Alvin Tan
Singapore
“And if our companies can use Johor as a complementary base to scale, serve larger markets and strengthen their regional competitiveness while retaining their core capabilities here, that is also additive integration.”
“Sir, I have answered the Member's questions specific to HDB car parks. Specifically, I think, with the provision of hose reels, fire engine access, natural and mechanical ventilations that will help in the event of a fire, and that the HDB carparks must comply with these technical specifications and safety requirements under Technical Ref…”
“Sir, all Housing and Development Board (HDB) car parks are designed and constructed in compliance with the prevailing Fire Code stipulated by the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF). This includes provisions such as hose reels, fire engine access and natural or mechanical ventilation to disperse smoke and heat.”
“What was left unsaid was that in the emails and in the MP Appeal System (MPAS), the Member was informed that: one, he was aware of the fact that AVS had investigated the incident; he was aware of the processes; he was aware that AVS found no professional negligence or misconduct by the vet; he was aware and noted that AVS had found no rel…”
“As we have observed a growth in the range of animal-related services offered by non-vets that may pose a risk to animal health and welfare, Part 4 of the Bill will introduce various offences and penalties to safeguard against unlawful practice and misrepresentation by or about unauthorised persons.”
“Owners are responsible for providing for their pets' needs, including medical care. So, we strongly encourage prospective pet owners to thoroughly consider the full cost of raising a pet before committing to becoming a pet owner. Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, vet professionals form an important pillar of our animal health and welfare system.”
The complete record
Every one of 767 lines we hold for Alvin Tan, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 8 of 16.
“Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to take Question Nos 10 and 11 in today's Order Paper, as well as Written Question Nos and 5 in today's Order Paper, filed by Ms Sylvia Lim, together, as they relate to the proposed Shared Responsibility Framework (SRF)?”
“Sir, I can understand the Member's concerns and I share those concerns as well. I mentioned that earlier on with regard to how we are and must be digital first but not digital only. To Ms Jean's point also, for customers who incurred late charges due to the outrage, DBS and Citibank will waive these charges. To Mr Don Wee's question, in fact, I had already explained that the point of restricting some of these activities, either acquisitions or reduce the scale-back of ATMs and branches and restricting the IT changes, these are all meant for this particular period for the bank, for DBS, to focus on remediating and fixing the issues that led to 14 October and, in fact, other issues that have related to the multiple disruptions over the course of a year.”
“Sir, the short answer is, we will do so.”
“These expectations are spelt out in MAS' Technology Risk Management Guidelines and Outsourcing Guidelines.”
“Sir, I thank Mr Yip for his supplementary questions. The short answer to that is yes. Please let me explain why MAS does not require banks to operate their own data centres. Because not all banks possess the relevant expertise and the skills to do so. Therefore, banks are given the option to tap on data centre operators' specialised know-how as well as the state-of-the-art data centre technologies. But, of course, as I mentioned earlier on, these things fail from time to time and, even if they have their exercises and their testing, some other parts of the system may fail. And, therefore, the lessons learnt will be incorporated into reviews and as well as exercises. To the Member's point about the whole-of-Government's approach to data centres, because it is not just confined to the financial services, the questions about the regulation of data centres have been addressed in response to Parliamentary Questions in this House. As we know, data centres serve multiple industries, not just the financial sector, MAS will, indeed, work with the relevant authorities on the Government's policy over data centre reliance. But let me also assure Members that although MAS does not directly regulate data centres, MAS expects all financial institutions to implement adequate risk controls to ensure data centre resilience such as conducting a threat and vulnerability risk assessment to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses and the protection that they should establish to safeguard data centres against physical and environmental threats. Financial institutions are also expected to conduct due diligence and exercise adequate oversight of outsourced data centre service providers.”
“Recently, when I had a dinner, I was unable to pay using my credit card that was not available to me. However, then I had to use my PayNow, for example. So, on a whole level, if you look at it, the service providers, the systems need to be accountable, they need to do their part. Consumers themselves also have agencies. All of us also have agencies. We can make sure that we have contingency, the different ways to pay. But, ultimately, I think it is important that in the age of digitalisation both financial institutions as well as consumers – have to be aware that some people may not be adept at technology. And the banks and financial institutions and, in fact, companies, service providers must acknowledge that and must be able to provide other forms of payment approaches, so that others who are not so adept can still participate in the economy.”
“Sir, I thank Ms Jessica Tan for her question. I think she raises a very important point. Let me take this in some detail. First, DBS' review; second, Citibank's review and then what MAS expects of all financial institutions, learning particularly from this incident, but also learning from the disruptions by financial institutions over the course of the last year or so. First, DBS' review, which was completed just a couple of months ago in 2023, has four pillars: first, technology risks, governance and oversight; second, incident management; third, how do you strengthen your system's resilience; and fourth, change management. So, DBS is undertaking this and they will look into this in detail. Second, for Citibank, MAS will assess the supervisory actions to be taken against Citibank following the conclusions of the investigations in the 14 October incident. But if you take a step back and look at the whole financial system as a whole, MAS expects all financial institutions to implement the adequate risk controls. MAS will work with financial industry to incorporate the key learnings from this incident into all banks' risk management controls and include it into the MAS' future tech supervisory approach and also discuss it and it will be a key measure for the next financial sector business continuity exercise in 2024. But Mr Speaker, Sir, if you allow me to just take one step back and to answer the Member's question also. We will accept that all forms of technology are not infallible. They will fail from time to time. They are not foolproof. They are not watertight. You see that happen in your smartphones; you see that in laptops; you also see that in your light bulbs. Our approach to digitalisation is being digital first but not digital only.”
