YouSaid · the spoken record
Zenenga
- lines on the record
- 52
- first
- 1992-02-28
- most recent
- 2019-05-22
- sittings or episodes
- 4
- sources
- un-security-council
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“I would addjust one point to the lessons learned from Operation Badbaado, which is that joint planning and a comprehensive approach produced very good results. The meeting rose at 5.35 pm.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“We have very active and very capable staff counsellors who are helping in this difficult environment, and we believe that the deployment of the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General will also contribute immensely to the improvement of staff morale. We continue to update the staff on the progress we are making in repairing our relations with the Federal Government, and that is also helping to reduce tensions within the staff body. Another question posed by the representative of Germany was whether there had been a follow-up meeting to the Garowe schedule. As I indicated in the briefing, there has been no agreement on scheduling the next meeting, but the President and the Prime Minister continue to reach out to the federal member states. We are also encouraging them to resume their meetings.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“The United Nations Support Office in Somalia is doing its best to construct more accommodation facilities, especially office accommodations, so that we can decongest the areas where we have accommodated staff who are working in soft-skin offices, and also to construct areas for social gatherings that we had closed down because they were in open spaces that are vulnerable. The visit by Ms. DiCarlo contributed immensely to improving staff morale, as she engaged with them. We now have a stock-taking review being conducted by an independent team whose headquarters is deployed here. They are also engaging staff over the course of more than a week, and that is helping also to improve staff morale.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“I would cite the examples of the restoration of cooperation between the two tiers of Government; the completion of the review of the Constitution; preparations for elections, including the passage of the electoral law; and Somali National Army and police force generation to support the transition process and the ongoing related operations. There is also the issue of achieving the cluster of benchmarks that have been agreed under the economic reform process. We believe that if we make progress in these areas, that would also propel progress across the board. On the question raised by the representative of Germany on whether staffmorale is improved, I will say very briefly that the security environment is still very difficult.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“We are therefore continuing to encourage the resumption of dialogue and the scheduling of another meeting between the respective leaders of the federal member states and the Federal Government. It is important that they have a prior meeting ahead of the Somalia Partnership Forum. The representative of the United Kingdom also asked about key priorities on which the Forum could focus. The Federal Government has set out its priorities in the four road maps, all of which are important. However, we believe that the Somalia Partnership Forum and, going forward, all of us should focus on those key priorities that will propel progress across the board in Somalia. These are what we have called in our recent discussions the "must-not-fail priorities" that would open up the prospects of further progress on many fronts.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“Mr. Zenenga: I thank Council members for their statements of support and for the questions that they have raised. The questions raised by the representative of France have been addressed by previous speakers. I think I will therefore focus on only the questions from the United Kingdom and Germany. The question raised by the representative of the United Kingdom was about the prospects of the Somalia Partnership Forum. All partners in the Federal Government agree that holding that Partnership Forum is very important, and we are working towards that. There is a preparatory committee that is putting the technical preparations in place. However, as long as cooperation between the federal member states and the Federal Government leaders is not restored, it might be very difficult to convene that meeting.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“All national stakeholders need to collaborate effectively in responding to the imminent drought and avert a famine. And key relationships, including with national stakeholders, international partners and regional Powers, both in the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf, should be nurtured. The trajectory is upward and positive. We can all work together to energize Somalia's population and their international partners towards reform and progress.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“However, the ongoing deterioration in relations between Somalia and Kenya, emanating from the maritime boundary dispute, is worrisome. It has implications for Somalia's State-building and peacebuilding efforts. Dialogue, not only between Kenya and Somalia but also with other member States of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, is essential for lowering tensions and for addressing the fundamental issues that have created the continuing tensions. Somalia has immense opportunities to make further progress in the coming months. For that to happen, its leaders at the federal and subfederal levels must agree to work together in a spirit of consensus. Parliament must focus on passing priority legislation in a timely manner.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“We continue to urge the federal and regional authorities to draw lessons from South West state, as well as good practices from the Puntland elections, and to manage disputes in the upcoming electoral processes in a manner that avoids conflict and ensures transparency and fairness. The dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland, which also has implications for the completion of the constitutional review process, remains stalled. We are, however, encouraged by the remarks of Somaliland's President Muse Bihi Abdi on 18 May, expressing his readiness to promote peace with Puntland, including through the exchange of prisoners, and to cooperate with Somalia on issues related to security, trade and education. The positive dynamics in the Horn of Africa region hold great opportunities for Somalia to realize its strategic and economic potential.