Josephine Teo
Singapore
“The Government's risk-calibrated approach to data security in artificial intelligence (AI) systems was explained in a written reply, given on 9 January 2024, to related questions asked by Dr Tan Wu Meng and Mr Gerald Giam.”
“Access to frontier models is helpful for specific use cases, such as advanced research and cybersecurity. However, these form a small proportion of artificial intelligence (AI) demand. For most industry, Government and research uses, capable models are already available.”
“The Government tracks the development of technical standards for identifying artificial intelligence (AI)-generated content, including watermarking and digital provenance approaches, as part of broader efforts to manage AI-related risks.”
“Upon receiving a valid report of intimate image abuse, the Commissioner of Online Safety is empowered by law to direct Online Service Providers (OSPs) to disable access by Singapore users to the specified harmful online material. This direction may be extended to cover identical copies found on the platform.”
“The Government is committed to keeping children safe online. We have announced plans to extend age assurance requirements to designated social media services, including requiring platforms to keep users under 13 off their services.”
“Under the Online Safety (Relief and Accountability) Act 2025, the Commissioner of Online Safety is empowered to issue directions to platforms to remove specified harmful content, including intimate image abuse.”
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“IMDA's Start Digital (SD) programme provides easy-to-deploy digital solutions to new companies or those that have yet to digitalise. To date, about 1,320 companies in the education sector and 220 in the exercise sector have adopted SD solutions. IMDA's Data Protection Essentials (DPE) programme is designed to support SMEs in acquiring a basic level of data protection and security to protect their customers' personal data and recover quickly from a data breach. Since its inception in April 2022, there have been over 100 applications for the DPE one-stop professional service (“Service”). The Service helps SMEs to set up data security practices and incident management plans, provides data protection and cyber awareness training to the SME's staff and comes with a one-year retainer service that includes software updates and reviews of the SME's systems and data handling processes. Most of the applications for the Service come from SMEs in sectors, such as healthcare and IT which handle a large amount of personal data (more than 500 individuals). Over 40% of the applications are from micro-SMEs. Specifically, four applications are from the education sector and none are from the exercise sector. To date, 50% of all applicants have successfully implemented the Service, while the remaining are at different stages of implementation. Different SMEs have varying data protection needs depending on the volume and type of data they handle. IMDA has been collaborating with various sector champions to promote the DPE, including in the education and exercise sectors. For example, IMDA is partnering the Committee for Private Education to encourage small-to-medium private education institutions to adopt the DPE to protect their customers' personal data.”
“The Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Scheme covers disputes over billing and unsolicited charges for telecommunications and media services which are licensed by IMDA. These include mobile, fibre broadband and pay TV services. Services that are not licensed by IMDA, such as billing-on-behalf services, are excluded from the Scheme as these are outside IMDA’s regulatory mandate and authority. For disputes concerning services which are not licensed by IMDA, consumers continue to have access to a range of dispute resolution options, such as the Consumers Association of Singapore and the Small Claims Tribunal.”
“The Lamppost-as-a-Platform (LaaP) trials were started in late 2017 to explore the technical and business feasibility of using lampposts to mount sensors. Trials were conducted in existing built-up areas in Geylang and one-north, and in a greenfield site at Punggol Northshore. The concept was based on the available technology and information at that point in time, with several other leading countries similarly exploring this concept. The technology has evolved since the start of the project, as expected. New and cost-effective options are now available to better meet the varied and dynamic operational needs of our agencies. For example, the use of mobile sensor deployment and fuel cells have brought about greater flexibility and a lower cost as compared to the use of fixed infrastructure like lampposts. Therefore, we have assessed that it is not practical to roll out the LaaP on a large-scale. However, the trial has resulted in positive outcomes, for example the development of data exchange platforms and governance models that allow Government agencies to share data from sensors. Trials are a necessary part of experimenting, learning and developing our processes and skills. The Government will continue to adopt a bold and agile approach for innovative projects that advance Singapore's smart city ambitions and transform our lived environment. Such an approach allows us to explore new and emerging technologies. We need to be able to scale technology solutions quickly across agencies when validated, or to pivot or discontinue projects and products when appropriate.”
“Today, most data centre operators already adopt a risk management approach in line with international standards, including the implementation of measures to ensure resilience. The Government is studying whether and how best to strengthen the security and resilience of data centres as a category of digital infrastructure with significant impact. This may include risk-calibrated regulation for data centres, taking reference from international standards and best practices. However, we must recognise that regulation alone will not fully eliminate the possibility of outages and disruptions. Industries and enterprises must also play their part. To ensure consumer confidence, entities, such as banks, telcos and digital service providers, should take steps to mitigate risks and ensure the continued delivery of important digital services even when outages or disruptions occur.”
