Murali Pillai
Singapore
“Sir, my response will also cover matters raised in the related oral questions, as well as written questions, all filed by the hon Member, Ms Sylvia Lim1, 2, for a subsequent Sitting. The hon Member may wish to withdraw her Parliamentary Questions (PQs) if her queries are answered in today's Sitting.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to respond to the hon Member Ms Poh's third question on jet fuel. We are working with the aviation stakeholders to monitor the fuel supply for aviation hubs carefully to ensure that it remains stable.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, in response to the hon Member Dennis Tan's question on maritime hub, I just want to say that for the now, for the current, port operations have been stable. There are no significant fuel supply shortages, and we have adequate fuel and bunker supply.”
“Sir, I would like to answer the hon Member Shawn Loh's question on the status of the aviation hub. There have been some flight disruptions. Apart from the disruptions, most of Changi Airport's flights have been operating normally. The disruptions have been limited to some Singapore-Middle East passenger and cargo services.”
“Sir, I would like to thank the hon Member Mr Chia for his kind words about the efforts we have made thus far to attract young talent. On the specific issue about the GRIT programme, that involves traineeship, the good thing about the maritime sector is that we have jobs available.”
“It was John Harrison's invention of the chronometer, highly accurate even at sea, that allowed longitudes to be plotted and journeys to be precise enough to chase a nimble whale. Likewise, Singapore must remain alive to the transformational power of new technologies, to master new tasks and chart new journeys through untested waters.”
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“The reason for having three Judges, amongst others, is a recognition of the complexity of the cases that SICC would have to deal with. With the increasing complexity of cases and voluminous documents involved in local civil cases, I would respectfully suggest that, as a matter of policy, there should be no distinction drawn between the General Division and SICC. It may be good to give the Court the discretion to decide which number is more appropriate, having regard to all the facts and circumstances. I would be grateful for the Senior Minister of State’s views on this matter. Second, I note that there is a list of situations set out in the proposed Sixth Schedule where appeals are brought directly to the Court of Appeal, instead of the Appellate Division. I reviewed the list and I note that under paragraph 1(i) of the Sixth Schedule, there is a raft of legislation, from the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act to the Competition Act to Maintenance of Parents Act dealing with a diverse range of topics in respect of which it is stipulated that appeals are to be brought to the Court of Appeal. May I ask what is the policy ground for shortlisting these pieces of legislation? I note from subparagraph (j), it is stated that there would be a direct appeal to the Court of Appeal if it is so provided under a specific piece of legislation. May I also please ask what would be the policy governing the provision for such a direct appeal to the Court of Appeal in future pieces of legislation that this House may pass? Third, further arguments.”
“I acknowledge that it is also not easy to appoint Judges, given that Singapore is a small country with a limited pool of legal talent. It is not easy to find top talent with the right aptitude for public service to agree to be appointed as Supreme Court Judges. I would welcome the Senior Minister of State's response on my query. Several Members, including Ms Anthea Ong and Assoc Prof Walter Theseira, talked about increasing the retirement age of Judges. I am not sure whether that is an appropriate suggestion because there is a linkage between increasing retirement age and independence of the Judiciary. But I see this as two separate things. Based on how the Judges have been appointed, the appointment of Senior Judges as well as Judicial Commissioners are done on an ad hoc basis to clear workload as and when workload increases. And I think that flexibility must still be retained. But I think we should be careful about drawing an analogy between these Judges who are there for specific reasons to clear workload and then an inference that somehow the independence of the Judiciary is affected by their appointments. I now turn to the other proposed amendments in the Bills. I beg the indulgence of hon Members because these are rather technical areas. First, the configuration of the High Court hearing a civil case in the proposed General Division. The proposed section 10(1) of SCJA stipulates that proceedings in the General Division of the High Court dealing with civil cases should be before a single Judge. This is the same requirement that exists now. I note, however, section 18G of SCJA allows the SICC, which is another division of the High Court dealing with international commercial cases, allowing for proceedings to be heard before a single or three Judges.”
“We need to ensure that the Judiciary, in its appellate jurisdiction, is provided with adequate resources so that the clearance rate is kept high, there is no significant backlog, and litigants get to receive their results of the cases within a reasonable time. At the same time, the quality of the judgments must be kept consistently high and in keeping with the hard-earned reputation for Singapore as a world-class, independent Court with exceptionally competent and committed Judges of the highest integrity. In that regard, I noted the Senior Minister of State highlighting how well our Courts are rated in published rankings across the world. My learned friend Ms Sylvia Lim had highlighted a possibility of increased costs arising from the establishment of the Appellate Division of the High Court. But as I understand the workings of the system, for at least the overwhelming majority of the cases, it is not to have a two-tier appeal. For the overwhelming majority of cases, you only have a one-tier appeal. Only in cases where there are novel points of law of public importance will there be a second set of appeal to the Court of Appeal. And that is rightly so because the Court of Appeal is the apex Court. So, in that regard, I think the impact of cost should not be very significant. My query is in relation to how and how many Appellate Division Judges are to be chosen. If we were to draw just from the existing cohort of High Court Judges, I am concerned that there could be a "cannibalisation" effect. The High Court workload is not insignificant. It is also expected to become heavier for the reasons I just mentioned. How can we ensure that the workload of the High Court is dealt with by an adequate number of Judges?”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, before I start my speech, I would like to wish the hon Senior Minister of State Mr Edwin Tong – who persevered with his duty to deliver his speeches despite being clearly under the weather – a speedy recovery. In my speech, I will focus on two areas: first, how the policy objective behind the creation of the new Appellate Division of the High Court is sought to be achieved; and second, the practical workings of some of the proposed new procedures set out in the SCJA. Turning to the first point, I note that the reason for the proposal to create the new Court is to share the burgeoning appeals caseload between the existing Court of Appeal and the new Appellate Division of the High Court. This is expected to ensure that the Court processes remain efficient. The hon Senior Minister of State had shared some statistics in relation to the heavy workload of the Court of Appeal in dealing with the appeals. I do not wish to dwell at length about the reasons contributing to the increase, save as to point out that we all can agree that, as lawmakers, we have been passing quite a number of Bills both in the First and Second Sessions of the 13th Parliament and it does appear that our Ministers and their respective Ministries are not letting up and this rate of law-making may be likely to be maintained, if not go higher. So, eventually, all this would have an impact on the workload of the Judiciary which applies the law in accordance with the manifested intent of Parliament. This phenomenon is not unique to Singapore. A retired UK law lord, Lord Sumption, referred to this as "Law’s Expanding Empire". The proposed restructuring of the Judiciary to deal with the increase in the Appellate Court’s workload comes at a right time.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to applaud MOT's decision to ban the use of PMDs on footpaths. With the ban of using PMDs in void decks, this measure would largely address the safety concerns of residents. I also think that this represents an openness and willingness on the part of MOT to revisit issues when the circumstances warrant it and I think Members of this House should acknowledge that. It is also a matter of regret because the first decision to rely on the conduct of PMD users by self-regulating appears to be an experiment which somehow failed, but it is not a wrong decision in itself. My supplementary question is in relation to enforcement in Pedestrian-only Zones (POZs). As I hear the hon Senior Minister of State, we have enforcement officers under the Active Mobility Act. The POZs are enforced by Town Councils and I wonder whether we could have enforcement officers appointed by the Town Councils to be also given powers under the Active Mobility Act so that these officers can enforce seamlessly.”