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“While it was an important step towards the resumption of dialogue, the consultative meeting held between the leaders of the Federal Government and the federal member states in Garowe from 5 to 10 May failed to reach agreement on any of the substantive issues and on the date, format and venue of the next meeting. Together with other international partners, we continue to encourage the Federal Government and federal member state leaders to urgently resume dialogue and cooperation, which are indispensable for the sustainable implementation of reforms. The disputed electoral processes in Galmudug and Jubaland, scheduled respectively for July and August, were discussed during the consultative meeting. They have become a source of concern. As was the case in South West state last year, the risk of violence is very high.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“The Federal Government's reform efforts have encountered inevitable resistance. The economic reforms and security sector reforms in particular entail dismantling a war economy that had flourished for decades. There are many vested interests, which pose obstacles to increased accountability. Taking on those vested interests requires not only the determination, which the Federal Government has shown, but also an inclusive approach of building relationships with all stakeholders to demonstrate that the reforms will yield benefits for the whole nation. The full and sustainable implementation of Somalia's priorities hinges on the restoration of cooperation between the leadership of the Federal Government and the federal member states.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“Important progress has also been made on human rights. Following the violence that resulted in civilian casualties during the elections in South-West State last December, both the Federal Government and the South- West State authorities completed investigations into the killing of civilians. South-West State also conducted reconciliation meetings with the communities involved and agreed to pay reparations to the families of the victims. On 18 May, the Federal Parliament ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The ratification will now go to the President for his signature. I congratulate the Federal Government on that important step to promote and protect the rights of persons with disabilities. Somalia continues to grapple with significant challenges.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“The draft political parties bill and the electoral bill were approved by the federal Cabinet and submitted to Parliament. However, the electoral bill remains a contentious issue with the federal member states. The adoption of those bills is absolutely essential for the political road map to remain on track, and we urge all stakeholders to work towards reaching agreement that can be translated into parliamentary approval in the coming months. A technical revision of 9 of the 15 chapters of the Somali Provisional Federal Constitution was undertaken. That is a significant achievement. However, progress will ultimately be measured against political agreements between the leaders of the Federal Government and the federal member states on key areas of the Constitution, including power- and resource-sharing.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“In an unprecedented development, the current military operations, supported by the African Union Military Observer Mission in Somalia, UNSOS and international partners, have catalysed joint planning and the systematic generation of capable, accountable, acceptable and affordable Somali National Army units. They have also demonstrated the value of a comprehensive approach to security by incorporating stabilization and policing elements in military operations and have reinvigorated implementation of the transition plan. Technical preparations for universal suffrage elections in 2020 are making progress. The process of identifying potential voter registration sites began this month. The National Independent Electoral Commission opened offices in most of the federal member states.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“All 16,000 registered soldiers now receive their salaries directly into their bank accounts. That has cut out middlemen and reduced corruption and ensures the regular payment of salaries to military personnel. It also paves the way for rightsizing the National Army. In parallel with those security sector reforms, the Federal Government launched military operations in Lower Shabelle region to advance the transition plan, degrade Al-Shabaab in strongholds that are contiguous to Mogadishu and thereby stop the recent increase in Al-Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“There was also progress on the inclusive politics agenda, including the constitutional review process and preparations for the universal suffrage elections. At the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in April, participants commended Somalia for the achievements on its economic reforms. The satisfactory completion of the third staff-monitored programme has enabled the design of a fourth such programme that will pave the way for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative decision point, anticipated in early 2020. The Federal Government decided to apply the same rigorous approach to bring accountability and transparency to the security sector. For instance, biometric registration of all Somali National Army soldiers was completed on 3 March.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“Those include preparations for the 2020 elections, the constitutional review process, capacity-building of the police and contributing to the planning for ongoing security operations, including stabilization activities. Working together with other international partners, we are also using our good offices to encourage dialogue between the Federal Government and the federal member states. Despite the challenging security environment and the recurrent political crises, as well as the capacity constraints and Challenges of managing political obstacles to its reform agenda, Somalia has remained on a positive trajectory. During the reporting period the country made significant progress on its economic and security sector reforms.