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Velina Tchakarova

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2024-06-12

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2024-06-12

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1. “This business of foresight, geopolitical foresight, with big teams and trying to foresee the future. But in the end, I would argue it's a methodology that is not so easily to be conducted. And especially it's not easily to be conducted because you have to free yourself from any kind of biases, personal biases, and you have to have a model. Now, we may argue some have developed indexes like the geopolitical risk index that is now being, let's say, published by the Federal Reserve. They try to track back different headlines in various newspapers and magazines, and then they, you know, based on the number, empirically, they just point to the severity of geopolitical risk like it happened with the Russians war against Ukraine. We have different kind of metrics, algorithmic and imperial...”

   2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

2. “Proves you right. And this is what was happening, at least with most of my assessments. And this is how I'm right now not stuck in 2024. I'm already in 2030, 2040, and so on and so forth. So most of my assessment is actually helping clients to prepare for the long-term perspective. I'm not a consultancy like most of these consultancies providing this daily briefs and analysis telling you about the dynamics in a specific country, explaining you the constellations between the political actors and whatsoever, which is equally important. I'm not denying the importance on the opposite. It's just that what I do is so rare. And, you know, right now a lot of, I'm observing a lot of consultancies, like the big consultancies, Goldman Sachs, so on and so forth, are trying to enter.”

   2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

3. “Are already talking about decoupling and we are already discussing this kind of bipolarity. This is the point. So we have 10 years of time span that I have been investing every day into trying to get the trend projections correctly. But it is absolutely not possible to convince anybody else of the correctness of this assessment so long as the reality doesn't kick in and”

   2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

4. “Years to the daily business of politics. Why? Because people are just not following. They just don't have the time to follow all these trends and they don't have the time to go into all these specific systemic processes. So when I was talking about bipolarity in 2015 or when I was talking about the dragon bear since 2014, the dragon bear being this modus vivendi of China and Russia as modus operandi to coordinate without the necessity to enter any strategic alliance. You know, people were not interested because it did not really affect the daily life of politics. But now you would agree that China, Russia, axis or whatever kind of articles are almost coming out on a daily base and we”

   2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

5. “Argue has taken sight already in twenty fourteen. In fact, Russia has been saved by China following the first intervention in Ukraine and following the first launch of Western sanctions when Russia was facing a serious almost precarious economic situation was saved by China. Now meanwhile Most of this middle powers are still avoiding taking sides. They want to capitalize from both worlds. Classic example right now is the case of India. India is acting as a bridge, as a geopolitical bridge between the two antagonists trying to take the best of both worlds. It is very, very difficult to bring this long-term picture that is to play out in the next five or ten or 50 years.”

   2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

6. “Since 2014, and that is that practically all the relevant socioeconomic networks you take global finance system, you take global energy system, you take These systems are undergoing transformation gives me some answers as to in which direction it goes. Let me give you an example. Most of the analysts, you would agree have been pointing, at least for the last 20 years, towards multipolarity. So the biggest cliche that we've been hearing is that we are sliding into a multipolarity order. We have several big centers of power, several great powers and so on and so forth. And I just, I've never bought into this. And since 2014, when I started looking at this macro perspective based on this global system concept I've developed, I saw that practically we have only two centers of power and everything in between is in this gray zone that is oscillating between United States on the one hand and China on the other. Now Russia”

   2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

7. “So, the big difference is that predictions, for instance, you have this big prediction houses when it comes to elections, for instance, right? And they try to predict the outcome of elections. And contrary to predictions, I anticipate possible futures. I do foresight, not predictions, not forecasts. So I cannot forecast anything. What is foresight? Foresight is practically to, you know, thanks to the daily observation of events and developments, to categorize these events and developments into trends, to assess a possible trend projection that will point to a certain direction in which, for instance, the global system goes. What do I mean by global system? Because I really, I'm really focused on the macro perspective. In my case, the global system, this is my own concept that I've been working with”

   2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

8. “The critical areas of it will be semiconductor. So having the trend projections, the long-term projections in mind helps you to get the big picture in the long run. If you are, of course, patient and if you really want to play this game, you know, the long game. And this is where I'm located mostly, not at the tactical level.”

