They are willing to cobble together tailor-made arrest warrants in a matter of days. For a fee, they can be issued to coincide with specific events. You want to whitewash the NATO aggression against Libya? Be our guest.”
2023-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9469 (2023) · source
“In our view, a good illustration is the current crisis in Palestine, a situation that the International Criminal Court has been preliminarily studying since 2015 and formally investigating since 2021. On 6 November, nearly one month after the current escalation began, the Secretary-General stated that more United Nations aid workers have been killed than in any comparable period in the history of our Organization. He also said that Gaza is becoming a graveyard for children. Every day, hundreds of girls and boys are killed or injured. It would seem that if the International Criminal Court’s investigation into the situation in Palestine has been ongoing since 2021, then some kind of action could have been undertaken — for example, the issuance of arrest warrants or something else. But no, we see nothing of the kind.”
2023-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9469 (2023) · source
“The years of procrastination by the pseudo-court and its officials on Libya and Darfur speak for themselves. That is more striking than what can be seen in any report. Reports on the imitation of the work are heard twice a year, which is clearly a pointless waste of our time. This time should be devoted to other more significant issues. Right now, for example, the question of Middle East settlement should be a priority for the Council. For years, we have heard another premise, that the International Criminal Court’s investigation into a particular situation allegedly prevents its escalation and allegedly deters the parties from committing serious crimes under international law. Of course, that sounds great, but let us take a look at the reality.”
2023-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9469 (2023) · source
“In that regard, we wish to propose another measure. Let us consider recalling from the International Criminal Court situations that had previously been referred to it on Libya and the Sudan. If the Council could refer those situations to the Court, in our view they can therefore be recalled. That would be very useful because the Council would be free of having to listen to these so- called reports, and we would have an opportunity to begin to deal with delivering real assistance to those countries, including on the question of the reinforcement of their legal systems. The political process and national reconciliation must be in the hands of the peoples of those countries. The International Criminal Court is clearly not helping in that regard.”
2023-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9469 (2023) · source
“The only real priority for the International Criminal Court are made-to-order trials shamelessly paid for by Western countries, which pour millions of dollars into this pseudo-court under the guise of voluntary contributions. Against that backdrop, it is surprising to hear the International Criminal Court’s constant complaints about a lack of funds. Even its regular annual budget is thrice as large as that of the United Nations International Court of Justice, and that is not counting generous assistance from sponsors. Despite that, some of our colleagues on the Council are calling for considering additional injections of funds to assist the Court. We believe that we have observed the progressive deterioration of the Court for too long to believe that additional funds can somehow redress the situation.”
2023-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9469 (2023) · source
“Year after year, we read the same run-arrounds. The word order is the only thing that changes, but we continue the same discussion and, for some reason, pretend that something is happening. We read with great interest about Mr. Khan dealing with matters, for example, regarding migrants. However, what do we hear from him about that? We hear that he is cooperating with the structures of the European Union on that question, while he should in fact have been considering their violations against migrants. That picture is telling and common, and is the same on all fronts. In Darfur, for example, the situation is the same. The result is not just non-existent, it is negative, if we take into account the situations in Libya and the Sudan. At the end of the day, there is nothing surprising here.”
2023-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9469 (2023) · source
“Ms. Zabolotskaya (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Our position on the ineffective and politicized activities of the so-called International Criminal Court and its so-called Prosecutor was set out exhaustively during the Security Council’s previous meeting on this matter (see S/PV.9320). That position has not changed in any way, and is available for review in the verbatim record of 11 May 2023 and has also been posted on the website of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. Today, however, we once again have to pose the question: why is the Council spending time on useless run-arrounds with the International Criminal Court? In terms of substance, the Prosecutor’s latest report is as empty as his promise to prioritize the consideration of the situations referred by the Council.”
