YouSaid · the spoken record

Zuma

lines on the record: 92
first: 2002-12-04
most recent: 2012-01-12
sittings or episodes: 4
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“With regard to ceasefire agreements, in my report last year, I indicated that at the signing of the agreement between the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie - Forces pour la defense de la democratie (CNDD-FDD) of Mr. Nkurunziza and the Transitional Government, certain outstanding issues still needed to be negotiated. They included the participation of the former armed movements in the transitional institutions of the State and Parliament, as well as issues relating to disarmament and demobilization and the building of a new inclusive security apparatus in Burundi.”
2003-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4876 (2003) · source
“The African Mission is headed by Ambassador Bah, the Special Representative of the African Union in Burundi, who is assisted by three deputies from South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. It integrates a military component, under the command of Major- General Sipho Binda of South Africa, comprising contingents from Mozambique, Ethiopia and South Africa. It also has a military observer component of 43 members from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia. The Joint Ceasefire Commission of the African Mission in Burundi is led by General Alioune Samba, of the United Nations. As of the end of November, the total strength of the force stood at 2,656 men and women. The Mission is widely regarded as a shining example and model of African solutions to continental security challenges.”
2003-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4876 (2003) · source
“The objectives of the African Mission are to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreements - a task it continues to undertake effectively, to our satisfaction; to support the disarmament and demobilization initiatives and advise on the reintegration of ex-combatants - a task it has begun to execute efficiently, as will be reported on in this presentation; to contribute to political and economic stability in Burundi - a responsibility it has executed exceptionally - in assisting the implementation of all agreements and preparing the groundwork for the social and economic reconstruction of Burundi; and to work to achieve conditions that are favourable for the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission - again, a task executed professionally and successfully - leading to our presence here today to say that the time has come for the United Nations to become actively involved.”
2003-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4876 (2003) · source
“It was founded in terms of a decision of the nineteenth Summit Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, which was held in Tanzania in December 2002. The establishment of the African mission was, in our View, in line with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, which supports the establishment of regional initiatives for the resolution of conflicts, provided such arrangements are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Reference is also made to such initiatives in Chapter VI, which provides for the use of regional initiatives for the resolution of disputes without the active, direct involvement - but with the full support - of the United Nations.”
2003-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4876 (2003) · source
“That assistance will help to consolidate the gains already made, prepare the ground for successful democratic elections in 11 months' time and firmly place Burundi on the road to lasting peace and stability. We are pleased to report that tremendous progress has been made over the past year, and that we are ending 2003 on a positive note due to the significant developments that have taken place. Those have included the establishment of the African mission in Burundi, the conclusion of outstanding negotiations and the implementation of various agreements, including with regard to power-sharing and the transformation of the security apparatus. The African mission, which was just a concept at this time last year, was successfully established in March 2003, and has worked tirelessly to fulfil its mandate.”
2003-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4876 (2003) · source
“Thank you very much, Mr. President, for affording me the honour of once again addressing the Security Council. It has been exactly one year since I was last afforded this privilege, having made a presentation to the Security Council on 4 December last year. The twentieth summit of the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, which was held on 16 November 2003 in Tanzania under the leadership of President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Chairperson of the Regional Initiative on Burundi, and President Joaquim Chissano, Chairperson of the African Union, has mandated me, as facilitator, to report to the Security Council again and to request urgent direct assistance for the Burundi peace process.”
