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UK PARLIAMENT · SITTING

Andy Slaughter

MP for Hammersmith and Chiswick · Labour · United Kingdom

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

I welcome the Bill, and thank the Government for introducing it and bringing it back to the House before the summer recess. It is the result of years of committed campaigning, led by the families of the victims and survivors of Hillsborough.

PUBLIC OFFICE (ACCOUNTABILITY) BILL · 2026-07-14 · READ IN HANSARD

I know that case means a huge amount to the hon. Lady as a constituency MP, and I thank her for all the work she does on the Justice Committee. I think we have only begun to scratch the surface. This Bill will be a transforming piece of legislation. I will make one final comment.

PUBLIC OFFICE (ACCOUNTABILITY) BILL · 2026-07-14 · READ IN HANSARD

This would be a new, independent public body that collated, analysed and followed up on the conclusions and recommendations made after official investigations into deaths and state failings, in order to improve oversight and implementation of them.

PUBLIC OFFICE (ACCOUNTABILITY) BILL · 2026-07-14 · READ IN HANSARD

I think I have taken enough time, but I thank the Member for that intervention. This afternoon, the Justice Committee signed off a new major report on legal aid, which will be published on Friday. Those who are interested can read more there.

PUBLIC OFFICE (ACCOUNTABILITY) BILL · 2026-07-14 · READ IN HANSARD

In the time that I have, I will focus my remarks on clauses 1 to 16, which create a new appeals body for immigration and asylum cases known as the independent immigration appeals authority.

IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM BILL · 2026-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

From that visit, our diagnosis was that these are operational problems. There are two key questions for the House: will the IIAA fix the problems with the current system, and will it be truly independent from the Home Office?

IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM BILL · 2026-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

The complete record

Every one of 7,200 lines we hold for Andy Slaughter, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 31 of 144.

  1. Having found that Parliament could never have intended a clear derogation from the right of access to justice, the Supreme Court quashed the order that required individuals to pay to use the employment tribunal. The remedial consequence of the quashing order was that the Government were required to retrospectively refund the claimants who had been charged fees. A prospective-only remedy in this scenario would have denied the claimants this refund and therefore would have been a serious injustice to the claimants, whose fundamental right to access to justice had been found to have been violated.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  2. All preceding activity, including expense in performance of any contracts that the judicial review court may not be fully aware of, if at all, are reliant on the unlawful decision would be considered lawful to the date of the order, even though the full contracts could not be completed. This could cause significant loss to contractors who were not present to make representations during the hearing, as they could potentially only claim for losses thereafter. The other case I will mention is the Unison case, which is another important real-world example. It is worth considering the impact that prospective-only remedies could have had if they had applied in that case, which concerned, as I think all Members know, fees to access employment tribunals.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  3. Yes, and I am grateful for that reminder. I have a little more to say on the Stonehenge case and I will mention one other case that is familiar to Members. However, my hon. Friend makes exactly the point: there is mischief caused here. However many times the Government say, “This is designed to simplify and extend the powers,” the less credible that seems when one looks at the actual nature and type of decisions that would be affected, and at how they would be affected. In the Stonehenge case, the likely effect of the order would be to remove the possibility for collateral claims for compensation against the Government for their unlawful decision up to the date of the prospective order.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  4. With that in mind, it appears likely that the introduction of prospective-only remedies would have a chilling effect upon future potential claimants. With their use not only allowed but encouraged, that sends a strong signal to an individual who has been wronged by a public body that their actions are not worth challenging: even if they win, their situation may not improve.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  5. The group that trades under the name Equally Ours, which briefed us, has significant concerns about the likely effect of deterring people from seeking judicial reviews if this clause is unamended. If prospective-only remedies are applied, the effect would be that unlawful decisions or actions would be treated as lawful until the quashing order came into effect. Retrospective quashing orders recognise the unlawful decision or action and provide a remedy. Bringing a judicial review has many disadvantages to applicants, not least the cost, uncertainty and length of the process. The key motivation for many applicants—for the impact on them to be remedied—will be lost if a prospective-only order is made.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  6. In creating a statutory presumption and mandating consideration of these new remedies, judges are being clearly signalled to, and may well be less likely to—and, in fact, may be required not to—award effective remedies for claimants against any common-sense understanding of justice. The result of limiting retrospective effect would be that a claimant could have the court agree that the decision made by the Government or public body was unlawful, but would not have recourse to a retrospective remedy. That would allow the Government to avoid having to compensate people who are victims of its previous unlawful behaviour. If claimants know at the outset that it is likely that they could win but nothing would happen, why bother going for judicial review at all?