“I thank Mr Ang Wei Neng for his supplementary questions. As I mentioned earlier on, the banks are and will be held accountable. First, through MAS' actions – which I mentioned and went into detail on – how imposition of regulatory capital will impact the banks; in addition, it will be a drag on the return of capital, it could impact their credit ratings and it could impact their stock price. That is one. DBS, on its own, also has acknowledged that the bank had fallen short of expectations and that senior management will be held accountable. This is in line with MAS' expectation for incentive structure, the bank's incentive structure to promote accountability. The bank will reflect this in its year-end compensation process. So, all of these in concert is meant to send a very strong message that this is unacceptable and that we are holding banks accountable. But it does not stop there. The review will take place. We will look at what the banks have put in place during this period, how they are remediating, how they are fixing, how they are restoring this and, if necessary, we will have more – MAS will impose, potentially, more measures as necessary. Thirdly, consumers also will hold banks accountable. If I am unable to pay using one of the financial services providers, then I go to the other one; and if I lose confidence in one, I go to the other one. So, I think number one, MAS will and is holding the banks accountable; two, the bank is holding itself accountable; and three, consumers can also hold the financial institutions accountable.”
“Sir, I thank the Member for his supplementary questions. First of all, I want to reiterate that: one, the banks have fallen short of MAS' requirements and expectations; two, that the outages and the length of time that are required to restore services are unacceptable; and three, the banks and the financial institutions involved are being held accountable. How so? First, I mentioned earlier on that DBS is required to hold regulatory capital. Members will know that this will be at great cost to the bank, as I had mentioned earlier on. Second, they are also other measures. The bank, or DBS in this case, is not allowed to make any IT changes and also to involve themselves in any acquisitions, and the third, is that they are not to decrease the number of physical ATMs and branches. If you look at these as a whole, there is an impact on the banks in terms of regulatory capital that is costly to the bank – that is one. Second, in the whole suite of measures, this is meant to allow for them to focus all of their attention into this – that they have the time, attention and resources to focus on this. The third aspect of it, is to slow down the reduction of the number of ATMs and branches is also critical. Because while we want to be digital-first, in our approach to digitalisation, we cannot be digital-only. And therefore, all of these measures are, we think, at this point in time commensurate, but we will review them. If the banks' response and mediation measures are not adequate, MAS will take further necessary actions to ensure that that is so.”
“Another dimension of remediation has to do with data centres, which host the IT systems of not just the banks but also other critical sectors. The Government is studying ways to further strengthen the security and resilience of data centres, where lapses could result in a significant impact. Finally, contingency. Contingency measures in the face of banking disruptions are key. No IT system is infallible. Disruptions can occur for a variety of reasons and can happen without warning. When they do occur, MAS expects banks to take prompt action to reduce inconvenience and costs to customers. This includes being proactive and transparent in updating affected customers on the status of service recovery and alternative services. While our banking system is generally robust, customers too must plan and prepare for contingencies. They can benefit from having alternative payment options and not be over-reliant on one provider for time-sensitive transactions. Indeed, during the recent service disruption, customers who were able to switch to alternative payment methods or providers or use cash as a last resort would have been less affected. Mr Speaker, the digitalisation of financial services has brought significant conveniences to the public. While some disruption from time to time is unavoidable, we expect financial institutions to build and strengthen their capabilities to safely recover from any disruption within a reasonable time period. Where financial institutions fail to do so, as with this incident, MAS will work with them to thoroughly investigate the incident, apply lessons learnt in our supervisory oversight of the financial industry and take necessary action to further strengthen the resilience of financial service delivery.”
“MAS has instructed both DBS and Citibank to conduct thorough investigations into the root causes of the incidents that occurred on 14 October, as well as to put in place remediation measures to minimise future disruptions and outages and to strengthen their recoverability in the event of an outage. In addition, the banks are required to provide to MAS, regular system availability reports relating to their critical systems. MAS will also work with the financial industry to incorporate key learnings from these incidents into all banks' risk management controls, MAS' future technology risk supervisory approach as well as the next financial sector business continuity exercise, which is scheduled for 2024. MAS has adopted a tougher stance against DBS because it experienced five disruptions to its banking services in the last eight months. This is unacceptable. As directed by MAS, DBS convened a Special Board Committee earlier this year to oversee a full review of its IT resilience by an independent external expert. The review was completed in August and DBS has set out a technology resiliency roadmap to address the findings and to improve system resilience. To ensure that DBS keeps a sharp focus on restoring the resilience of its digital banking services, MAS has prohibited DBS from making any non-essential IT changes or acquiring any new business ventures for a six-month period. There must not be any distractions that take away the needed resources and attention by the bank to strengthen its technology risk management systems and controls. MAS has also barred DBS from reducing the size of its branch and ATM networks in Singapore until MAS is satisfied with the progress of DBS' remediation.”
“Under the Banking Act, MAS can impose a fine of up to $100,000 on financial institutions found in breach of MAS' requirements on technology risk management. With the passing of the Financial Services and Markets Act in 2022, which will progressively come into force next year, the fine quantum will be increased to a maximum of $1 million. The fine quantum is consistent with existing local penalty regimes, such as those under the Telecommunications Act and the Personal Data Protection Act. Besides fines, MAS uses a range of regulatory tools to address lapses in banks' risk management. This includes additional capital requirements and suspension of specified businesses or activities. In May 2023, in response to repeated outages, MAS imposed a multiplier of 1.8 times to DBS' risk weighted assets for operational risk. This translated to approximately S$1.6 billion in total additional regulatory capital at the time. Holding additional regulatory capital comes with costs for the bank. It increases the cost of capital and it is a key metric that drives business decisions such as dividends and investments. It is a drag on the return on capital, which could in turn impact credit ratings as well as the stock price of the bank. Banks are also accountable to their customers, but matters of compensation are better dealt with between the bank and its customers as it would be highly dependent on individual cases and circumstances. MAS expects banks to have a fair process to deal with this. Second, remediation.”