   2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

9. “Powers, for instance, China, United States, or Russia, China, or India, China, and so on and so forth, for the next 10 to 15 years, thanks to trends and risk analysis. And this is something that is derived from the daily business of politics, but in fact is a different methodology. And this different methodology is not helpful for, let's say, tactical developments. It is helpful if you, for instance, consider long-term-oriented investment based or derived from this macro analysis. What do I mean? Let me give you one example. If now people are talking about semiconductors and an investment in semiconductors would be very smart investment. I have invested in semiconductors six, seven years ago knowing that there would be actually a bifurcation of the global system.”

   2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

10. “Understand what is credible, what not. But this is only one of several pillars of my activities at FACE. So yes, I have private clients within Face, but these are individuals from different backgrounds, different professions who are mostly interested in this world of geopolitics and do not have the same amount of time to read and to go through all these sources and they just rely on my assessment for specific topics. Now, I must also highlight that the daily business of politics is not my main field. My main field is actually the long-term 10 to 15 years macro perspective. I actually draw scenarios for the future of international relations and for the future of the relations between great”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

11. “From the day because the whole day I just read and written. A lot of sources, a lot of information. I have a lot of chat rooms on various platforms, the telecommunication platforms. Of course, with the time I can easily identify whether the source is credible or not, I use five different languages. So it's very, very kind of diverse way of getting information. I know For instance when it comes to a certain conflict or a certain region which sources to use and which platforms are credible. That is very, very different kind of approach if for instance a common user on Twitter will just check on Twitter and start reading through the sources. So thanks to this kind of long-term experience it's very easy for me to track and”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

12. “What will be the cascading effects beyond the region or the question that you ask about the military conflict and the possible military attack on Taiwan? This is questions that come out almost every day. But practically what I post on Twitter is linked to information I read. These are open source analysis and mostly assessments by other colleagues or articles being published and I just go through these sources and I post and comment. That's not the same as when you have to give an answer to a client for instance who has certain exposure in a particular region or has an investment portfolio and this investment portfolio is for instance affected by certain military conflicts and so on and so forth. So it's a very different way of let's say consulting Twitter which is now X is just for fun. This is my”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

13. “Well, first and foremost, what I post on Twitter is not what I actually discuss with my clients of the record. That's very important because I have networks, I have 25 years of professional background and I have networks of people who have proven track of analysis and assessment and are very often also on the ground. So what I do is to, of course, get as credible information as possible. And my clients usually ask exactly this kind of questions as you do right now. Will there be in the case of the example you gave, will there be an escalation between Israel and Iran? Will there be a political turmoil in Iran following this helicopter crash? Will there be an ex-military, let's say, episode between Israel and Iran?”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

14. “Complicates the situation with South Korea and South Korea together with Japan are the most important Indo-Pacific allies of the United States. So long as North Korea plays its card smartly and in its allowed, let's say, scope of activities, things will be fine, but I just don't see why North Korea would be actually eager to use a nuclear weapon. Maybe just because we are at the level of speculation, right? We are at the level of speculation one region that would probably see nuclearization will witness more nuclearization is actually the Middle East because Iran has never been closer to getting the nuclear”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

15. “China nor Russia will actually allow small player in the international relations to use the nuclear weapon because there is scalability in the international relations. You are allowed as a smaller player to do some steps to create some havoc in the regional environment if it's in the interest of some of your supporters as it is the case right now in North Korea. Why is North Korea receiving all this technological transfer and the whole political and diplomatic support from countries like China and Russia? Well, it's obvious because activating the North Korean cart plays into the carts of Beijing and Moscow because North Korea creates tensions in the Indo-Pacific and overstretches the attention of the US leadership.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

16. “Maybe actually the use of tactical nuclear weapon by Russia against Ukraine, if you outline all these scenarios, I just do not anticipate the United States using the nuclear weapon. Think of all the military defeats that the United States had experienced over the decades and they still did not use the nuclear weapon, be it Vietnam or Afghanistan or whatever kind of military endeavors they had. North Korea, I think that North Korea would not go for the nuclear weapon because the moment when they decide this they will be annihilated not by one but by two critically important players because the whole lifeline for North Korea is coming from China and by extension from Russia.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