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  7. Judges already have discretion over what remedy to give, but this Bill will increase their focus and attention on limiting the use of full quashing orders and mandate the consideration of factors that undermine successful claimants’ legitimate interests. It will embolden defendants who are found to be on the wrong side of the law to argue that they should not suffer the full consequences of their unlawful actions. Public trust in the system will be undermined where judges are seen to validate or immunise previous unlawful conduct through prospective-only remedies. That, in turn, may disincentivise legal compliance by those in power. The Government line is that judges are sensible and will strike the correct balance in practice, but that is cold comfort for individual claimants and is not in compliance with international law.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  8. Looking at the position in other jurisdictions, it is notable that courts are usually prepared to hand down a prospective remedy only in cases of constitutional importance, or cases that would have serious economic repercussions for a large number of good-faith relationships. In practice, that happens extremely rarely, and those are very limited categories that have been carefully contained on the basis of subtle judicial reasoning and incremental developments. The European Court of Human Rights has also held in a very clear judgment that certain remedies which have prospective-only effect cannot be regarded as effective, and therefore would be a violation of article 13 of the European convention on human rights.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  9. Turning back to the Unison case, it arbitrarily distinguishes between people who have been impacted by the unlawful measure before and after the court judgment, undermining certainty, consistency and equal treatment under the law, which was the point of my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East. Individuals who have not litigated but who are impacted by an unlawful measure have just as much need of the law’s protection as those individuals who will potentially be impacted in the future. Some unfortunate people would be denied justice, with no proper remedy even when the court said they were right.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  10. I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention, and I think she is following my argument. What I am trying to do through a series of case studies—some hypothetical, some that are likely, and some that have actually happened—is look at how those cases could have been different had this piece of legislation been in effect, specifically looking at the effect on individuals. That may be hundreds or thousands of individuals, or it may be one individual, but these are often people for whom this is the only form of redress, and it is hard to see how a prospective-only remedy would provide a just outcome to an individual claimant.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  11. That undermines Government accountability, and in turn undermines the quality and effectiveness of decision making.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  12. Laws should be able to guide conduct to enable persons to be able to act in accordance with the law. A position where a measure is both recognised as being unlawful but is also to be treated as if it were lawful is contrary to this. As one Department said in its submissions to IRAL—from those that we have been able to see— “the rule of law requires predictable rules around which citizens, businesses and government can plan their activities and lives”. Prospective-only remedies weaken the rule of law because they allow the Government and public authorities to act without fear of meaningful repercussions. The Government are effectively encouraged to take risks and act unlawfully, and the only consequence is that the decision will eventually be reversed should it be successfully challenged in the future.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  13. As well as depriving proper redress for individual claimants and others who may have been wronged by unlawful decisions, prospective-only remedies also have the potential to cause more general harm. The impact of a prospective-only quashing order and the transition between a measure being valid and then quashed going forward will be difficult and unwieldy to navigate, including for public bodies. By way of example, it is unclear whether proceedings to pay a penalty notice could be brought against an individual for breach of an unlawful byelaw if the events occurred prior to the byelaw being quashed prospectively but the charges and/or proceedings are brought afterwards. The introduction of prospective-only quashing orders removes the certainty provided by the position that a measure if found to be unlawful will then be treated as such.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  14. It may become difficult to satisfy this requirement where the litigant stands a high chance of being awarded a prospective-only remedy, meaning that more prospective applicants could be denied legal aid, forcing them to abandon their claim. With no legal aid and little prospect of benefiting even if successful, there is seemingly little incentive for someone who has been negatively affected by unlawful action to bring a case. Prospective-only remedies would therefore have a serious chilling effect on the system of judicial review, disincentivising bringing a case in such a way. Moreover, they would have a damaging effect on good governance; the threat of judicial review is a powerful tool in encouraging good decision making by public bodies.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  15. If these measures are not only allowed but encouraged, that sends a strong signal to an individual who has been wronged that the actions are not worth challenging. Even if a prospective-only quashing order is not used in a particular case, its mere availability would serve as a serious disincentive to claimants seeking to bring a judicial review if a claimant cannot be sure that they will benefit from the judicial review even if it is successful. A further financial hurdle could be placed in front of potential claimants as legal aid would likely become even harder to obtain. Applicants for legal aid must be able to demonstrate that there would be a tangible benefit to the litigant if successful.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  16. I am grateful for that intervention, and I hope from what I have said, and from many of the interventions by hon. Friends, that it is clear that what we are most concerned about here is the impact on an individual claimant. Bringing judicial review is not an easy thing to do; it is not a common remedy. Funding it, finding representation and getting into court are all difficult. I hope when the Minister responds—I do not have much more to say before I will allow him to—he will address some of those points, particularly in relation to what he thinks the effect of the measures in clause 1 of the Bill will be on individuals who currently have the ability to bring a successful claim. As I said, a chilling effect seems likely.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (THIRD SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  17. Welcome back to the afternoon sitting, Sir Mark. I can reply fairly briefly to this short debate. The hon. Member for Dudley North said that a power grab by the Government was not what was happening in this Bill. However, whatever language is used, the Bill does alter the balance of power. In that sense, it is a movement of power from the courts to the legislature, for reasons I will explain more under the next group of amendments. He said that it adds powers to the judge’s armoury. Technically that may be true, but if the net effect in reality is to create uncertainty and fewer protections for claimants, that is not a welcome development.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  18. If Government Members wish to emphasise the discretion that is available to judges, why are they supporting a clause that inserts conditions?