“The specifics of the recent outage affecting banking services have been, or will be, addressed in response to related Parliamentary Questions. This reply focuses on the broader digital infrastructure landscape and the Government’s approach to enhancing its security and resilience. Where a data centre supports the delivery of essential services or other nationally important systems, we have regulation in place to ensure its security and resilience. For example, the Cyber Security Agency identifies and regulates Critical Information Infrastructure (CII), which can include computer systems situated in a data centre that are necessary for the provision of essential services in sectors, such as the Government, infocomm, and banking and finance. In addition, sector regulators impose requirements on the service providers in their sectors. Major telecommunication operators (telcos) and banks, for instance, are regulated by the Infocomm Media Development Authority and Monetary Authority of Singapore respectively, for security and resilience. Exercises and audits are conducted to identify potential vulnerabilities and ensure the robustness of service providers’ security and resilience measures. With more of our economic activity moving online and the growing interconnectedness of our systems, the Government recognises the need to further study our reliance on different components of digital infrastructure, the risks and impact of disruptions, and the need for more interventions. For example, data centres may not all host CII systems but collectively provide foundational services for the proper functioning of our economy.”
“The Government is studying whether and how best to strengthen the security and resilience of data centres as a category of digital infrastructure with significant impact. This may include risk-calibrated regulation for data centres, taking reference from international standards and best practices. However, we must recognise that regulation alone will not fully eliminate the possibility of outages and disruptions. Industries and enterprises must also play their part. To ensure consumer confidence, entities, such as banks, telcos and digital service providers, should take steps to mitigate risks and ensure the continued delivery of important digital services even when outages or disruptions occur.”
“The specifics of the recent outage affecting banking services have been, or will be, addressed in response to related Parliamentary Questions. I will focus on the broader digital infrastructure landscape and the Government’s approach to enhancing its security and resilience. Where a data centre supports the delivery of essential services or other nationally important systems, we have regulation in place to ensure its security and resilience. For example, the Cyber Security Agency identifies and regulates Critical Information Infrastructure (CII), which can include computer systems situated in a data centre that are necessary for the provision of essential services in sectors, such as the Government, infocomm, and banking and finance. In addition, sector regulators impose requirements on the service providers in their sectors. Major telcos and banks, for instance, are regulated by the Infocomm Media Development Authority and Monetary Authority of Singapore respectively, for security and resilience. Exercises and audits are conducted to identify potential vulnerabilities and ensure the robustness of service providers’ security and resilience measures. With more of our economic activity moving online and the growing interconnectedness of our systems, the Government recognises the need to further study our reliance on different components of digital infrastructure, the risks and impact of disruptions, and the need for more interventions. For example, data centres may not all host CII systems but collectively provide foundational services for the proper functioning of our economy. Today, most data centre operators already adopt a risk management approach in line with international standards, including the implementation of measures to ensure resilience.”
“Singapore supports the responsible development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) across all settings. Though there is broad agreement that processes and outcomes should be explainable, transparent, fair and human-centric, technical standards for responsible AI are still in the nascent stage of development. Nevertheless, to promote responsible AI use, IMDA has introduced guidelines and tools for owners and developers of AI systems. These include (a) the Model AI Governance Framework in 2019; and (b) AI Verify in 2022 – a voluntary testing framework and software toolkit that helps companies (i) objectively validate the performance of their AI systems against responsible AI principles, and (ii) demonstrate this to their stakeholders through the sharing of testing reports. AI Verify can, therefore, be a useful basis for unions to engage employers or labour market intermediaries on the use of AI that impact workers. In fact, early adopters of AI Verify include online human resource services platform XOPA.ai. As for reporting channels, this would depend on the specific concerns. For example, reports concerning employment discrimination as a result of AI use should continue to be channelled to the Ministry of Manpower or the Tripartite Alliance for Fair and Progressive Employment Practices (TAFEP) for assessment and follow up. For insurance- or banking-related concerns, reports can be directed to the Monetary Authority of Singapore.”
“This will be more effective than depending on user reports to SMSs, as non-compliance to these Directions will be an offence. The Competent Authority can issue Orders to restrict access to the online services that are non-compliant with these Directions, to prevent the criminal activity and content from being accessed by persons in Singapore. Furthermore, OCHA will also empower the Government to require designated online services, including SMSs, to put in place systems, processes and measures to proactively disrupt scams and malicious cyber activities affecting people in Singapore.”
“Under the Broadcasting Act (BA), the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) has designated six Social Media Services (SMSs) with significant reach or impact in Singapore. They are Facebook, HardwareZone, Instagram, TikTok, X (formerly Twitter) and YouTube. These SMSs are required to comply with the Code of Practice for Online Safety, which took effect on 18 July 2023. They must put in place systems and processes to minimise exposure to harmful content for users in Singapore, including scams and violent content. Singapore users are also able to report such content to the SMSs for removal under their community guidelines and standards. BA also provides IMDA with the powers to issue Directions to disable access by Singapore users to egregious content found on SMSs, including content advocating or instructing violence. So far, IMDA has not received information concerning advertisements used to promote violence on any SMS. As for scams, the Police received more than 2,000 reports concerning online advertisements being used as tools for scams between 18 July and September 2023. The majority involved postings on Facebook. Concerning these reports, the Police have worked closely with the SMSs to remove these advertisements. Once the Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA) is brought into force next year, the Ministry of Home Affairs will also have the powers to deal with online content which facilitates or abets crime, such as scams. Designated officers, including from the Police, will be able to issue Directions to online service providers, which could include SMSs, to disable access by Singapore users to specified criminal content found on their services. Such criminal content could include advertisements which are believed to be carried out for scams.”