“Our Courts should be allowed to act as a safeguard against abuse of power against individuals in future. Members of the public are not necessarily in a good position to parse through evidence and draw the necessary conclusions. Judges, on the other hand, have the skill and ability and they are also highly regarded as an independent pillar in our Westminster-style Government. The point I make is not new, as the hon Member, Mr Pritam Singh noted. The Minister himself made the same points at the Second Reading of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill in 1990. I stress, my concern is ensuring that for the next 30 years and beyond, the MRHA provisions will continue to enjoy legitimacy. The hon Minister spoke about the rise in identity politics in the world. That is something which may catch root even in Singapore. And having judicial oversight would help keep our community together. And I would welcome his views on this. Finally, Sir, I wish to refer to the proposed section 19(g) of the Bill. There is a reference to the creation of offences which shall be punishable with a fine not exceeding $5,000 or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or with both. The way it reads is that it is proposed that the Minister create these offences. The punishment provisions are not light. Would it not be better for Parliament to create the offences arising from breach of regulations that the Minister prescribes? Or in any event, what are the offences that are being proposed? With that, I support the Bill.”
“Allowing decisions under MRHA to be judicially reviewed by the Court does not lead to a replacement of a political decision with a judicial one. The focus is on the process and whether there are reasonable grounds to support the decision of the Executive. This is already the case for orders of detention made by the Minister under the Criminal Law Temporary Provisions Act (CLTPA). Any concerns that the Court proceedings which are open to public may inflame tensions can be dealt with procedurally. Most importantly, there is a safeguard against abuse of power in the future. It is not enough to say that Executive is still accountable to the public through elections. The concern I have is to ensure legitimacy of MRHA. This is not gained just by obtaining the imprimatur of the majority who voted in the Government. It is also important to deal with minority interests. This is to ensure that all segments of our society are united. Lord Sumption, a retired UK Law Lord, pithily put this point across extrajudicially in the 2019 Reith Lectures. He said, "Majority rule is the basic principle of democracy, but that only means that a majority is enough to authorise the State’s acts. It isn’t enough to make them legitimate. That is because majority rule is no more than a rule of decision. It does nothing to accommodate our differences, it simply restates them in numerical terms." [Deputy Speaker (Mr Lim Biow Chuan) in the Chair] One good example of taking care of the minority interests is the Presidential Council of Minority Rights (PCMR) articles in the Constitution dealing with Acts that may discriminate against minorities. This is a point that was raised by the Prime Minister when he was Deputy Prime Minister during the Second Reading of MRHA in the House.”
“Would it not be better to vest with the Attorney-General this power or at least require the Minister to get the Attorney-General’s consent beforehand? The final point, Sir, is on section 18: all orders and decisions made under MRHA are not justiciable, meaning it cannot be called into question by the Court. Now, in this regard, I declare my interest as a lawyer in private practice. This provision invited much scrutiny in this House when the Bill was debated in 1990. The decision to oust the jurisdiction of the Court is based on mainly the following reasons. A decision to issue an RO is a political decision, not a judicial decision. The Executive Government is ultimately accountable to our people through the ballot box. This compares in stark contrast to judges who are appointed to their post. Court proceedings would not be suitable to deal with such matters because they are open proceedings and may unwittingly incite hatred among different religious groups. And one good example of this is the Maria Hertogh riots which happened in the 1950s where a Christian judge ordered a girl, who was brought up in a Muslim community, be returned to her Christian biological parents. This caused riots in which 18 people died. There was widespread property damage and fires, too. There is also a need to move fast and decisively, and this is something where Court proceedings may not necessarily be an answer. I have previously made a suggestion in this House this provision be relooked with a view to allowing Court scrutiny and welcome this opportunity to elaborate on my reasons. At the heart of the issue is to ensure that MRHA will continue to enjoy legitimacy amongst our people.”
“And what is not clear is that, at this point in time, whether the Ministry could say that, most likely, all the situations, or most of the situations, we are dealing with representations or statements made through the Internet. That part is not clear, and I would be grateful for the hon Minister’s views on this point. Next, I move on to the proposed section 16H which deals with CRI, and many Members spoke positively about this. It is meant to rehabilitate the person in question and to promote reconciliation with the wounded community and victims. The hon Minister’s reference to the laudable initiative by the Young Sikhs Association inviting a blogger, who made a statement which can be seen as offensive, to a Sikh gurdwara with a view to rehabilitate her is an excellent example of how the CRI can work in future. The starting point, however, is that the person in question is believed to have committed offences of causing ill-will between different groups or wounding religious feelings of any other person. These are offences under Penal Code provisions which are proposed to be ported over to MRHA. I agree with the porting over, but my concern is the interplay between the Attorney-General’s powers and the Minister’s powers. Under article 35(8) of the Constitution, it is the Attorney-General who has the power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any offence. Here, the Minister decides whether or not to offer the CRI, and while the CRI is implemented, there can be no prosecution. So, you could have a situation where the Attorney-General may decide to prosecute a person, only not to be able to proceed with the issuance of the CRI by the Minister.”
“This is a responsible thing to do because a number of the provisions in this Bill are focused on religious leaders. In fact, the Select Committee in 1990 also benefited from the views of the religious leaders. It should be borne in mind that the religious leaders consulted, whether they supported the Bill, was not, pardon the pun, preordained. As it turned out, after the consultative process and after their views had been taken into account into the Bill is presented in this House, they gave their support. So, the leaders’ expression of support, or for that matter, even if they have expressed reservation or dissent to the Bill in these circumstances, does not, in my respectful view, equate to mixing religion with politics. I have three points to make on the Bill proper and one query on the proposed powers for the Minister to make subsidiary legislation under this Bill. First, the removal of the requirement that the Minister may issue an RO only after sending of notice and receiving of representation to the person within a 14-day period. A number of hon Members spoke about this. I join Ms Anthea Ong in making the point that the focus of the removal of the 14-day period appears to be because of the fact that you have such statements being made on the Internet and there could be a viralling effect very quickly. But the wording of the provision applies broadly. So, in those circumstances, I wonder whether the rationale behind this provision in the first place that has been identified by the Select Committee as the safeguard, which is through requiring the Minister to take notice of the individual’s representation before proceeding further, can be adopted for situations which do not involve the Internet.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, I join the hon Members who spoke before me, such as Mr Mohamed Irshad as well as Mr Louis Ng, who stated that MRHA has a strong signalling effect even though it has not been invoked to date. The late Dr Ong Chit Chung, former Member of Parliament for Bukit Batok and my predecessor, stated presciently in this House at the Third Reading of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill on 9 November 1990, and I quote, "This Bill is a preventive measure. It need not be used at all if all is well. But its very presence will help to check mischievous or misguided persons. It helps to maintain law and order, without which no religious beliefs could be upheld or practised in peace." After almost 30 years, it is timely to review the MRHA to ensure that it is strengthened to deal with evolving issues that potentially have an impact on the maintenance of religious harmony in Singapore. I note that the principal aim of the amendment Bill is to deal with the challenge of social media which can cause a viralling and deleterious effect on our society very quickly, and possible foreign interference in local religious organisations. It also consolidates all the criminal provisions dealing with religious harmony, previously under the Penal Code, under MRHA. I support the aims of the Bill in principle. I note that it also has broad support of the local religious leaders. The hon Member Ms Sylvia Lim has some reservations that the religious leaders made statements to this effect. The suggestion, I believe, she made is that by making such statements, they may have crossed the religion-political divide. With respect, I disagree. These statements, as I recall, were issued after MHA actively sought the leaders’ views.”