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“Building on Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo's visit to Mogadishu in February, my discussions with Prime Minister Hassan Khayre have been constructive. We have agreed on arrangements to restore and strengthen the Mission's engagement with the Government, and the Prime Minister has assured me of his commitment to strengthening the relationship ahead of the arrival of the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General. There will be challenges on the road ahead and there are still issues that will test the relationship with the Federal Government. But we are certainly in a better place than we were at the beginning of the year. Mandate implementation is back on track, particularly in the areas where we deliver technical support.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“Working together with the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and the United Nations country team, we have taken measures to provide more secure accommodation and working space for our staff and to strengthen our resilience to mortar attacks. I thank UNSOS for the support that it has provided. However, a lasting solutionution to the continuing security threat will come from denying Al-Shabaab the space and opportunities to prepare and launch attacks. The United Nations system and international partners are working together to enable the Somali security forces to take control of areas used to launch mortars and to support the implementation of a comprehensive Mogadishu security plan. We are making good progress on resetting UNSOM's relations with the Federal Government.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“Mr. Zenenga: Allow me to express my good wishes for the holy month of Ramadan. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) began the new year facing a security crisis as a result of the mortar attack on the United Nations compound on 1 January and a political crisis as a result of the expulsion of Special Representative of the Secretary-General Nicholas Haysom on the same day. The two incidents severely disrupted mandate implementation and the Mission's engagement with the Federal Government of Somalia. They also elevated the security risk level for United Nations personnel and left our staff deeply demoralized. We immediately prioritized the safety and security of our staff, while concentrating our efforts on mending relations with the Federal Government and putting mandate implementation back on track.”
2019-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8533 (2019) · source
“We therefore trust that the Security Council and other relevant legislative bodies will support the recommendations of the strategic assessment and continue to provide the necessary resources required to enable the United Nations system to support Somalia's ambitious undertakings. I wish to thank all members of the Council for their strong and unified position on supporting Somalia's peacebuilding and State-building agenda and for supporting the United Nations team in Somalia.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“The findings and recommendations of the review will be presented to the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council for their consideration. The joint review builds on the strategic assessment of the United Nations presence in Somalia, which was conducted from 5-15 March, at the Council's request. In his letter of 5 May, addressed to you, Sir, the Secretary- General transmitted the results of the assessment. I wish to emphasize the Secretary-General's observation in the letter that, as the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia is adjusted according to new priorities, some elements of the United Nations support to Somalia over the next four years will create demands for increased resources.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“and the Somali security forces; secondly, identifying the necessary tasks for AMISOM, taking into account the national security architecture and the comprehensive approach to security; thirdly, identifying the range of security actors that play a role in Somalia and making recommendations on the preferred relationships and division of responsibilities among them; fourthly, making recommendations on AMISOM's future configuration to facilitate a smooth conditions-based transition to Somali security forces; fifthly, developing recommendations on what a conditions-based transition should look like and, finally, identifying the required support to AMISOM and the Somali security forces, tied to the transition plan.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“It sets out a mutual accountability framework, as well as specific partnership principles and enabling actions, based on which Somalia and its international partners will work together to meet the priority political, security and economic recovery goals identified in Somalia's national development plan. Somalia and its partners agreed to meet again in October, to follow up on the commitments made in London. At that meeting, they will consider a financing strategy for the national security architecture, in line with the comprehensive approach to security. The London Conference has therefore added momentum to the efforts to advance Somalia's key priorities. The joint AU-United Nations review focuses on six key tasks: first, establishing a baseline assessment of AMISOM.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“That is reflected in two key agreements that came out of the Conference. One is the security pact between Somalia and 42 international partners. The pact endorses the national security architecture agreement, sets out milestones for the rapid development of Somalia's security forces and recognizes that AMISOM. remains critical to securing Somalia, while also expressing support for a conditions-based transition from AMISOM. to Somali security forces, with clear target dates linked to the agreed milestones. It also outlines a coordination and implementation mechanism to ensure the coherent delivery of support by international partners. The second document defines a new partnership for Somalia.