“The Government is studying whether and how best to strengthen the security and resilience of data centres as a category of digital infrastructure with significant impact. This may include risk-calibrated regulation for data centres, taking reference from international standards and best practices. However, we must recognise that regulation alone will not fully eliminate the possibility of outages and disruptions. Industries and enterprises must also play their part. To ensure consumer confidence, entities, such as banks, telcos and digital service providers should take steps to mitigate risks and ensure the continued delivery of important digital services even when outages or disruptions occur.”
“The specifics of the recent outage affecting banking services have been, or will be, addressed in response to related Parliamentary Questions. I will focus on the broader digital infrastructure landscape and the Government’s approach to enhancing its security and resilience. Where a data centre supports the delivery of essential services or other nationally important systems, we have regulation in place to ensure its security and resilience. For example, the Cyber Security Agency identifies and regulates Critical Information Infrastructure (CII), which can include computer systems situated in a data centre, that are necessary for the provision of essential services in sectors, such as the Government, infocomm, and banking and finance. In addition, sector regulators impose requirements on the service providers in their sectors. Major telcos and banks, for instance, are regulated by the Infocomm Media Development Authority and Monetary Authority of Singapore respectively, for security and resilience. Exercises and audits are conducted to identify potential vulnerabilities and ensure the robustness of service providers’ security and resilience measures. With more of our economic activity moving online and the growing interconnectedness of our systems, the Government recognises the need to further study our reliance on different components of digital infrastructure, the risks and impact of disruptions, and the need for more interventions. For example, data centres may not all host CII systems but collectively provide foundational services for the proper functioning of our economy. Today, most data centre operators already adopt a risk management approach in line with international standards, including the implementation of measures to ensure resilience.”
“In addition to offering reading and learning resources through its network of 28 libraries, the National Library Board (NLB) works with partners and the community to ensure that Singaporeans have convenient access to reading materials. This includes donating older library books in good condition to community-run spaces as their seed collections. Doing so supports NLB’s focus on sustainability, as these books are given a new lease of life. Since April 2020, NLB has provided more than 48,000 such books to 102 organisations, including Residents’ Committees (RCs), Community Centres (CCs), Senior Activity Centres, schools and private organisations. Communities also seek NLB’s advice when they are looking to run initiatives that promote reading and learning, such as the setting up of reading corners. NLB shares its experience in operating public libraries, especially on the importance of educating users that libraries are shared spaces providing shared resources and should be used responsibly. In addition, the People’s Association (PA) actively supports programmes initiated and run by residents and communities to promote reading. This includes the provision of its premises, support for publicity, donation drives, as well as funding under the PA’s Community Volunteer Enabling Grant (CV-EG). NLB will continue to work with partners, including PA and the community, to promote the habit and joy of reading, lifelong learning and discovery.”
“Insanet’s advanced spyware product, named “Sherlock”, is yet another development in the fast-evolving cyber threat landscape. Such products are not new. Spyware is a type of sophisticated malware which is used to target specific high-value individuals and is designed to secretly obtain sensitive information and monitor someone’s activities. According to media reports, Sherlock can infect a mobile device if it was used simply to view an "infected" online advertisement. The same reports also say that the sale of Sherlock is subject to tight restrictions, including approval from the Israeli government. It is also an expensive spyware that has a multi-million-dollar price tag and requires a significant amount of resources, advanced planning and trained personnel to target its victim successfully. There have been no reported cases of Sherlock infections in Singapore. This will not be the last time we hear of sophisticated spyware being developed. Our security agencies will continue to guard against such threats. Spyware is different from the malware-enabled scams we see in Singapore. Malware-enabled scams target banking and financial transactions and typically trick users to download and install a malicious app. At the individual level, we must continue to stay vigilant and practise good cyber hygiene, such as avoiding untrustworthy websites and unknown apps, updating software promptly, and using anti-virus software and security apps. Such cyber hygiene practices will go a long way in protecting ourselves.”
“This query relates to the recent anti-money laundering operations conducted by the Police and Singapore’s anti-money laundering framework. The Ministerial Statement on Singapore’s Anti-money Laundering Regime at the Sitting on 3 October 2023 has addressed this query. [Please refer to "Singapore's Anti-Money Laundering Regime", Official Report, 3 October 2023, Vol 95, Issue 113, Ministerial Statements section.]”
“"Wood Morning Singapore" is a display held within a store, "BLAXK" by ActionCity, at Funan shopping mall. The store display features toy figurines and other merchandise which are available for sale. An Arts Entertainment Licence is not required for displays within commercial venues where the primary purpose is to sell the items. The Ministry of Communications and Information (MCI) has received public feedback expressing concerns regarding the display. Shopping mall management and tenants should consider public acceptance of items on display, especially if they are visible to young children. MCI has conveyed the feedback to ActionCity and the management of Funan shopping mall. We also understand that Police reports have been lodged and Police are looking into the matter.”
“Please refer to the Ministerial Statement on Singapore's Anti-Money Laundering Regime, at the Sitting on 3 October 2023, which has addressed this. [Please refer to "Singapore's Anti-Money Laundering Regime", Official Report, 3 October 2023, Vol 95, Issue 113, Ministerial Statements section.]”