17. “First and foremost, I want to stress that the risk of the use of nuclear weapons has not grown bigger. With all the nuclear blackmail, with all the threats that nuclear weapons will be used coming from Russia, we saw a precedent in the international relations, you know, modern times, the country obviously a great power, tries to legitimize territorial gains by the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. But this risk, the risk of the realistic use of nuclear weapons hasn't grown bigger. That's the first thing that I really want to stress that I still don't see actually nuclear war taking place. Okay, second point, Russia has a lot of conventional weapon systems that it is obviously already using against Ukraine. Doesn't need actually the technical nuclear weapon against Ukraine.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

18. “The Article five, let's say to use the opportunity to show that the Article 5 of NATO is not really going to be activated. This is a possibility. I would say right now from today's point of view, it is absolutely possible and to some extent probable, but not plausible. But in the next few years, depending on the success of Russia in Ukraine, and I mean the time frame of 2025-2026, I would not exclude, as I said, such possible and probable act by Russia. For instance, on the Balticum. Not so much on Poland. I do not take this really seriously, as some analysts are pointing an attack on Poland. I would also think that Poland may actually seek to get nuclear weapons. So in the case if Poland decides to go nuclear This question will be automatically answered as to whether Russia would be eager to attack Poland.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

19. “Exercise. And in the next step, I would actually consider doing something like this, like an attack on the Baltic on because first and foremost there will be a certain regional environment that will allow it. What do I mean by that? If, let's say, the members of NATO and the European Union are somehow in conflictual blocks because of the future of these organizations. I mean, we do not talk about 2024, obviously, but in the next years, the European Union as a bloc will undergo major shifts and a lot of troubles. And, you know, the member states will probably not be so coherent in their positions all the time. And the same goes for NATO, especially if we have a very, very different US leadership. So under this circumstances, provocation like this would mean to tell”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

20. “Yes, absolutely. If I were him or if I were to consult him and he is successful in his actions so far, why would he not try it? I mean, first and foremost, the Baltics, I think that they already understand high risk of such situation. In fact, we have to split it in two parts, the one part being neighboring countries like Moldova and Georgia. And there I would also go for territories because I have already the military presence, I have already, I mean, from Russia's point of view, territories like Transnistria, which is neighboring Odessa and practically will enable Sanitaire Cordon with the European Union, but also in Georgia with the sweeping borders in South Ossetia. For instance, in Abkhazia, I would just go for these territories because this is about status and about great”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

21. “In this case, this will also legitimize the Russian territorial gains. This ceasefire has always been violated. So in a sense, this is actually placed into the carts of Russia. I mean, this is the main question.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

22. “And if he is not able for whatever reasons, we cannot debate now about technical issues of the technicalities of the war. Russia has been adapting, but Russia has also made a lot of mistakes. Ukraine has been adapting in the war. But in reality right now, they are attacking the second largest city, Kharkiv, but obviously they are also attacking Odessa. And like I said, my expectation is that they will be attacking Kiev again. So let's assume even if partially successful or fully successful, but let's assume Putin succeeds in getting large part of Ukraine. And then we have some sort of negotiations, some sort of ceasefire, and then negotiations. And like I said, this is the best case scenario from Russia's point of view, because every time when there were ceasefire agreements and any kind of negotiation,”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

23. “China at that time was not ready for that kind of fast speeded competition, which meanwhile, as we know, has accelerated to the point of the introduction of tariffs and the decoupling has really, really been triggered. But also, you know, in a sense, Putin correctly bet on China that China was, even if not agreeing with the whole decision would actually support Moscow in this endeavor, as it turned out. So going back now to your question, I just wanted to make this clarification. What would be the next steps, right? What would be the next on his agenda? Now, again, first and foremost, what is on his agenda is that he will not give up on attacking Kiev and attacking Odessa and trying to get as much as possible from Ukraine.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

24. “twenty one already Lumink in Europe and we had the worst actually indicator for food prices. This is the FAO index that was reaching already levels of 2011 in December. So all of these were regional and global environment indicators that probably led also to this decision. But more importantly what Putin got was also this assurance of comprehensive if you like full scale comprehensive support coming from China. He has been building up these models with Andy with Xi Jinping since 2013 when Xi Jinping came to power and he knew that by launching a full-scale war and this is my personal assessment of course he would not just trigger the systemic competition between United States and China”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

