Josephine Teo
Singapore
“The Government's risk-calibrated approach to data security in artificial intelligence (AI) systems was explained in a written reply, given on 9 January 2024, to related questions asked by Dr Tan Wu Meng and Mr Gerald Giam.”
“Access to frontier models is helpful for specific use cases, such as advanced research and cybersecurity. However, these form a small proportion of artificial intelligence (AI) demand. For most industry, Government and research uses, capable models are already available.”
“The Government tracks the development of technical standards for identifying artificial intelligence (AI)-generated content, including watermarking and digital provenance approaches, as part of broader efforts to manage AI-related risks.”
“Upon receiving a valid report of intimate image abuse, the Commissioner of Online Safety is empowered by law to direct Online Service Providers (OSPs) to disable access by Singapore users to the specified harmful online material. This direction may be extended to cover identical copies found on the platform.”
“The Government is committed to keeping children safe online. We have announced plans to extend age assurance requirements to designated social media services, including requiring platforms to keep users under 13 off their services.”
“Under the Online Safety (Relief and Accountability) Act 2025, the Commissioner of Online Safety is empowered to issue directions to platforms to remove specified harmful content, including intimate image abuse.”
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“As with any technology, the need for regulation depends on how it is deployed, the nature of harm that may be caused and whether existing measures are effective in addressing those harms. In Singapore's context, many artificial intelligence (AI) risks are already addressed through existing legislation. For example, employers that use AI tools must still comply with the requirements for fair and merit-based employment practices in the upcoming Workplace Fairness Act. Similarly, laws like the Online Criminal Harms Act enable the Singapore Police Force to prevent and disrupt AI-enabled scams. Where existing measures are assessed to be inadequate and a suitable response can be designed, the Government will ensure its timely implementation. For example, the Elections (Integrity of Online Advertising) (Amendment) Act was passed to prevent the misuse of digitally generated or manipulated content of candidates during elections. These laws are complemented by guidelines in specific sectors. Such guidelines may not be for compliance at the outset but provide regulatory agencies with useful feedback as they consider future policies. For example, the Monetary Authority of Singapore has consulted on Guidelines on AI Risk Management for the financial services sector, while the Ministry of Health has updated the AI in Healthcare Guidelines (AIHGle 2.0). The Government has consistently emphasised the need for responsible AI development and deployment. We will continue to study the appropriate regulatory stance for AI and assess whether existing measures are adequate as the technology and risk landscape evolves.”
“The Government tracks the development of technical standards for identifying artificial intelligence (AI)-generated content, including watermarking and digital provenance approaches, as part of broader efforts to manage AI-related risks. We engage relevant international and industry platforms, such as the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, which has over 6,000 members, including the major technology and AI companies. As these technologies and standards continue to evolve, we will assess their applicability in the Singapore context, including cross-platform measures. If criminal offences are disclosed, the Police are empowered under the law to require platforms to disclose information to assist investigations, including metadata and identifiable data of content uploaders where available.”
“Upon receiving a valid report of intimate image abuse, the Commissioner of Online Safety is empowered by law to direct Online Service Providers (OSPs) to disable access by Singapore users to the specified harmful online material. This direction may be extended to cover identical copies found on the platform. The Commissioner will not direct that specific technologies be used as long as the outcome indicated in the direction is achieved; non-compliance with a direction is an offence. While such directions apply only to access by Singapore users, OSPs are not prevented from removing the content from access by other users. However, this decision will be based on their own policies and community guidelines.”
“Under the Online Safety (Relief and Accountability) Act 2025, the Commissioner of Online Safety is empowered to issue directions to platforms to remove specified harmful content, including intimate image abuse. Directions may also be issued to communicators or administrators of groups or pages, depending on the circumstances of each case. We understand how distressing it can be when victims have their intimate images shared online. Directions will include a clear timeline for compliance so that the harmful content is stopped or removed as soon as is practicable.”
“For example, there are no dialect restrictions for arts performances or content available on the internet and online streaming services. On free-to-air television and radio, we believe that Mandarin should continue to be the mainstay. For cinemas, we are prepared to allow more screenings of dialect-language films so as to provide audiences with greater access to such content. We appreciate the feedback from Members and will carefully consider what further steps are appropriate.”
“My response will cover the questions raised by Mr Cai Yinzhou, Mr Gerald Giam, Mr Kenneth Tiong, Mr Saktiandi Supaat, Mr Dennis Tan, Ms Valerie Lee, Mr Liang Eng Hwa and Dr Neo Kok Beng in today's Order Paper, as well as related questions by Mr Darryl David1 and Ms Mariam Jaafar2 filed for subsequent Sittings. If Members are satisfied with the response, they may wish to withdraw their questions after this session. Guidelines on language use in media are implemented by the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA). They support the Government's longstanding policy to promote Mandarin as one of four official languages and have generally served us well. However, as noted in the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth's earlier reply today, Singapore's language environment has evolved. Recognising this, in implementing the guidelines, IMDA has exercised greater flexibility to allow more dialect content in films. Each year, around 30 to 40 dialect films are screened at film festivals. At the same time, IMDA has allowed unrestricted screenings of films with substantial use of dialect such as "881", "Long Long Time Ago" and "Wonderland". For the film "Dear You", IMDA has approved a total of 272 screenings of the Teochew version and is prepared to approve additional screenings, should the film distributor request them in response to audience demand. Beyond these implementation changes, several Members have called for the guidelines themselves to be reviewed. We recognise that the circumstances have changed since these guidelines were first introduced. There is therefore scope to consider how we can expand the space for dialects, while continuing to uphold the importance of Mandarin. In doing so, we should also take into account the different media platforms.”
