Wong Kan Seng
Singapore
“We all want a better future for our children and the future generations. Amid the debates, let us not lose sight of what we are working for – we are working for the benefit and future of Singaporeans. Not for growth targets, not for foreigners, but for Singaporeans.”
“Mrs Mildred Tan also suggested doing a longitudinal study on the impact of new citizens on Singapore. I am told that there is a periodic study on the perception of integration and rootedness of Singaporeans and PRs. A study is now ongoing too.”
“All they need to do is simply declare that they meet the residential criteria. EASING IN US ECONOMY (Impact on Singapore) 9. Ms Sylvia Lim asked the Senior Minister what will be the expected impact on the Singapore economy arising from the US Federal Reserve's announcement on 3rd November 2010 of a "quantitative easing" of the US economy…”
“Well, from the data I have here, 553 registered to vote before the 2006 GE and this is the data I have but Ms Lim may be right. There may be 1,000-odd that Ms Lim had mentioned. From what I am told now, we have 1,325 Singaporean overseas who are eligible to register to vote have registered.”
“But, as I said, there are so many other possibilities that they could come in and there could also be many possibilities that we could have missed and they have entered or left Singapore. LAND SWAP AGREEMENT FOR KTM STATION AND RAILWAY LANDS 2.”
“They are also recruiting people by offering them scholarships. So, we hope more of our companies can do that. Hopefully they come here to work for a while and, if they like our place, they may want to settle down. This is a place which they can think about. POPULATION AND TALENT DIVISION 5. Assoc. Prof.”
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“Of course, they are not specifically trained for working inside the WRCD, but they are trained in the general duties as for all Gurkha guards. They were also told in their SOPs that they must keep the detainee under constant supervision. This was what the guard thought he was doing. By allowing the detainee into the urinal cubicle, he had thought that the site was well secured physically, not knowing that the window was not grilled. But his instruction was to keep the detainee under constant supervision. Now, of course, with this bad experience, it is no longer just a question of keeping the detainee under constant supervision, but also to maintain line of sight wherever the detainee is. So, the detainee will not be allowed to leave the line of sight of the guard. Why indeed do we have a door in the urinal cubicle? In fact, many would notice that most urinal cubicles do not have doors. We got to see the context of this place. This is a Family Visitation Block and the toilets are used not purely by detainees. They are used by people who work there as well as the family members who visit the detainees. And because of the structure, as you have seen it on the sketch just now, when they did the renovation, they decided to provide a door for some privacy of the people using it. Of course, it turned out to be not a good decision, particularly when detainees use that. Even if they use it, they should not be allowed to close the door. As to whether there is an alert or alarm system whenever an escape like that took place, yes, indeed there is an established system also.”
“Sir, I have explained clearly how and when the Family Visitation Block came about. In the early years when we built that complex, there was no Family Visitation Block. That block was used as officers' quarters, because officers needed to work late and stay overnight, some quarters were therefore provided for the senior officers. Later on, when ISD ran short of space and when the number of detainees actually went down over the years, ISD did not need the officers to stay on the site. But because of the pressure of office space, that block was converted into an office for the officers. When we had the JI arrests, and because of the sudden increase in numbers and ISD needed family visitation rooms for the families to cope with the increased number of JI detainees, the office of the block on the ground floor was converted into a Family Visitation Block. There are established protocols on custody. I have explained this earlier. When the detainees are first detained, they are handcuffed. Over time, when they show cooperation and when their attitude changes, the Case Officer will recommend to his Superintendent to have the handcuffs removed when they are inside WRDC. So, in the case of Mas Selamat, he was handcuffed for several months – I am told it was about seven to eight months. Sometime around September 2006 – he was detained in February 2006 – the Case Officer recommended to his Superintendent to have the handcuffs removed. But whenever he moves out of the Cell Block to other areas within that whole complex, he was always under the escort of two guards. The guards are well trained to deal with situations when detainees attempt to escape.”
“Mr Low also asked after he left through the window, we do not seem to know where he was and how he left. The COI could not find the specific escape route through which he has left. Neither could the CID conclusively be able to determine how he got over the fence.”
“Sir, of course, the WRDC should have done regular audits. This was not done in the regular way. What they did were security audits when they did their renovations. And despite that, this kind of failing, for example, in the fencing and covered walkway, was not detected. But it does not mean to say that there is no procedure established to deal with detainees. There are a number of procedures. In fact, the WRDC as well as the GC guards have their respective procedures. For example, when the detainees are in the Cell Block, they are under guard, and they are being watched by a significant number of guards inside the Cell Block. The ratio of the guards is more than that in the prison. When detainees are taken out of the Cell Block and go to other blocks, and most of those movements are in passageways that are enclosed, they are also blindfolded. This is to keep them from familiarising themselves with the surroundings. Even when they get to the Family Visitation Block, they are also blindfolded. And it is also through an enclosed passageway before they get into the Family Visitation Block. Of course, there are some open areas between the Family Visitation Block and the other blocks which are not covered. But then they are completely blindfolded and they are under the tight security of two Gurkha guards. These are just examples. Every movement from the time they leave the Cell Block is logged in a book by the guard. So there are established procedures. The only thing that ought to have been done better is a regular system check and a regular audit. As I said in my statement, this will now be carried out on a regular basis and every year, the Director of Prisons will do an independent audit of this.”
“And just as we had found him the last time, even when he thought himself safe hiding among JI friends, outside Singapore, so we will eventually again track him down, arrest him and detain him. I will now answer questions from Members. Please do not be afraid to ask, and I will answer them to the best of my ability, so long as it does not compromise the sensitive operations that we are doing in the WRDC.”
“Indeed, all the Home Team agencies have played and will continue to play a vital role in the security of Singapore. Sir, before I end, let me thank the Singapore Armed Forces for deploying their resources and men in the hunt for Mas Selamat. Much credit is to be given to both the active and operationally ready NSmen in the SAF and the Home Team for their commitment and efforts over the last seven weeks in the search for Mas Selamat. I also want to thank the many Singaporeans who have actively put their minds to the problem, to share their ideas and help us. I know that they were equally disappointed over this security lapse but they stepped forward to work with the Government to address the immediate challenge. Of course, there were also Singaporeans who wrote to me or blogged on the Internet expressing anger and, in some cases, abuse. Others thought that the whole episode made good creative material for cynical humour. I understand their frustration. This incident should not have happened. But since it did happen, my first priority had to be to establish the full facts of what and how it happened and, at the same time, galvanise and focus the energies of the Home Team and its partners, including the community, to tackle the situation at hand. I am deeply grateful for the way Singaporeans have rallied behind our efforts even as they rightly expect a proper accounting. This is why I have given Members and the public a full account of what happened, what we will do to fix the problem, and how we will ensure that the same problem does not happen again in future. Sir, the fight against terrorism is on-going. Today, for the second time, that fight includes the search for Mas Selamat.”