25. “I was seeing this as a 10 to 15 years plan how to slowly subjugate the country. Why did he make Owen move and he practically launched a full-scale war from five directions? Well, I think it's so early to make all these assessments, but certainly I would argue the regional environment and situation prior to 2022 and also the global environment. That means think of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, then think of elections in key European countries in 2021. There was a political, let's say, vacuum until new governments were built. We had key election in Germany. This is, as you know, meanwhile the key provider of support for Ukraine. So we had worst energy crisis in 2010.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

26. “Rinse and repeat tactics. This was the case for almost 10 years. And due to this kind of strategy, Russia was able to militarily control eastern Ukraine and then it could seize the opportunity to make a move. Of course, I have to say that in my assessment from December 2021, I was pointing to a scenario in which I was absolutely sure that there will be a war, but I actually even call this war a limited military operation. And I thought, this was my mistake, that the war will start in the east and south of Ukraine. I did not think that Putin will make an all-in move in 2022. This is, I must say, a mistake on my side. Because, as I said,”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

27. “Okay, so first let's start with the calculus what Putin wants. I would like to give you my assessment as to what's going on there and what's been going on there for quite some time now. Now first and foremost Putin wants the whole of Ukraine, not just one third of Ukraine or 20%. Right now Russia controls around 18%. No, they want all of it and if it's necessary they will just make you know 10 to 15 years planned how to slowly but surely subjugate the whole of Ukraine. That means in a similar way how it's been proceeded since 2014 you had practically a series of military actions followed by ceasefire followed by some kind of negotiations then followed by military actions and”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

28. “More or less the narratives that are coming from both sides are equally being instrumentalized because on the one hand right now you mentioned the case of the Middle East. In fact I argued that the war between Israel and Hamas probably will find its way by the end of this year as compared to some other tensions that will be still ongoing and like the war for instance in Ukraine which will still be ongoing in the next several years. But here we have a clear case where you see that the West, United States, European Union powers are supporting Israel and countries like China, Russia are actually supporting the Palestinian question and I argue that in the end probably this kind of balance balancing act will be the positive influence on finding a two-state”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

29. “Volatile. And in a sense, I'm not surprised that we are in this situation where both sides are trying to instrumentalize legal norms, rules, standards, but to no avail because in the end, up until we do not have, let's say, a new winner or new emerging blocks with their reading of international law, with their understanding of organizational principles.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

30. “Clear bipolarization, bifurcation of the club between China and Russia on the one hand and United States, France and UK on the other. And the same goes for all these international bodies. And that is to say that they are being, of course, used on both sides and at the same time they are being misused, unfortunately. That is the reality we are right now. We are in this period of international relations where the number of international military conflicts and wars hasn't been that high since the end of the Cold War. So it's the highest number of military conflicts and wars. We have a lot of, as you said, casualties. We have, I argue, we are going to have even more tensions and more military conflicts in the next years to come with this year, 2024, being extremely...”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

31. “While we have international law, but in the world of realpolitik and geopolitics, the strong do what they want and the weak suffer what they must. And this is the principle, unfortunately, that more or less overrides international law norms and rules. And right now in grey area of intermunistic international system, so the old international system is crumbling down and the new international system is trying to be born. So we are in this, let's say, stadium of an emergence of a new global system in which each and single field, including the international law, we see it also with international organizations such as the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council is a perfect example for it, where we have”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

32. “Political stability in China is shaken, where the Chinese leader Xi Jinping is somehow put into the corner to take a very, let's say, ad hoc decision on the matter because certain circles of the hoax, of the military hoax, of course we have this kind of possibility as well. It could be a black swan event, something that has happened in China, and this makes him, you know, take this decision in order to draw the attention away from internal problems. Foreign policy adventures are always kind of gathering the public support. So it's not 100% to be excluded, but in my scenario I would actually point to rather, as I explained, this debt by thousands approach rather than military. attack on Taiwan.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