“Mr Speaker, to the specific question of how much fines have been levied on the banks, I think I made it quite clear to Mr Leong if he would like to know the figure, he may file a PQ and we will address it. I think it is not right for him to infer as to the involvement of the banks and financial institutions in this particular case. That conclusion cannot yet be drawn. The investigations are still ongoing. Nothing that Minister of State Alvin Tan or I said implicate the banks right now. We have only stated the facts about where the monies were found and how we seized them. That is all that we said. It is not right for Mr Leong to infer in his last part of his clarifications. I think it is helpful that he acknowledged that he may have misunderstood by saying that the banks were complicit. If that is his clarification, that he is not making a sweeping statement that our banks have been complicit, I think I welcome that clarification.”
“Sir, with all due respect to Mr Leong, I am still trying to figure out what exactly he is saying. Nobody disputes that our financial institutions have a responsibility to uphold the strict measures that we will take against money launderers. Nobody is saying that at all. Nobody is also saying that if they were to breach their obligations, they should not be taken to task. In fact, what I have presented and what Minister of State Alvin Tan has presented point to the seriousness with which we hold the financial institutions to their obligations. I think that part is very clear. What I seem to be hearing Mr Leong say is that, "Aha, you have found these amounts in your system. And therefore, it must point to some action on the part of the financial institutions in facilitating this, in helping to make this happen". I am saying until we get to the bottom of things, this is not the right way to think about it. The correct way to think about it is that the entire machinery that we have put in place was able to uncover such a web. I mentioned this earlier in my Statement and the response to some questions that were posed by Members – would we be happier if we had acted at an earlier stage in the investigations and then uncovered a smaller web? Or are we in the better position to have rooted out more of these activities? We should continue to keep this number in perspective. It speaks to the strength of our system to be able to uncover these suspected criminal proceeds. That is what we must continue to strengthen. That is what this effort is all about.”
“Mr Speaker, with your permission, I would like to make a further clarification to the question that was raised by Member Mr Leong, with regard to the $1.45 billion. Mr Leong was not right to, in the first place, conflate the $3.8 million with the $1.45 billion. They relate to completely different things. The $3.8 million is related only to the Wirecard incident. With respect to the $1.45 billion, I had said in my Statement that these are seizures of monies in bank accounts amounting to more than $1.45 billion. This money does not belong to the bank. It is certainly not the bank's profits that you should use to weigh against the responsibility that we hold them to. This $1.45 billion has to be properly sorted out in terms of ownership. They just happen to sit in the bank accounts. They do not belong to the banks. So, I hope that Members understand that these two numbers have no business being talked about together. I hope that makes it clear, Mr Speaker.”
“Yes. Specific to this case, I am not at liberty to disclose which foreign law enforcement agencies we are working with. Suffice to say that there would be a variety. Because the proceeds that potentially had been laundered through the Singapore system involve activities that were carried on outside of Singapore; they could involve more than one jurisdiction. And as we cast our net wide, it would not be unusual or unthinkable for us to be cooperating with other law enforcement agencies – not confined to one country, China.”
“I thank Ms Sylvia Lim for her questions. On her first, in relation to the STRs, they came from a variety of gatekeepers and the usual gatekeepers that are involved include the banks, they include corporate service providers, they include real estate agents – and so there is a variety. As to whether we connect the dots only using STRs, the answer is no. There will also be suspicious transactions exchange of information with foreign counterparts. I cannot comment specifically to what it is in this case; it is premature for me to reveal more but it would not be unusual. Keep in mind also that there will be other sources of intelligence. Police interact with a wide surface and these can also help to form a picture as to what is going on. So, I hope that addresses her questions.”
“Separate the two things, Sir. The Member is asking at the moment what is the total number of fines levied on banks. I believe we do not have the information right now. If that is something that the Member is seeking, perhaps, I can advise him to file a PQ and then we can answer that specifically. The point that the Member is trying to link together – this $1.45 billion – the case is still live. That amount has not been adjudicated. It is for the Courts subsequently to determine what should be done with them. And, in any case, I do not think it is right to link the amount seized with the fines that are imposed on the bank, on completely unrelated things. There will have to be a proper investigation as to whether there were actors in the financial sector that contributed to this web that we have uncovered. But until that has been properly settled, it is premature for you to draw any conclusions.”
“I think Mr Leong is mistaken. The $3.8 million fine was issued in relation to one case – Wirecard. Minister of State Alvin Tan had already pointed that out. I am just reiterating what he has just said. It was one case. But there have been other cases.”
“And overall, if we consider how it has enabled Singapore businesses to be held in very high regard wherever it is that they go in the world and if we also think about the benefits it brings to Singaporeans, in terms of the quality of jobs that we are able to provide, it is really incumbent upon us to make sure that our regime remains robust. And that is what this whole exercise is about for setting up the IMC.”
“Mr Speaker, thank you very much. I thought I would just like to briefly respond to the point that was raised by Member Mr Liang Eng Hwa. For anyone to see value in being Singapore-washed, you must have something within Singapore that has attracted this way of thinking. You must be thought of as a jurisdiction of repute. Your anti-money laundering regime must be held in high regard because, if it was not, why would it be useful to be Singapore-washed? Having said that, it does not mean that we adopt a very lax attitude towards anyone who sees a benefit of Singapore-washing. In fact, the more this is valuable to the bad actors, to the money launderers, the more we must be resolved to weed them out in order to uphold this standing. So, on the one hand, it is kind of worrying that money launderers, criminal actors, would want to think of using Singapore as a haven to create the impression of legitimacy. But on the other hand, it must say something about the quality of our regime, too. There are no two ways about it. Either we opt out of it and say that this is all too high risk, we do not want to be in this field, we would rather stay out of it completely. Or we say that we take the risks that come with it, we strengthen not just our preventive measures, but also our ability to detect and to take the criminals to task, the enforcement aspect of it, our capabilities and our consistency in approaching all of these issues as they come about. I think we have to look at it overall, in terms of the benefits and the cost.”