2003-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4876 (2003) · source
“The other possible thing that might be done to the FNL - and the heads of State have talked about this - is the possible sanctions. Of course, I must also say that the FNL is not as big as the CNDD-FDD. It operates more in rural areas of Bujumbura and has been confined in one place most of the time, unlike the CNDD-FDD. So we believe that what is happening - and particularly with the Council's support here, and the call upon the FNL to come into the process - must have an impact.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“Take it from us; we are very committed to dealing with those problems. As I have indicated, the Constitutive Act of the African Union specifically addresses the problems in the continent. As you know, in the NEPAD we have also identified the problems of conflict as the main obstacle. Therefore, we are in the process of dealing with this. Your support for this agreement is really welcome, and in any case, this is what we expected from this Organization, because it is in keeping with the beliefs and, indeed, with the mission of the United Nations. Thank you very much for the support. I am convinced that from here on we will be in a better position to work with confidence and understanding that there is support by this body for what we are doing. With the Council's support I am sure that we will do more than we have.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“They will be very helpful in terms of making the country able to deal with the processes in which it is involved. Those are some of the areas that will need support from the Security Council. We believe that it should not be difficult for the Security Council to be able to provide it. I take it that some of the questions that have been asked were, in a sense, repeated and that, in answering the few that I have answered, they have actually dealt with that issue, including the question on how the FNL sees itself, the agreement and the process. I think, at the end, I must express our gratitude for the support that the Security Council has shown in this matter. This is more than pleasing, more than encouraging, particularly as we are dealing with a number of problems in the continent.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“The African Union has not elaborated the manner in which these things should be done in terms of how to deal with peacekeeping if it has to do so from the beginning. While the Constitutive Act of the African Union says that this is what the continent must do, it is still developing that capacity, so we will certainly benefit from the expertise of the United Nations in the process of planning and discussing the implementation. We believe that this is among the things on which the United Nations could help. The United Nations could also call upon the international community - particularly the donors who have been holding the funds, since there has been no ceasefire - to release those funds now that the biggest group has signed the ceasefire Agreement.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“There is also going to be the need for support to feed the combatants who are going to be at the assembly points. One member asked about the strength of the CNDD-FDD. It is always difficult to give the accurate strength of a movement of that nature, but they are counted in the thousands. Some people talk about 10,000 or more people who are going to emerge. Certainly, the United Nations will have to support them. I think there will be other things to be supported. One is something that I talked about - the process of integration into the Transitional Government institutions of the new people who are coming in and assistance in strengthening those institutions as well. But there are also the issues of technical support. As members can see, the time frames are not long.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“If we were to do that, however, we would certainly need support, while understanding, as the heads of State understand it, that this is a bridging mechanism to open and clear the way so that we have a perfect situation for the United Nations to come into. It is going to need support because, as members know, the African countries do not have all the resources. Here, they are going to put the commitment into action, but they are going to need support from the Security Council to bolster that effort. One specific action might be, for example, to airlift those forces, wherever they are. That help will be necessary so that they are able to arrive on time. Of course, that will mean not necessarily that the Security Council will have to commit troops, but that there will be that kind of support.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“But of course, I think it would be fair to say that we are expecting a number of things that we believe the United Nations could do. This agreement, as we explained, is not like a classic kind of agreement that is reached, particularly because we still have the FNL factor and the combatants of the CNDD-FDD coming into the assembly points. Only there are their arms taken from them and stored within. That is precisely the reason why the heads of State thought it was important to come in with the African mission so that we could deal with that situation and not ask the impossible from the Security Council, given the rules that are in effect.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“All it has been putting across is certain conditions, and I believe, given the situation - and I think that, as a movement, it must also be analysing the situation - that with the signing by the CNDD-FDD, FNL has no other group to stand with and refuse to sign. So I am hopeful that it will sign and come into the process. It has been reported that FNL has publicly welcomed this Agreement and that in itself seems to me to be a positive indication on its part. The other question that has been asked by a number of members is: What do we think the Security Council or the United Nations could do to help? Well, I think that this body is more experienced in matters of this nature and will certainly know what it is that needs to be done to help such a situation.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“But the bulk of those preconditions are actually the issues that are being addressed already within Bujumbura. One example is the issue of political prisoners, on which there has been a lot of work done with the participation of the United Nations. So I believe that, now that the CNDD-FDD has taken a decision to be part of this Agreement, that in itself is going to impact positively on the FNL. We will see in the course of December how that one goes. I do not think one can give a categorical answer as to whether it is going to come in or not, but since I have engaged with FNL over two years, it has never said that it was not committed to peace.