“The Government takes the threat of Government Officials Impersonation Scams seriously and is committed to combating calls that undermine public trust in Government communications. As previously shared at the Committee of Supply 2026, the Government is developing systems for all Government agencies to make calls with numbers that start with a common prefix. The Singapore Police Force will be piloting this initiative later this year. We are also working towards the tagging of Government calls with a recognisable caller name and adopting authentication protocols that reference international standards, such as STIR/SHAKEN. Together, these measures are intended to help the public identify genuine calls from Government agencies. More details will be shared when ready. Public education remains a critical pillar of our anti-scam efforts. Even as the Government continues to strengthen such safeguards, we must all remain vigilant and take active steps to protect ourselves. The Government has issued advisories to remind the public that Government officials will never ask them to transfer money, disclose bank log-in details over a phone call or install mobile applications from unofficial app stores.”
“The Ministry of Digital Development and Information (MDDI) and Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) do not collect data on the number of times early termination charges (ETCs) are imposed by telecommunication operators on individual consumers. IMDA has in place safeguards to prevent unreasonable ETCs, which are captured in the Telecom Competition Code and advisory guidelines. First, contract periods cannot be longer than 24 months. Second, any ETC charged must be reasonably proportionate to any discounts given and to the amount of time remaining on the contract. This effectively caps the ETC. Third, telecommunication companies must inform consumers of any applicable ETC upfront before subscription or upon renewal, and to obtain express written acknowledgement that consumers have understood these charges. IMDA will continue to monitor market developments and take enforcement action where operators are found to be in breach of these requirements. Given the many telecommunication service offerings available in the market for consumers, including no-contract SIM-only plans, consumers can choose the services that best meet their needs.”
“The Government's risk-calibrated approach to data security in artificial intelligence (AI) systems was explained in a written reply, given on 9 January 2024, to related questions asked by Dr Tan Wu Meng and Mr Gerald Giam. [Please refer to "Regulations on Input Prompts for Large Language Models to Prevent Disclosure of Confidential Data", Official Report, 9 January 2024, Vol 95, Issue 118, Written Answers to Questions for Oral Answer not Answered by End of Question Time section.] That overarching approach continues to apply today. We mandate technical and contractual safeguards commensurate with the classification and sensitivity of data involved; these are complemented by responsible use policies and governance processes practiced by officers. As AI technologies evolve, we continue to apply these same principles to new use cases, tools and capabilities. We regularly review our rules and safeguards to ensure agencies can harness AI to transform public service delivery while keeping Government data and systems secure.”
“Access to frontier models is helpful for specific use cases, such as advanced research and cybersecurity. However, these form a small proportion of artificial intelligence (AI) demand. For most industry, Government and research uses, capable models are already available. For the foreseeable future, access to frontier AI will continue to be shaped not just by commercial considerations but also export controls and geopolitics. We should therefore be realistic and focus on making the most of the considerable capabilities that remain accessible. At the same time, for better resilience, we will diversify and maintain access to a range of AI models through partnerships with multiple providers. At international fora, we continue to advocate for an AI ecosystem that is open and collaborate with partners on different aspects of AI governance, including safety, security and the responsible use of AI. This will help preserve flexibility to choose amongst available options to meet Singapore's AI needs.”
“On 18 May 2026, the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) informed the public that Simba could have been using radio frequency bands that had not been assigned to them to provide mobile services. Mobile network operators (MNOs) must only use spectrum assigned to them. Any use of spectrum beyond the assigned bands without IMDA's prior approval is a serious matter because it can cause interference to other services and allow operators to gain an unfair advantage over their competitors. IMDA conducts regular technical checks and monitoring of MNOs' compliance in spectrum use, with a primary focus on preventing interference in spectrum bands and disruption of approved wireless and mobile services. Where interference has been detected, IMDA will work with the affected parties to minimise the impact and disruption to services and take enforcement actions where appropriate. IMDA's investigations of Simba's case are ongoing. We will need to let IMDA carry out its due process and conclude its investigations before further details can be shared. Notwithstanding the investigations, IMDA will ensure that Simba continues to meet licence obligations and service level commitments to their subscribers.”
“From 1 April 2026, designated app distribution services, also known as app stores, are required to implement age assurance measures to prevent users younger than 18 from accessing and downloading age-inappropriate apps. Thus far, all five designated app stores have fully implemented age assurance measures. The Government is looking to enhance its safeguards for designated social media services, which include age assurance requirements. We have started engaging designated social media services and will provide an update when ready.”