“There is no doubt that Mas Selamat's escape is a major setback for ISD and for MHA. It is a dark stain on the record of successes which ISD has achieved in the fight against terrorism. Sir, it was ISD which uncovered the clandestine Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist network and its links to the Al Qaeda in 2001. Before that, nobody had heard of the terrorist organisation. Singaporeans were saved from an otherwise catastrophic attack planned for early 2002 when ISD disrupted the JI operational cells collaborating with Al Qaeda operative, Mansour Jabarah and the JI bomb maker, Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi. These two individuals were later arrested by foreign governments. ISD's intelligence has also significantly supported the investigation into the Al Qaeda and the JI networks in the region as well as other parts of the world. Even now, no doubt with morale sorely affected, the ISD and its officers continue to also pursue every lead and intelligence to further their counter-terrorism operations which have kept us safe. Do not misunderstand me. I mention these facts not to absolve or to excuse ISD from the responsibility for its officers' mistakes or lapses. I mention these facts because we need to be fair and balanced in our judgment and not "throw the baby out with the bath water." Yes, this episode of Mas Selamat's escape is a bad mistake and officers who did not carry out their duties as required will be held accountable. But ISD, the organisation and the many dedicated and committed officers who continue to serve in it, are resolved to pick themselves up, recover their spirits and move forward relentlessly in their national mission. We must support them in this. ISD's contribution in countering terrorism and keeping Singapore safe is crucial.”
“Director Prisons will also conduct an annual audit independently to check that these revised protocols are strictly adhered to, and report his findings to me. Enforcing discipline and disciplinary action I have directed the Commissioner of Police and Director ISD to investigate the operational lapses related to the escape and to ascertain accountabilities, taking into account the findings of the COI and the CID reports. Officers who are responsible for Mas Selamat's escape will be disciplined and penalised. In this connection, I have asked Director ISD to examine the roles not only of the WRDC junior officers but also to go up the chain of command and include the supervisory and management levels of WRDC as well. There is a proper process for disciplinary action under civil service or Police Force rules and this must take its course. I have also instructed the Commissioner of Police and Director ISD to replace all the officers at WRDC responsible for Mas Selamat's escape as identified in the COI report. Closing remarks Sir, I have spoken to the ISD and GC officers. I can see that they feel the disappointment most acutely because they have fallen short of the high standards that Singaporeans have come to expect from them. This security lapse in WRDC came as a rude and painful shock to them; all the more when the mistakes have turned out to be so simple as to appear silly and incredible. I can appreciate this sentiment because this was what I felt on 27th February. I was shocked and disappointed when first informed of Mas Selamat's escape on 27th February via an SMS message on my phone. At that moment, I was in this House in the midst of answering questions on the Prime Minister's Office's Committee of Supply.”
“Even when the guards and the Special Duty Operative became concerned over the time Mas Selamat was taking in the toilet, they did not think that he might have escaped. One question that some have asked is – why was Mas Selamat not held in Changi Prison instead? It is a fair question. On hindsight, Mas Selamat could have been held in Changi Prison as it would have been neater and certainly less problematic. After all, ISD does transfer the more difficult and hostile detainees to the Changi Prison. But in Mas Selamat's case, he was not hostile although he was not cooperative. And so long as there was hope to extract useful intelligence from him, ISD preferred to hold him in the WRDC. The potential intelligence value from such a detainee to the on-going counter-terrorism investigation is significant. Taking corrective action Sir, what has happened is a costly and painful wake-up call. Director ISD met me and told me that he accepted responsibility for what has happened and apologised. Having known him for many years, and worked with him, I told him that I have full confidence in him and he must carry on. His first priority is to find Mas Selamat and take immediate action to prevent another escape. I also consulted the Prime Minister who agreed with me. I have instructed Director ISD to follow up immediately on all the recommendations of the COI. I know that following the escape, immediate action was taken to strengthen security at WRDC. For example, the toilet window has been sealed. Other actions such as raising the height of the perimeter fencing are in progress and should be completed by May 2008. In addition, Director ISD will seek Director Prisons' endorsement on the revised protocols for the escort and detention of detainees at WRDC.”
“This included scrutiny and review of all the past family visits of Mas Selamat and his contact with any staff. ISD's investigation has not found any evidence to suggest collusion on the part of ISD officers or guards at WRDC in assisting Mas Selamat to escape. ISD also examined whether Mas Selamat could have been assisted by anyone outside WRDC. ISD's assessment on the basis of the investigation and available intelligence is "No". Could he have secured help after his escape? While there is no intelligence to confirm this, the possibility cannot be dismissed and is indeed a scenario pursued by ISD even now. Complacency creeping in over time In my view, while the COI and the CID investigations found no malice or criminal liability on the part of any officer implicated in Mas Selamat's escape, there is no avoiding the fact that the escape would not have happened but for the security and operational lapses identified by the COI. Mas Selamat was able to exploit these weaknesses when the opportunity arose. A window that should have been grilled but was not; guards who should have maintained line of sight of the detainee under their escort, and who should have immediately checked why the detainee took so long in the urinal cubicle, but did not; physical security weaknesses that were not plugged – these all point to a slackening in the internal vigilance and supervision. Complacency for whatever reason, be it fatigue given the protracted security operations by ISD since 2001 or routinisation over time, had crept into the operating culture at the WRDC. That no detainee had escaped from WRDC before may have been one reason why an escape was unimaginable in the minds of those who run WRDC.”
“Establishing liability, accountability and follow-up actions Determining if there was collusion by officers in WRDC One question which needed to be answered clearly when the escape occurred is whether this was an inside job. Was Mas Selamat assisted by anyone inside WRDC to escape? Determining this is critical because if there were such collusion, then its continuance undetected would lead to more escapes. In the course of its inquiry, the COI found no evidence of connivance, collusion or assistance given to Mas Selamat, on the part of any individual. The COI observed that no one individual had full control to bring about the confluence of the material factors at the time of Mas Selamat's escape, as I have explained earlier. The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) also launched an independent investigation on the day of the escape to establish if there was criminal liability on anyone's part. The CID investigation has been completed with extensive interviews and forensic examination of the site. Polygraph tests were also administered to some witnesses to support investigation. The CID has found no evidence to suggest collusion on the part of any ISD officers, WRDC staff or guards involved. The CID submitted its investigation papers to the Attorney-General's Chambers to determine if any offences have been committed. I am informed that the Attorney-General has considered the investigation papers and concluded that there is no basis to lay criminal charges against any individual. However, this does not mean that no departmental disciplinary action will be taken against the officers accountable for the lapse. I will say more on this later. ISD also immediately launched its own investigation to establish if Mas Selamat received any assistance to aid his escape.”
“While this is a strength in safeguarding secrets on a "need to know" basis for an intelligence agency, it also makes a shared facility like the WRDC vulnerable to blind spots when issues falling between the different functional groups at the Centre are missed. The COI's recommendation to shift the detention centre to the Changi Prison Complex will, among other things, ensure that security and prison operating standards of the detention centre are always pegged and tied to best practices. At the same time, ISD can tap the Prison's medical and food logistics for its detainees. However – and let me emphasise this – careful thought must be given to how to operationalise this plan to ensure that it meets ISD's needs and, at the same time, not undermine Prison's operating regime. Among other things, we definitely do not want to expose the prison inmate population to "contamination" by extremist detainees. This had been the bad experience in many countries where prisons have been one of the most fertile sources of new terrorist recruits. I have tasked Director ISD and Director Prisons to co-chair a team to study the implementation details for a new purpose- built detention facility within Changi Prison. They should re-visit the current approach and the overall tone of the detention centre and affirm or adjust accordingly, to make it a facility relevant to the complex challenges of a new security landscape. Meanwhile, I have asked Director ISD to revise the protocols for the escort and detention of detainees at WRDC in consultation with Director Prisons. Director Prisons will also conduct an independent audit annually to check that these revised protocols are strictly adhered to, and report his findings to me.”