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“I think there is a determination by the region that we cannot have a situation in which the peace process is undermined by one party, when about 22 parties have signed the Agreement. They all committed to peace and this party that defines itself as outside peace will be defining itself as anti-peace. Therefore, decisions will be taken. Whether there will be a summit or not I do not know, but it did not seem that the heads of State wanted to call a summit on this issue alone. I think they have, in a sense, a position they would like to take, but they have felt it necessary to persuade FNL to come into the process and have instructed me to try my level best to persuade it to do so. I have started communicating with FNL. I have a hope that it will come in, because when we last met it stipulated its preconditions.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“Those who are inside will move in a particular way to the assembly points, as the Agreement stipulates, but those who are outside will also have to be transported back into the country. A mechanism will be worked out, but, again, bringing those forces from outside is one element that will need support. Of course, one would imagine, whatever the forces may be - since these are the two forces that signed before - that this will cover all of them. The other question is: What are the possibilities of FNL coming into the process? I believe that the possibilities are there. The call was made by the summit very deliberately that FNL should come and quickly conclude the agreement before 30 December and that if did not do so - as this was the second chance that was given to FNL - appropriate action would be taken.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“That is why, on the question of the army, while the army will take a clear, defensive posture and will also have heavy armaments that were meant to attack and deal with the armed groups, it will have to be limited. But the point is taken that, while FNL is there, one will expect certain elements of the army to be specifically charged with the task of dealing with that issue. As to the details, they will be worked out, first, by the army and, secondly, by the Joint Commission. In fact, both parties agreed that they will collaborate and work together to ensure that they are able to deal with the issue of FNL. The other question has been: How will the CNDD-FDD forces that are outside the country come back? Certainly, those are the details that are going to be worked out together by the Joint Commission.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“I am also optimistic that it will not be difficult for the international community, the United Nations, to help in this. Because of the three-year period that has been allowed for this process in Burundi, there are actually two years left. So, any financial support for this year has a very definite time period within which you might have to take action. I would imagine that, after discussion among the parties, they will be able to come up with very specific requirements on the material support that they will need. But there is no problem in everyone agreeing that this should happen. One of the questions was how will the army operate, given the FNL factor. I think that quite a number of questions have arisen on that issue. It was taken into account when the two parties were reaching an agreement.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“The inclusion of the parties that have signed the agreement will mean further expansion of that Government. The question is, how can we support that? It will need resources as well. You cannot have them sign the agreement and not participate in planning and taking decisions on how the Government will work. That is the challenge. There is no difficulty having all sides agree that they are going to participate. What is left is working out the details: how it will be done and what percentage of the new parties coming in will participate? I would imagine that the support we are talking about will certainly include that process of integration, because for peace we do need the parties coming in to participate. In fact, it might be more important for those who came late to be shown the benefits of signing and therefore of participating.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“The question is: how will those groups come in? I do not think that they have any alternative to coming in; they have to come in. First, if groups are party to an agreement, you cannot envisage a situation in which, when some of the provisions of the agreement are implemented, those groups are not party to the decision-making or are not part of the implementation of that decision. So, of necessity, they have got to be part of the institutions. There is no difficulty about it. They have got to participate at the executive level, as well as in the Parliament. And they have also made the point about civil servants. However, that raises a new challenge, because the Transitional Government is, by nature, bigger than the Government that has always existed in Burundi. It had to accommodate all 19 parties.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“I thank the Council for the comments made and the questions asked. I will try to respond. One of the questions that many members have asked is how will the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and others be integrated into the Transitional Government. All parties signed the Arusha Agreement, but the Burundi Government has passed an act stating that the parties that come in will have to sign that act, committing themselves to participating. Having done that, they have to come in. The issue has been raised with the Burundi Government, because if those parties were not there at the installation of the Transitional Government, it means that they are not party to the Government at the moment. You have the Government and all the existing institutions such as the Parliament.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“We hope we can count on the international community to invest in this peace and ensure that we eliminate conflict, once and for all, in Burundi.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“Many people initially thought the Pretoria Agreement between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo would be impossible to implement; yet, within the deadline Rwanda left the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is therefore possible that with initiatives by Africans, and with the commitment shown by Africans, we can move and address the conflicts in the continent. Again, many thought that the Arusha Agreement would not be concluded in 2000, and it was. They thought there would never be a transitional government in Burundi, yet it was installed on 1 November 2001. This shows that regional solutions work if people are determined to succeed. All they need is support from this body. Burundi is now poised for peace.