33. “Even though that China is catching up militarily right now, I think that the mindset of the Chinese leadership, the way how the Chinese leadership is actually conducting strategy does contradict such risky behavior again because time is on China's side. China only needs to really prepare this sum of minor actions in a longer period of time, this is what I would actually do as a strategist which would promise a much better percentage of success than like I said an adventurous military attack. Now we may argue that under unanticipated circumstances for the political leadership think of a situation where the”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

34. “It's not giving you, I would even say 50-50% of success. The terrain of Taiwan, if we compare it with the most sophisticated war that's going on right now, it's much more difficult. You have a very, very limited window to attack in the case of Taiwan. This window of opportunity is limited only to probably two periods in the whole year, which of course is also known by everyone in the region, and that particularly means defense of Taiwan. You have window of opportunity in April and then in October. So you cannot attack at any time in the year. It is sophisticated military attack that it cannot be conducted on the whole of the island.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

35. “And it is, you know, we could argue it's the old Soviet playbook. It could be done in a more subtle way using plausible deniability. It could be Taiwanese still the most successful democracy in the Indo-Pacific. That means also it is vulnerable to this kind of penetration where you can practically use agents provocateurs on the ground. You can buy up a lot of institutional or individual players. You can start doing all this subversion process in, let's say, longer time frame, but it could bring about bigger success than actually risking military intervention, which”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

36. “Well, I do understand that there is a lot of analysis coming out right now, especially on behalf of the military experts. Militarily with the United States, and I do not share this assessment. I just don't see why China will have to take such a big risk. in achieving something that it can achieve in a much smarter and more efficient way. What do I mean by that? I call this approach that by a thousand cuts. That would mean that China could spend a little bit longer in a slow but steady Political, social, economic and societal penetration of Taiwan”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

37. “Go to Serbia nowadays and ask the, and you know, just conduct a poll in the Serbian population and ask who is one of the biggest investors in Serbia. You know, a lot of people will tell you that this is Russia, which is actually not the case. It's not factual. Because still the European Union is in fact the biggest institutional investor in the country. But it tells you a lot about perception, how Russia is being perceived in terms of its strong role in the country.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

38. “Also, some instrumentalized influences. I wouldn't use any generalization for the region except, as I said, this golden rule that could be applicable that of course geographic approximation is certainly an indicator that will tell you a lot about how an external and powerful player would behave towards the smaller neighbors and will try to of course increase its leverage via different mechanisms and actions and this goes through cultural ties, through personal business ties but also political and economic projects. So it goes also via instrumentalization of dependencies, raw materials and all of these kind of things let me give you another example just to end up this topic.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

39. “with Alexander Battenberg. So we had a very different mode of development and at the same time influence. Today we have for instance political parties in Bulgaria that are still very much let's say rooted in the same mindset that one needs an internal friendship with Russia, that this is the only way forward even on behalf of the social democrats, social democrats you will find these kind of voices. We have a Bulgarian president who is very much also pro-Russian even though he will deny it. So you see that this kind of layers of influence and penetration to some extent are very very manifold. You will have some that are taking place. Let's say free base out of political convention or out of individual conviction. But you will have”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

40. “Same time facing new realities with the buildup of the other states, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and so on and so forth. Of course, Serbia was in a dire need to have a very strong supporter. And it has found this supporter in the face of Russia. In the Bulgarian case, this is more historic. It has a sentiment in the Bulgarian population even up until today that has to do with emancipation of the Bulgarian state, the third Bulgarian state following the Russian-Turkish war from 1878 and then practically because of the Russian Empire, Bulgaria could regain its statehood. And the first Tsar of Bulgaria was also practically from the Russian Empire.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

41. “Saying in whatever topics and at the same time if you look at the policies and actions of Soviet bloc satellites such as Poland or Czechoslovakia at the time you will see that they had much more space to act and there were more you know they were prone to more you know turmoil internal turmoil even Hungary if you if you consider they had you know their moments of turning against the Soviet Union no this hasn't been the case with Bulgaria in the case of Serbia because again you cannot use a common denominator you cannot just say that this tool because they were geographically and still are geographically closer they would be you know more influenced by Russia because in the case of Serbia being still in a very very specific situation following the collapse of Yugoslavia trying to find external partners that support the leadership at the same time”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