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  19. I think it is actually the senior judiciary, and I would never ascribe any political motivation to them whatsoever. I take the point that the Deputy Prime Minister may well not be a leftie lawyer, but it is the Prime Minister, I think, who coined the phrase rather than me. I do not know who he had in mind exactly; I hope not the former Prime Minister, Lady Thatcher, but there it is. People move around the political spectrum all the time these days. The main issue I take from what the hon. Member for Dudley North said is that there remains an element of discretion. Up to a point, Lord Copper, is the answer to that. Why have a presumption at all? We are coming on to that debate, so perhaps we went off at a slight tangent a few moments ago, but it is a relevant point to make.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  20. I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 1, page 1, line 9, at end insert— “(1A) Provision under subsection (1) may only be made if the court considers that it is in the interest of justice to do so.” This amendment would limit the remedies in subsection (1) to where the court considers it is in the interests of justice.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  21. We are concerned that the Government have chosen to disregard the expertise and opinions of their stakeholders and to push forward with a statutory presumption that has little or no support, particularly as there is no evidence to suggest that without the presumption, the courts would not use the additional remedial tools at their disposal where appropriate.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  22. Instead of preserving judicial discretion over whether to suspend a quashing order or remove or limit its retrospective effect, proposed new subsection 29A(9) and (10) in clause 1 introduces a statutory presumption in favour of doing so if it would “offer adequate redress”. We are strongly opposed to the statutory presumption. It is a long-established and fundamental principle in judicial review that remedies are discretionary. As no two judicial reviews are the same, it is necessary to ensure that there is a fair outcome that fits the circumstances of the case at hand. The Government’s response to their consultation on their judicial review proposals showed that the overwhelming majority of responses that they received were clearly against the introduction of statutory presumption and in favour of preserving judicial discretion.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  23. It undermines the principle of legality if the default is that an unlawful action is still valid and that a quashing order ought normally to be suspended or have only prospective effect. The presumption in the subsection ought to be reversed so that it is in favour of quashing orders taking effect immediately. In its report, the independent review of administrative law did recommend legislating for suspended quashing orders, but it did not presume that such a remedy would be mandatory. The panel suggested that the courts are best placed to develop remedies that work in practice, and that rather than giving judges increased flexibility, imposing this presumption would limit their ability to provide redress to claimants.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  24. The Public Law Project’s conclusion is that clause 1 “should be amended to remove the presumption and make clear that remedies should only be restricted in this way in exceptional circumstances.” Creating a further barrier to getting an effective remedy is wrong in principle. There are already substantial hurdles to citizens bringing a successful judicial review: they have to show standing, get past the preliminary hearing, have the money to pay large legal fees, bring the case very promptly, and then show that a public authority has acted unlawfully. After all that, it is unfair to place another hurdle in their way. Proposed subsection (9) means that even after all those hurdles have been cleared and the court has ruled that the public authority is in the wrong, the presumption is that the effect of the quashing order will be limited.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  25. A presumption in favour of suspending a quashing order is precisely that—permission for the state to continue to act unlawfully. In most cases, the “constructive and sensible” thing to do with an unlawful Government decision is to rule that it has no effect. Professor Tom Hickman has called proposed new section 29A(9) “muddled” and suggested that it would be best to omit it altogether. Jonathan Morgan, who we heard from earlier this week, welcomed clause 1 generally but also argued that the proposed subsection is wrong. Liberty has said that it is “entirely opposed to any presumption in favour of suspending a quashing order”.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  26. The Lord Chancellor has argued that while we quite rightly have judicial checks on the Executive, they have to be applied “in a constructive and sensible way which allows the Government to deliver the projects that it’s tasked and mandated by Parliament to do” and ensures that “taxpayers’ money is not being squandered because projects are being harpooned.” That argument is self-contradictory, because it states two quite different things—first, that there ought to be judicial checks on Government, and secondly, that the Government must be allowed to do things they have been mandated by Parliament to do. The whole point of judicial review is to prevent the state from acting unlawfully. The Lord Chancellor’s argument seems to be that even if the state is acting unlawfully, it ought to be allowed to continue to act unlawfully.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  27. Proposed subsection (9) sets up a presumption in favour of suspended quashing orders or prospective-only remedies. It says, in effect, that if the court considers that if such an order would offer “adequate redress”, it has to make one unless there is a good reason not to. It is a convoluted provision that introduces several steps and several terms that will lead to increased arguments and submissions at the remedy stage of litigation, increasing the costs and length of that litigation to the detriment of parties and the courts. It is also unclear how the subsection accords with the list of factors that courts are directed to consider in proposed subsection (8).