“Prior to the JI arrests and the detentions in 2001, the number of detainees was quite small. In the whole decade of the 1990s, only six persons were detained, in total, over different periods. Since 2001, the sudden surge in the number of JI detainees has undoubtedly strained the human and operating capacity of WRDC. At its peak, the WRDC had to hold 41 detainees. Sir, in 1995, ISD had considered the idea of shifting the detention centre to Changi Prison as the lease of the WRDC site was running out. Plans were in fact drawn up, pending a decision whether the lease would be renewed. Eventually in 2003, the lease was extended by 20 years. Because of the increase in JI detainees and the overriding need to handle them effectively, ISD decided to keep to the existing WRDC and to embark instead on a renovation and re-development programme for WRDC. In 2002, ISD carried out some minor works as a stop-gap measure to accommodate the expanding requirements. These minor works included converting the officers' quarters into offices and subsequently into a Family Visitation Block. This block was originally outside the WRDC itself. The WRDC compound was then enlarged and the enlarged WRDC incorporated the Family Visitation Block. The enlarged WRDC covers an area of 2.2 hectares or the size of three football fields. With the extension of the lease and the overriding need to effectively handle the larger number of JI detainees, ISD began to develop a major renovation and re-development plan for WRDC in late 2004. Renovation works finally started in early 2007. Sir, in my view, such periodic renovation and improvement works over time altered the security eco-system of WRDC. Like all security agencies, ISD operates in a compartmentalised manner.”
“The COI recommends that a formal system of feedback be established to ensure that all parties have a common understanding of instructions, and issues and problems are raised in a timely fashion. Conduct regular ground exercises and security audits The COI also recommends that ISD conducts regular exercises for front-line officers and institutes a system of regular security audits of WRDC. This will enhance coordination at the working level as well as raise preparedness for any contingency. The regular security audits will also ensure compliance with procedures and rules as well as periodically review the security of WRDC holistically. Design and build a new detention facility in Changi Prison A key recommendation of the COI is that a new Detention Centre be built and located in Changi Prison. I have asked my staff to work out a detailed implementation plan and schedule for this recommendation which requires careful planning and execution. I see much merit in it. Let me explain why. One of the things that struck me in the COI findings was the recognition that the WRDC is a complex multi-functional facility. WRDC is not a prison per se, like those under the Prisons Department. It is a holding centre which supports the investigation and intelligence collection and analysis related to an on-going security operation. Rehabilitation, whether religious or secular, is above all to serve a practical national security interest – to neutralise the security threat that the detainee poses to society. WRDC is therefore a purpose-built facility to serve a number of concurrent purposes. It has to balance the need between a hardened physical facility on the one hand, and flexibility to support operational and intelligence activities on the other.”
“Let me now highlight the key recommendations of the COI, all of which I have accepted, as I have said earlier. Centralise command and control The COI observed that the framework of security at WRDC was based on shared responsibility. What does this mean? ISD was responsible for the physical security infrastructure and the GC guards were responsible for the safe and secure custody of the detainees, security of the inner perimeter fence and Cell Block and the deployment of sentries at strategic locations within WRDC. This "dual" or "parallel" system of security by ISD's WRDC staff and the GC guards runs the risk of each party being blind-sided by each other. For instance, the Superintendent thought that the ventilation window at the toilet was secure enough just by sawing off the handle, partly because he had assumed that the guards would have line of sight of the detainee at all times. On the other hand, the guards were confident that they had the detainees under close supervision even without line of sight because they had assumed the toilet facilities to be properly secure. To avoid such ambiguity and misunderstanding, the COI recommends that as the WRDC is an ISD facility, ISD should assume overall command and control of all aspects of WRDC operations, including its security. Enhance communication and coordination The COI recommends better coordination and communication among the three functional groups operating within WRDC, namely, the WRDC Administration which is responsible for the general management of WRDC and the custody of detainees; the GC guards who are responsible for guarding WRDC and for escorting detainees within and outside WRDC; and thirdly, the Operations Group which is in charge of investigations.”
“Apart from such searches, we are maintaining tight border controls and round-the-clock surveillance of coastal and forested areas. In parallel, intelligence-led operations are actively ongoing. Community vigilance efforts will also continue. Since Mas Selamat's escape, about 1,500 calls have been received by 999. The Police followed up on all these leads, especially reports of possible sightings of Mas Selamat by the public. Mr Low had asked about the estimated cost of the manhunt. To-date, these operations are covered by my Ministry's and the Ministry of Defence's existing operating resources, and we have not asked for additional funds. We have worked within the framework of our contingency plans and re-deployed current manpower and resources in a targeted manner. This also ensures that our continuing operations are sustainable over a protracted period of time without undermining the other functions of the Home Team and the Singapore Armed Forces. The COI's recommendations Mr Speaker, Sir, the COI's assessment is that the WRDC's custodial protocols and procedures over the handling of detainees are generally sound. For instance, detainees are secured in individual cells to prevent them from communicating with one another. Different blocks are linked via enclosed walkways to prevent detainees from familiarising themselves with the layout of the WRDC. When a detainee moves within the WRDC compound, he is escorted by at least two guards and his movements are logged. The lapses which occurred were in breach of established procedures and protocols. Nevertheless, the COI observed some weaknesses in operationalising the WRDC's systems and processes and has made specific recommendations.”
“] A CID team of investigators was also deployed at the scene at the WRDC to interview persons and conduct forensics examination. Their role was to determine if there had been any collusion by any WRDC insider. I will talk more about this later on. Beyond these immediate measures taken at the Whitley Road Complex by the GC guards, ISD officers and the Police, MHA also promptly mounted a comprehensive operational response to the escape. In the first few hours, the immediate priority was to mobilise all our Home Team resources to capture Mas Selamat. Counter Terrorism Units deployed at the checkpoints were alerted at 4.30 pm. This was followed shortly by the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority raising activity to a high-level alert among all personnel and conducting 100% checks to tighten security at our land, sea and air checkpoints. This was at about 5.15 pm. The SAF units were activated to support the extensive search operations by about 8.00 pm the same evening. Police and ISD officers on the ground were tasked to pick up any leads on Mas Selamat. Ground intelligence units were activated and immediately spread out to collect any pertinent information on Mas Selamat. This was critical as ISD could not be sure, in the immediate moments after Mas Selamat's escape, whether he had outside help. Sir, since 1st April 2008, after conducting a systematic sweep through the forested areas, the security agencies have moved into a more targeted phase of the search. This is guided by what was learnt during the earlier extensive sweeps and also from specific intelligence picked up in the course of these earlier operations. These efforts will continue to be multi-pronged.”