“The Government is committed to keeping children safe online. We have announced plans to extend age assurance requirements to designated social media services, including requiring platforms to keep users under 13 off their services. For older children, we are exploring how to make social media platforms safer by requiring age-appropriate experiences and safeguards. Platforms that are unwilling to do so will be excluded from serving this group of users. Beyond regulation, we will continue to support parents and work with platforms and the wider community to foster healthy digital habits among children.”
“Over the past three years, the National Library Board's (NLB's) MakeIT at Libraries had a total annual participation of about 60,000 across its four locations. Individuals who participated in multiple sessions or activities may be counted more than once. NLB considers factors, such as patron demand, operational sustainability and availability of space, in deciding the mix of programmes and services across libraries. More details on Clementi Library's upcoming revamp will be announced when ready. NLB welcomes collaboration with community partners for all its programmes and services. Specifically, for MakeIT, over the past three years, we have worked with a diverse range of partners, including non-profit groups serving persons with disabilities and volunteers from tech, design and engineering sectors.”
“Public officers use artificial intelligence (AI) tools to more effectively serve the public. They are equipped with AI literacy, to understand the risks and benefits of AI. The Government takes seriously the trust of residents in our interactions. Before they are deployed for public officers' use, AI tools are rigorously assessed, undergo safety and accuracy testing and meet data security requirements. Officers remain responsible for the replies they draft, even if aided by AI tools. They are not permitted to enter sensitive or classified information into unapproved AI systems, in line with Government information technology security policies. We will continue to monitor how these tools perform, learn from our experience and strengthen our practices.”
“The Government recognises that generative artificial intelligence (AI), including large language models, brings significant benefits. However, its probabilistic nature means residual risks may persist despite reasonable safeguards. The Model AI Governance Framework for Generative AI provides guidelines to manage these risks, focusing on accountability, transparency and public trust. There is also existing legislation to protect Singaporeans from online harms and risks, such as the Online Criminal Harms Act and our misinformation laws. They extend to harms that could result from the use of AI and its output. In addition, existing legal principles, such as under tort and contract law, can be applied by our Courts to assess and determine liability in appropriate cases. That being said, we share the concerns raised by the Member and will continue to study this issue, including consulting with practitioners, academia and industry on whether there are any accountability gaps and if policy, regulatory and legal measures may be needed.”
“Under the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA), organisations, including individuals creating content for commercial purposes, are accountable for how personal data is collected and used. The taking of photographs or making of video or audio recordings is subject to the same rules and principles regardless of the form factor of the device. While the PDPA generally does not require consent to be sought from persons for photography or recording in public spaces, organisations must ensure that any subsequent use or disclosure of the personal data, including for artificial intelligence features, is for a reasonable purpose and complies with any other applicable laws. Regardless of the capacity they are acting in, individuals should also note that non-consensual recording, sharing or other misuse of intimate or private content may constitute criminal offences under existing laws, including the Penal Code and the Protection from Harassment Act. Under the Online Safety (Relief and Accountability) Act, creators of online content may also be held accountable for harms caused to victims.”
“Under the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act, a Minister can issue a Correction Direction if a false statement of fact has been communicated in Singapore, and it is in the public interest to issue the Correction Direction. This includes online falsehoods communicated via deepfake videos. Under the Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA), the Government can issue directions to online service providers to disable Singapore users' access to an online content or activity, when there is reasonable suspicion that the online activity is in furtherance of a specified criminal offence under the First Schedule of OCHA, or when there is suspicion or reason to believe that the online activity is preparatory to the commission of a scam or malicious cyber activity. This includes deepfake images and videos. The Government assesses harmful online content holistically and determines the appropriate response, based on a range of factors for each case and the legal conditions under the relevant legislation. As such, intervention is not determined by any single factor alone. We recognise that there are segments of society who may be less confident in their ability to discern between fact and falsehood online. Public education initiatives are therefore as important as legislation to help our people become more vigilant and discerning when they go online. For example, the Digital Skills for Life framework, developed by the Infocomm Media Development Authority, equips Singaporeans with skills to identify and respond to false and misleading content. The SG Digital Office also runs Gen AI workshops for seniors, which cover how to stay safe and smart online against AI-generated misinformation.”
“The Model Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance Framework for Agentic AI (Framework) sets out guidance for organisations to ensure meaningful human accountability in deploying agentic AI. They should not allow high stakes or irreversible actions to take place without human review. Appropriate actions therefore include identifying checkpoints or action boundaries that require human approval. The Framework also emphasises transparency towards users, such as declaring upfront that users are interacting with agents and the agents' capabilities and data access. Agentic AI use cases and the appropriate safeguards are still evolving. Hence, together with sector regulators, we will continue to monitor how various sectors deploy agentic AI and put the above principles in practice, continue to consult and learn from best practices internationally, to make the adjustments to the framework as necessary.”