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“In addition, the Chairperson of the AU, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, has taken a hands-on approach to conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region, and we value his contribution to the process, not least by allowing his Deputy to spend so much time on Burundi matters. Once again, Mr. President, thank you for allowing me the honour of interacting with you today. We have come a long way with the Burundi peace process, and we know that we cannot achieve the results we seek if we work alone. We need the wholehearted support of the United Nations and the international community. We are convinced that peace will be sustained, for we have experience in this regard.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“I must also use this opportunity to thank the heads of State of the Great Lakes region for their continued support to the process. I also wish to single out President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, the Chairperson of the Regional Initiative on Burundi, for his unwavering support of the facilitation team. On the first and the second, he sat with us throughout the day and night as we negotiated the process. Since its launching, the African Union (AU) has also played a critical role in the Burundi peace process, alongside the United Nations. As I have indicated, Ambassador Bah, who represented the AU, was always together with Ambassador Dinka. The AU participates actively through the special representative of the Secretary General of the AU.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“This indicates their confidence that the Organization's participation boosts confidence and makes people implement what would be difficult to implement without that participation in one form or the other. We must also record our gratitude for United Nations assistance in providing military experts, who worked with South African and Tanzanian military experts in drafting the ceasefire agreement as a basis for discussion, discussed and lent their assistance, up to the signing of the agreement among the belligerent parties. The contribution of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Burundi, Ambassador Berhanu Dinka, is also extremely valuable to all of us. We are grateful for this contribution. It has brought confidence and hope to the Burundians and to those who participated in these processes.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“Other areas of United Nations support that we will soon be asking for include training, integration support and other humanitarian assistance, particularly for returning combatants, especially those who cannot be integrated into the security forces. We will certainly be discussing more issues in that regard, because we believe that the role of the United Nations will be very critical in making this mission a success. Allow me at this juncture to sincerely thank Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Security Council for this unwavering support provided while we have been involved in this process. We are here today because we know we can count on your unique and continued support. I am sure it will interest the Council to know that as we discussed the ceasefire, all parties kept on mentioning the United Nations.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“We believe that support of such a unique situation is possible under Chapter VIII of the Charter, which supports the establishment of regional initiatives for the resolution of conflicts, provided such arrangements are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, as well as Chapter VI, which provides for the use of regional initiatives for the resolution of disputes without the active, direct involvement of but with the full support of the United Nations. We consider the introduction of the African mission as a bridging instrument, opening the situation for the United Nations to come in when we have perfected the conditions. The African mission and other structures to be set up will require the support of the United Nations apparatus to ensure success.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“We made this point when the Security Council visited South Africa. That was precisely the reason why we thought it would be important to come to the Security Council as we have done. The process has been complicated by the fact that there are more than one belligerent party, all with divergent demands, which had to be engaged separately and differently. The Security Council delegation that visited South Africa in April had some experience with the problem when the CNDD-FDD of Pierre Nkurunziza refused to meet the Council delegation in the same room as the CNDD- FDD of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“Therefore, the fears by the CNDD that, if they were unarmed or had no arms near them while the army was armed, that could prejudice them, and we could therefore end up with a situation of that nature. That is why that arrangement was necessary. We trust that the less-than-perfect nature of the Burundi ceasefire will not stand in the way of United Nations support, especially given the fact that there have been precedents for such ceasefire arrangements. We have in mind Mozambique and Zimbabwe in our region, although the situations might not be identical. We believe that, when the Security Council considers the matter, it will take this into account. We appeal for understanding of the Burundian problem. Given the nature of the conflict, we are never going to have a straightforward and classical ceasefire agreement.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“In addition, the uniqueness of the Burundi agreement has necessitated the provision that combatants should move to assembly areas armed. Weapons will be taken away from them and stored in an armoury to which they will have access, should the need arise. Again, that is a provision unique to Burundi, allowed in order to allay fears. One of the critical tasks of the African mission will be to monitor the movements of the belligerents to the assembly areas with their arms. I also wish to add that that was considered because, as you know, Mr. President, in the Great Lakes region the conflict has tended to involve mass killings, massacres and genocide.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“We are aware of the stringent prescripts of the United Nations, including the difficulties of deploying peacekeeping forces where there is not a total ceasefire, as in Burundi. We say not total because of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. But we believe that creativity and innovation in looking at the situation would make it possible for the United Nations to become involved. The nineteenth summit of heads of State directed the PALIPEHUTU-FNL to enter into negotiations immediately and conclude a ceasefire agreement by 30 December, or face robust sanctions. We will be interacting with the movement shortly to arrange negotiations, because the Summit Meeting again felt it was necessary to give PALIPEHUTU-FNL another chance.