“The post-incident response The COI also examined the immediate post-escape response by ISD, GC guards and the Police and found them to be sufficiently prompt. On discovering Mas Selamat's escape, ISD immediately locked down Whitley Road Complex which WRDC is part of. The inner and outer gates of the Whitley Road Complex compound were closed and thorough checks were conducted on all vehicles leaving the compound. The guards on duty in the Whitley Road Complex were activated and a cordon along Onraet Road was set up about five minutes after the discovery of Mas Selamat's escape. Road blocks were set up by the ISD officers and GC guards in the immediate vicinity, eg, Mount Pleasant Road, at around 4.20 pm. Senior officers from the GC Headquarters, which was alerted of the escape at 4.10 pm, arrived at the Whitley Road Complex within 20 minutes of being notified, at about 4.30 pm. GC Trackers next arrived at about 4.35 pm and started an intensive search of the wooded areas in the vicinity of the Whitley Road Complex. Police and ISD officers also conducted intensive and systematic searches of the Whitley Road Complex and its immediate vicinity. The search area that was cordoned off at about 4.40 pm was considerable and is equivalent to the size of almost 44 soccer fields. It covered the Whitley Road Complex, the former Police Academy and the surrounding compounds, as well as the wooded areas around Onraet Road, Mount Pleasant Road and Thomson Road. It was not a straightforward search. The Whitley Road Complex itself is segregated into several clusters of low-rise buildings. The former Police Academy and the surrounding compounds comprise a number of vacant buildings. [A map of the area searched and a photo of some of the vacant buildings searched were shown on the screen.”
“Weaknesses in physical security Once Mas Selamat got out of the ventilation window, he was able to get over the double perimeter fencing of the WRDC. The COI could not determine exactly how he did this. Of the different possible scenarios, the COI surmises that Mas Selamat could have exploited a weakness in a section of the perimeter fencing at the back of the Family Visitation Block. This was a section where the roof of an enclosed staircase and walkway converges with the perimeter fencing. The COI surmises that Mas Selamat could have climbed onto this roof and, from there, jumped over the perimeter fencing and out of WRDC. Sir, we do not know if this scenario is correct. But regardless whether it was exploited by Mas Selamat to make his escape, the failure of the WRDC staff to detect this particular weakness in the fence-line in past security reviews is a failing. The COI notes that the CCTV coverage of the area was in the midst of being upgraded to add motion-detectors. This was part of a major CCTV security surveillance system upgrade for the whole complex. At the time of the escape, there were two CCTV cameras mounted at the location where Mas Selamat climbed out of the Family Visitation Block. However, these cameras were not commissioned yet as they were part of the CCTV system upgrading, and the system was still in its testing and validation stage. As such, at the time of the incident, there was no recording or active monitoring of these cameras. This is very unfortunate because, if there had been operational cameras in the right places to record the escape, then we could have an idea as to how he got out of the WRDC.”
“] He thought that this would be adequate as he had assumed that the guards would always have sight of the detainees. This is a bad judgment on the part of the Superintendent. In my view, Sir, the security weakness of this window is the single most crucial factor which enabled Mas Selamat to escape. This is because the movement of the detainee from his cell to the Family Visitation Block is always under tight escort and entry into the Block is through a sealed passageway. The omission to fully secure this ventilation window in the Family Visitation Block toilet routinely used by detainees was a glaring weakness which should have been rectified properly by grilling it up, and not dealt with in an ad hoc manner by sawing off the window handle. The guards failed in their duties The guard who escorted Mas Selamat while he was using this toilet did not stop Mas Selamat from closing the urinal cubicle door. This allowed Mas Selamat to get out of his line of sight. The guard had assumed that the urinal cubicle was a secure facility and that Mas Selamat could not escape from it. This assumption was wrong. When this guard felt that Mas Selamat had taken too long in the toilet, he referred the matter to his fellow guard instead of taking immediate action to check on Mas Selamat. This officer in turn asked the Special Duty Operative. Finally, it was the Assistant Case Officer who kicked open the urinal cubicle door. If the guard had acted immediately to check on Mas Selamat in the urinal cubicle, Mas Selamat might have been stopped or, at least, his escape would have been discovered earlier. In my view, these factors, taken together, form the second most critical security failure which enabled Mas Selamat to escape.”
“It was not grilled; (2) The guards had not stopped Mas Selamat from closing the urinal cubicle door and, as a result, lost line of sight of the detainee. And when Mas Selamat took too long in the urinal cubicle, the guards had not acted quickly enough; and (3) The convergence of the perimeter fencing with the enclosed staircase and walkway at the back of the Family Visitation Block was a physical weakness that Mas Selamat probably exploited to get out of WRDC. Let me now say more about each of these three factors. The ventilation window was not grilled Mr Speaker, Sir, Mas Selamat was able to climb through the ventilation window because there were no grilles over the ventilation window. The COI learnt that the WRDC Administration had in fact intended to grille all windows in the Family Visitation Block when it began planning for the renovations of WRDC in 2004. These renovations were to upgrade the facilities to address the growing requirements of WRDC and its detainees. ISD had instructed the vendor to install grilles for all windows. But when the renovation works were carried out in 2007, this toilet ventilation window was not grilled up. This arose due to a difference in understanding between ISD and the vendor over exactly which windows were to be secured with grilles. Nevertheless, a WRDC staff did a walkabout to review the status of renovations some time between April and May 2007 and he detected the ventilation window without grilles. He alerted the Superintendent of WRDC to this weakness. Instead of having it grilled, the Superintendent instructed that the handle of the ventilation window be sawn off as a security measure to make the window more secure. [A photo of the ventilation window sawn off was shown on the screen.”
“The COI observed that the light yellow baju kurong which Mas Selamat was wearing was found in the forested area outside the perimeter fence near this spot. [A photo of where the baju kurong was found, and the cover of trees and vegetation was shown on the screen. ] However, the COI also notes that pinpointing a specific escape route would be speculative, given the many possibilities and the lack of conclusive evidence on this issue. The COI believes that Mas Selamat had planned his escape over time and he had seized the opportunity presented by the confluence of various factors to escape on 27th February 2008. The COI believes that the routine use of the toilet in the Family Visitation Block would have provided Mas Selamat with the opportunity to plan his escape. Prior to his escape, during previous family visits, Mas Selamat had partially closed the urinal cubicle door on some occasions, and then completely closed the urinal cubicle door on subsequent occasions. On 5th February 2008, he closed the urinal cubicle door completely and turned on the water tap. The COI believes that these actions by Mas Selamat could have been done to test how the guards would react. This could also have helped him to prepare for his actual escape attempt. This planning had not been noted by the guards, possibly because the guards are frequently rotated to avoid over familiarisation or fraternisation with the detainees. Factors leading to Mas Selamat's escape Let me now deal with the factors that enabled Mas Selamat to escape. Having heard and considered the evidence from witnesses and the re-enactments, the COI believes that Mas Selamat was able to escape because of a confluence of three factors: (1) The ventilation window through which Mas Selamat had escaped, was not properly secured.”