“Let me now address the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)'s requirements on: one, banks' business continuity; two, IT infrastructure resilience; three, their outsourced services involving critical IT systems. MAS requires banks to establish IT disaster recovery plans and to test these plans regularly. Banks must conduct disaster recovery exercises with their back-up data centres to validate that critical systems and services can be restored within four hours of an outage. The unscheduled downtime for a critical system affecting a bank's operations or service to customers must not exceed four hours within any 12-month period. MAS does not oversee banks' external service providers, which are typically not financial institutions. This is similar to the approach taken by regulators in other major jurisdictions. The onus is on the banks to ensure that the external service providers they appoint to support their operations or service to customers, can meet MAS' requirements on operational resilience. MAS also requires banks to maintain close oversight of the external service providers, so that they can deliver services with minimal disruptions. DBS and Citibank have fallen short of MAS' requirements to ensure that their critical IT systems are resilient against prolonged disruptions. While both banks conducted annual exercises to test the recovery of their IT systems at the back-up data centres, the specific issues that led to the delays in system recovery on 14 October did not surface during those tests. I will now elaborate on the accountability and remediation measures taken to uphold the reliability and recoverability of banking services. First, accountability and holding banks accountable.”
“Thank you, Sir. If Members are satisfied with the response, they may wish to withdraw their questions after my response. Let me start with the causes and impact of the disruption on Saturday, 14 October 2023. DBS and Citibank experienced system outages in the mid-afternoon of 14 October 2023, which affected their banking as well as their payment services. These outages were caused by a malfunction of the cooling system in the data centre hosting both DBS' and Citibank's IT systems. These IT systems support the delivery of retail and corporate banking services. The temperature in the data centre rose above the optimal operating range, causing the banks' IT systems to shut down. To restore the impacted services, DBS and Citibank immediately activated their IT disaster recovery and business continuity plans. However, both banks encountered technical issues which prevented them from fully recovering their affected systems at their respective back-up data centres: DBS due to a network misconfiguration and Citibank due to connectivity issues. Services at DBS and Citibank were progressively recovered from 8.21 pm and 7.05 pm respectively on 14 October, but only fully recovered in the early hours of 15 October. The impact of the service outage was wide. Up to 810,000 attempts to access the digital banking platforms of both banks were estimated to have failed between 2.54 pm on 14 October 2023 and 4.47 am on 15 October 2023. Approximately 2.5 million payment and ATM transactions could not be completed. DBS reopened its branches from 5.30 pm to 9.30 pm on 14 October to assist affected customers. Both banks provided updates via their social media platforms.”
“Sir, may I have your permission to answer all the Parliamentary Question (PQ) nos 47 to 54 in today's Order Paper, as well as the questions filed by Members for subsequent Sittings relating to the banking services disruption of DBS and Citibank on 14 October 2023?”
“I thank Mr Louis Chua for his supplementary questions. I will try to answer the second question first, which is regarding our delisting. Since 2014, there has been a trend where the number of delistings has surpassed the number of IPOs. As of April 2023, the total number of listed companies on SGX stood at 650. As I mentioned in my main reply, there are a variety of different reasons why companies would list on a particular exchange, and also a variety of reasons why they would delist. That is based upon maybe how they view the market, whether they want to list overseas, or they look at prevailing options. It could be different funding sources. They might want to go back to private, for example. So, there is a whole different variety of why they would want to do so. As I mentioned earlier on also, I think it is important for us to try to play a part but there is also a limit to what we can do to encourage listings. I do not have an answer, but I think the short answer to the Member's first question is that we just take a very different approach to Indonesia's.”
“I thank Ms He Ting Ru for her supplementary questions. I think her idea is to help and we are all aligned if we want to enhance our equities market. To the first question, we do not collect that data. That is the simple answer to the question. As I mentioned earlier on in my reply, we are doing all that we can to help to boost the equities market, but there is also a limit. Because, ultimately, firms will have major commercial considerations, including valuations, including market, as well as including whether they can secure the best kinds of valuations elsewhere as well as whether they want to list in the market where they are closer to the particular target market. So, I think that is the question. If you ask any of the companies or firms, they will tell you that it is primarily a commercial decision. Of course, we will do what we can. But, ultimately, it is a commercial decision. On a broader perspective, I would like to share with the House also that in line with our Industry Transformation Map 2025, particularly on the financial sector, we are constantly looking at ways in which to enhance and deepen our financial sector. The financial sector is not focused on just having an equities market. We have a very vibrant foreign exchange market, we have a very vibrant wealth management market, we are into green finance, we are into fintech and others also. So, it is a dynamic, deep and also very diversified financial market.”
“We will continue to monitor the situation closely and review and update our measures, where necessary, to adapt to the shifts in global capital markets.”