2023-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9469 (2023) · source
“The EU does everything it can to protect the blooming garden, as Mr. Borrell Fontelles put it, from visitors from the jungle. We have repeatedly raised this issue both from the standpoint of compliance with international law and from that of basic humanity. People are dying, and no one is being held accountable for it. Involved in this are EU countries who very often talk here about responsibility and the inadmissibility of impunity. It is clear to all that the situation will not change unless there are safe ports of landing for refugees rescued and intercepted at sea, in accordance with international law of the sea. We ask the High Commissioner to keep the Mediterranean region in the spotlight and to exert influence on the European Union in order to compel it to comply with its international obligations.”
2023-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9465 (2023) · source
“We would like to draw attention to the tragic situation of refugees from Africa who are forced to flee their homelands, which have been engulfed by conflict or destroyed by the irresponsible interference of Western States. For many who attempt to make it to Europe every year, the Mediterranean Sea has become a mass grave. From time to time, we witness terrible tragedies when the vessels of European Union (EU) coastal States choose not to extend a helping hand to people in distress, but instead deliberately push them out of their area of jurisdiction, condemning people to death. Some EU countries even forbid humanitarian and non-governmental organizations that have ships at their disposal from going to their aid, and those who try to save lives face criminal prosecution for complicity in trafficking in persons.”
2023-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9465 (2023) · source
“The mass exodus from Ukraine to Russia has continued in recent years due to the unceasing shelling of peaceful towns in Donbas by Ukrainian armed forces. Since February 2022, more than 5 million people have left the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics and the Kherson and Zaporizhzhya oblasts and moved to various regions of Russia. The Russian Federation is making every effort to receive and accommodate these persons and provide them with comprehensive assistance, including employment, enrolment in pre-school and school for children, social payments and benefits. Persons arriving from those regions are provided with free medical care and medicines. They are entitled to simplified legal status procedures. UNHCR staff in Moscow can see for themselves the effectiveness of our work and the decent living conditions we offer to refugees.”
2023-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9465 (2023) · source
“We believe that assistance in creating conditions that are conducive to the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their places of permanent residence is an important step towards achieving long-term stabilization in Syria. We call on UNHCR to support the implementation of the initiative for the voluntary return of Syrian refugees to their homeland. We note the efforts of UNHCR to resolve the problems of Ukrainian internally displaced persons and refugees. We recall that back in 2014, after the unconstitutional coup d’état in Kyiv and the ascent to power of ultra-radical nationalists who unleashed a civil war against the people of Donbas, hundreds of thousands of Russian and Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine fled to Russia.”
2023-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9465 (2023) · source
“However, our ability to do so is limited by unilateral restrictions, which we call to be lifted so as to allow us to transfer money for this purpose. The expanding geography of conflicts, poverty and economic inequalities continue to trigger an exodus of populations from their countries of origin. We would like to highlight that one cause of these negative phenomena is interference in the internal affairs of States dictated by neocolonial thinking. We attach great importance to continuing work to facilitate the voluntary return of Syrian refugees. According to UNHCR, more than 50,000 Syrians returned to their country in 2022, which is almost 15,000 more than in the previous year. It is important to note that this number is steadily growing.”
2023-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9465 (2023) · source
“We will work constructively at the upcoming second Global Refugee Forum, to be held in Geneva in December. We attach great importance to developing cooperation with UNHCR, the work of which is particularly valuable in situations of major humanitarian crises. We should like to express our special thanks to High Commissioner Grandi for drawing attention to the humanitarian crisis that is unfolding as a result of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As a practical contribution, among others, Russia advocates increasing the share of the regular budget going to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and we call on all States to support that initiative. While talking about money, we would also like to mention that Russia has always contributed to UNHCR and is ready to do so now as well.”
2023-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9465 (2023) · source
“Ms. Zabolotskaya (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are pleased to welcome United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi to this meeting. We listened to his briefing with interest. Assistance to refugees is an important area of international cooperation aimed at the maintenance of international peace, security and stability. The High Commissioner and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) contribute significantly to the achievement of those aims. Russia is committed to its obligations with regard to refugees and is taking measures to assist persons seeking protection. We view the Global Compact on Refugees as a key instrument for consolidating the efforts of the international community to protect the rights and improve the situation of refugees.”
2023-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9465 (2023) · source