42. “First and foremost, I would say it's cyclical. It's not just you don't have a recipe that reflects on the realities on the ground one-on-one. You have very strong cultural, personal, cultural, and historical roots, of course, specifically in this region. You have religious and also post-imperial roots in the case of the Russian Empire. There has been, you know, I would argue that what we see right now with Russia is a continuum of the Russian Empire DNA. And practically I use this golden rule of the closer, the better, you know, in terms of influence and in terms of penetration and subversion, the closer to the core, the bigger the influence. We saw this clearly also during the Cold War with Bulgaria being probably the most affected and highly influenced satellite with almost no”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

43. “Of several empires, and each of these empires was trying to get a chunk of this region for itself. And practically through this balancing act, these small states were trying to capitalize on their own interests. And this is a continuum, a geopolitical continuum that is still very much in play in this region.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

44. “There is a stability outside the influence exercise exercised by Hedgeman. For instance, through the balance of several external powers. This is the case right now. So we do not have a hegemonic power in the region right now. We have, let's say, if you like, a balance act of several external and very powerful actors. That's not just the European Union, it's Jewish economic cloud, it's also Russia still very much active in the region. And we have also Turkey, which is also, of course, quite active. And we have the United States and China also trying to play their leverage in the region. So you see that it's not one specific hegemon. That's always been the case, by the way, if you would like to go back to the Balkan wars, if you would like to go back to previous periods of the Balkan region, you would find out that once again it was a competition.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

45. “With a few exceptions, of course, because Africa and Southeast Asia will still see at macro level kind of positive demographics, but in general, Bulgaria is probably one of the fastest shrinking demographically shrinking countries in the world, not just in Europe. And here we have a very, very serious issue that is a systematic and a structural issue that goes back to 30 years of political mismanagement, corruption, and precarious, I would say, socioeconomic indicator. So it's not just about the missing birth rates, it's also about the skyrocketing debt rates in this country and more or less 3, 3 and a half million people who have sold their happiness and try to find their luck outside of the country, which is quite telling.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

46. “The newly elected president of North Macedonia didn't use the full name but used only the name of Macedonia. These kind of sensitivities will remain, but again, they do not find a common denominator even in these countries. Now, going back to the demographics, I think this is a bigger issue because right now and probably the most famous person right now who is making the case, the strong case of shrinking demographics all over the world.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

47. “Neighbors is over. This is not going to come back specifically in the case of Bulgaria. I would argue actually in the case of the other neighbors as well, unless we see a major process that right now I don't see happening in the short term of, let's say, dissolvement of the European Union because so long as these countries are part of the European Union or candidates for the European Union, this kind of conflicts will always find a kind of solution mechanism within the institutions and there will be enough incentives for broader part of the parties and actors to find a common denominator. So yes, even countries like North Macedonia, and we saw that there were immediately conflict, a kind of a verbal conflict between North Macedonia and Greece because”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

48. “I think that the second part of the question is easier to be answered. Yes, nationalism, as I already outlined, is always going to have some sort of solid ground in the whole region, including Bulgaria. And again, right now we have a very strong sentiment, nationalistic sentiment, that is also finding political reflection. And we have elections in June for a parliament since the coalition government between the conservatives and the liberals has parted ways. But coming to the first part of your question, these sentiments will be politicized and instrumentalized, but they will not find a common denominator among the population in Bulgaria. The dream of, let's say, San Stefano Bulgaria, or if you like, you know, big Bulgaria, including parts of other countries.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

49. “That was anticipated event which eventually resulted in the First World War. So even now these reference is being used as survival moment as something that is defined as a black swan event and that could lead to a major military conflict if not even let's say another world war. So all in all these kind of things are still kind of relevant even though they are not having the same of course influence or scale as it used to be the case 200 years ago.”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

50. “Parties, we have nationalists in most of these countries which are getting stronger by the day and are running for elections and are using actually agenda and narratives that have been known for the last 200 years. All in all, unfortunately quite relevant. And even let me use another example. the incident, the helicopter crash from yesterday where the Iranian president and the foreign minister has to weigh was used as an example by some analysts already I would just use the reference here that it could be the next arayv moment now again we have you know balkan wars and then we had also as you know the big moment the biggest black swan as being described by professor nassim taleb the surayvo moment from 19”

    2024-06-12 · Conversations with Tyler · Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source