“Mr Speaker, may I ask the Minister whether there is scope to require the manufacturers of these hobbyists' drones to cooperate with MINDEF such that action can be taken?”
“And this may also be seen as a sidestep from what would otherwise be the subject matter of a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) request between countries. There could also be issues vis-a-vis bona fide third parties who may have to deal with assets that are ordered to be forfeited by a foreign court. May I ask how the proposed amendments would deal with foreign civil forfeiture orders? In this regard, it may be useful to consider how other jurisdictions deal with such orders. For example, in New Jersey, there is a separate piece of legislation dealing with civil asset recovery orders made by foreign courts. It does not confer automatic recognition of such orders. It will involve the Attorney-General who makes a decision in his discretion whether or not to make an application to freeze and confiscate the assets which are the subject matter of the foreign civil asset recovery order. Finally, I welcome the safeguard that is sought to be introduced in the form of the proposed section 4(3A) of REFJA under which the Court may only register a non-money judgment if it is satisfied that the enforcement of the judgment would be just and convenient. I seek an elaboration on the factors the Court is supposed to consider before deciding it is just and convenient to recognise a foreign non-monetary judgment or, if it is not, what are the circumstances in which the judge would then decide to convert it into a money judgment. Notwithstanding my comments, I support the Bills.”
“Specifically, in the context of interim injunctions, I am heartened to note that the Bill does allow for recognition of interim freezing orders, targeting assets of a defendant in Singapore issued by a foreign court so as not to make a subsequent final judgment of the foreign court nugatory. This is to be welcomed because previously, in my view, there was a "black hole" which a defendant can exploit because the individual may be situated in one country and have assets in another country. The current legal position in Singapore is that the local Courts may not necessarily grant an injunctive relief purely in aid of foreign proceedings. In an interconnected world, this makes less sense and, certainly, it is not the case in respect of arbitration proceedings. Under the International Arbitration Act, the Singapore Court may issue interim relief in respect of arbitration proceedings overseas. So, with this amendment, we can potentially resolve this anomaly. And through the principle of reciprocity, I hope that the Singapore interim judgments will similarly be recognised overseas so as not to render a subsequent final judgment of the Singapore Courts nugatory. I now turn to civil forfeiture action taken by sovereign governments. There are certain jurisdictions which assert wide jurisdiction over assets wherever it may be situated. For example, we have the unexplained Wealth Orders issued by the UK courts aimed at assets overseas. These proceedings are civil in nature. But if you look at it carefully, in reality, these Orders may be viewed as penal in nature and may not be too different from a tax judgment or a fine or other penalty which is not covered under REFJA.”
“Subject to the comments that I will shortly make, I support the enlargement of the statutory base. Before I deal with my comments on the Bills, I would like to make some suggestions on steps that can be considered to increase the attraction of Singapore's Courts judgments and Singapore as a dispute resolution hub. I had previously suggested in this House that Singapore consider the viability of entering into the Apostille Convention which deals with certification of a document's validity for legal purposes in signatory states. There are currently 117 countries which are parties to this Convention. This would significantly cut down the costs and labour involved in legalisation of documents. I understand that the Ministry of Law is looking into this matter and would appreciate an update. In the same vein, I would suggest that the Government consider the viability of Singapore signing the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, in other words, the Hague Service Convention, which currently has 75 countries as contracting parties. This will enable easier service of process commencing legal action on parties situated in Convention countries. Otherwise, it may take an inordinate amount of time through the usual consular routes to serve process. And this may take between three to five years, depending on the countries involved. Returning to the Bills, I would like to ask about the scope of recognition and enforcement of an interim and non-money judgment under the proposed amendments to REFJA. I note from the hon Senior Minister of State's speech that injunctions are considered; also, orders for specific performance. May I ask how many search orders? How about declarations?”
“Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I would like to declare my interest as a lawyer in private practice. These two Bills are presented after public consultation. The move on the part of the Ministry of Law to consult before introducing these two Bills is to be commended. The stated aims of these Bills are to streamline the statutory regimes for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments into one under REFJA and to take the necessary steps to ensure the recognition of Singapore's civil judgments overseas on the basis of the reciprocity principle between countries. I welcome and support these aims. As mentioned by the hon Senior Minister of State, Singapore is already a well-recognised dispute resolution hub, with the SIAC, SICC and SIMC. In the context of the litigation in Courts, the setting up of SICC was a game changer. SICC, a division of the High Court, consists of top international jurists, in addition to the Singapore Supreme Court judges, who all have deep expertise, skill and experience to try complex international commercial disputes. Singapore's ratification of the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, a point that the hon Member, Mr Christopher de Souza mentioned, allows judgments issued by the Singapore Court pursuant to exclusive choice of Court agreements to be recognised by signatory countries. This was a big step in achieving the policy aim of ensuring the wide recognition of Singapore judgments. It is proposed under the REFJA (Amendment) Bill that the statutory base for recognition of a foreign judgment be enlarged. The effect of this is to allow a Singapore judgment to be similarly recognised by competent authorities in foreign jurisdictions through the reciprocity principle.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, I applaud the announcement by the hon Senior Minister of State Dr Lam Pin Min to bring forward the amnesty period for the use of non-compliant PMDs from end 2020 to 1 July 2020. This is the concern I had in the Parliamentary Question that I filed for answer in today's session. I have three supplementary questions. The first is in relation to the spike in fire incidents. As Senior Minister of State Dr Lam mentioned, last year, we had 52 PMD-related fires and, this year, from January to July, we already had 49 fires. As the Members of the House may recall, Dr Lam Pin Min made an announcement in this House in September 2018 about the new standards. Following that, retailers of PMDs dumped prices from $600 to about $200 to $300. I believe this may have resulted in people buying these non-compliant PMDs. I am not sure whether there is a correlation between this dumping and the higher incidents of fires involving PMDs. I am also concerned whether or not these PMDs are fit for purpose. Even though you charged the PMDs properly, they could still be fire hazards. I wonder whether the Ministry could provide services to such PMD users to see whether their PMDs are fit for purpose. The second question is in relation to the mandatory inspection date of 1 April 2020. Given that only 10% of PMDs are compliant now and given that the amnesty ends on 1 July 2020, I would imagine that a good percentage of PMDs would fail the inspection, come 1 April 2020. What would be the status of such PMD users? Finally, given that there is still a high number of non-compliant PMDs after 1 July 2020, I wonder whether steps could be taken to prevent a secondary market of non-compliant PMDs in Singapore. Perhaps we could consider providing value for scrapping such non-compliant PMDs.”