“The Special Duty Operative, who is female, subsequently asked Mas Selamat's male Assistant Case Officer to check on Mas Selamat as he was in a male toilet. When the Assistant Case Officer kicked open the door of the urinal cubicle, Mas Selamat was not inside. The ventilation window pane located above the urinal cubicle had been swung open. [A photo showing the urinal cubicle ventilation window with pane open was shown on the screen.] An immediate alert was raised to the GC Guard Room in the WRDC that Mas Selamat had escaped. In all, the COI found that Mas Selamat had about 11 minutes between the time he was brought to the toilet at 3.54 pm and 4.05 pm when the alert was raised. Within that timeframe, he took time to shave, then entered the urinal cubicle, turned on the tap and flipped his pants over the concrete ledge above the urinal cubicle door and made his escape. Mas Selamat climbed through the toilet ventilation window and out of the Family Visitation Block. [A photo showing the external wall and window at the rear of the Family Visitation Room was shown on the screen. ] The ventilation window turned out to be not properly secured. I will give more details about this later on. Sir, the COI finds no conclusive evidence of the exact escape route he took after this point. The COI surmises that Mas Selamat could have climbed onto the roof of an enclosed staircase and walkway at the section where the perimeter fencing converges with this enclosed staircase and walkway. This point is adjacent to the Family Visitation Block, and about 20 metres away from the toilet window. [A photo showing where the perimeter fencing converges with the enclosed staircase and walkway was shown on the screen. ] Mas Selamat could have jumped over the perimeter fence and out of WRDC.”
“While inside the locker room, Mas Selamat asked the guard for a curtain so that he could change behind it. There was no curtain. Mas Selamat then stood behind a column of lockers to change and was out of sight of the guard. After changing, Mas Selamat emerged wearing a light yellow baju kurong and greenish-grey pants, and was escorted by the two guards and the Special Duty Operative to the Family Visitation Block. At about 3.54 pm, the four of them, that is, the two guards, Special Duty Operative and Mas Selamat, arrived at the Family Visitation Block. [A photo of the family visitation room was shown on the screen.] Mas Selamat used the toilet located next to the family visitation room to shave and comb his hair before meeting his family members. This toilet he used is intended for use by the WRDC staff and the detainees' family visitors. However, for practical convenience, detainees also use this toilet when proceeding for family visits. [What was shown on the screen was a sketch of the toilet and the wash basin as well as the urinal.] One guard stood outside the toilet, while the other followed Mas Selamat into the toilet. After Mas Selamat had finished shaving, he entered a urinal cubicle and closed the cubicle door. [A photo of the urinal cubicle was shown on the screen. ] The guard who followed Mas Selamat into the toilet stood outside the closed door of the urinal cubicle. Mas Selamat then flipped his pants over the ledge above the urinal cubicle door. The guard heard the sound of water from a running tap inside the urinal cubicle. After a few minutes, the guard felt that Mas Selamat was taking too long. He alerted the other guard standing outside the toilet, who then turned to the Special Duty Operative who was outside the toilet.”
“Family visits to sustain the detainee's bonds with his wife, children and other family members are an important part of the rehabilitation programme for detainees. The family visit was to be held in the Family Visitation Block. This is a building which was retrofitted to serve this function and is located in a separate part of the WRDC from where the detainees' cells are housed in the Cell Block. The Cell Block, of course, by design, has the tightest level of security. Mas Selamat was escorted by two Gurkha guards and a Special Duty Operative. The Gurkha Contingent (GC) guards the detention centre and ensures the secure custody of the detainees. Special Duty Operatives are ISD junior officers whose duty is to make administrative arrangements for family visits, which include supervising the movement of detainees from the cell to the family visit room. The day-to-day administration and operations of WRDC come under the charge of the Superintendent of the WRDC. He is a senior officer holding the rank equivalent to a Superintendent of Police or Lieutenant Colonel in the SAF. At approximately 3.30 pm, the Special Duty Operative requested the Guard Commander to take Mas Selamat out of his individual cell for his family visit. At about 3.35 pm, two guards were assigned to escort Mas Selamat. Mas Selamat was first escorted from the Cell Block to a locker room in the Locker Block to change into civilian clothes. At each family visit, the detainee's family can bring civilian clothing for the detainee to wear at the next family visit. Inside this locker room are several columns of lockers. Each locker contains a personal clothing bag that belongs to each detainee. The WRDC Administration has custody of the keys to the locker.”
“Given its details and observations on the various operational processes in the WRDC, I am satisfied that indeed the members of the COI have done a thorough job. I have briefed the Prime Minister and Cabinet on the findings of the COI. Because many sensitive details cannot be disclosed for obvious reasons, including the identity of the ISD and other security personnel as well as the precise work they do, the Cabinet agreed that it is not possible to release the entire report without harming national interest and endangering the men and women who serve the nation. We had also considered releasing the COI's report with the sensitive parts blacked out, but that was not feasible as the details are extensive. It would not only make understanding the report difficult, but also fuel the distraction of baseless speculation. However, we are very conscious that Members of this House and the public have a keen and valid interest in the findings of the COI. Hence, the Government has decided to release the Executive Summary of the COI report to show that the COI had carefully considered all the issues. Mr Speaker, Sir, I will begin with a detailed account, based on the COI report of how Mas Selamat escaped, followed by the COI's findings on the factors that led to his escape, and its recommenda- tions. I will also inform the House about the actions that I will take. In the process, I will answer the questions raised by Dr Teo Ho Pin, Mdm Ho Geok Choo, Mr Chiam See Tong and Mr Low Thia Khiang. Of course, Members too can ask me more questions later on. Mas Selamat Kastari's escape from WRDC Sir, on 27th February 2008, Mas Selamat was scheduled to meet his wife and children during his weekly family visit scheduled between 4.00 pm and 4.30 pm that day.”