“INDEPTH is a deepfake detection platform designed specifically for Government agencies and is not intended for public use. It is not in the public interest to reveal its detection capabilities as malicious actors may exploit such information. The ScamShield app was developed by Open Government Products in collaboration with the National Crime Prevention Council and the Singapore Police Force to protect the public from scams. It blocks scam calls from numbers verified by the authorities and filters scam SMSes. It also allows users to check and report suspicious calls, messages, such as SMS, WhatsApp and Telegram, and website links, including those that may show signs of digital manipulation, such as deepfakes. The Government will continue to strengthen ScamShield's existing scam detection capabilities and reporting channels and step up public education to better protect users from evolving scam tactics. There are no plans at this juncture to develop a verification API within the ScamShield app to provide real-time risk scores for suspicious media.”
“Courier service is not a regulated service unlike postal services, which the Infocomm Media Development Authority regulates because it is an essential service. Nonetheless, the Government has been working with industry partners on best-practice guides to support courier companies in improving the efficiency of their last-mile deliveries in residential areas. For example, the Singapore Logistics Association, with support from Enterprise Singapore, the Land Transport Authority (LTA) and Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA), published a Best Practice Guide for Last-mile Delivery (Condominiums) to help improve the delivery experience within condominiums. URA and LTA are looking to develop similar guides for different development typologies.”
“The Infocomm Media Development Authority has also launched a set of resources on the Digital for Life portal to empower parents to help their child develop healthy digital habits from young, with content tailored to children's different developmental stages and key digital milestones. Through these regulatory and public education efforts, we will continue to foster a digital environment where our children can grow and thrive safely.”
“We will also consider similar safeguards for online gaming. We are determined to go further to enhance safeguards for children on designated social media services. MDDI is carefully studying features on these services, such as direct messaging and autoplay, which can result in unwanted interactions with strangers or excessive use for children and adolescents. To that end, MDDI is in active discussions with the designated social media services, to outline our expectations of the standards they must meet. We will also consult the public, including parents and youths, to better understand their experiences and perspectives across different age groups, to determine the safeguards that are necessary and appropriate. The outcome of these engagements will shape our policy response, which may include restricting access to services with age-inappropriate features. Beyond regulatory measures, the Government has stepped up efforts to support parents in guiding their children's digital use. For example, the Ministry of Education (MOE) has disallowed the use of smartphones and smartwatches during school hours, including during co-curricular activities, in primary and secondary schools. The Ministry of Health updated its Guidance on Screen Use in Children aged below 12 years to provide parents with clearer and more actionable guidance on screen use practices in children. The Health Promotion Board, MOE and Ministry of Social and Family Development jointly developed the Parenting for Wellness toolkit to equip parents with key knowledge and skills to parent effectively in the digital age, and prepare their children to navigate the digital environment safely.”
“My response will cover the questions raised by Mr Vikram Nair, Mr Louis Chua, Miss Rachel Ong and Mr Abdul Muhaimin in today's Order Paper, as well as questions by Mr Chua, Ms Elysa Chen and Mr Victor Lye filed for subsequent Sittings relating to the Government's measures to enhance safeguards for children and adolescents when they go on social media platforms. [Please refer to "Review of Current Regulations and Protection Measures For Children and Teenagers Against Social Media Addiction", Official Report, 5 May 2026, Vol 96, Issue 29, Written Answers to Questions section; "Regulating Young People's Access to Social Media Given Negligent Finding on Meta and Alphabet In US", Official Report, 6 May 2026, Vol 96, Issue 30, Oral Answers to Questions section; and "Assessment of Age-based Restrictions for Addictive Design Features on Social Media and Gaming Platforms", Official Report, 6 May 2026, Vol 96, Issue 30, Written Answers to Questions section.] If the Members are satisfied with the response, they may wish to withdraw their questions after this session. We share the concerns Members have raised regarding online safety for children and youths on social media platforms. Today, the Code of Practice for Online Safety – Social Media Services already requires designated social media services to put in place systems and processes to minimise users' exposure to harmful online content, especially younger users. As the Ministry of Digital Development and Information (MDDI) announced during our Committee of Supply debate, we plan to extend age assurance requirements to designated social media services. Age assurance is a critical step in ensuring that designated social media services can identify young users and provide them with protective measures on their platforms.”
“Agencies are required to share data that is assessed to be suitable and useful for disclosure to the public as soon as practicable, through platforms, such as data.gov.sg (DGS), OneMap or their own websites. Today, there are almost 5,000 datasets from across agencies shared on DGS, some of which are automatically updated via application programming interface (API) connections. The DGS team is taking steps to enhance the timely sharing and updating of datasets. These include expanding and improving API integrations with agencies and tracking high-demand datasets which could be prioritised for such integrations.”
“The question raised by Ms He Ting Ru in today’s Order Paper, in relation to the 18 April 2026 broadband service disruption, has been addressed in a written reply to related Parliamentary Questions at the 5 May Parliament sitting. The Member may refer to that reply. [Please refer to "Defining Significant Telecommunication Outages to Hours Disrupted and Consumers Affected and Pursuing Third-Party Damages and Restitution for Disruption on 18 April 2026", Official Report, 5 May 2026, Vol 96, Issue 29, Written Answers to Questions section.]”