“I also suggest that the Ministry consider making some safety measures mandatory to protect other road users and this is a call that was made by the hon Member Mr Ang Hin Kee as well as the hon Member Assoc Prof Walter Theseira. It could consider measures taken overseas. For example, in the US, it is compulsory to install rear view cameras. There are also discussions in several countries about making the installation of dash cams compulsory, too. Dash cams can be a deterrent against irresponsible driving, too. The hon Minister mentioned about video footage being referred to the Police for investigation. They are also a good source of evidence for investigation into RTA offences. Some dash cams have anti-collision sensors and could have made a difference, for example, in relation to the accident that the hon Nominated Member of Parliament Prof Lim Sun Sun was involved in. I am so glad that she is none the worse for it. Notwithstanding my comments, I support the Bill.”
“The prescribed breathalyser test was introduced in 1996. It was contemplated then that the test has to be administered in the Police station. The motorist has to be transported to the Police station for this. Now, there are Police-grade mobile prescribed breathalyser machines readily available which provide very accurate readings and can be administered at the roadside. There is also a potential for removing the need to administer preliminary breath test. What we will then get is a reading of the alcohol level of the motorist at an earlier time, which probably will be a better gauge of what his alcohol level was at the time he was driving or was in charge of his vehicle. I also note that in France, drink-drivers, especially repeat offenders, would be required to fit their cars with vehicle ignition breathalysers or ignition interlock which require them to take a test before they can start their car. They will also be required to blow on a second occasion at a random time to limit the chances of others blowing into the breathalyser for them. I would be grateful for an update from the hon Minister on this front. The final point I wish to make relates to making owners and operators of vehicles who cause death or injuries as a result of mechanical failure arising from negligent maintenance of their vehicles, especially heavy vehicles. I have spoken on this topic in this House recently. I appreciate that these amendments are being introduced by the Minister for Home Affairs and the focus is, therefore, on driver conduct. I would respectfully suggest that MOT take a look at the RTA with a view to tighten the framework so that such owners are held responsible for death and injuries arising from their neglect.”
“The next point I wish to make relates to the fact that the sentencing provision in section 69 of the RTA, which deals with administration of preliminary breath tests, is being retained in its current form even though the sentencing provisions for section 67 are proposed to be enhanced. Currently, there is a parity of sentence under section 67(1), which deals with drink-driving, and under section 69(4) of the RTA, which deals with refusing to give a breath specimen for a preliminary breath test. In both situations, a first-timer would be liable on conviction to a fine of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months. A repeat offender would similarly be liable for a fine of not less than $3,000 and not more than $10,000 and to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months. In the Bill, the sentencing provisions for section 67(1) are proposed to be enhanced. However, the same is not proposed for section 69(4) of the RTA. I do appreciate that if a person does not provide a breath sample for a preliminary breath test, he may be arrested nonetheless and be required to submit a breath sample for the prescribed breathalyser test at the Police station. If he again refuses to provide the breath sample, he will be presumed to have committed the offence of drink-driving and charged separately for that offence. However, given that there is currently an existing parity between the sentences provided for both provisions and the aim of this Bill is to deter motorists from irresponsible behaviour, I wonder what is the policy reason for not similarly proposing to amend the punishment for section 69(4) of the RTA. I also would like to ask if we have sufficiently leveraged advances made in technology.”
“In my respectful view, for traffic cases involving people behaving negligently or not realising that they exceeded the alcohol limit but who have caused low to medium levels of harm to life and property, community sentences may be a good option for them in terms of addressing the sentencing principles of deterrence as well as just deserts. Subsequently, in March 2018, this House passed amendments to the CPC to expand the list of offences for which community sentences may be imposed. Under the amended section 337(3) of the CPC, a Court may impose a community work order even if the offender is convicted of an offence for which a mandatory minimum sentence of a fine is prescribed by law. One example is the offence of drink-driving. I would welcome the hon Minister’s confirmation that this comports with the policy intent behind this amendment Bill. I may be wrong, but one community sentencing option which does not appear to be open for offenders under the RTA in relation to offences under the proposed sections 64 and 65 is the short detention order. If a person is imposed with a short detention order, unlike an imprisonment, his conviction would not constitute as a registrable crime under the Registration of Criminals Act. I would have thought that, particularly for lower-level culpability acts leading to medium-level harm, a short detention order should be considered as a suitable punishment so that the accused would not be delivered with a disproportionate crushing blow vis-a-vis his prospects in the future. I wonder why this option is not provided for in this Bill.”
“On the face of it, there is a possibility that the serious offender may be punished twice. This is because, as mentioned before, in the current sentencing framework, the harm and culpability of a drink-driver would be taken into consideration in relation to a sentence imposed on a drink-driver under section 67. Sir, I do appreciate that this scenario would only be triggered if a person faces two charges: that of drink-driving as well as that of dangerous driving. But we cannot have one analytical framework for sentencing in relation to drink-driving if a person is charged singly, as opposed to another situation if he is charged for drink-driving as well as dangerous driving. So, I would welcome a clarification from the hon Minister as to what is the Ministry's expectation in relation to sentencing under the proposed sections 64 and 65. The next query I have is in relation to the applicability of community sentencing options. I have previously spoken about the desirability to widen sentencing options during an Adjournment Motion in this House on 11 September 2017. I pointed out that then, for drink-driving cases, the person on conviction would not be liable for community sentencing but a motorist who was convicted for causing death by a negligent act under the Penal Code was imposed a community sentence of a short detention order. This was because the sentence for drink-driving offence under the RTA was fixed in law with a minimum mandatory sentence of a fine.”
“Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I declare my interest as a lawyer in private practice dealing with, on occasions, traffic matters. I support the aim behind the Bill which is to deter irresponsible driving that may lead to harming of innocent lives and damage to property. I applaud the Ministry for obtaining feedback from the public before presenting this Bill for consideration in Parliament. In particular, in this Bill, I support the calibration of punishment depending on the harm caused by the motorist in driving his vehicle dangerously or carelessly. Indeed, I note that the Supreme Court, in several recent decisions dealing with sentencing of motorists who are convicted for offences, such as drink-driving, dangerous driving and careless driving, already apply an analytical framework which requires a consideration of the harm caused by the motorist as well as his culpability. I have a query on the proposal to provide for enhanced punishment for a "serious offender" who commits the offence of dangerous driving or careless driving. "Serious Offender" is defined in the amendment Bill as a person convicted for drink-driving or, alternatively convicted for refusing to give his breath sample. Under the proposed sections 64 and 65, if the same person is convicted for dangerous driving or careless driving, he is subject to an extra punishment which is in addition to the punishment for dangerous driving. So, for example, under the proposed section 64(2)(b), if hurt is caused, where an offender is a serious offender, he is to be punished with a fine of not less than $2,000 and not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than 12 months or to both, in addition to the punishment for dangerous driving charge.”
“We make the best judgement on the facts that we have and what we think would be the reasonable assessment or reasonable way people behave and then we see how it goes. I believe I have covered all three points.”