“Similarly, global investors who are in Singapore will ultimately determine how to allocate their capital based on their strategies and how they view the market. So, again, if we prescribe that they must invest certain amounts in only locally listed companies, we will effectively constrain their investment mandates and end up losing a larger pool of investors who adopt a regional or a global view. Let me next respond to Mr Desmond Choo’s question on SGX’s role in helping small and medium enterprises (SMEs) raise capital from overseas markets. One way is to make sure we have good sources of SME financing available to meet our SMEs' needs. And apart from a well-developed banking system that provides a range of financing options for our SMEs, SGX has Catalist, a second board that caters to the fundraising needs of growth-stage companies or enterprises and currently has over 200 SMEs listed on it. In addition, MAS has a grant scheme which defrays listing costs for issuers listing on Catalist. In 2021, MAS increased the grant cap under this scheme from S$200,000 to S$300,000, to further help SMEs who choose to list on Catalist, to alleviate their listing costs. Apart from accessing public markets, private equity and venture capital, or PE/VC in short, have in recent years been an increasingly important source of growth capital for promising startups. More PE/VC managers have established their presence in Singapore and are coming in at earlier stages, which broadens the range of financing for our startups. MAS recognises the value of an attractive equities market as part of our overall financial services ecosystem. That is why the Government and SGX have in place a range of initiatives to better position our equities market.”
“The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has enhanced its grant scheme to defray listing costs and develop Singapore’s equity research ecosystem. SGX has also been actively seeking cross-border partnerships with the regional exchanges to enhance its attractiveness as a gateway for Singapore companies and international investors to access regional capital markets and opportunities. In May this year, to expand access and connectivity to regional capital markets, SGX launched a Thailand-Singapore Depository Receipt or DR Connect, to broaden access to capital and to markets. Overall, our initiatives aim to provide a more enabling environment for companies to consider listing on SGX. At the same time, Mr Speaker, Sir, we recognise that there are limits to how these measures can directly influence listing decisions. Companies considering possible public listings have several commercial objectives in mind. In some cases, these considerations may prompt them to explore listing venues outside of Singapore. First, they may decide to list in jurisdictions where they can secure the best valuations for their shareholders. For quite a number of companies, a US listing is attractive due to the US’ deeper pool of investors and liquidity. Second, companies may list in jurisdictions that give them better exposure to their own target markets. For example, a company planning to expand its business in China may choose to list in either Hong Kong or China, or both. If we take an overly prescriptive approach by making Government support to promising startups conditional on a local listing, we may end up imposing a rule that may be at odds with the growth plans of the company or the founder.”
“Mr Speaker, I will address the questions by Ms He Ting Ru in today’s Order Paper as well as the written Parliamentary Question filed by Mr Desmond Choo for yesterday’s Sitting as they pertain to initiatives in progress to strengthen the attractiveness of Singapore’s equity markets. The challenge of sustaining a vibrant and attractive cash equities market is not unique to Singapore. Globally, the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) and proceeds raised has been declining since 2021. This was driven by the trend of companies staying private for longer and, more recently, against the backdrop of a challenging global macro-environment and interest rate environment. In the first half of 2023, global IPO proceeds fell by 36%, while Asia Pacific IPO proceeds were down by 40%. Many stock exchanges are also dealing with the trend of local companies looking to list on large overseas markets like the United States (US). For instance, the United Kingdom (UK)’s largest chip design firm ARM Holdings recently listed in the US. Israel has a vibrant startup ecosystem. Yet, many of its companies list in the US due to its deep and liquid capital market and investor base. Nearer to home, Hong Kong is also looking to retain and attract more IPOs amidst the more challenging macro-economic environment. Against this backdrop, we have shared in this House, most recently in November 2022, the initiatives that Government agencies and the Singapore Exchange (SGX) have established in recent years to support the attractiveness of our equities market. We have set up the S$1.5 billion Anchor Fund @ 65, which is a co-investment fund by the Government and Temasek, and the S$500 million EDBI Growth IPO Fund, to invest in high-growth enterprises at the late stage or at IPO.”
“Sir, I just want to make a really strong point that if there is wrongdoing, we will be firm with them as we have done so in the past. Fines are one, but we have invoked other measures, including banning financial institutions, revoking their licences, as well as holding senior management to task. There is a variety, there is a spectrum of it. As what Minister Josephine Teo had mentioned earlier on, the investigations are ongoing; we cannot, and we ought not to prematurely attribute any guilt or offence to the banks prematurely until investigations have been completed. But I want to assure the Member and assure Members of the House that we take firm action against errant banks, against errant financial institutions and against the senior management of financial institutions if they are found wanting and if they are found to have contravened our strict AML/CFT standards, which are, as I mention again, aligned with international standards and verified and assessed by FATF. I think these are parameters we need to be aware of and these are parameters that the financial institutions know. As I mentioned in my Ministerial Statement earlier on, it is a priority for MAS.”
“I thank Assoc Prof Jamus Lim. I had wanted to respond to Member Gerald Giam's question earlier on, so this gives me an opportunity to do so. We were talking about how COSMIC initially in the earlier stages by the six banks, is sharing information amongst one another. Let me just share that currently, MAS is able to share information in its possession with domestic supervisory and law enforcement authorities, as Mr Gerald Giam mentioned, for AML/CFT purposes, and this is to facilitate supervisory or investigation action. This will include information from COSMIC when it is rolled out. And where relevant, STRO, which is effectively Singapore's financial intelligence unit, may also share information and obtain this from COSMIC with law enforcement agencies to facilitate investigations and supervision.”
“Just to clarify that credit information is very different from STRs. I think Mr Leong would also appreciate that the direct sharing of financial institution's information to financial institution, on STR, for example, will need to be very carefully circumscribed. Why? When I talked about this in May earlier on, Members who had spoken about the Financial Institutions (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill that this House passed in May, had also expressed concerns about customer confidentiality. So, it cannot be that just because there is an urgent need, we move at a quick pace, at too fast a pace that we forget the concerns about customer confidentiality. Under COSMIC, I assure the Member, that information sharing will only be allowed when customers cross stipulated thresholds for sharing, which are primarily guided by financial crime red flags in pre-defined risk areas – and, currently, it is related to shell companies, trade-based money laundering and proliferation financing. Again, I want to reiterate that financial institutions do not share STRs which only cover customer information. That is an important point to note.”