“The Question raised by Mr Chua Kheng Wee Louis, in relation to AI-enabled cybersecurity risks, has been addressed in my reply to related Parliament Questions in yesterday’s Parliament sitting. The Member may refer to that reply. [Please refer to "Response to Risks from Frontier AI Models with Potential to Steal Data, Disrupt Critical Infrastructure and Exploit Software Vulnerabilities", Official Report, 5 May 2026, Vol 96, Issue 29, Oral Answers to Questions section.]”
“IMDA is working with the Ministry of National Development and relevant infrastructure agencies to improve processes, raise the industry's capabilities and promote the adoption of advanced non-invasive technologies to detect and avoid damaging underground cables.”
“IMDA conducts regular dialogues with earthworks contractors to ensure that they are aware of these requirements and can take necessary precautions to prevent cable damage. Contractors that fail to comply with the Earthworks Requirements and damage telecommunications cables face serious penalties. A contractor who damages telecommunications cables is liable, on conviction, to a fine of up to $1 million or imprisonment of up to five years, or both. The Government's role is to raise awareness and introduce safety measures to prevent damage to telecommunication cables. When cable cuts still occur despite the best efforts to prevent them, IMDA will investigate and, where necessary, commence legal proceedings against the errant parties. The recovery of repair costs and losses is a commercial matter for the affected operators to pursue against the responsible parties. Besides protecting our underground telecommunication cables from accidental cuts, IMDA also requires NetLink Trust to ensure that its network is resilient to outages. This includes investing in projects through a dedicated Capital Expenditure Reserve Fund, to enhance the capacity and resilience of its network. NetLink Trust has built in redundancy and path diversity in its cable routes, especially near its network core. However, nearer to homes, underground space constraints in a densely built-up city do not allow for the same degree of route duplication. Should service disruptions still occur, the Telecom Service Resiliency Code requires telecommunications operators to recover their services as quickly as possible. Finally, we recognise the need to do more to prevent such incidents in future.”
“My response will address the questions filed by Mr Fadli Fawzi and Mr Low Wu Yang Andre in today's Order Paper, as well as the question filed by Ms He Ting Ru for tomorrow's Sitting, as they relate to the same incident. If the Member is satisfied with the response, she may wish to withdraw her question after this session. [Please refer to "Reviewing Adequacy of Path Diversity of Passive Fibre Infrastructure Owners", Official Report, 6 May 2026, Vol 96, Issue 30, Written Answers to Questions for Oral Answer not Answered by End of Question Time section.] On 18 April 2026, a subcontractor conducting boring works along Marymount Road for the North-South Corridor project struck and damaged 25 underground telecommunication cables owned by NetLink Trust and Singtel. This disrupted broadband services to approximately 5,000 subscribers in parts of Ang Mo Kio, Bishan, Sengkang and Punggol. Broadband services were progressively restored, with full recovery taking approximately 20 hours. A disruption of this duration and scale is a significant service disruption. We have rules in place to minimise the risk of telecommunication cable cuts due to construction activity and earthworks. In 2019, the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) introduced the Earthworks Requirements for Prevention of Damage to Telecommunication Cables, under the Telecommunications Act. They set out a multi-step process that earthwork contractors must comply with before commencing any earthworks near underground telecommunications cables. Measures include engaging licensed cable detection workers, verifying cable locations through trial holes and obtaining approval from relevant telecommunications operators before commencing earthworks.”
“Under the Personal Data Protection Act, data about an identifiable individual is considered personal data and an organisation has obligations to safeguard such data in its possession or control. This also covers data about the individual that an organisation derives in the course of business from such personal data. The Personal Data Protection Commission has published Advisory Guidelines on the Use of Personal Data in Artificial Intelligence (AI) Recommendation and Decision Systems. It sets out principles to guide organisations and consumers on the responsible collection and use of personal data in AI systems, such as using data only for legitimate business purposes and limiting data collection to what is needed.”
“The Member’s questions centre on safeguards for young users of online gaming platforms and accountability of the platforms when harms occur. The Code of Practice for Online Safety – App Distribution Services requires Designated App Distribution Services (DADSs) – Apple App Store, Google Play Store, Huawei AppGallery, Microsoft Store, and Samsung Galaxy Store – to put in place regulatory measures to minimise users’ risk of exposure to harmful content, including those found in gaming apps. Among other obligations, DADSs are required to put in place age assurance measures to reduce the likelihood of users under 18 accessing and downloading age-inappropriate apps, including gaming apps. In addition, when harms occur, the Online Safety (Relief and Accountability) Act provides redress to victims. The Act covers 13 specified harms that are among the most severe and prevalent harms experienced by Singapore users, and include those occurring on gaming platforms. These harms may be caused by user behaviour and may also be amplified through algorithmic design. Platforms are held accountable for timely responses when notified of these harms. Failure to do so may be an offence and may result in civil liability. The Ministry of Digital Development and Infocomm (MDDI) is committed to fostering safe and age-appropriate digital environments for young users. The Member may refer to recent statements about MDDI’s plans to improve online safety for young users such as minimising unwanted interactions and excessive use.”
