YouSaid · the spoken record

Zacklin

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19
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2005-06-15
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2005-06-15
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1
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un-security-council

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  1. “They are really a blueprint, and it is quite obvious that there are quite a number of points that require further elucidation, some of which have been mentioned this afternoon, including, for example, questions of timing and questions of funding. The Secretariat will provide the information in response to those questions as we proceed in the next stage of the process. They are not easy questions to deal with, but we would be prepared to provide that information as soon as we are in a position to have further discussions with the Government of Burundi. The Secretary-General has made it clear that he wishes the Secretariat to proceed as soon as possible with the implementation of the recommendations, and we look forward to having further discussions with the representatives of the Government of Burundi shortly.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  2. “Mr. Zacklin: I listened very carefully to the statements that were made by the members of the Council in support of the Kalomoh report and its recommendations, and I paid particular attention to the statement by the Minister of Justice of Burundi, and in particular his confirmation that Burundi supports those recommendations. That is particularly important in the context of the question of national ownership, which, as I said in my own statement, is of vital importance to the success or failure of any accountability mechanism that we might put in place. The report of the Secretary-General and the recommendations are, of course, only a beginning.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  3. “It goes without saying that such a process should be based on a broad-based, genuine and transparent consultation with a range of national actors and civil society to ensure that the general legal framework for the establishment of judicial and non-judicial accountability mechanisms reflects the views and wishes of the people of Burundi and that the sense of national ownership is deep and genuine.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  4. “What is important is that whatever mode of financing is utilized, there should be viable, sustained funding that will permit the mechanisms to take root, fulfil their mandates and create the desired legacy of truth, reconciliation and justice. The report of the assessment mission has presented a comprehensive approach to the pursuit of truth and justice in Burundi. If that approach is acceptable to the Council, it should mandate the Secretary-General to engage in negotiations with the Government of Burundi on the practical implementation of the proposal to establish the truth commission and the special chamber with a view to concluding an agreement with the Government of Burundi on the terms and conditions for United Nations cooperation in the establishment and operation of the truth commission and the special chamber.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  5. “It is obvious, however, that the establishment of any accountability mechanism for Burundi will have to rely, virtually in its entirety, on international funding. There are a number of recent examples of both judicial and non-judicial accountability mechanisms being funded by voluntary contributions from Governments or by a mixture of such contributions and institutional support from the international and regional intergovernmental machinery. While that may not be ideal, if there is a true commitment on the part of Governments and the existing institutional framework in the rule-of-law sector, it can be done.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  6. “This sense of ownership is of critical importance, and it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the success or failure of such mechanisms will depend on the degree to which Burundi as a whole embraces the proposals. Given the deep ethnic divisions within Burundian society and the mutual distrust between the two ethnic groups, the mission strongly urges that the judges, prosecutor and defence counsel selected be known for their integrity, objectivity and impartiality and recognized in Burundi as transcending the ethnic divide. I would be remiss if I did not say a few words about funding. As national entities, neither accountability mechanism for Burundi would be entitled to financing through assessed contributions.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  7. “As part of this comprehensive approach to justice and the rule of law, properly organized and implemented, the establishment of a truth-telling mechanism and a special chamber in the court system of Burundi would have the added value of enhancing the capacity of the Burundian administration of justice, strengthening the judicial sector and leaving behind a legacy of international standards of justice and a core group of experienced judges, prosecutors, defence counsel and court managers. The establishment of such mechanisms for Burundi with mixed composition will serve to promote objectivity, impartiality and credibility. At the same time, it will promote a sense of national ownership through participation of Burundian nationals in both processes.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  8. “In an integrated approach to justice and the rule of law in post-conflict societies, the establishment of a judicial accountability mechanism clearly cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be seen as part of a whole, placed in the general context of overall judicial reform and capacity-building and pursued in tandem with other transitional justice and rule of law initiatives.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  9. “It is envisaged that the prosecutor's office and court management would include a substantial international component working alongside Burundi nationals. In proposing both a judicial and a non-judicial accountability mechanism, the mission has taken into account the Arusha Agreement, the needs and expectations of the Burundians so clearly expressed to the mission, the capacity of the Burundian administration of justice, established United Nations principles and practices and the practicality and feasibility of any proposed mechanism. In so doing, it has attempted to apply the lessons learned from the United Nations experience in establishing international tribunals and transitional justice mechanisms since 1993.