“Sir, I thank Mr Leong for his questions. The first one is related to the Wirecard case, where only at $3.8 million was levied. Maybe I will also provide some background. In the last five years, we had a total of 20 investigations that were opened against financial institutions for suspected breaches of AML/CFT requirements. And these enforcement actions were taken against 17 financial institutions. That shows that when we first prevent and then we detect, we quickly enforce. That is the hallmark of our AML/CFT regime which, again, I had mentioned, is on par with international standards as defined also by FATF's assessment. The licence of one of the financial institutions was revoked. So, it is not just financial penalties, but also other forms of penalties to deter, thwart and punish in that regard. The composition fines were imposed on 14 financial institutions and reprimands were issued to two financial institutions. In addition, a total of 25 investigations were opened against individuals. Enforcement actions were also taken against 11 individuals. So, what I am trying to say is that, again, the third prong, the way that we enforce, is not just fines but there are also prohibition orders, reprimands and so on, so forth. So, it is a whole suite of it. Again, if you tie that with the overall AML/CFT framework, it is in line with international jurisdictions. Can I just ask Mr Leong to just repeat his question with regard to COSMIC, please?”
“Sir, I thank Mr Liang Eng Hwa for his question. I think we have reiterated these points throughout this afternoon and the points remain very clear. First, our success as an international and financial hub is premised on our status as a trusted and well-governed hub with a strong rule of law. And the same characteristics which investors as well as companies consider when they invest in Singapore are the same characteristics, interconnectedness, that illicit criminals and syndicates also are attracted to. And we have also said that Singapore has a very robust AML/CFT regime that is in line with FATF standards, for example, and our regime compares well with other countries. So, the core response to the question is that Singapore will always remain attractive. We hope that Singapore will continue to remain attractive. But we must and we always must make sure that our AML/CFT standards are in place and prevention, detection and enforcements are in place at the same time, to keep Singapore open and connected and attractive to the flow of funds, to the flow of talent and to the flow of businesses.”
“Sir, I mentioned to Ms Usha Chandradas as well as Mr Desmond Choo, and maybe I will share a little bit again. I said that ongoing investigations and supervisory engagements suggest that one or more of the accused persons in this case may have been linked to SFOs that were awarded tax incentives. I also shared with Ms Usha Chandradas earlier that MAS is looking to tighten these checks and that we will be looking to terminate these incentives, as appropriate. I also want to take a step back to touch on Ms He Ting Ru's point about financial flows. Family offices play an important role in our financial sector as well and I want to caution Members against seeing all SFOs in the same light as those that are charged or wanted. SFOs linked to this case, in fact, represent a very small proportion of all the SFOs here. We have just completed the consultation, which will enable us to tighten some of these processes, but we remain open as the other Ministers and I have mentioned – to talent, to investments as well as to financial flows, including those in SFOs. Our regime is strict. Our regime is in line with international best practices, and so, these two prongs of making sure that we are dynamic and open, and that we also have strong robust controls, remain central to our functioning as a vibrant and trusted financial centre.”
“Sir, I thank the Member for his supplementary questions. These are in regard to charities. The answer to the first question is it is a legal obligation to file an STR if charities know or, in fact, have grounds to suspect that the property or transaction that they are dealing with is connected to criminal activity. We will be covering these questions in the COC's advisory, which Minister Josephine Teo had mentioned. On the second question on the duties of charities and how to safeguard against money laundering and terrorist financing abuse, we expect charities to implement appropriate mitigating measures to safeguard themselves against potential abuse for illicit purposes, including money laundering and terrorist financing, as charities may be misused as conduits for the movement of illegal funds. Charities should exercise vigilance in accepting donations, in particular, when the donors are unknown or unfamiliar to the charities, or when requests are made by donors to redirect part of the donations to unknown third parties for purposes that may be incongruent with the charities' charitable objectives. A charity should also perform reasonable due diligence checks on donors, so as to ascertain the legitimacy of the source of funds or donations received, especially when a substantial amount of donation is received from an unfamiliar or an unknown donor. If charities have reasonable grounds to suspect that any property may be connected to a criminal activity, as I mentioned earlier on, they are required to file an STR. On the third question, we will review if there are gaps found, and the COC has been engaging charities all of this while on AML/CFT measures, and we will continue these efforts.”
“I thank the Member for her question. As investigations are ongoing, I cannot reveal more than what I had said in my Parliamentary reply earlier on. However, what I can say is that MAS is tightening these measures as necessary, and we will be looking to terminate these incentives as appropriate.”
“In the meantime, also, banks can and should – and will be and are able to – alert other financial institutions of concerning trends, typologies and emerging risks through sharing information on our public-private platform, which Mr Don Wee mentioned, which is ACIP, so that mitigating factors and mitigating actions can be taken by financial institutions as well as Government agencies to thwart these efforts.”
“Sir, I thank Mr Don Wee for this very important question. I think it is quite important just to understand whether if you open a bank account and you are affected, whether you can hop to another bank and whether the information will be shared. As the Member knows, MAS requires banks to abide by customer confidentiality provisions that is provided for in the Banking Act and this prohibits them from disclosing customer information. However, to prevent criminals from exploiting these weaknesses of each financial institution's understanding of their customers' risk profile is because that is limited by the information that the financial institution collects. We know that there is a particular weakness. And therefore, as I mentioned earlier on, we are developing COSMIC to allow financial institutions to share information on customers that specifically cross certain risk thresholds and to then allow them to break down these information silos more effectively, so that you are able to detect and disrupt criminal activities. In subsequent phases, as mentioned earlier, we will expand COSMIC to include other risk areas and even more financial institutions. But in the interim, as we await the launch of COSMIC, MAS will monitor for material risk mitigation to financial institutions not yet on COSMIC, and then we will also take the preventive or supervisory measures to prevent or to mitigate such developments from taking place.”