“We will also consult the public, including parents and youths to better understand their experiences and perspectives across different age groups, to determine the safeguards that are necessary and appropriate. The outcome of these engagements will shape our policy response, which may include restricting access to services with age-inappropriate features. Beyond regulatory measures, the Government has stepped up efforts to support parents in guiding their children's digital use. For example, the Ministry of Education (MOE) has disallowed the use of smartphones and smartwatches during school hours, including during co-curricular activities, in primary and secondary schools. The Ministry of Health (MOH) updated its Guidance on Screen Use in Children aged below 12 years to provide parents with clearer and more actionable guidance on screen use practices in children. The Health Promotion Board, MOE and the Ministry of Social and Family Development jointly developed the Parenting for Wellness toolkit to equip parents with key knowledge and skills to parent effectively in the digital age and prepare their children to navigate the digital environment safely. The Infocomm Media Development Authority has also launched a set of resources on the Digital for Life portal to empower parents to help their child develop healthy digital habits from young, with content tailored to children's different developmental stages and key digital milestones. Through these regulatory and public education efforts, we will continue to foster a digital environment where our children can grow and thrive safely.”
“My response will cover the questions raised by Mr Vikram Nair, Mr Louis Chua, Miss Rachel Ong and Mr Abdul Muhaimin in today's Order Paper, as well as questions by Mr Chua, Ms Elysa Chen and Mr Victor Lye filed for subsequent sittings relating to the Government's measures to enhance safeguards for children and adolescents when they go on social media platforms. If the Members of Parliament (MPs) are satisfied with the response, they may wish to withdraw their questions after this session. We share the concerns Members have raised regarding online safety for children and youths on social media platforms. Today, the Code of Practice for Online Safety – Social Media Services already requires designated social media services to put in place systems and processes to minimise users' exposure to harmful online content, especially younger users. As the Ministry of Digital Development and Information (MDDI) announced during our Committee of Supply debate, we plan to extend age assurance requirements to designated social media services. Age assurance is a critical step in ensuring that designated social media services can identify young users and provide them with protective measures on their platforms. We will also consider similar safeguards for online gaming. We are determined to go further to enhance safeguards for children on designated social media services. MDDI is carefully studying features on these services, such as direct messaging and autoplay, which can result in unwanted interactions with strangers or excessive use for children and adolescents. To that end, MDDI is in active discussions with the designated social media services to outline our expectations of the standards they must meet.”
“The Member's question has been addressed in the reply to Question No 28 on the Order Paper for 8 April 2026. [Please refer to "Rationale for Correction Direction Issued on 23 March 2026 for Correction Notice to Be Published in The Straits Times", Official Report, 8 April 2026, Vol 96, Issue 28, Written Answers to Questions for Oral Answer not Answered by End of Question Time section.]”
“IMDA is working with the Ministry of National Development and relevant infrastructure agencies to improve processes, raise the industry's capabilities, and promote the adoption of advanced non-invasive technologies to detect and avoid damaging underground cables.”
“IMDA conducts regular dialogues with earthworks contractors to ensure that they are aware of these requirements and can take necessary precautions to prevent cable damage. Contractors that fail to comply with the Earthworks Requirements, and damage telecommunications cables, face serious penalties. A contractor who damages telecommunications cables is liable, on conviction, to a fine of up to $1 million or imprisonment of up to five years, or both. The Government's role is to raise awareness and introduce safety measures to prevent damage to telecommunication cables. When cable cuts still occur despite the best efforts to prevent them, IMDA will investigate and, where necessary, commence legal proceedings against the errant parties. The recovery of repair costs and losses is a commercial matter for the affected operators to pursue against the responsible parties. Besides protecting our underground telecommunication cables from accidental cuts, IMDA also requires NetLink Trust to ensure that its network is resilient to outages. This includes investing in projects through a dedicated Capital Expenditure Reserve Fund, to enhance the capacity and resilience of its network. NetLink Trust has built in redundancy and path diversity in its cable routes, especially near its network core. However, nearer to homes, underground space constraints in a densely built-up city do not allow for the same degree of route duplication. Should service disruptions still occur, the Telecom Service Resiliency Code requires telecommunications operators to recover their services as quickly as possible. Finally, we recognise the need to do more to prevent such incidents in future.”
“My response will address the questions filed by Mr Fadli Fawzi and Mr Low Wu Yang Andre in today's Order Paper, as well as the question filed by Ms He Ting Ru for tomorrow's Sitting, as they relate to the same incident. [Please refer to "Reviewing Adequacy of Path Diversity of Passive Fibre Infrastructure Owners", Official Report, 6 May 2026, Vol 96, Issue 30, Written Answers to Questions for Oral Answer not Answered by End of Question Time section.] If the Member is satisfied with the response, she may wish to withdraw her question after this session. On 18 April 2026, a subcontractor conducting boring works along Marymount Road for the North-South Corridor project struck and damaged 25 underground telecommunication cables owned by NetLink Trust and Singtel. This disrupted broadband services to approximately 5,000 subscribers in parts of Ang Mo Kio, Bishan, Sengkang and Punggol. Broadband services were progressively restored, with full recovery taking approximately 20 hours. A disruption of this duration and scale is a significant service disruption. We have rules in place to minimise the risk of telecommunication cable cuts due to construction activity and earthworks. In 2019, the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) introduced the Earthworks Requirements for Prevention of Damage to Telecommunication Cables, under the Telecommunications Act. They set out a multi-step process that earthwork contractors must comply with before commencing any earthworks near underground telecommunications cables. Measures include, engaging licensed cable detection workers, verifying cable locations through trial holes and obtaining approval from relevant telecommunications operators before commencing earthworks.”