“In all, the COI recorded statements from 41 individuals and heard testimony from 36. The COI also arranged for re-enactments of the possible ways that Mas Selamat could have escaped. I had directed that the COI was to be given full access to all information and to WRDC, including full access to highly classified and sensitive information on operational systems and processes as well as access to interview the Internal Security Department (or ISD) intelligence and field personnel whose identities need to be protected given the nature of their jobs. I had explained that this inquiry could not be held in public. Its very purpose was a thorough examination of a sensitive installation – the WRDC, including its detention, security and investigation and intelligence gathering functions, which are all inter-related. It needed to directly examine officers, including those holding classified appointments. Exposing these details in public would compromise the persons and processes involved in our security and intelligence operations and put these operations at risk. Holding the inquiry out of public view enabled the COI to have the full and unfettered access needed to fulfil their mission and establish the facts. The COI has completed its inquiry and submitted its findings and recommendations to me on 10th April 2008. I met the COI members and asked them if they were satisfied that they had been given full access and cooperation to carry out their inquiry. The Chairman personally assured me that this had been the case. The COI has been candid in its report, and has held nothing back in its conclusions and recommendations. I have read the COI's report closely. I agree with the COI's findings and accept all its recommendations, which I will talk about later.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, on Wednesday 27th February 2008, ISA detainee Mas Selamat bin Kastari escaped from the Whitley Road Detention Centre (WRDC). A day after his escape, I apologised in this House for what had happened, and promised that in due course I would give a full account of his escape. At that point, the full facts had yet to be fully established. I repeated this assurance a fortnight later, telling Singaporeans that after the Committee of Inquiry (COI) completed its work, I would give a full account of how Mas Selamat escaped and what would be done to prevent another escape. The Committee of Inquiry Mr Speaker, Sir, I convened a COI on 1st March 2008 under the Prisons Act so as to objectively establish the facts of what happened. I appointed Mr Goh Joon Seng as Chairman of the COI. Mr Goh is a retired High Court Judge and a member of the Council of Presidential Advisers and the Chairman of the Presidential Council on Religious Harmony. The other two members are Mr Tee Tua Ba and Dr Choong May Ling. Mr Tee is a retired Commissioner of Police and currently non-resident Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. Dr Choong is a senior Administrative Officer and the Deputy Secretary (Security) at the Ministry of Home Affairs. I tasked the COI to determine the full facts relating to Mas Selamat's escape. It was also to examine if there were lapses in the WRDC's custodial system, the physical security and procedures, and recommend improvements to ensure that a similar incident does not recur. The COI conducted its inquiry proceedings at WRDC itself so that the members could re-visit the site whenever they needed to. The COI could also hear testimonies from as many staff of the WRDC as the COI deemed necessary.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, the Prime Minister will also answer this Question in a Ministerial Statement but he will do it tomorrow. ESCAPE OF MAS SELAMAT KASTARI (Impact on investor confidence and Singapore's reputation) 8. Mr Low Thia Khiang asked the Minister for Trade and Industry whether investor confidence and the international reputation of Singapore have been affected by the escape of Mas Selamat.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, I will be answering Question Nos. 1 to 6 later, after Question Time, when I make my Ministerial Statement. ESCAPE OF MAS SELAMAT KASTARI (Government responsibility) 7. Ms Sylvia Lim asked the Prime Minister what is the Government's approach to taking responsibility for major lapses in Government functions such as the escape of high-risk terror suspect Mas Selamat Kastari from the Whitley Road Detention Centre.”
“I can understand the concerns of the public. When I heard from some of the Members here who sent their children to the schools this morning around the area where the search was conducted, they were also alarmed by the large presence of the Police force and security people, including the SAF in that area. Let me advise the public to stay calm about this. The Police will do its job. The photograph of Mas Selamat is flashed all over the country. Look out for him. If there is any information of anyone that looks like him, report the case to the Police and they can be sure that the Police will look into it thoroughly. For example, I read in the papers that there was a case of an old lady at the Goldhill area where she reported that someone was up at the roof of her house or nearby. So Police actually went in and secured the area, checked it up but they could not find the person. So, we spare no efforts in ensuring that this man will be captured but, at the same time, we ask the public to stay calm and help the Police in its job. If they have information as to the whereabouts of this person, report to the Police. But let me also warn those who are helping Mas Selamat. If they are helping Mas Selamat to hide, they are committing a grave offence and they will have to face the law.”
“Yes, indeed, the smugglers have tried using high speed boats to come into Singapore. For us, we have also upgraded our PCG craft to be equally high speed, in fact, even faster in some cases. Therefore, it is quite a risky venture for smugglers to try to come into Singapore on a high speed boat. They will run the risk of a collision and they will be the worst for it, and lives may be lost.”
“The Ministry of Home Affairs has always been in contact with the grassroot organisations and talk to them about ways of enhancing our security and preparedness in dealing with emergencies and even dealing with sensitive issues like race, religion, and so on. So, that is an ongoing effort and, of course, we keep them informed of what we do with regard to security. I can assure the Member that the moment the incident happened yesterday, the Internal Security Department has taken steps to ensure that this will not happen again in the Whitley Road Centre.”
“Sir, there are all kinds of public entertainment. We can try to narrow down as much as possible the scope of the meaning of "public entertainment". There will always be groups and activities and matters which we have not contemplated and, therefore, I would rather leave the Schedule as it is and the Police would look at every case and apply the most practical way of granting a permit where one is needed.”
“Dogs are not just for drugs but also for explosives and so on. So, we will do as much as we can, but no country can guarantee that we will have a watertight security such as no fly can get into Singapore.”
“Sir, I will ask the investigators to do a thorough job. Let us not rush them. When it is completed, yes, the House will be kept informed as to what took place. As for the comment on our border and the reason why we still have drugs coming in and cigarettes being smuggled, no country can guarantee a watertight security around its shores, particularly when we have a shoreline which is also quite long and we have only a few checkpoints around Singapore. It is not difficult for anyone who is determined to plan to leave Singapore or to come into Singapore if he wants to do so. All he needs is just a very high speed boat, and within minutes he can come in. Despite what we do, and we have radars all round our coast, there could still be people who would slip into Singapore. But at the checkpoints where we have security and immigration, you can be assured that 100% checks are being conducted, and that is why you see that we have over 30,000 cases of smuggling being detected at our checkpoints, a very significant increase in the number of detection. We can strengthen barriers as much as possible and, indeed, this is done. I think if Members were to visit the ICA checkpoints, they will know there is a whole host of security measures as well as people manning the right places to ensure that those who want to come in illegally will be detected. Dogs are used from time to time. We do not have dogs all over the place like in some countries, as the dogs may not do the job well if they are too tired. So dogs are deployed at the appropriate time and when we have significant numbers of people coming in and that we need to deploy dogs for specific purposes, we will do so. At the Woodlands train checkpoint, for example, we do have dogs.”
“They are free to share their ideas, views and criticisms, including on the Internet where Singaporeans can freely access them. But foreigners do not have the right of citizens to take part directly in the politics of Singapore. We will not allow, for example, foreign funding of political parties or sponsorship of candidates for election. Singaporeans alone have the sovereign right to determine what kind of society they want Singapore to be. Finally, with more de-regulation and autonomy, there must also be greater individual ownership, responsibility and accountability over the exercise of one’s actions in these realms. Sir, we will continue to review our policies and steer by these fundamentals. Singaporeans are neither a society of people with no views nor lacking the means to express them. We will hear and consider their views carefully. However, as we contemplate change, we are also mindful of the silent majority and their interests. Ultimately, the Singapore we create must be a Singapore for all.”
“But it is a choice of mine now to stay and contribute to my country and to make a difference in whatever small way I can. I may not always agree with the Government but I am proud to be a Singaporean. I am happy that as a Malay Singaporean, I claim credit for whatever I do because of my efforts and not because of my race. I am happy that I am not part of a system which discriminates, even if it were to bring benefits to my race.' 1.00 pm That is young Khartini who has seen the world. I think most Singaporeans will share Ms Khartini’s views too. Like her, they may not always agree with the Government. But like her, they value good governance that Singapore enjoys. I believe that Singaporeans understand and support the fundamentals that have made Singapore what it is today. What are these fundamentals? The first fundamental is the rule of law. In a multi-religious society, the primacy of the secular law is especially vital. If we are to have maximum space to pursue our interests with equal basic protection, we must also observe equal basic liability and obligations. Not everyone likes this or that law. But everyone must abide by the law and respect its authority. Civil disobedience cannot be acceptable. In fact, more than even the political interest groups, the religious individual may lay greater claim to a moral basis to choose to disobey laws which are not in accord with his beliefs. If we allow this, our society will be torn apart. Second, we must continue to uphold a regime which requires that we respect the sensitivities of each ethnic community and not denigrate another’s religion or ethnicity. The third fundamental is that we will not allow foreigners to interfere in our domestic politics.”