“Mr Speaker, to Mr Lee's first question, we will proceed carefully. I think within his question is the concern that we will have knee-jerk reactions and overdo the reporting requirements as well as the other anti-money laundering obligations that we impose on different companies. So, his point is very well taken. We always strive to be very calibrated in the statements of my colleagues and I; we were careful to emphasise that maintaining Singapore's overall friendliness towards legitimate businesses and legitimate investors. That must still be a priority for us to uphold. It is not a question of just layering on new measures without regard to their effectiveness but, really, weighing which are the new approaches or measures that will be necessary in order for us to uphold our reputation as a sound financial centre. So, that is to his first question. The second question is with regard to capability development and expanding the capacity of both our law enforcement agencies as well as our gatekeepers. It is very much related to Mr Neil Parekh's points, and we totally agree with him and that is also an area of effort that we will have to step up. I am sorry I was not sure that there was a third question specifically.”
“Sir, as much as I like to be able to provide this level of detail, I am afraid this is not possible right now.”
“Mr Speaker, I thank Mr Leong for his questions. But as I explained during my Ministerial Statement, this is a live investigation. I have shared with Members the extent to which I am able to reveal. So, as to his specific question, this is a level of detail that will have to be made known at a later stage. I am not able to comment more on the details of this case – Mr Leong asked how they came to be placed in our financial system. This is a level of detail that we are not at liberty to discuss right now. As you can well imagine, we are continuing to uncover new assets. And if we are in the process of still trying to uncover the assets that have been procured as a result of these likely criminal proceeds, it would not be in the interest to say more at this point in time how the tracks were eventually identified. I am also not sure that the question that the Member posed to Minister Indranee ought to be answered by her. I think I should answer it because it relates to the STRO. I mentioned in my Statement that 43,000 STRs were filed on average annually between 2020 and 2022, 80% of them came from the financial institutions, 20% came from the other non-financial institution gatekeepers that would include corporate service providers, that would include property agents and other types of gatekeepers. So, that is the overall number. He might have missed that. Or I am not sure that there was another level of detail that that he was seeking.”
“Mr Speaker, I fully agree with Mr Neil Parekh. He is absolutely right. We do have a set of red flag indicators that each sectoral regulator provides to their community of gatekeepers. Clearly, these indicators can be improved and we will continue to do so over time. Clearly, it is also in our interest to ensure that the training of the gatekeepers is properly done so that they, like Mr Neil Parekh said, also ask their customers the right questions and their minds are correctly attuned to the potential risks. So, I thank him for his suggestion. It is certainly something that we will continue to uplift our capabilities in, and I am sure that Minister Indranee and her IMC will look into. I think it is, in fact, the fourth of her terms of reference, if I heard her correctly.”
“Mr Speaker, I thank Mr Zhulkarnain for his question. May I also just note that Mr Mark Lee made largely the same comments when he posed his PQ, which was to urge caution in terms of the extent of the measures that we put in place. To Mr Zhulkarnain's question, in fact, our sectoral regulators engage with their gatekeepers very regularly. Earlier this year, for example, because of the impending changes in our PSPM Act, MinLaw had engaged with the industry behind closed doors to get a sense of what they were observing and to also find out if the additional measures that MinLaw was intending, was thinking about, would be too onerous to implement and also, more importantly, to what extent they could be effective. MAS, as well as the CEA, regularly engage their respective communities of gatekeepers as well. So, these engagements are ongoing. But I think the point that the Member is also trying to make, Sir, if I may, is that the key is in sensemaking. It is not just a question of imposing reporting requirements for the sake of the reporting requirements. We would have to try and connect the dots. Otherwise, it is just lots of signals and a lot of noise, which you cannot really do very much about. You have heard me talk about how the STRO had put in place a new data analytics system since February last year. Minister of State Alvin Tan also talked about using COSMIC as a way of helping financial institutions make better sense of what information has already been captured through the STRs. These efforts will obviously have to intensify. I should also say that each time we have a big bust like that, it also offers us fresh insights as to what kinds of signals we should be paying greater attention to.”
“In this particular instance, if we had not made the decision to withhold enforcement action until as full a picture emerged – we might have been able to, say, sometime in 2022 or the earlier part of 2023 gone after the suspects – we might not have gotten what was initially $1.8 billion, which grew to $2.4 billion and now $2.8 billion. We might have found a much smaller amount and we might have patted ourselves on the back and said, "That was not too bad. Well done." But, in fact, we would have missed an opportunity to get to the root of the problem and to try our very best to stamp it out. This ability to uncover a web of this size is actually something that speaks volumes. So, if you are a money launderer, if you still think that Singapore is a good place to try and flow your dirty money through, please know that we are equally resolved to catch you.”