“Sir, I thank Mr Derrick Goh for his supplementary questions. I think both Minister Teo and Minister Indranee had also mentioned this, and I thought it will be useful to also flesh this out. Minister Teo mentioned, and I too have mentioned, that the very characteristics that make us a dynamic and open financial sector also makes it attractive to criminals. But like other financial centres, Singapore is not unique to this challenge of money laundering. Other financial regulators have also had to deal with the cases and Minister Teo had mentioned that in her main reply. For instance, we mentioned the 1MDB case. But the US, the UK, Switzerland and Hong Kong also imposed fines and warnings against their financial institutions for respective failures in AML/CFT controls. In Switzerland, for example, one individual was fined for failing to file an STR. So, it is not unique to Singapore. It occurs across the world's financial centres. I would like to assure the Member and Members of this House that Singapore will continue to fiercely defend Singapore's reputation as a clean and trusted financial centre, and to make sure and to assure everybody that we will not hesitate to take firm actions where warranted, including taking financial institutions and individuals to task should we find evidence for breaches of law and misconduct.”
“Sir, I will answer Ms He Ting Ru's first question. I think the flow of funds speak to the robustness and the dynamism of Singapore's financial sector. As we mentioned earlier on, the sector accounts for 14% of our GDP as well as 200,000 jobs. So, we must and we will continue to build our financial sector, because it creates good jobs for Singaporeans and enhances our standing as an international financial centre. However, we know, given that there are millions of transactions every single day, that there will be some illicit funds. But the majority of these transactions, as we had mentioned, are legitimate. So, it is very important that we do not throw the baby out with the bathwater. We throw only the dirty water out. That is really important. The second part of this limb, as I had mentioned earlier on, is also the robustness of our AML/CFT regulations, that is really much in line with what international financial sectors have. So, it is strict enough, but we would also be very keen to make sure that, as both Mr Mark Lee as well as Mr Neil Parekh had mentioned, we remain open to global financial flows, investments, as well as talent.”
“I wanted to assure the Member and also Members of this House that MAS has in fact been building up these capabilities and at present are using data analytics and network analysis tools to conduct system-wide money laundering and terrorist financing risk surveillance. It is really our approach to continue to review and enhance these surveillance capabilities, including with the money laundering and terrorist financing information when we launch and we roll out COSMIC, which allow greater sharing of information amongst financial institutions. We will also share information with RTIG and other agencies, inter-Ministry agencies, to act on the typologies that I mentioned, that are emerging and quickly stop these illicit activities from gaining ground.”
“I thank Mr Saktiandi Supaat for his questions and I acknowledge also that it is very important that the financial sector represents 14% of our GDP and accounts for 200,000 jobs. So, we must make sure that our financial sector remains robust, both in terms of the vibrancy of the financial sector as well as being stringent to prevent illicit activities in the financial sector. In that case, in the second limb of that question, therefore, it is – how are we preparing our sector regulators, supervisors, for example, to be prepared and to be able to look out for these illicit activities? Let me share a few. On anti-money laundering resources, the MAS' approach to the supervision of anti-money laundering and the countering of financial terrorism, is that it has established the dedicated department, that is the Anti-Money Laundering Department (AMLD), in 2016. This department is responsible for three aspects, including regularly reviewing policies relating to money laundering and illicit financing, and also to then supervise how financial institutions manage these risks. The third is also being forward looking and constantly looking at trends and typologies that will emerge, such as the typologies that have emerged in this case. But we also know that there are some limitations. The AMLD currently has 40 staff and they work very closely with other departments to tackle money laundering as well as terrorist financing. We also understand that the volume – Minister Josephine Teo talks about 43,000 over 2020 to 2022, and 80% of these STRs are filed by financial institutions.”
“Sir, I thank the Member for her supplementary questions. As my colleagues have mentioned, there are three prongs to the approach towards anti-ML/TF. The key to this is the first prong, which is prevention, and MAS regularly reviews all of our AML/CFT procedures. We review them as we go along and, of course, regularly as well. The first also is that, given that there are huge financial flows into the system – millions of transactions every day – the same qualities which are strengths in our financial system will also be exploited by criminals. In this case, and also, in speaking to Member Raj Thomas' view, MAS' supervisory engagements with financial institutions, underpinned by all of the different procedures, regulations and preventions, are ongoing in this case. We will constantly review whether there had been any lapses in the AML/CFT regime in accordance with our process and our policies and also whether any of these lapses had been incurred in onboarding the accused persons. Where there has been complicity on the part of the relationship manager, for example, or senior management, in onboarding the accused persons, I want to assure all Members that if MAS finds any complicity or collusion by banks or their staff, we will not hesitate to take firm actions against the financial institutions and individuals involved to hold them accountable.”
“Sir, we advise the public to dispose of the packets in an appropriate and responsible manner, and MCCY will take public feedback into consideration in future as well.”
“I thank the Member for his question. I will give a bit of a context as well the few ways in which we are handling inflation – and we have discussed this and debated this in the House multiple times: one, is monetary policy, which helps to dampen imported inflation; and the second is, as I have mentioned earlier, our fiscal policies. I will also share that during the first GST increase to 8% that we saw earlier this year, the CAP also saw an increase in feedback volume received on this. So, we will monitor that very carefully and one of the key measures is also to get feedback from the ground and then we will take the appropriate measures.”