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“Another key pending task is the facilitation of the discussion of outstanding political issues that could not be finalized during negotiations. Those issues, among others, include the return to constitutional legitimacy, issues relating to post-war management, the transitional period and its leaders, the welfare of the combatants after the ceasefire, the location of the combatants, issues such as good governance and the reconciliation and reconstruction of the country. Those issues are part of the annex to the agreement. Under the agreement signed, negotiations on those issues will not constitute preconditions for the implementation of the ceasefire. The implementation process is a difficult and involved one that requires the strong support of the international community, especially the United Nations.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“Under the agreement, the truce or the cessation of fighting is to enter into force with 72 hours of signing. By 30 December, the combatants should have commenced their movement towards the assembly areas. Within thirty days the parties are to discuss the establishment of implementation structures, such as the joint monitoring commission and joint liaison teams. The agreement also provides for the establishment of an African mission that will be responsible for the verification and control of the ceasefire. The mission is to set up the organs and machinery required for the control and verification of the ceasefire. The Nineteenth Summit Meeting on Burundi mandated us to assist the parties to work out the implementation details.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“The signatories of the 7 October document - President Buyoya, Alain Mugabarabona of PALIPEHUTU-FNL and Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye of CNDD-FDD - have already held three meetings, in Pretoria and Dar-es-Salam, to unpack the details on various implementation issues. Those include the return to Burundi of former fighters and leaders, the participation of former armed movements in the transitional institutions of the State and Parliament, and issues relating to disarmament and demobilization and to the building of a new, inclusive security apparatus in the country. With regard to the CNDD-FDD of Pierre Nkurunziza, the agreement will come into force on 30 December 2002. The first 14 days after the date of signature have been designated as a period to allow the belligerents to communicate to their rank and file the decision to stop fighting.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“Indeed, these are positive developments, as the delay in securing a ceasefire had led to continued suffering by ordinary innocent people in Burundi. When the Arusha Agreement was signed, on 28 August 2000, all the signatories and stakeholders understood that it would remain incomplete until a ceasefire agreement was concluded. That meant that the resources that were pledged by the international community for the implementation of the Arusha Agreement were kept in abeyance until that requirement was fulfilled. The Council will recall that, at the request of former President Mandela at Paris in 2000, international donors pledged $440 million in aid to war-weary Burundi, subject to the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement. The serious and challenging work of implementing the agreements has now begun.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“The unequivocal support of the Security Council delegation for the peace process and the message it gave to the armed groups directing them to enter into negotiations immediately and without conditions eliminated the wrong impression of sympathy held by the armed movements. The leadership provided by the Security Council in that regard was indeed invaluable. Given the difficulties we have faced in the past, it is therefore pleasing and encouraging that we are today meeting with the Security Council in a climate of optimism and hope. Only two days ago, President Pierre Buyoya signed a ceasefire agreement with Pierre Nkurunziza of the CNDD-FDD at Arusha, Tanzania. On 7 October 2002, the CNDD-FDD of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Alain Mugabarabona signed a ceasefire agreement with the Transitional Government.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“The armed movements and the Transitional Government were far from finding common ground. Interaction with the armed movements was characterized by the issuing of preconditions and demands, many of which had already been addressed, or were being addressed, through the Arusha Agreement of 2000. Many of them were indeed also being implemented by the Government of Burundi. There was also a sense from the armed groups of not accepting the Arusha Agreement and of seeking to negotiate a new type of agreement outside of Arusha. There was also an impression on the part of the armed groups that the international community supported their reluctance to negotiate and conclude a ceasefire.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“There were two armed groups at the time, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and the Palipehutu Forces for National Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL). Due to infighting, they later split, resulting in four armed movements with the same names but with different leaders. Last year, the facilitation responsibility was expanded, when former President Mandela asked President Omar Bongo of Gabon to assist, in order to widen expertise and capacity. Later on, we also requested Tanzania to help, particularly with regard to relations with the CNDD- FDD of Pierre Nkurunziza. When we last met with the Security Council delegation in South Africa, earlier this year, there was every reason to have mixed feelings about the Burundi peace process.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“I had indicated to the delegation that I would come to New York to brief the Security Council on progress in the ceasefire negotiations. That intention was endorsed by the Nineteenth Great Lakes regional Summit on Burundi, which was held a few days ago, on 1 and 2 December. The heads of State attending the meeting believed that it was important that we should keep the Security Council informed and actively involved in the process of cementing peace in the region. It has been more than two years since former President Nelson Mandela, the chief mediator in the Burundi conflict, asked me to facilitate ceasefire negotiations between the belligerent parties in Burundi.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source
“Thank you, Mr. President, for affording me the opportunity to address the Security Council today. It is indeed an honour and a privilege. I find it important and prudent to brief the Security Council in pursuance of the common objective of security, peace and stability on the African continent in general, and in Burundi in particular. The efforts to find peace in Burundi are being made within the context of our overall objective of creating a climate of peace, order, stability and sustainable development on the African continent. We are fully aware that the United Nations shares that vision and that mission. Today's meeting is a follow-up to the visit by a Security Council delegation to South Africa in April of this year.”
2002-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4655 (2002) · source