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“We must acknowledge that the absence of an agreed-on national security architecture and the disorganized delivery by international partners of security-sector support over the past eight years have contributed equally to the lack of progress in building capable and legitimate security forces in Somalia. That is why the outcome of the London Conference on Somalia, which took place six days ago, and the joint African Union (AU) and United Nations review of AMISOM. and Somali security forces, which is currently under way, are so important. The London Conference provided a unique opportunity for Somalia to present its agenda to international partners and reach agreement on the framework for cooperation to realize key priorities, anchored in the principle of mutual accountability.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“Similarly, timely progress in reviewing the Constitution, synchronized with both the painstaking process of securing political agreements on key issues and the preparations for the 2020 elections in a challenging political and security context, requires complex coordination between the Somali institutions concerned and reinforcement of their capacity. Such cohesion is imperative not just among the relevant Somali institutions but also among the many international partners that deliver support to Somalia's security sector and its key political processes.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“The Somali institutions responsible for implementing the Government's agenda over the next four years are suffering from severe capacity shortfalls. The target dates set out in the political agreement on the national security architecture and other plans will not be met without substantial and coherent support from international partners. The work related to the national security architecture must be harmonized with arrangements for the conditions-based transition of primary responsibility for the country's security from AMISOM. to Somalia's security forces, which is expected to start in 2018. That will require a high degree of coordination that exceeds the current capacity of the country's institutions.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“An inclusive approach to governance and access to basic services is therefore critical to preventing and countering violent extremism. We welcome the Federal Government's efforts to mediate between Galmudug state and Ahl Al-Sunna Wal-Jama'a. The dialogue must continue. Reconciliation with Ahl Al-Sunna is critical to the viability and security of Galmudug state, including its efforts to address the threat from piracy. While it is premature to talk ofa return to the peak era of piracy off the coast of Somalia, the recent hijackings of ships remind us that the progress achieved so far could be reversed. Robust counter-piracy efforts, including increased patrolling of Somali waters, should continue, accompanied by greater support to building the capacity of Somalia's maritime law-enforcement services.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“and the Somali forces will yield sustainable outcomes only if they are planned in a coordinated manner and conducted in compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law. The current humanitarian crisis should be taken into account, vulnerable populations properly protected and arrangements put in place for holding and building recovered areas, including local administrations acceptable to the local communities. The vigorous implementation of the United Nations human rights due diligence policy is important as we continue to enable AMISOM. operations and help to accelerate the building of Somali security forces. Al-Shabaab feeds on shortfalls in governance, particularly in the areas of human rights, justice and the rule of law, and the delivery of basic services.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“and Somali national army offensive operations; conducting special counter- terrorism operations by those of Somalia's partners in a position to do so; fostering the extension of State authority; addressing governance deficits; and resolving local conflicts, while at the same time providing incentives to elements wishing to take advantage of President Farmajo's offer of amnesty. Support enabling AMISOM. to carry out effective operations must accompany and complement the implementation of the national security architecture agreement. There is no question of choosing one over the other. In the short term, therefore, AMISOM needs predictable funding, ideally through assessed contributions. Offensive operations by AMISOM.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“As we welcome the advent of a new chapter in Somalia and the unique opportunities it has unlocked, we are not oblivious to the scale and complexity of the hurdles facing the Somali Government during the long four-year journey that lies ahead. Continued insecurity, owing primarily but not exclusively to Al-Shabaab attacks, remains the biggest challenge. We applaud AMISOM. for providing the backbone for security in Somalia over the past 10 years. Its joint efforts with the Somali security forces, with support from international partners, have made possible the progress the country has achieved so far. However, Al-Shabaab still has the capacity to disrupt and impede the peace- and State-building process. Fighting it requires a multi-pronged approach that combines staging AMISOM.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“In addition, it provides a model for other essential political agreements on such key issues as the management of natural resources, revenue sharing and the broader definition of the respective powers and responsibilities of the Federal Government and the federal member states. The agreement makes it possible for international partners to support Somalia's security sector in a more coherent manner. The national security architecture agreement and the new policing model, adopted last year, should now be complemented by a political agreement defining a federal model for the justice and corrections sectors.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“They have also shown the necessary commitment to working with the private sector and engaging constructively with Somalia's international partners. On 16 April, just two months into President Farmajo's term of office, the leaders concluded a political agreement on the long-awaited national security architecture. It defines the size, structure, composition, command and control, and financing arrangements for Somalia's security forces, based on a federal model. Its significance is enormous. It provides a framework for the accelerated development of acceptable, accountable, affordable and able security forces. It will also have a catalytic effect on efforts to reinforce governance and increase revenue generation.