“Sir, I thank the Member for her supplementary question and I also acknowledge that these are valid concerns on the ground. As the Member would also understand, business costs arise through a variety of factors, including the cost of utilities, including water, manpower and also a variety of different factors. Singapore has a robust regime in place to ensure that our businesses compete fairly and consumers have sufficient choices across the board. Should a member of the public come across egregious cases of potential profiteering, they can report this to the CAP via three channels: first, the online feedback form – it is at cap.gov.sg; second, the hotline – I will just give the number here at 67970618; or you can visit any of our 112 Community Clubs and these can help to deal with vernacular speakers. Sir, I also wanted to emphasise on Senior Minister of State Dr Koh Poh Koon's point earlier on that the Government has taken on and in fact announced a suite of measures over the past couple of years, including recently the $1.1 billion Cost-of-Living Support Package announced by Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong. But the Government's efforts alone are not enough. I would like to express appreciation to our businesses for also doing their part to promote the welfare of our consumers by holding prices steady or providing discounts to our vulnerable groups. I would also like to acknowledge businesses which voluntarily absorbed the impact of the GST increase for an initial period in 2023, such as Fairprice, Giant, Sheng Siong supermarkets as well as retailers like IKEA and Owndays.”
“Sir, the Committee Against Profiteering (CAP) has received over 350 feedback submissions to date. Among these submissions, 32 cases involved specific allegations of Goods and Services Tax (GST) misrepresentation. The CAP worked with partners including the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, the Consumers Association of Singapore and the People's Association to investigate these cases. The businesses concerned were cooperative and have ceased the practices of GST misrepresentation. The CAP has not received any repeat complaints of GST misrepresentation against the same shops.”
“I thank the Member for his supplementary questions. With regard to the impact, particularly on the lower- and middle-income households, in fact, if you look at the January to June figures, the impact of inflation rates were lower for low-income households. The CPI-All Items Inflation for the lowest 20 percentile and the middle 60% income groups came at 4.9% and 5.6% year-on-year respectively, compared to 5.9% year-on year for the highest 20% income group. So, it is less for the lower-income group. Nonetheless, we are also aware that this same level of inflation can have a more adverse impact on lower-income households. I think both Minister Tan See Leng as well as Minister of State Chee Hong Tat have already explained as per in my reply how we are particularly helping the lower-income group through higher payouts, for example, in the Assurance Packages and the Good and Services Tax (GST) Voucher schemes. Also, as Minister of State Chee mentioned earlier, the Government will look at ways to further help Singaporeans, if necessary. With regard to the energy prices, global demand for oil is expected to moderate, given the ongoing global economic slowdown and also China's slower than expected economic recovery. But despite coming off their peaks last year, global oil prices are expected to remain elevated in 2023 because of tightened supply constraints. All in all, what the Government is doing is also on the fiscal stance but on the monetary policy stance. And it is for MAS to continue the current stance of appreciating the Singapore dollar to dampen imported inflation. In fact, MAS will review this stance in the next monetary policy meeting in October.”
“I thank the Member for the question. Maybe also to share a little bit of background on global rice prices. Global rice prices, in fact, have risen in recent months because of India's ban on the export of non-basmati white rice and, of course, adverse weather conditions. So, if you look at the Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) All Rice Price Index, it has increased by 31.2% in August year-on-year. That is the rice price. But if you look at the global rice of most other food commodities, they have fallen. The overall FAO Food Price Index has actually dropped by 11.8% in August year-on-year. I am giving Members the bigger picture so that we can see how we can better address this. The Government has also then strengthened food supply resilience both by diversifying the food import sources as well as encouraging local production. So, in July 2023, when India banned the non-basmati white rice exports, we requested the Indian government for waiver from the ban for our domestic food security requirements. The Indian government acceded, and our multiple import sources and our rice stockpile scheme have also allowed us to mitigate the impact of these disruptions. I also encourage Singaporeans to widen their choice of food, including different kinds of rice. I also encourage everyone to use the Price Kaki app by CASE to choose as well as to find out the prices of rice between different retailers as well. So, widen your scope. There are different sources of rice and different prices of rice as well.”
“Price Kaki, of course, promotes price transparency by providing easy and timely comparisons of grocery and hawker food prices. We will continue to monitor trends in inflation and do even more to help Singaporeans, businesses and households, if necessary.”
“Inflation in Singapore has eased in recent months. The Consumer Price Index (CPI)-All Items inflation fell to 4.1% on a year-on-year basis in July, from 6.6% in January. Similarly, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) Core Inflation eased from 5.5% to 3.8% over the same period. For the rest of 2023, inflation should slow further as import costs are likely to remain lower relative to a year ago. For the full year, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) expects CPI-All Items inflation to average 4.5% to 5.5%, while the MAS Core Inflation is projected to be 3.5% to 4.5%. Nevertheless, upside risks remain, including from further shocks to the global economy and global commodity prices and supply chains. The Government has taken a multi-pronged approach to help households and businesses cope with inflation. We have introduced measures to help lower- and middle-income households manage the higher cost of living. For example, the Assurance Package in Budget 2023 provided a Cost-of-Living Special Payment of between $200 and $400 and additional Community Development Council (CDC) Vouchers for eligible Singaporean households. The Government is also helping businesses manage rising costs. For instance, we enhanced the Enterprise Financing Scheme in Budget 2023 to reduce businesses’ borrowing needs. To mitigate higher energy prices, Government schemes, such as the Energy Efficiency Grant and the Resource Efficiency Grant for Emissions, help businesses become more energy-efficient. MAS will continue to keep the Singapore dollar strong, which dampens imported inflation. Finally, to help consumers make informed purchasing decisions, the Government has worked with the Consumers Association of Singapore (CASE) to onboard more retailers onto its Price Kaki app.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, may I have your permission to answer Question Nos 18 and 19 on today’s Order Paper together as they pertain to inflation as well as support for households and businesses?”