“The question for Singaporeans is whether we should accept the risk and permit a culture of street protests. That is the key question. In my view, one riot is one riot too many. The scars of violence in a community take a long time to heal. Once lost, public confidence in our stability and security will take a long time to re-build. Let me now share with Members the views from a young Singaporean, Ms Khartini Khalid, who wrote to the Prime Minister after she attended the Prime Minister's Chinese New Year reception about 10 days ago. Ms Khartini is a grassroots leader and polytechnic lecturer. She said and I quote: 'I was in the United States last summer on a State Department-sponsored programme on citizen participation in America. I attended an anti-war rally near Capitol Hill and saw how vibrant the spirit of the people was, due to America's freedom of speech provision in the constitution. I came back with a tinge of envy for societies with more "freedom" of expression. However, I got a reality check soon after when the Burmese uprising happened, and a few months later, the Hindraf protests. It hit me then that the most important thing to a citizen is good governance, because without capable leaders, all the demonstrations and protests in the world would be meaningless. While persuasive arguments by Singapore's critics sometimes manage to seduce me, and while I continue to harbour hopes that the authorities will be less strict over certain matters, I realise that ultimately, I do not want Singapore to be like Burma, or Malaysia, or even the US.' Sir, that is her view to the Prime Minister. I further quote: 'It is by no choice of mine that I was born in Singapore.”
“The only content restriction to all these is that the speeches must not touch on race or religion, and Members know why. We have stopped short of allowing outdoor and street demonstrations. However, we allow demonstrations if they take place indoors or within the confines of stadiums, as the Police assess that any disorder will be better contained in such venues. We are presently reviewing how we can further liberalise the use of Speaker's Corner as an outdoor venue for more political activities including demonstrations. Our experiences in the past have taught us to be very circumspect about outdoor and street protests. The 1950 Maria Hertogh riots and the 1964 race riots, both started as peaceful assemblies, but eventually ended up with 54 dead, 736 injured, and significant damages to property. I think many Members in this House are either too young to remember these incidents or not even born yet. Some members of the public may say that this is all old history and should not apply to us today. Is it really so sanguine? I do not think so. Indeed, we constantly review our assumptions by monitoring the developments in other countries. And what we learn tells us that our concerns remain valid. In many supposedly mature societies, we see cases where peaceful protests do degenerate into riots and violence. Protest organisers do not typically declare that they want to hold a violent protest. And although most people involved in a demonstration may have no intention of using violence, a handful of agitators can spark off mob violence quite easily. So, for young people in their exuberance, they may think that it is fun to demonstrate for whatever the cause. They have no control of the situation should agitators choose to exploit it.”
“However, our approach is and will remain one of harm prevention and zero tolerance. We must keep drugs out of our society and not go soft on drugs. Singaporeans are plugged into a global environment and are open to a universe of ideas and their influence. Many ideas and values can benefit us. But others, like going soft on drugs, are harmful to us should we adopt them. Ms Eunice Olsen called for the Government to have a lighter touch when it comes to Singaporeans expressing their views on important public issues. I thank her for raising this important subject. Over the years, I believe we have seen real changes. We see more divergent views expressed through various avenues. This includes the press, Internet, various forums as well as letters and emails from individuals and groups directly to the Government and political leaders, like Ministers. I have received many such letters and emails of grievances or strong views about what we do or what we should do. Some are polite, some are very rude. But all are read and looked into. Accessibility to avenues to express one's views, therefore, is not wanting. In terms of Government reaction to such views, I believe that while the occasional robust response is given when felt necessary, there has been generally a more accommodative dialogue with the man-in-the-street. We have also evolved our policies in relation to different forms of expression. To recapitulate, in the year 2000, we created the Speakers' Corner as an outdoor venue for political speeches. In 2004, we liberalised its use to include performances and exhibitions. In addition, we exempted all indoor public talks from the licensing requirement under the Public Entertainments and Meetings Act, so long as the organisers and speakers are Singapore citizens.”
“If we are unable to ensure the security and safety of everyone, be they Singaporeans, foreign VIPs, delegates and visitors, Singapore will decline as a premium event centre or investment destination. Security must be regarded as part and parcel of the cost and reality of doing business. Going forward, we must continue to engage business, industry and citizens to become stakeholders in their own security, as they ought to be. Let me now turn to the issue of drug abuse raised by Dr Teo, Dr Fatimah and Ms Sylvia Lim. The last two years saw an increase in the number of drug addicts returning to heroin abuse. This was partly due to the displacement from Subutex abuse. A more important reason is the increase in the regional production and supply of both opium based and synthetic drugs. We anticipate increased attempts by syndicates to smuggle drugs into Singapore. In my mind, however, the most significant challenge is about maintaining the support of our community against drugs. I am concerned by the increasing acceptance of the use of so-called social drugs or party drugs amongst some of our young. Some foreigners also expect to continue their drug taking habit in Singapore. Some argue that Singapore should follow the approach of liberal societies which have given up trying to stop drug abuse, and seek instead to minimise its dangers to the addicts by providing, for instance, clean needles for the addicts to "shoot up" safely. Those advocating this approach want us to dismantle our tough laws and permit drug abuse among our people. If we go down this road, we will unravel the relatively crime-free and drug-free society that we have today. We will continue to help addicts who are willing to take responsibility for their lives to overcome their addiction.”
“Mr Fong is right that technology alone does not defeat determined criminals and terrorists. Technology is only a tool; the operator is the brain that makes it work. Hence, we invest heavily in the training and development of our officers. Mdm Ho Geok Choo has raised concerns with emergency readiness. Our agencies have a high level of preparedness, having built up significant capabilities. Singaporeans, however, must get more involved in preparing themselves and their families for emergencies. The SCDF conducts community emergency preparedness programme for the constituencies, and they impart life saving and emergency preparedness skills to the community. Since its implementation in 2003, participation has grown over the years. We have trained about 310,000 participants to date, and we encourage more participation, regardless of local or foreign. Everyone should know the basics of CPR, first aid and fire fighting. The four SCDF centres are open every day for training. Mdm Ho will be pleased to note that the participants include many housewives, the elderly and students. We welcome ideas from Members on ways to broaden and deepen our outreach, as there can be no age or gender bias in dealing with terrorism. All must play a role. But no government can provide total protection to all. Resources are not unlimited. Increasingly, the Home Team's resources are being stretched to meet the security and safety needs that come with higher tourist arrivals, a growing foreign worker population and an increasing number of mega international events like Formula One, APEC 2009 and the Youth Olympics in 2010. Order, security and safety are critical pre-conditions to any successful event or business.”