“As part of our broader efforts to strengthen trust and safety in the digital space, the Ministry, together with Infocomm Media Development Authority, is exploring the concept of "nutrition labels" for service providers to disclose key information about the AI application's capabilities and limitations in a clear and accessible manner. We are currently in consultation with relevant service providers. This includes ascertaining how such information can help shape user behaviour. The provision of information will complement efforts to set baseline standards for online safety to better protect young users, such as the age assurance measures for app stores that took effect from 1 April.”
“The Health Promotion Board, MOE and Ministry of Social and Family Development jointly developed the Parenting for Wellness toolkit to equip parents with key knowledge and skills to parent effectively in the digital age, and prepare their children to navigate the digital environment safely. The Infocomm Media Development Authority has also launched a set of resources on the Digital for Life portal to empower parents to help their child develop healthy digital habits from young, with content tailored to children's different developmental stages and key digital milestones. Through these regulatory and public education efforts, we will continue to foster a digital environment where our children can grow and thrive safely.”
“Age assurance is a critical step in ensuring that designated social media services can identify young users and provide them with protective measures on their platforms. We will also consider similar safeguards for online gaming. We are determined to go further to enhance safeguards for children on designated social media services. MDDI is carefully studying features on these services, such as direct messaging and autoplay, which can result in unwanted interactions with strangers or excessive use for children and adolescents. To that end, MDDI is in active discussions with the designated social media services, to outline our expectations of the standards they must meet. We will also consult the public, including parents and youths, to better understand their experiences and perspectives across different age groups, to determine the safeguards that are necessary and appropriate. The outcome of these engagements will shape our policy response, which may include restricting access to services with age-inappropriate features. Beyond regulatory measures, the Government has stepped up efforts to support parents in guiding their children's digital use. For example, the Ministry of Education (MOE) has disallowed the use of smartphones and smartwatches during school hours, including during co-curricular activities, in primary and secondary schools. The Ministry of Health updated its Guidance on Screen Use in Children aged below 12 years to provide parents with clearer and more actionable guidance on screen use practices in children.”
“My response will cover the questions raised by Mr Vikram Nair, Mr Louis Chua, Miss Rachel Ong and Mr Abdul Muhaimin in today's Order Paper, as well as questions by Mr Chua, Ms Elysa Chen and Mr Victor Lye filed for subsequent Sittings relating to the Government's measures to enhance safeguards for children and adolescents when they go on social media platforms. [Please refer to "Review of Current Regulations and Protection Measures For Children and Teenagers Against Social Media Addiction", Official Report, 5 May 2026, Vol 96, Issue 29, Written Answers to Questions section; "Regulating Young People's Access to Social Media Given Negligent Finding on Meta and Alphabet In US", Official Report, 6 May 2026, Vol 96, Issue 30, Oral Answers to Questions section; and "Assessment of Age-based Restrictions for Addictive Design Features on Social Media and Gaming Platforms", Official Report, 6 May 2026, Vol 96, Issue 30, Written Answers to Questions section.] If the Members of Parliament are satisfied with the response, they may wish to withdraw their questions after this session. We share the concerns Members have raised regarding online safety for children and youths on social media platforms. Today, the Code of Practice for Online Safety – Social Media Services already requires designated social media services to put in place systems and processes to minimise users' exposure to harmful online content, especially younger users. As the Ministry of Digital Development and Information (MDDI) announced during our Committee of Supply debate, we plan to extend age assurance requirements to designated social media services.”
“The Personal Data Protection Act requires organisations to respond to personal data access requests as soon as reasonably practicable. If the organisation is unable to provide the requested personal data within 30 days after receiving the request, the organisation must within that time inform the individual in writing of when it will respond to the request. Organisations must also implement policies and practices to handle access requests, which include having appropriate measures to preserve the requested personal data while the request is being processed.”
“Suicide cases are distressing incidents that affect individuals and communities profoundly. Any media reporting should be done sensitively and responsibly to discourage imitative behaviour and avoid compounding the trauma of the parties involved. In their reporting, the media has also put in place a practice to include mental health helplines and resources for those facing distress. Our mainstream media have been largely responsible and sensitive in reporting suicide cases. The Ministry of Digital Development and Information will continue to engage and work closely with the media to ensure responsible reporting of such cases. The Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) Code of Practice for Online Safety – Social Media Services requires designated social media services to put in place systems and processes to minimise users’ exposure to harmful content, including suicide and self-harm content, on their platforms. In addition, under the Social Media Services Code, designated social media services must actively offer relevant safety information, such as local suicide prevention hotlines, to users who use high-risk search terms on their platforms, such as terms relating to suicide and self-harm. IMDA can also direct social media services to disable Singapore users' access to content advocating or instructing on suicide on their platforms. We will continue to monitor and update our efforts, where relevant.”