“Again, I thank Ms Sylvia Lim and Members in this House for their focus on this very important and rapidly evolving issue and I welcome all of you to work with the Government, to join us in our ongoing fight against scams. 6.52 pm [(proc text) Question put, and agreed to. (proc text)] [(proc text) Resolved, "That Parliament do now adjourn." (proc text)]”
“Should new information come to light that is materially different from the premise upon which the customer had accepted the goodwill offer, the customer can request the bank to relook the case, or to approach FIDReC for assistance. Finally, let me provide an update on the Shared Responsibility Framework. While this has taken longer than we would like, the Government aims to publish a consultation paper on the framework next month, focusing on phishing scams as a start. Ms Sylvia Lim pointed out that some other countries, including the United Kingdom, have either implemented or are considering mechanisms to mitigate the burden of scam losses. We are monitoring these developments, and will take them into account as we further develop this framework, including for other types of scams in the digital payments ecosystem. Ms Sylvia Lim also talked about the physical token. Customers can request for physical tokens and MAS is also looking at her suggestion. On the other part about the digital payment tokens or crypto currency, I wanted to say that MAS also continues to watch for developments in the digital payment tokens or crypto-currency space, and will regularly review the adequacy and appropriateness of these regulations. On her point of FIDReC, FIDReC will also continue to monitor and regularly review its process and procedures. Mr. Speaker, allow me to sum up. Scams are an ever-present and evolving threat. The Government will spare no effort to implement effective upstream and downstream anti-scam measures alongside industry. In doing so, as the Member suggested, we may inevitably sacrifice some convenience to achieve better security. Finally, a discerning and vigilant public remains an essential pillar in our fight against scams.”
“MAS requires banks to secure digital systems, including by implementing multi-factor authentication to verify a customer’s identity and to authorise online transactions; and also sending notification alerts to customers so they can report unauthorised transactions as soon as possible. However, we should also note that scammers can still bypass these digital security measures, by deceiving customers into inadvertently divulging their account access credentials or downloading malware, thereby granting scammers remote access to victims’ devices and their accounts. Individual customers thus also have an important responsibility to protect access to their accounts and this includes practising good cyber hygiene and being diligent in preventing their login information and one-time passwords (OTPs) from being divulged to third parties. MAS has issued guidance for banks to institute clear customer handling and investigation processes and to treat customers fairly in all disputes. MAS also monitors how banks handle such disputes. In scam cases, banks must consider if they have fulfilled their obligations, and whether the victim had acted responsibly. Customers who practised good cyber hygiene and were diligent in preventing their login information and OTPs from being divulged to third parties, should not have to bear losses. Depending on the facts of each case, banks may offer goodwill payments to customers. If a customer is unsatisfied with an offer, he may decline and approach FIDReC for mediation and adjudication. A customer can further pursue his case in court if he is not satisfied with the outcome. If the customer accepts a goodwill payment offer, he or she will be bound by the terms of the offer.”
“Banks are also exploring MoneyLock, to allow customers to set aside an amount in their bank accounts which cannot be digitally transferred out without strict authentication measures. This will further help to limit losses against scams. Third, public education. Members of the public must take active steps to protect themselves against scams. We must foster stronger adoption of scam prevention actions and cyber hygiene practices through public engagements. SPF, CSA, MoneySENSE and banks have used multiple platforms such as outreach events, social and print media, as well as digital display panels to broadcast simple advisories, including messages such as "download only from official app stores" to the public. To the Member's point, the Government is also targeting outreach and messages to vulnerable groups, including seniors, students and migrant workers. I will now address the matter that she raised about who should be responsible for scam losses. And I think the House understands that this is a difficult issue, since amounts lost in any single case can be substantial. We must, hence, strike a balance between fairness, accountability and compassion. There are some views that banks can easily absorb losses arising from individual scam cases. However, full restitution without due consideration of culpability is neither fair nor desirable. Doing so can erode vigilance and personal responsibility and lull users into complacency. Ms Sylvia Lim suggested that customers rely on banks to ensure the security and the robustness of their online banking and payment options. This is indeed so.”
“In recent months, we have seen a growing number of malware-enabled scam cases, with some victims suffering considerable losses. Left unaddressed, such scam threats and ensuing losses can undermine public confidence in payments and digital banking. The Government is resolute in fighting malware-enabled scams, and we have augmented our efforts under the three prongs I mentioned. First, upstream measures. The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA) and Singapore Police Force (SPF) are working with key tech players to limit mainstream access to identified malware variants and tools, such as those used in scams seen here in Singapore. Agencies are also working with industry and international partners to raise the security standards of mobile operating systems and mobile devices. Second, downstream measures. SPF has taken timely enforcement action, and works with banks to trace and recover funds. SPF also collaborates with overseas law enforcement agencies to take down cross-border scam syndicates. MAS has also been working closely with our banks to strengthen anti-malware controls, fraud surveillance, and detection capabilities. Major retail banks have hence enhanced the security measures to protect customers against malware scams and will progressively introduce refinements or new measures to keep pace with changes in the threat landscape. Members might know that the Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS) announced this a few hours ago. A recent example is OCBC’s move to block mobile banking access on devices that are detected to carry potentially malicious apps. Other banks are also implementing similar measures.”