“In fact, we have made a lot of progress in our Bar, but I cannot think of more than 10 people whom I can offer as candidates for judicial appointments in the Supreme Court because it is a very rigorous process. It is not easy to build resources that way. That is why, having regard to the limitations we have as a small country, I thought the configuration that POFMA envisages in relation to Ministerial action with accountability to the Courts always is a good balance. We need to be honest about the resources that we have or do not have. The point about individuals and the chilling effect on them, I hear my learned friend. But I think the point I was focused on is this. If we accept for the moment that all that POFMA is focused on is not opinion but statements of facts which are false, then the issue about chilling effect can be viewed a little bit more carefully and see whether, indeed, it is really perceived or real. Like, for example, when a person says, you know, that "the Merdeka Generation Package is meant to buy votes", if the person says that "I have no faith in the Government." If they were to say all these things and the assurance from the frontbenchers is that, "No, it is not caught in POFMA", that I am trying to see how then POFMA introduces a chilling effect. Like what I also said in my speech was that there is nothing stopping the individual who is the subject of a POFMA Direction to comment on the POFMA Direction. So, he has that right in relation to what has happened to him. Again, it is a balancing act. I do see where my learned friend Mr Leon Perera is coming from. Sometimes, issues are perceived. Sometimes, we do not know exactly how things are going to pan out.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, thank you for the opportunity to reply to the hon Member Mr Leon Perera. He raises three issues and I am grateful to Mr Perera for the opportunity to clarify the points that I have made in relation to these three points. The first point he made was in relation to the legal burden in any appeal proceedings. And it goes without saying, and I agree fully with him, the legal burden would only arise if there are legal proceedings, meaning if there was an appeal. But that is not the end of the matter. As I mentioned in my speech, at the outset, the Minister would have to nail his or her colours on the mast, because he would have to issue the reasons why a Direction is issued and that is gazetted. And that is available to members of the public as well. So, from that perspective, there is accountability. In relation to the second point, I believe the second point concerns about making sure that there is sufficient judicial resource. That is a very, very important point. And, in fact, it occurred to me that the Government obviously is taking POFMA issues seriously because it could have designated an appeal from a POFMA issue relating to a representation of fact at the District Court level. What it did here is to elevate it to the Supreme Court level. So, we are looking increasing at judicial resources at the Supreme Court level. That is not an easy situation. At the Supreme Court level, you are talking about Supreme Court Judges who are at the top of the game. They have security of tenure, you have to make sure they do not just deal with POFMA matters but they deal with the whole gamut of issues and make sure they superintend justice in the way that reflects public interest, that ensures and safeguards the interest of our country. It is not easy.”
“Yes, Sir. If I have used up my time, then I will stop here, Sir.”
“So, to guard against these possibilities, I wonder if the Ministry had considered enacting a statutory review procedure, together with the appeal procedure, such that a person who wishes to challenge the Minister's decision on falsity and public interest, can do it in one shot. It can overcome the procedural hurdle that the appeal has been disposed of before the judicial review process begins. My suggestion is a bit different from what the hon Member Mr Dennis Tan has suggested because he said the High Court should have oversight over all issues. Here, I think there is merit in retaining judicial review in relation to exercise of public interest. That is a decision that has been made by the Minister for the reasons I mentioned earlier but, of course, can be subject to a review. The same High Court Judge should decide on both matters. Even if the same High Court Judge is designated by the Chief Justice to hear the judicial review matter, so long as the matters are separate, he is not bound by his prior decision. So, by twinning the process, there is no risk of inconsistent decisions. To guard against abuse of process of judicial review, there can even be a stipulation for a leave procedure to sift out unmeritorious applications. It is important that statutory review procedures be simplified and be rendered cost-effective. This is a point that my learned friend Ms Sylvia Lim made, for the same reasons as to why the appeal procedure has to be cost-effective as well. I would welcome the hon Minister's thoughts on this. I am not saying that this is a likely outcome. But I think there could be some risks and I would be grateful for his elaboration on this matter. Now, I come to my last point. The hon Nominated Members of Parliament —”
“Let us assume the High Court decides that the representation is false and provides an explanation for its decision. Looking at the representation, it could be false in a number of ways, but I will highlight just two. One, it could be false as it suggests Tamil is being replaced by Hindi. This obviously would create feelings of enmity and ill-will between groups of people, particularly involving Tamil-speaking people. It may be in the public interest to correct that representation. Or it could be false as it suggests that Hindi is being added, not replaced, as a recognised language. Here, whether or not there is a public interest involved, it is more arguable. Some in this House may ask whether there is a need for the High Court to articulate its reasons. Could it just say true or false? The answer is, of course, no. The Supreme Court is an independent branch of our Government that is vested with judicial power under Article 93 of the Constitution. It has a responsibility to build jurisprudence, explain its decisions through grounds that are released, unless the issues are really plain and obvious, especially if there is an appeal. It also ensures transparency. Let us assume that the person loses the appeal and then commences the High Court action to review their decision. The High Court, listening to the judicial review application, is not bound by the decision of the other Court. The focus of the review will be on public interest, but it overlaps with what is assessed to be a representation of fact because that is what the lawyers call a jurisdictional fact. So, it can be, for example, open to the High Court to decide the statement is true because Hindi is offered in our schools and, therefore, it is a recognised language.”
“In a situation where a respondent both prosecutes an appeal to a Supreme Court Judge and also intends to take up judicial review, the Supreme Court Judge listening to the appeal in relation to whether a statement of fact is true or false, would only deal with half the issues. His decision on the appeal is not dispositive of the matter. This is not necessarily the most judicious use of a Supreme Court Judge's resource. I am also concerned that there could be a risk of inconsistent decisions as a High Court decision on the truth of the representation is not necessarily binding on the High Court dealing with the judicial review. Let me explain through an example. Hon Members of this House may recall an incident involving a market operator issuing a flyer in four languages, namely, English, Mandarin, Malay and Hindi. Tamil was excluded. Let us consider a situation where a person noting this incident publishes a representation online referring to the above matter and announcing "Hindi has become a recognised language in Singapore". Let us assume that the Government takes action against the person under POFMA and the person appeals to the High Court on the issue of whether the statement is false and also seeks a judicial review. Under our current rules, the High Court appeal has to be disposed of first before the separate judicial review application. This is because, under our rules, judicial review applications are measures of last resort. The High Court would then have to decide first whether the statement is true or false. This may seem like a binary choice – true or false. But the reasons underpinning the decision may be relevant on a consequent issue of public interest.”
“He gave an example of the Prime Minister stating in this House that he does not wish to sue his siblings because they are his siblings and he is in a conflicted position in relation to the allegations made by his siblings against him about abuse of power. But that is in relation to him, in his personal standing. But when it comes to the Government, that is a completely different thing. There is a set procedure. If a Minister is conflicted, he cannot make that decision. Somebody else would have to make a decision. So, the issue of conflict would not arise in these circumstances. Ultimately, we must all remember our fellow Singaporeans are looking at us, and they would be holding the Government to account through the ballot box. I do think, however, it would be useful for the hon Minister to provide an outline of how he intends that the powers under POFMA be exercised, in terms of the variety of tools, to effect a Correction, for example, or effect a takedown, because we hear from the hon Minister that, in most circumstances, it would usually be a Correction order. This outline can help even the Court later to assess whether the exercise of power under POFMA is within the legitimate expectations arising from the Minister's statements when it reviews the Minister's decision later. It sharpens the ability of the Court to review Executive action that ensures that this is legal and proper. And I believe this is the point that the hon Member Mr Vikram Nair made. I now come to my next point. I have a concern that two parallel procedures providing for judicial oversight may, in certain circumstances, create difficulties. I made mention at the outset that is not usual for statutes to have these two levels of judicial oversight, and I have some sympathies for the draftsman.”