“Mr Speaker, I thank the Member for his questions. I explained during my Statement that when we set up our strategies for prevention of money laundering, we must understand that it is not all about prevention only. We must know from the outset that however stringent the measures we put in place, criminal actors, money launderers, will find ways and means to still take advantage of our openness and our solid reputation as a sound financial centre. It is precisely because of our openness and precisely because we are deemed to have a very high reputation that the money launderers find us just as attractive as the legitimate investors. So, we must know that they are resolved, they are determined to try and circumvent the rules that we have put in place. Therefore, the strategy must also include detection and enforcement. If we merely had prevention and then imagine that all is well and good, we are kidding no one else but ourselves. And, so, it is useful for us to remember if we do not detect any cases at all and, more importantly, if we are not able to mount a robust response by way of enforcement and taking these criminals to task, it does not necessarily speak better of the robustness of our anti-money laundering regime. In this particular instance, we have uncovered a very large web. I do not mean to cast aspersions on other regimes. But the examples that I cited shows you how difficult it is to round up criminals. Some of the amounts that I cited, if we think that that is all there is to the illicit funds that are sloshing around in these other regimes, I think that is not being very realistic. So, the strength of our regime is also in detection and then, to be able to enforce in a decisive and robust manner.”
“" It says that we are highly sophisticated and inclusive of all relevant competent authorities.”
“Thank you, Sir. Members may also access the handout through the MP@SGPARL app. Whilst the materials are making their way to the Members, Mr Murali Pillai, in his question, referred to FATF and the mutual evaluations that are being conducted by FATF. By way of background, for Members' information, Singapore has been a member of FATF since 1992. And FATF, as an international organisation that sets standards for the prevention of money laundering, is well-recognised for several things. For one thing, the standards that FATF has set are adopted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. So, as far as the IMF and the World Bank are concerned, FATF's standards are gold standards. If you are a serious financial centre and you meet those standards, then, in a sense, you have passed the test. But how does one get evaluated against the standards? So, what Mr Murali referred to are mutual evaluations. And who does the mutual evaluation? These are experts that are drawn from within FATF itself as an organisation as well as a global network of expert practitioners. So, individuals like that are held in high regard. What they say carry weight. Because this is a very involved exercise to carry out a mutual evaluation, countries do not get to be audited so regularly. We were last audited through this mutual evaluation in 2016. We have joined the queue. The next time we go through mutual evaluation is, in fact, in 2025. But what was said after the evaluation in 2016? I quote from the FATF report and it says, "Singapore has a strong legal and institutional framework to fight money laundering and terrorist financing. Singapore's AML/CFT coordination is highly sophisticated and inclusive of all relevant competent authorities.”
“Mr Speaker, I would also like to thank Members as well as Mr Murali Pillai for their affirmation of the work done by our law enforcement agencies. Sir, I would like to keep my response to Mr Murali Pillai quite brief. But understandably, all the work that goes into our anti-money laundering regime is quite involved. So, with your permission, Sir, may I ask the Clerks to distribute a handout which describes more fully the different aspects of our anti-money laundering regime?”
“Many Members have filed queries on the recent anti-money laundering operations conducted by the Police and Singapore’s anti-money laundering framework. The queries cover a wide range of issues across several Ministries. The Ministry of Home Affairs, together with various other Ministries, will respond to the queries comprehensively in a Ministerial Statement in October. [Please refer to "Singapore's Anti-Money Laundering Regime", Official Report, 03 October 2023, Vol 95, Issue 113, Ministerial Statements section.]”
“Many Members have filed queries on the recent anti-money laundering operations conducted by the Police and Singapore’s anti-money laundering framework. The queries cover a wide range of issues across several Ministries. The Ministry of Home Affairs, together with various other Ministries, will respond to the queries comprehensively in a Ministerial Statement in October. [Please refer to "Singapore's Anti-Money Laundering Regime", Official Report, 03 October 2023, Vol 95, Issue 113, Ministerial Statements section.]”
“The vast majority of the Government’s paid communications materials do not feature political officeholders. We also do not track spending according to whether they are featured.”
“The Ministry of Communications and Information has been reviewing the process for the application of political party newspaper permits to enable applicants to submit their forms digitally while safeguarding the confidentiality of information submitted. The review is expected to be completed by the first quarter of 2024.”
“Many Members have filed queries on the recent anti-money laundering operations conducted by the Police and Singapore’s anti-money laundering framework. The queries cover a wide range of issues across several Ministries. The Ministry of Home Affairs, together with various other Ministries, will respond to the queries comprehensively in a Ministerial Statement in October 2023. [Please refer to "Singapore's Anti-Money Laundering Regime", Official Report, 3 October 2023, Vol 95, Issue 113, Ministerial Statements section.]”
“I thank Mr Gerald Giam for both his questions. It is really premature for us to consider what steps might make it possible for us to proceed with sharing of biometric data with other governments or foreign airport operator. The technology must be secure enough and there must be also mutual acceptance of the additional safeguards that must be put in place. Without knowing exactly what those conditions need to be, I do not want to speculate on what approvals may be needed. It is really just too early for us to even contemplate such a step. To his second question, I am very sympathetic to the situations when the applicants are told that what they would like to see by way of a grant of permanent residency or other passes has not been approved. In my own experience dealing with these applicants, even when the reasons are articulated to them, whether broadly or with a fair amount of detail, the disappointment does not go away. So, I will be quite realistic as to what these steps can achieve. I think it is more important to look at it in broader context. The broad context is that we have been facilitative, particularly for families who have children, for applicants whose family ties are long-established and we will continue to support them in this process.”