“The number of scams featuring phone calls and SMSes as a first approach have decreased by 19% and 65% respectively from 2024 to 2025. This suggests that the new anti-scam measures and strengthening of enforcement action have been effective in mitigating the exploitation of SIM cards for scams. To further deter SIM card offences, the Government has introduced enhanced penalties. With effect from 30 December 2025, scam mules who enable scammers by providing SIM cards will face discretionary caning of up to 12 strokes. They will also not be able to subscribe to new mobile lines. In addition, the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) and the Government Technology Agency of Singapore, alongside the Singapore Police Force (SPF), are proactively detecting scam-related mobile lines, and disrupted more than 105,000 scam-related mobile lines across all the telcos in 2025. More recently, IMDA together with SPF, tightened the SIM card registration rules such that a person can only register a maximum of 10 postpaid SIM cards across all telcos with effect from 28 February 2026. To further mitigate scams through the call channel, we are also implementing a common prefix for Government agencies' calls to enable citizens to easily identify and trust calls from the authorities. The Government will continue calibrating our measures against the scam situation in Singapore, including adjusting the postpaid SIM card limit if required. The Government takes a serious stance against those who enable scammers by providing them tools for scams, such as SIM cards. Offenders will be dealt with severely under the law.”
“The proposed consolidation is being assessed in accordance with the Infocomm Media Development Authority's (IMDA) Telecom and Media Competition Code (TMCC). IMDA is conducting a comprehensive review of Simba and M1's commitments to ensure that public interests, including national security considerations, continue to be met and there is no significant lessening of competition. IMDA will make a decision when it has studied these considerations thoroughly. For national security reasons, we do not disclose which systems are designated as critical information infrastructure. It is clear that our telecommunications infrastructure is critical and our telcos play an important role in safeguarding it by adhering to strict security and resilience requirements.”
“Smart glasses with AI capabilities are subject to existing safeguards for data protection and safety in Singapore. Organisations that are offering these products in Singapore would have to ensure that the collection, use and disclosure of personal data through such products complies with the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA). This includes being upfront about what personal data is collected and why, ensuring that proper consent has been sought where required, and ensuring data protection policies are clearly written and easily accessible. Should an organisation transfer such personal data to third-party contractors overseas, it remains responsible for ensuring protection which is comparable to Singapore's standards. Organisations that fail to do so could face financial penalties under the PDPA. In addition, non-consensual recording, sharing or other misuse of intimate or private content may constitute criminal offences under existing laws, including the Penal Code and the Protection from Harassment Act.”
“Due to this repeated pattern of behaviour of spreading multiple online falsehoods, TOC's website, Facebook and X pages have also been designated as Declared Online Locations under POFMA on more than one occasion – first in July 2023 and again in July 2025. Despite these measures, TOC has continued to disseminate false and misleading content. Over the past six years, TOC and its affiliated pages have been issued 25 Correction Directions. To mitigate against the impact and reach of the falsehoods communicated by TOC, it was necessary to supplement the online correction notices with a print correction notice in The Straits Times, so that the facts are made accessible beyond the online audience. The Government will assess the need for a print correction notice depending on the circumstance of each case, to ensure corrections are effective in reaching the relevant audiences.”
“Countries worldwide continue to grapple with the persistent challenge of online falsehoods, which can spread quickly. Falsehoods can polarise societies, undermine public trust in institutions and threaten the foundations of democratic discourse by attacking the shared factual basis upon which debate can take place. The Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) provides the Government with targeted tools to address online falsehoods. These include directions to publish correction notices on both online and, where necessary, offline channels, to correct falsehoods and inform the public of the facts. In addition, persistent communicators of falsehoods may be designated as Declared Online Locations, with readers cautioned to exercise discretion when accessing such sources for information. These tools address the distinctive challenges that online falsehoods present, namely their potential for rapid proliferation and viral transmission, permanence in digital environments, and tendency for false information to achieve broader circulation than facts. Falsehoods can go beyond digital boundaries and spread through offline discourse, influencing public understanding even among those who have not encountered the original false content online. In assessing what measures were necessary in the specific case highlighted by the Member, the Government took into account the overall context. The Online Citizen (TOC), which received the Correction Direction issued on 23 March 2026, has a history of publishing falsehoods.”
“Mr Speaker, I think I addressed the Member's question, which is that where it is useful and relevant to do so for certain types of cybersecurity accesses, yes, we do have measures in place to ensure that the persons accessing them fit the right conditions and we have no concerns. But we do not publicly reveal all the requirements that we put in place, and that is for obvious security reasons. Because if it was so plain, if you state it so clearly that there is this particular process and once you clear it, that is it. Then, that becomes the easiest thing to overcome. So, I take the Member's point. It is not the case that there is no vetting. It depends on what the activity is.”