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“The fifth and last is fostering reconciliation and resolving the many long- standing local conflicts in the country. The universal elections to be held in 2020 will be a defining litmus test of the progress that has been made towards building a properly functioning State. In the past two months, the Federal Government and federal member state leaders have taken important first steps that have reinforced the prevailing hope that these key peace- and State-building priorities can be accomplished during the new Government's current term. They have demonstrated the will to secure the political agreements that are essential to such progress. The leaders recognize that the current credibility gap dividing Government institutions from the general population needs to be addressed.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“The first is building security and police forces that are capable of protecting its population and that can start taking over responsibility for security from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The second is promoting economic recovery so that it can generate revenues, create jobs, start delivering basic social services and reduce the country's overdependence on donors. The third is instituting appropriate measures for effective management of public funds, coupled with rooting out corruption - which is as great a threat to stability as the prevailing insecurity - and accelerating progress in clearing arrears in order to secure financing from international financial institutions through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative process. The fourth is completing the review of the Constitution and strengthening federalism.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“In parallel, steps must be taken to build Somalia's capacity to withstand recurrent humanitarian crises triggered by extreme climatic conditions. Somalia will continue to lurch from one avoidable humanitarian crisis to another unless resilience is fostered by addressing the country's structural problems. Investment in capacity- building for relevant State institutions and development- oriented approaches should be prioritized to enable the country to better cope with future humanitarian crises. Improving security, generating revenues and fighting corruption will also increase resilience. Somalia now has a unique opportunity to overcome its current fragility and build a functional State in the coming four years. To realize this vision, the country needs to make progress on the following priorities.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“The crisis is unlikely to abate any time soon. Mortality and protection risks, especially for women and children, continue to rise as drought conditions force nomads to migrate from rural areas to towns. Sexual violence in the IDP camps is on the rise. The scaled-up response of the humanitarian agencies has averted a famine thus far, but the crisis is unlikely to abate any time soon. The needs for humanitarian assistance are increasing faster than the pace of the response. So far, only half of the 3 million people in need of food have been reached. A total of $669 million has been received or pledged for the ongoing humanitarian effort, leaving a gap of $831 million in the revised 2017 humanitarian response plan. Donor contributions and commitments therefore need to be further scaled up.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“Mr. Zenenga: When Special Representative of the Secretary-General Keating addressed the Council two months ago (see (S/PV.79()5), Somalia's new Cabinet had just been announced and the Secretary-General had just visited the country at a time that he aptly described as a moment of both tragedy and hope. The tragedy, emanating from the severe drought, continues to unfold. The humanitarian crisis has deteriorated more rapidly than was originally projected. Assessments conducted in April indicate critical levels of acute malnutrition among pastoral and agricultural populations, and also among internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Baidoa and Mogadishu. The expected relief from the Gu rains has not materialized. The rains arrived late and a substantial loss of livestock has already occurred. Food security is also expected to further decline.”
2017-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7942 (2017) · source
“We therefore appeal to Member States to form a similar coalition, commit the same level of military capabilities and deploy the multinational force to stabilize Mogadishu and prepare the ground for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. That operation would then carry forward the task of consolidating peace, establishing a secure environment in the rest of the country and working with other partners to help rebuild the Somali State.”
2008-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6020 (2008) · source
“These crucial operations have been extremely valuable in securing food deliveries for the 3.2 million people in Somalia, who are dependent on humanitarian assistance. At the same time, we are also mindful of the fact that piracy and the recent terrorist attacks against international targets are only symptoms of the fundamental problem, which is the state of anarchy in Somalia. These threats to international peace and security cannot be successfully eradicated without tackling the state of lawlessness in Mogadishu. We believe that the approach pursued by Member States in the efforts to combat piracy sets an example of what is required to tackle the real source of the security challenges in Somalia.”
2008-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6020 (2008) · source
“It is important to draw lessons from the Somalia operations of the 1990s, in which a multinational force, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), succeeded in stabilizing Mogadishu and a United Nations peacekeeping force with lesser capabilities failed. We would like to stress that the multinational force, as described in the Secretary-General's report, is not a maximalist approach. It is a limited, targeted operation, deployed in Mogadishu only. It will have the focused goal of supporting critical aspects of the Djibouti Agreement and preparing the ground for the deployment of a follow-on United Nations peacekeeping operation. We would like to express our appreciation to Member States that have committed assets to anti- piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, under Security Council resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008).”