“One, since January 2023, ICA has implemented the Automated Clearance Initiative to allow eligible foreign visitors to use the automated lanes for immigration clearance, without prior enrolment of their biometrics. Two, ICA will progressively implement automated clearance for cars at the two checkpoints in addition to motorcycles, thereby reducing overall time taken to clear immigration. Three, progressively from 2024, Singaporeans and departing visitors will no longer need to present their passports for immigration clearance and will instead verify their identity through biometrics, reducing clearance time in bus halls by up to 40%. Four, over the longer term, ICA will redevelop Woodlands Checkpoint to enhance clearance for all types of vehicular traffic and reduce travel times, especially during peak periods. Mr Speaker, to conclude, the Immigration (Amendment) Bill will facilitate the implementation of more digitalised and automated services for the benefit of all travellers, as well as enhance our immigration processes so that they are more robust, effective and efficient. Once again, I thank Members for their support of the Bill. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.”
“To Mr Vikram Nair's question, on average, 7,900 or less than 2% of the total PR population each year lose their PR status by being outside of Singapore without a valid Re-Entry Permit. Of those who appealed, the majority were successful as they had valid reasons for not renewing their Re-Entry Permit in time. On the powers of the Controller to publish changes to permit and pass conditions on a prescribed website or by Gazette, Mr Louis Ng asked when such situations would arise. There are many instances where ICA may impose conditions on permit and pass holders. For example, if an individual committed a minor offence or displayed adverse behaviour, ICA would notify the person individually that it will impose a condition that he shall not engage in such activities further or risk having his permit or pass cancelled. However, there may also be situations where ICA is required to impose conditions en masse, for instance, during a pandemic. Given the large number of PRs and pass holders, it would not be practicable to contact each and every one to notify them individually. The Controller will then publish the changes on a prescribed website or by Gazette. Mr Louis Ng rightly pointed out that many individuals may not know how to access a prescribed website or the Gazette. Hence, ICA will explore suitable avenues to reach out to as many affected persons as possible, for example, through media platforms. Finally, in his concluding remarks, Mr Yip Hon Weng asked how congestion at the Woodlands and Tuas checkpoints can be improved. This is not the focus of the Bill today and I would draw the Member's attention to ICA's various announcements over the past months on its efforts. Nevertheless, I shall share broadly four key initiatives.”
“This is outside the scope of this Bill but we would like to assure the Member that the Registry of Marriages and the Registry of Muslim Marriages do provide to couples in person advice to complete the PMLA before marriage. Mr Derrick Goh and Mr Gerald Giam asked immigration criteria can be made more transparent, including the assessment criteria for the renewal of the Re-Entry Permit. Mr Vikram Nair asked if we can give assurance to law-abiding PRs of their stay in Singapore. As Members know, we do not disclose our detailed immigration criteria. The reasons are well-known and not new. They are also not the focus of today's Bill. Nonetheless, I should point out that the comparison with COMPASS neglects important differences. I was the Manpower Minister when COMPASS was conceived. Its considerations are that employment pass holders mainly impact the workplace and they are also mostly transient. But for PRs and Singapore Citizens, the applicants must be considered differently because they are not transient and they impact the wider fabric of society. Therefore, the considerations must be more holistic and sensitive to long-term impact. We must also recognise the stronger incentives to game the system if the criteria were fully disclosed. Be that as it may, we have shared the broad criteria that ICA considers, such as whether an applicant is gainfully employed, contributing to Singapore or has family roots here. PRs who have conducted themselves well and continue to be a resident in Singapore should not have much difficulty with the renewal of their Re-Entry Permit. I can assure the Members that the vast majority of applications for Re-Entry Permit renewal are approved.”
“Like him, we are particularly sympathetic to foreigners with close family ties to Singaporeans. Immigration decisions take into consideration a wide range of factors. In some cases, this includes sensitive intelligence information. As I mentioned earlier, each decision is also based on a polycentric evaluation of factors relating to our policies and security needs. While we understand the desire for explicit reasons to be provided, a blanket provision will be too blunt. Instead, we will continue to allow foreigners affected by an immigration decision to make representations and to provide explanations to the authorities. As Mr Gerald Giam suggested, for certain decisions, ICA does advise affected persons in broad terms why a decision was made, for example, that his PR status was revoked because of his criminal offences. Foreigners can continue to seek ICA's reconsideration of the matter and ICA will escalate the matter for the Minister's determination if appropriate. This approach strikes a better balance between the need to safeguard the public interest and our national security on the one hand and fairness to foreigners affected by immigration decisions on the other. Mr Louis Ng and Mr Gerald Giam asked how affected persons can submit appeals. They can do so via a general feedback form on ICA's website and it will be directed to the relevant immigration officers. In any case, I can assure them that even without a Member of Parliament's representation, these appeals are attended to. Mr Giam asked about the administration of the Pre-Marriage LTVP Assessment (PMLA).”