“That assessment is either true or false, and if you were to put in the definition of misleading, it does not change. The ultimate outcome is whether or not the statement is a statement of fact which is true or false. So, with respect, I do not see this as significantly enlarging the issues. In fact, the wording is essential to deal with the mischief this Bill is aimed at addressing. There is also a point made by the hon Member Mr Low Thia Khiang about the Government being a player and a referee. It is vested with powers under POFMA. I reflected on the Member's statement. I believe, with respect, he may have conflated a number of scenarios together. I think that no one in this House would raise an objection if a POFMA Direction is issued to deal with a public interest, race issue, language issue, religious issue or issues dealing with relations with foreign powers or national security. In these kinds of situations, both sides of the House must unite. That is a no-brainer. It is sometimes good in debates to highlight what is the common ground that is achieved between both sides of the House. So, what are we left with? We are left with areas where, potentially, powers can be used for political purposes. In that kind of situation, it is pretty clear to me, reading POFMA, that it would not be consistent with the definition of public interest for a Minister to issue a Direction to further his or her political aims. What is the safeguard? The safeguard is the Court because the Court, through judicial review, would be the referee. The hon Member Mr Faisal Manap talked about conflict of interest.”
“Here, you have fairly forensic powers, including that of issuing a Correction order. Would that not be a better approach? If the Government were to commit to use a narrow set of powers, is that the sign of a government which is not acting in good faith? The hon Members Ms Irene Quay and Ms Anthea Ong mentioned that there is nothing in the Bill that states that the focus of POFMA is only on statements of facts and not opinion. But that has been stated by a number of frontbenchers on a few occasions. And if one were to look at the interpretation of statute, read it with the Interpretation Act, the Courts will know what to do. They will know what is the intention of the Government. They know that POFMA Directions are not meant to be applied for opinions. The hon Members Mr Pritam Singh and Mr Dennis Tan highlighted that, under POFMA, statements which are misleading are also caught, in addition to statements which are false. They seem to suggest that there is a significant enlargement of the scope of the Bill in these circumstances. Now, I looked at the definition under the proposed section 2(2) of the Bill. What is clear is that the main criterion is that there must be a statement of fact, and this is a point that the hon Senior Minister of State Edwin Tong made. So, the usage of "misleading" does not enlarge the scope of the representations to include opinion. The way I read section 2(2B) is that the intention behind the usage of "misleading" is to focus on statements of fact that weave truth with fiction, such that it creates a distorted statement which is false. So, in relation to the hon Member Mr Dennis Tan's example of a person who states, "I lodged a Police report".”
“Mr Leon Perera also talked about the impact on the individual who is visited with a Direction under POFMA. We need to compare because we are talking about public interest as a potential for large groups of people to be affected. Yes, there is an impact on the individual. But what is the kind of impact we are talking about? Most times, we are talking about a Correction order. He or she can comment on the correction order. He or she can comment on the Ministerial action. So, we need to strike a proper balancing act between the impact on an individual and the potential for disaffection amongst lots of people. And I think this Bill strikes the right balance. I now turn to the issue of assessment of the representation of fact. Several hon Members in the Opposition, including the hon Member Mr Low Thia Khiang, expressed the view that POFMA is meant to chill criticisms against the Government. He then went on to state, "I have no faith in this Government" or words to that effect, and that the Pioneer Generation Package and the Merdeka Generation Package were meant to buy votes. As stated by the hon Member Er Dr Lee Bee Wah, both statements are clearly statements of opinion and not caught by POFMA. Just like if I were to say that some hon Members in this House are fearmongering. That is an opinion. That is not a statement of fact. How can there be a chilling effect introduced by POFMA in these circumstances? What we need to be mindful about is that as the hon Minister mentioned yesterday, what the Government is trying to do through POFMA is to narrow the powers. He mentioned about two pieces of legislation where there are broad powers and, if used, may be like using a sledgehammer to break a nut.”
“It may well be that the Ministers, after the passing of this Bill, may want to set up advisory panels to get the necessary inputs and make appropriate decisions. The hon Member Mr Pritam Singh made a comparison between POHA and POFMA, and pointed out that there is regime for expedited protection orders issued by the Court. He, I believe, wondered why this same route cannot be used for POFMA. Looking at just the legal ingredients, there is a singular difference. The issues under POFMA, unlike POHA, affect public interest. This means a lot more is at stake. I am not trivialising the effect of harassment of a POHA victim. I am not. But what I am trying to say is that, when it comes to POFMA, we are talking about public interest. There is a potential for disaffection amongst groups of people. It can change the complexion of society if something happens. And that is why we cannot afford to have inaction or slow action. And that is why the procedure has been streamlined to allow for the Executive to take action fast but without losing the accountability that the regime contemplates. The hon Member Mr Leon Perera spoke about the American experience where, in America, a judicial officer would make himself or herself available to issue a warrant of arrest. Now, that may be so in America. In Singapore, I believe, by the 1970s, we have moved ahead. In Singapore, Police Officers are vested with powers of arrest without warrant. These are serious powers, but they are accountable and they do it in the right circumstance and we see the effect of it. From the 1970s to date, actually, our crime rates have come down so much and, really, we need not compare ourselves with America in this situation.”
“This is the point that hon Member Mr Cedric Foo made very cogently a few hours ago. We would need a decision-maker who is in touch with the ground situation, not just in Singapore but even overseas. He or she would have to have access to intelligence reports, gauge what would be the likely reaction of Singapore residents, what steps are needed to address the problems on the ground. These are just some examples. With due respect, it is not easy for the Courts to make such a decision. Courts are best suited to apply the law, including the law promulgated by this House. Do not get me wrong. I am not saying that the Court cannot review a decision made in the public interest. I recalled when the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Bill was moved in this House, my Parliamentary colleagues from the WP spoke about the development of judicial review in Singapore, by reference to the speech delivered extra-judicially by the hon Chief Justice in America. His Honour said that "judicial review is the sharp edge that keeps government action within the form and substance of the law." His Honour also spoke about the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation within the context of judicial review. So, there is a robust system in place. This is the system that will guard against actions of a rogue government. This would ensure that powers are only used in the manner that the Government has promised at the Second Reading of this Bill. Decisions of what is in the public interest are, therefore, best to be left with Ministers who head the Ministries, have access to Civil Service apparatus, are elected and are accountable to the people through the ballot box. The hon Member Prof Lim Sun Sun said that Ministers would benefit from inputs from advisory panel and I agree.”