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  10. “The legal basis for the establishment of the special chamber and the applicable law governing its operation will be the Burundian law, with the necessary modifications introduced to ensure procedural guarantees of fair trial and due process of law. In this connection, I should point out that, based on existing United Nations practice, in order for the United Nations to cooperate in the establishment of the special chamber, its founding instrument will have to exclude the death penalty from the sentencing framework and declare any amnesty given to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes invalid before the chamber. As in the case of the truth commission, the composition of the special chamber would be mixed, with a majority of international judges and an international prosecutor and a registrar.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  11. “Should there be concurrent operation, the modalities for cooperation could include a referral of cases from the commission to the chamber, the sharing of information and evidentiary material and, where appropriate, the sharing of services, knowledge and expertise. In deciding to recommend a special chamber within the court system of Burundi, the mission has opted for a judicial accountability mechanism located in the country and forming part of the Burundian court system. It is envisaged that the special chamber would have the competence to prosecute those bearing the greatest responsibility for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Burundi. Its temporal jurisdiction would be limited to specific phases of the conflict, and would include, as a minimum, the events between 1972 and 1993, inclusive.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  12. “The experience gained in establishing parallel judicial and non-judicial accountability mechanisms in Sierra Leone and East Timor will be helpful in determining the relationship between the truth commission and the proposed judicial accountability mechanism. The expeditious establishment of the truth commission for Burundi will ensure that, by the time a special chamber is established, the results of the investigations carried out by the commission could be shared with the prosecutor of the special chamber. As a matter of sequencing, it is possible that the two mechanisms will operate simultaneously for a certain period of time.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  13. “Given the state of the local administration of justice in Burundi, it also concluded that the likelihood of a local trial process meeting international standards of justice was questionable. The proposed truth commission would be established under the existing Burundian law, revised as appropriate. It would be composed of five members: three international and two national commissioners. The mandate of the commission would be to establish the historical facts and determine the causes and nature of the conflict in Burundi, classify the crimes committed since independence in 1962 and identify those responsible.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  14. “The mission has accordingly recommended the establishment of a non-judicial accountability mechanism in the form of a truth commission, and the establishment of a judicial accountability mechanism in the form of a special chamber within the court system of Burundi. The mission recognizes that this proposal is a departure from the letter - although not the spirit - of the Arusha Agreement. It was nevertheless convinced that the establishment of the two commissions envisaged under the Arusha Agreement, having virtually identical temporal and subject-matter jurisdiction, including powers of investigation, would create the inevitable and undesirable risk of overlapping jurisdictions and the possibility of contradictory findings, and would represent a misuse of scarce resources.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  15. “Against that background, the Secretariat assessment mission was mandated by the Council to determine the advisability and feasibility of establishing yet another commission of inquiry and to consider the relationship between the international judicial commission of inquiry and the national truth and reconciliation commission envisaged under the Arusha Agreement. Based on extensive consultations with representatives of the Government, political parties and civil society at large, and convinced of the acute need to support the peace process and, in the words of the Council, foster "truth and reconciliation while achieving justice" (S/2004/72, annex, para. 2), the mission considered modalities for establishing a twin accountability mechanism to clarify the historical truth, investigate the crimes and bring to justice those responsible.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  16. “In such a deeply divided society, where inter- ethnic killings in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991 and 1993 have formed part of a dreadful and deeply disturbing repetitive cycle, limiting the mandate of any inquiry to a single cycle of massacres and characterizing it - and it alone - as genocide was considered by many of the mission's interlocutors in Burundi as a partial and biased account of the events. The demands for the establishment of a commission of inquiry whose temporal jurisdiction extends over four decades of Burundi's recent history are thus an appeal for fairness in establishing and recounting the historical truth and putting the 1993 massacres in a broad historical perspective.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  17. “Their subject matter and their temporal jurisdiction were limited to the events of 1993, namely, the coup d'etat, the assassination of the President of Burundi and the massacres that followed. As the earlier 1972 massacre of Hutus was outside their mandate, a legal determination that the crime of genocide had been committed in Burundi was made only in respect of the 1993 massacres of Tutsis. While all four commissions recommended that if impunity is to be eradicated those responsible should be brought to account, no action has been taken on those recommendations by any United Nations organ.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  18. “The request in July 2002 by the then-President of Burundi, Pierre Buyoya, for the establishment of an international judicial commission of inquiry, which was foreseen in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, must be considered in the light of Burundi's history of ethnic conflict, the events that have taken place since the conclusion of the Arusha Agreement in 2000 and the experience gained by the United Nations in promoting justice and the rule of law over the past 12 years. It should also be examined against the background of four international commissions of inquiry established between 1993 and 1995, three of which were at the request of the Council. For all of their differences, the four commissions shared similar features.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source

  19. “Mr. Zacklin: I shall be brief. The report of the assessment mission, which was led by Assistant Secretary-General Kalomoh of the Department of Political Affairs in May of 2004, is before the Council and is self-explanatory. I will focus my remarks on the judicial and non-judicial mechanisms that have been recommended and place them in their national and international contexts.”

    2005-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5203 (2005) · source