2008-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6020 (2008) · source
“The letters sent to Member States by the Secretary-General were in addition to bilateral meetings he held with several leaders in September, during which he raised this important issue. In doing so, he has reiterated his view that the current conditions in Somalia are not ready for a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The Council is aware of the need to ensure that any force deploying in the complex conditions in Somalia must have the appropriate military capacities, which would not be available to a typical United Nations peacekeeping force. As we experienced in the 1990s, a force lacking in the right capabilities can easily get bogged down and fail.”
2008-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6020 (2008) · source
“No country has come forward at this stage to pledge a lead contingent. Several have indicated that they are considering the proposal carefully. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has received and responded to a large number of inquiries from Permanent Missions in New York about the details of the 08-6107] envisaged multinational force, particularly the expected mandate, tasks, composition, areas and duration of deployment, financial implications and support arrangements. On 17 November, the Secretariat convened a meeting of the 50 Member States and three international organizations to whom the letters of the Secretary-General were addressed. At that meeting, we provided additional information based on the inquiries received.”
2008-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6020 (2008) · source
“However, many Member States have indicated that they will need more time to respond. The first replies are now beginning to trickle in. The few responses received so far are mixed. To date, we have received a total of seven formal responses. Of these, one Member State expressed support for the multinational force and offered to contribute equipment, airlift capacity or funding, as required, but indicated that it was not in a position to provide the lead contingent or troops. Four Member States advised that they are unable to contribute troops to a multinational force, owing to concerns of overstretch. Two of the three organizations approached expressed readiness to help facilitate funding from their member States. The remaining 45 countries and one organization approached have yet to respond formally.”
2008-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6020 (2008) · source
“On 18 September, DPKO convened a meeting with members of the Security Council at the level of experts to seek their suggestions and support regarding the mobilization of countries that could contribute to the multinational force. Proposals were received from a number of Council members in that regard. As indicated in the report of the Secretary- General, on 24 October the Secretary-General wrote to 50 countries identified as potential contributors of either one or all of the needed elements for the multinational force, that is, equipment, troops or funding. He also wrote to three international organizations to appeal for funding and help in mobilizing potential troop contributors. Given the 60-day deadline set by the Security Council, the Secretary-General, in his letters to potential contributors, requested responses by 4 November.”
2008-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6020 (2008) · source
“It is expected that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) will form part of the multinational force, as explained in the report. The envisaged follow-on United Nations peacekeeping operation would also absorb AMISOM. troops. In that regard, the team of 19 United Nations planning experts that is currently assigned to African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa is, among other things, providing advice on the deployment of AMISOM contingents in accordance with United Nations standards. With respect to the third task, DPKO has developed a list of Member States and international organizations identified as possible lead nations or potential troop, financing or equipment contributors to the multinational force.”
2008-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6020 (2008) · source
“With regard to the first two tasks, the Secretary- General's report (S/2008/709) provides the requested information on the envisaged multinational force, including its tasks, size and area of deployment. The report also explains the phased deployment of the multinational force, leading to a follow-on United Nations peacekeeping operation that would be deployed, as stipulated in resolution 1814 (2008), at an appropriate time and subject to progress on the political process and improvements in the security situation on the ground. The proposed tasks of the follow-on United Nations peacekeeping operation are described in paragraph 49 of the report before the Council. DPKO sent a planning team to Addis Ababa in September to develop the requested description of the envisaged multinational force jointly with the African Union (AU).”
2008-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6020 (2008) · source
“Mr. Zenenga: Thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief the Council on the actions taken by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) with respect of the Council's presidential statement of 4 September (S/PRST/2008/33). In the presidential statement, the Council requested the Secretary-General to undertake three tasks: first, to provide a detailed description of a feasible multinational force; secondly, to provide a detailed concept of operations for a feasible United Nations peacekeeping operation; and, thirdly, to identify and approach States that might contribute the required financial resources, personnel, equipment and services for the envisaged multinational force.”
2008-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6020 (2008) · source
“We lock forward to the periodic reports by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution, and join in the calls to all Member States to assist in any way they can in the rehabilitation of Cambodia, especially with regard to the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. Finally, the mammoth cost of implementing the plan is at the forefront of our consideration. Although we feel that no price is too great for peace, we hope that in the appropriate forums of our Organization ways and means of reducing this cost will be found to everyone's satisfaction. We are painfully aware that other conflicts still exist where our Organization will be called upon to launch similar operations, and therefore realize the need to conserve our resources for this purpose as much as possible.”
1992-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3057 (1992) · source