“But having reviewed the material closer, my concern on this matter has been assuaged. This is because I noted that the Minister stated yesterday, at the point when a Direction is issued, the Minister would have to nail his or her colours to the mast by stating the reasons why the Direction is being issued. This Direction will also be gazetted. In relation to this point, the hon Members Ms Anthea Ong as well as Assoc Prof Walter Theseira said, "But that is in subsidiary legislation". When the Minister made his statement at the Second Reading of the Bill, that goes into the corpus of the Hansard on how the legislation is to be reviewed and that creates a legitimate expectation. When the Court reviews the exercise of power against the legitimate expectations created, it can strike down the power which is used outside the legitimate expectations it has been created. So, the Executive's case would be crystalised at the outset. The respondent would know what case he or she has to meet. In this regard, the hon Member Mr Leon Perera said but, in the process, the legal burden would be on the respondent. With great respect, that is not how I understand POFMA to be. The provisions are quite clear. The legal burden has always rested with the Executive to prove that the Part 3 Directions comply with the criteria for "falsehood" as well as "public interest". Hon Members of Parliament have engaged in a lively debate on which is the proper entity or person who should make a decision to issue Directions under POFMA. Under the proposed POFMA, there are two cumulative conditions: falsity of the statement of fact and public interest. When it comes to deciding what is in the public interest, what kind of decision-maker do we need?”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, permit me to go straight to the issues without making the usual prefatory remarks. Sir, the structure of the statute, from a drafting perspective, is unique. Usually, in previous pieces of legislation passed by this House, when it comes to exercise of the Minister's discretion dealing with public order issues, there is no providing of an appeal as a matter of right to the Court. There is a limited recourse in the form of judicial review of the Minister's decision. In some statutes, the Court's power of review has been ousted, for example, the Maintenance of the Religious Harmony Act and ISA. Here, what is contemplated is two-fold. An appeal to the Supreme Court on the issue of the truth or falsity of the representation and attribution of the representation to a person in Singapore as well as a parallel track of a judicial review of the Minister's decision, which operates separately. This regime deals with the point that the hon Member Assoc Prof Walter Theseira made about what happens if the Government gets it wrong, by reference to Galileo's case. In Galileo's case, the Church took more than three centuries to correct itself. Here, there is an appeal process and there are timelines for the appeal process to complete. Originally, I was concerned with the structure of the Bill leading to the appeal process. This is because when I looked at it, I saw that the appeal is made "after the fact", meaning after the Minister's decision is made. And it will only be initiated by the respondent to the Direction made under POFMA. The concern I had was that, ordinarily, it would be for the Executive to make out the case first, as opposed to requiring the respondent at the outset to state why the Executive got it wrong without knowing the Executive's case.”
“Under common law, there is a "double actionability" rule which the Senior Minister of State would know. It would ordinarily apply to torts. For example, a person who has been defamed overseas may, in certain circumstances, commence an action in Singapore if he can show that the offending act that occurred overseas would constitute a civil wrong both at the location where it had occurred as well as Singapore. In an interconnected world, these kinds of expanded bases of jurisdictions would be welcomed. Otherwise, the victims would be left with no remedy and has to wait until he or she is harassed in Singapore before commencing action. Notwithstanding my comments, I wholeheartedly support the amendment Bill.”
“I would like to seek clarification that the wording does not prohibit the Court to make whatever ancillary orders that it deems fit, for example, "delivery up" orders, to ensure that the victim is sufficiently protected, depending on the circumstances of the case. Let me provide an example to explain the point. From time to time, we read of cases of female victims being harassed by ex-boyfriends who possess videos of them being intimate. On such occasions, victims may, and indeed have, taken action under POHA to obtain a PO against the respondents. What is not clear, though, is whether under the proposed provision, the victims are able to demand that the respondents give back the videos featuring them. This is important because so long as the videos are in the hands of the harasser, there is every chance that offending behaviour may reoccur. I would have imagined that the Court should have such powers to ensure that the objective of the PO is met. I would welcome the hon Senior Minister of State's clarification on this point. Finally, I have a query on the jurisdiction and application of POHA over persons outside Singapore, or persons whose actions covered by POHA were committed when they were outside Singapore. From my reading of the proposed section 17 of POHA, it seems that there may not be jurisdiction to deal with a situation where the victim of harassment is outside Singapore at the material time and the act of harassment by the harasser is committed outside Singapore, too. I do appreciate why there should not be criminal jurisdiction over such acts. However, when it comes to civil jurisdiction, I would respectfully suggest different considerations should apply.”
“If the provision is widened to allow the company to commence civil action against the harasser and obtain an injunction to prevent harassment, it can protect all its employees in one go. In the United Kingdom (UK), there is precedent that allows an employer to sue a harasser on behalf of all its employees. In the 2005 English High Court decision of First Global Locums, the High Court granted an injunction under the UK Protection from Harassment Act in favour of a recruitment company against a disgruntled ex-employee. In deciding to issue an injunction protecting the company, the Court held that if it only covered the employees who had been harassed without including the company, there is a likelihood for the ex-employee to harass other employees of the company who, at that point in time, have not been harassed yet and thereby retaliate against the company. I would welcome the hon Senior Minister of State's clarification on this matter. My next point deals with the ambit of the protection order under the proposed section 12 of the Bill. As currently worded, the scope of protection under the order would involve prohibiting the harasser from doing anything in relation to the victim and this right may extend to directing that the harasser be excluded from occupying the shared residence with the victim. It also may include requiring the harasser to stop publishing an offending communication or referring the harasser to attend counselling and mediation. The hon Senior Minister of State also mentioned some other aspects of broadening the PO.”
“I would like to seek clarification as to whether the provision is broad enough for corporate entities or other third parties who may not be directly victims of the harassment but nonetheless are affected by the acts of the harasser so as to be able to bring civil actions against the harasser. Let me provide an example by reference to the 2013 High Court decision of AXA vs Chandran Natesan, where I acted as the lawyer. This case predates the enactment of POHA. In that case, the defendant was a psychotic. He targeted the plaintiff company's employees, particularly the women, and repeatedly sent emails and made calls to them using vulgar and threatening language. The company obtained an interim injunction preventing the defendant from harassing its employees. However, it failed to get a permanent injunction as the High Court doubted the existence of the common law tort of harassment. The common law tort of harassment has since been abrogated by POHA. Under section 11 of POHA, clearly, the harassed employees will have a remedy in commencing civil action against the harasser. However, it is not clear to me whether the company, the employer of the employees, would be able to commence an action to protect its employees. It would be good for employers to be provided with such remedies for two main reasons. First, as an employer, the company has a duty to its employees to provide a safe working environment. The hon Member, Mr Patrick Tay, was talking about workplace harassment just a few minutes ago. Hence, it has a direct interest in ensuring that its employees are not harassed at work. Second, when we are dealing with a company with many employees, the harasser can escape the effect of an injunction by shifting the target to employees whom he has not harassed before.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, first, I would like to declare my interest as a practising lawyer. I support the aims of the amendment Bill which was carefully outlined by the hon Senior Minister of State Edwin Tong in his speech. I commend MinLaw for taking active steps to protect victims of harassment. I believe, once passed, this Bill will have the effect of considerably strengthening the protection regime for victims. I have four comments to make on the Bill. First, is on the issue of doxxing. Many hon Members spoke about this before me. I think there is clearly support for the criminalisation of such behaviour. The query, though, is on the ambit of the proposed crime and, in that, I join the observations made by the hon Member Pritam Singh. He mentioned an example where an author posts information online to highlight a person's offending conduct. The author's focus is not necessarily to harass the person but to highlight the person's bad conduct. It, however, may be foreseeable that the person may still be harassed. Alternatively, there could be situations where a victim of an offence shares his or her experience online and names the perpetrator at the same time. In such situations, would the offence of doxxing be committed? I think it is important to understand what kind of behaviour would be caught under this new provision so that people will know how they should regulate their conduct online. I now turn to the proposed section 11 which is being broadened to allow for a victim of harassment to bring civil action against any individual or entity, and this entity may include corporate bodies or unincorporated bodies.”