“MUIS, the RRG and other groups like Taman Bacaan and 4PM have established programmes to raise the awareness of the community, especially the young, against terrorist ideology. In addition to these efforts, we need to recognise that the threat of the self-radicalised terrorist must also be defeated by the vigilance of the others around him. Early warning signs in the individual's conduct can be discerned. Those who see it must recognise the significance and not be reluctant to report on him. Early intervention will help us nip the problem in the bud, and also help the individual in his recovery before he plunges deeper into terrorist and extremist violence. There seems to be a creeping danger of polarisation between Muslim and non-Muslim communities in many countries. We see a greater intolerance and hardening of attitudes at the extreme ends of both communities. This is both compounded when provocative acts, like films which offend Muslims, are pursued in the name of freedom of speech or expression. Such ethnic polarisation only serves the cause of the jihadist extremists and terrorists. We must not allow this to happen in Singapore. While we address the ideological dimension of the threat, we must continue to make Singapore a hard target. I therefore agree with Mr Arthur Fong that in this regard, we must fully exploit technology. Our border security technology infrastructure, for instance, is a formidable resource. It has enhanced our operational capabilities. In 2007, ICA officers detected 37,800 cases of smuggling at our borders, a rise of 83% over 2006. This is a good proxy indicator because if we can catch people smuggling cigarettes or other items, we can catch people smuggling terrorist materials.”
“This is indeed a troubling development although not unique to Singapore. Many countries have reported cases of nationals who, on their own, had planned terrorist attacks. In Singapore, in February and December last year, ISD arrested and detained several self-radicalised individuals. There would be some who have yet to be discovered. A common denominator in such self-radicalisation cases is an individual's exposure to radical and extremist ideology via various sources, such as the Internet and publications. The importance of their ideological campaign is clear. In 2007, the Al Qaeda reportedly released a video every three days, and with broadcasts now also accompanied by subtitles, including English and other European languages to reach out to a wider audience. Terrorist organisations and their supporters exploit the unregulated, anonymous and pervasive nature of the Internet to propagate their extremist ideology. Dr Teo asked how my Ministry would monitor the thousands of radical websites or reduce their influence on young people. There is no way that we can monitor all the radical websites. Even if we were to block some of these websites, new ones will be created very quickly. To address such a threat, we need, firstly, to strengthen the efforts of our Muslim leaders in countering extremist ideology. Secondly, we need to raise Singaporeans' vigilance and resilience to detect those in our midst who have been infected by such extremist ideas and show signs of radicalisation. I am truly appreciative of our Muslim leaders' efforts, as they have not shied away from the problem. They are confronting the terrorism threat directly, even taking the fight online to counter the extremist ideology.”
“I will now address the Members' comments on terrorism, drugs and public expression. SMS Ho Peng Kee will speak about crime and drugs and other issues in greater detail. Until the threat of the Al Qaeda and its proxy, the Jemaah Islamiyah, surfaced against us in 2001, Singapore was essentially not a direct target of international terrorist groups. Today, we are so targeted. We are living today in a different security climate. Our security agencies have successfully disrupted local plots and terrorist networks so far. However, we have remained a "trophy" target in the eyes of the terrorists. Hence, apart from hardening security in key installations, including iconic buildings, we also need to step up security for international events held in Singapore. That is also why we must treat certain crimes differently. For instance, any intrusion which breaches our borders must be treated as a security incident. Our officers must, in the first instance, deal with it as such even if the intruder eventually may turn out to be just a cigarette smuggler. While the threat of terrorism is by no means over, there have been fewer attacks in the major cities last year. The counter-terrorism efforts of countries have led to many arrests and timely disruptions of terrorist plots. Terrorism researcher, Dr Rohan Gunaratna, has observed that the threat posed by Al Qaeda has expanded into a "Global Jihad Movement" with its ideology penetrating conflict zones in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. While the operational threat of Al Qaeda itself has weakened, the affiliated jihadist groups and the home-grown cells, including self-radicalised elements, have spawned. 12.45 pm Dr Teo asked about the phenomenon of self-radicalisation.”
“Sir, I thank the Members who have spoken on the Ministry Head for their questions, observations, suggestions and also their criticisms. Members have spoken on the escape of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) detainee Mas Selamat yesterday. Let me give an update. There has been a security lapse at the Whitley Road Detention Centre, which allowed Mas Selamat to escape. Mas Selamat, at that time, was taken out of his cell where he was confined to go to the family visitation room to wait for the arrival of his family. He asked to go to the toilet from where he escaped. This should never have happened. I am sorry that it has. An independent investigation is underway. We should not speculate now as to what and how it happened. Security at the centre has been stepped up. Mas Selamat is a security threat which is why he was placed under preventive detention. However, there is no information that he has any plans that threaten public security at this time. Nevertheless, we are not taking any chances. Dr Teo asked why the public was only informed about four hours after the escape. Our security agencies assessed that there was no imminent danger to the public. The focus then was to lock down the Whitley Road Detention Centre and start a systematic operation to find and arrest him. The priority is to find and arrest Mas Selamat. No efforts will be spared to track him down. Security at all our land, sea and air checkpoints have been tightened, including areas where there may be a possibility that he may leave our shores and from areas which are not the normal immigration checkpoints. In the meantime, I urge the public to stay calm and to report any suspicious sighting to the Police immediately. Anyone who renders assistance to him is committing a grave offence.”
“I am happy to hear Mr Low saying and confirming here in this House that he believes that the vote is secret. And I believe Ms Lim, the Party Chairman, also thinks that the vote is secret. So there is no question about the integrity of the voting process as well as the secrecy of the vote. I have explained many times in this House before why we have a serial number behind the ballot paper. The reason is very simple. When there is a dispute, eg, there are more votes counted than there are voters in a particular constituency, then we know ballot papers have been stuffed into the ballot boxes. We can then trace every number and see where the extra ballot papers came from. If we do not have that system, and I am sure Mr Low and Members here would have also read that in some countries where they do not have such a system, they find more ballot papers than the voters. I am sure we do not want to have that kind of situation here. So, we ensure the integrity of the ballot paper by having a serial number at the back of the ballot paper. But there is no way of tracing the votes, unless the court so orders when there is a dispute in terms of the vote. For that, one has to petition the court to open the ballot boxes in order to check the ballot papers. On educating voters on vote secrecy, that will be done. I can assure Mr Low that we will do that. The Chairman: Any other questions? If none, Dr Neo, are you withdrawing the amendment?”
“Sir, before I answer the question, maybe I ask Mr Low whether he thinks that the vote is secret. Since Mr Low has asked me a question about voters' concern about the secrecy of votes, I would like to ask him whether he believes that the vote is secret or not secret.”
“Sir, we have to study very carefully this issue of allowing overseas Singaporeans to cast their vote early. Because if they vote, say, three or four days before the actual polling day so that their votes can arrive in time for counting on the same night after polling closes, it would mean that they will have four or five days of listening to campaign speeches or watching at what goes on in Singapore from overseas, and they may not have enough information to form a conclusion. It would not be fair to expect them to vote so early before polling closes. The issue that we now face is the situation that Ms Lim described, in the case of a constituency with very few overseas Singaporeans voting in that particular constituency. I am not sure whether the situation will hold for a long time, especially when more Singaporeans go overseas. There may be such situations. One possibility would be, for example, for us to see how to put aside some votes in Singapore that will be mixed up with the overseas votes if the number is really that small. We will know that early enough. But, again, it will also mean a delay in the announcement of the results of those constituencies. So there are many implications of deciding on an early overseas voting for Singaporeans who are overseas.”