“While ICA facilities are not specially designed for a child, it will make all reasonable efforts to ensure the child’s safety and well-being. Whenever possible, immigration officers will ask that the travelling companion stays with the child until the child’s parent or guardian arrives. If a child is abandoned at the checkpoints, and the parent or guardian is uncontactable, ICA will hand over the child to the Police. Child Protection Services will also be involved if necessary. Mr Murali Pillai spoke about the issue of fairness in dealing with foreigners and asked why there is a need to remove statutory appeals. Let me explain in greater detail. As is the case in most countries, foreigners do not have the right to enter or remain in Singapore. That follows then that they should not be entitled to challenge the terms of their entry or stay under the law. This position is reflected in our legal provisions regarding the issuance and cancellation of long-term passes and application for citizenship. There has never been a right of statutory appeal for such immigration facilities and this has also not prevented us from according the affected foreigners fair and reasonable treatment and protection from harm under prevailing laws. The provision of statutory appeals for entry permit holders who are PRs is found in the Immigration Act 1959, an old piece of legislation dating back to the start of self-government. We are now simply updating and rationalising our laws so that the position for entry permit holders who are PRs is aligned with that of applicants for long-term passes and citizenship. Let me also assure Mr Murali Pillai that we do not make immigration decisions in a cavalier manner.”
“Such a move also ensures consistent treatment in offences where fines are imposed in lieu of caning. Second, Mr Murali Pillai asked why there is no provision in the Bill to limit the length of the imprisonment term that the Court can impose on an offender who cannot be caned but defaults on the fine imposed in lieu. We agree with him, that in such cases, it would be ironic if the imprisonment for defaulting on a fine is longer than the prison term that could have been imposed in lieu of caning. Nevertheless, we have decided that this should be left to the Court’s discretion, looking at all the factors in each case. If the Court considers that an in-default imprisonment term is appropriate, it can also calibrate the length of the imprisonment. Section 319 only sets out the upper limit of the imprisonment terms that can be imposed and do not prevent the Court from imposing a shorter term. I thank Mr Murali Pillai for the suggestion to digitalise the process of notification of Court orders and lodgement of written consent from the parent for a child to leave Singapore. Currently, parties who wish to inform ICA of any Restraining Orders or provide their written consent can do so by simply emailing ICA at a stipulated email address. This is the process we have agreed with the Family Justice Courts and it is set out in the Family Justice Practice Directions. We will continuously explore new ways to make the process more efficient. Mr Louis Ng asked if the facilities in ICA’s authorised area are appropriate for keeping a child. The new section 5AA seeks to give ICA ancillary powers to keep the child temporarily, while preventing the child from being brought out of Singapore by any person without the consent of the parent or guardian.”
“Mr Derrick Goh asked for factors of assessment before the exercise of powers to prohibit the entry or transit of foreigners. As I have mentioned earlier, we will only use such powers when the situation warrants it. The key consideration is whether such a restriction is proportionate to the severity of the situation. We have seen how in times of a pandemic, travel restrictions may have to be put in place at very short notice. I shall move on to the proposals to strengthen our border controls. Mr Derrick Goh asked for the number of cases and the costs unrecovered from repatriated persons over the past five years. From 2018 to 2022, there were 74 cases and more than $53,000 of Government-aided funds used for repatriation expenses. Most of the involved offenders genuinely could not pay their way; the rest were able to. Mr Murali Pillai asked two questions on the proposed amendments to introduce fines in lieu of caning, for offenders exempted from or found medically unfit for caning. First, he asked why our amendment applies to offenders convicted of employing five or more immigration offenders, since they are likely to be Singaporeans. To clarify, the law today requires offenders convicted of this offence to be caned. But for offenders who cannot be caned because of their age or sex, the current law also requires the Court to impose fines in lieu of caning. This is under section 57(1B), which we are not changing. Our amendment does nothing more than extend this provision to males who are sentenced to caning for this offence but are subsequently found medically unfit for caning. This allows for the deterrent effect of the penalty to still be met without unduly expending our prison resources while the penalty is held in a suspended state.”
“As a final point on NBDs, let me assure Mr Desmond Choo and Mr Yip Hon Weng that ICA will provide adequate transition periods for the respective domains and will do so in close consultation with the industry. For example, with the airlines, ICA intends to run trials from end-2024. Let me now deal with the issue of false statements. Mr Yip Hon Weng asked how ICA plans to monitor and validate the accuracy of such statements. ICA will review the historical records of a person’s self-declarations and conduct further checks when there are inconsistencies across records. ICA will also cross-check with other available sources. For persons who are suspected to have made false statements or provided false information, ICA will commence investigations. In the event passengers fail to declare symptoms of a contagious disease, whether deliberately or otherwise, ICA will work with relevant stakeholders to ensure there are other means to identify them. This includes engaging the transport operators’ help to flag them prior to boarding. During a pandemic situation, travellers may also be required to conduct pre-arrival health checks or tests. If, unfortunately, such passengers still manage to arrive at our checkpoints, ICA will work with the Ministry of Health (MOH) to implement necessary measures to identify them promptly, such as through temperature screening or visual checks. In terms of enforcement measures, ICA will maintain a firm and strict posture. Travellers deemed to have made false statements will have their entry into Singapore denied. With the proposed amendment at clause 57, it will be a strict liability offence for anyone who gives false or misleading information, or omits anything so as to mislead.”