“I would like to thank the hon Senior Minister of State for the comprehensive answer to my question. I congratulate the Ministry of Transport as well as LTA for securing the cooperation of these companies. I have a suggestion. Would these companies make available their contact details such that there are any claims to be made, these claims can be made easily? At this point in time, we find it difficult to make claims against these companies.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank the Senior Minister of State for his clarification. May I respectfully clarify that the focus of my Parliamentary Question is not on void decks generally, but it is in relation to ground floor lift lobbies and letter box areas. The point is that people in these areas would not be exercising the same caution as crossing roads. So, in those circumstances, would the Ministry consider imposing regulations? Because I think the interest of residents in this area would be paramount and also, there would be no real difference in opinions of all the Town Councils. They all want the ground floor lift lobbies and the letter box areas to be safe for residents.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank the Senior Minister of State for his answer. I have a few supplementary questions. Firstly, would the Senior Minister of State not accept that the Town Councils Act and the regulations thereunder may not be fit for purpose in relation to deterring PMD users from plying through void deck space near lift lobbies and letter box areas? If he agrees with that view, then, perhaps the Ministry of Transport (MOT) can take the lead to work with the Town Councils, and then, prescribe these areas as pedestrian-only areas. I say this because there is a real-life example in Bukit Batok where an elderly lady, after taking out letters from her letter box, collided with a PMD user, and she had to be warded. I think there are similar circumstances in other places as well. So, this is an area of need.”
“Next point, I believe there is a basis to consider amalgamating Penal Code provisions which cover the same ground as provisions in specific pieces of legislation. This will allow for a more uniform application of the law dealing with the same area. In addition, reforms of these areas can be done more quickly, instead of waiting for the next review of the Penal Code. In this regard, I commend the move to transfer the Chapter XX offences dealing with "offences relating to marriage" to the Women’s Charter. Similarly, the Penal Code provisions dealing with kidnapping could have been consolidated with the provisions in the Kidnapping Act. This also would be an opportunity to deal with and remove an anomaly in sentencing. Kidnapping under the Kidnapping Act may be punishable by death. It is not the case in Penal Code. Also, the corruption offences vis-a-vis "public servants" in the Penal Code could be merged with the Prevention of Corruption Act. I seldom hear of these provisions in the Penal Code being invoked nowadays. Again, the Penal Code punishment for corruption offences is lighter than the Prevention of Corruption Act equivalent. Notwithstanding my comments, I support the Bill.”
“I have also noted that, potentially, aggravated acts of defamation, such as "threats imputing the unchastity of a woman" under section 506 of the Penal Code, and "insulting the modesty of a woman" under section 509 of the Penal Code are proposed to be repealed. What then is the basis to continue to make defaming another a criminal matter in these circumstances? Third, I have misgivings, just like the hon Member Mr Christopher de Souza, on the proposal to abolish section 309 of the Penal Code which currently criminalises an attempt to commit suicide. I appreciate the point made by Senior Parliamentary Secretary Amrin Amin as well as the PCRC that "persons who commit such offences should undergo treatment instead". I wish to point out though that section 309 of the Penal Code, read with the CPC, now allows the Court to impose on persons convicted for the offence of attempting suicide, mandatory treatment orders aimed at providing psychiatric treatment for such persons in lieu of the jail term provided in the Penal Code. This would, therefore, take care of the concern expressed by PCRC. There is also a practical function. It allows the Police to intervene by arresting and sequestering the person in a safe environment, for example, a padded cell, so as to stabilise his or her condition. I understand from Senior Parliamentary Secretary Amrin Amin that it is proposed that the Police be given powers to intervene. I seek a clarification on the basis and extent of these powers, as well as when it is expected for these Police Officers to be vested with such powers. Finally, there is a signalling effect to would-be offenders, and this is a point that was made by speakers before me, too.”
“Presently, it is an offence to imagine the death, hurt, imprisonment or restraint of the President, and the accused, if convicted, may be sentenced to death or imprisonment for life. It is also an offence to imagine the deposition of the President from the sovereignty of Singapore. These are clearly anachronistic provisions. It simply does not sit well with the mores and values of present-day society. I am not alone in making this call. The hon Member Mr Charles Chong made this call in 2008 in this House. He said, "It is, of course, right that anyone who plots, plans or actually takes action against the person or the Office of the President ought to be punished, but merely 'imagining' any of these – should this really be in our books?" It did not appear that Mr Charles Chong's question was answered then. Nonetheless, it has been answered now. Second, I note that the proposed section 120A dealing with "criminal conspiracy" is significantly narrower. The proposed provision would have the effect of decriminalising a conspiracy to commit an illegal act, which was defined as anything that furnishes ground for a civil action. May I please ask what is the rationale for this? How does the narrowing of the definition of "criminal conspiracy" reflect on the expected sense of behaviour within our society? How does this square with the retention of the offence of criminal defamation under section 500 of the Penal Code which focuses on vindication of reputation? As Members know, people who have been defamed also have a right of civil action, too.”
“I believe that this House owes the PCRC a debt of gratitude for executing the gargantuan task of updating the Penal Code so well. I also commend MHA, just like what Assoc Prof Walter Theseira said, for conducting extensive consultation with the public and VWOs before presenting this Bill. A simple perusal of the Bill will reveal the extraordinary breadth of the review that was undertaken. We see updates in the following areas: (a) the extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction of the offences; (b) concepts of fault and physical elements that usually make up an offence; these elements are the equivalent of the "computer source codes" of the criminal provisions; (c) general defences that may be raised by accused persons; (d) creation of new offences and enhancement of sentences to protect the vulnerable and minors and to deal with modern circumstances and advances in technology; (e) updating of sentences to ensure their deterrent effect; and (f) removing offences which are seen as anachronistic or irrelevant. The recommendations that the Committee made took into account issues raised by our Courts in many judgments. I am reasonably assured that, with these enhancements, the revised Penal Code, once passed, will continue to play an important role in the administration of criminal justice in Singapore. I would now like to make several observations and comments on the Bill. First, I am glad that the hon Minister, through a notice of amendment issued on 26 April 2019, accepted my suggestion made outside this House after the First Reading of this Bill to remove the thought crime provisions, namely, sections 121A and 121B in the Penal Code.”