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  28. The default remedy will be prospective- only, meaning that those who have missed out on their benefits in the past due to an unlawful action will not be entitled to back pay of those benefits. The remedy will help people in the future, but will do nothing to help those who have already suffered. What is the point in going to court in such a case, when the remedy granted will be of zero help to the applicant? Proposed new section 29A(9) and (10) contains a presumption in favour of the use of suspended quashing orders and prospective-only quashing orders, which will favour the assurances of the Executive over other important considerations, particularly the impact on claimants and third parties of suspending a quashing order or making it prospective-only.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  29. That was the outcome in the Gallagher case, where the Supreme Court held that ruling a statutory instrument void would introduce a discrepancy in the statutory scheme. This is very much the exception, but it is a course of action open to a judge in making a decision on the remedy to be awarded in judicial review. However, proposed new section 29A(9) of Senior Courts Act 1981, as set out in clause 1, flips that principle on its head. The new default position will be that where a court issues a quashing order, it must suspend it, or limit any retrospective effect, unless there is a good reason not to. This undermines the rule of law, because judicial decisions are not effective or are less effective. Consider a hypothetical case where a homelessness charity challenges a decision on the availability of social security benefits.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  30. If the state does not comply with the law, an individual can bring a case to court in order to force the state to comply with the law. The current law on remedies in judicial review also vindicates these principles. The default approach is that if the state does something unlawful, that decision will be quashed and have no legal effect. People generally do not bring cases to court for declarations; they bring cases to court to right a wrong, for a tangible result, and to actually achieve something. If I am injured in a car crash, I bring a case so that the court can rule that I am not at fault and so that the judge will award me damages. As ever, there is nuance, and it is possible that there would be some instances where it would be appropriate for an unlawful action to retain its validity in some way.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  31. Various Members have commented already on the presumption, which is perhaps the most controversial provision in part 1. I look forward to hearing the Minister justify it, particularly as the comments from the Government side so far have emphasised the retention of discretion. Sir Mark, we will seek a vote on amendment 22 if the Government persist in their support for the presumption. By way of background—I will be a lot shorter than I was with the first group, because I have already laid out our concerns about clause 1—the rule of law requires compliance with the law, which means that everyone in the state, including public authorities, must act in accordance with the law. Judicial review, as we discussed this morning, is a fundamental way that these rule of law principles are vindicated.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  32. The amendments in this group are principally in my name, although amendment 27 has been tabled by the SNP. They lead on quite conveniently from the short debate we have just had. It is a large group and I intend to speak to all the amendments, although for most of them I can be fairly brief. The common theme is that they propose ways of mitigating the introduction of prospective-only quashing orders, and in some cases suspended quashing orders, which, as I think we have made clear, we do not believe should be in the Bill at all. If they are to be in the Bill, we want to ensure that they are appropriately caveated and mitigated. However, the crucial amendment here is amendment 22, which would remove the presumption from the Bill.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  33. While being presented as a measure that promotes certainty, the new remedies in fact generate significant uncertainty about how they will operate and are likely to result in expensive post-judgment satellite litigation. That uncertainty, together with an increase in costs, will create yet another practical barrier to individual claimants bringing judicial review claims in the first place. Fifthly, proposed new section 29A(5) undermines a person’s right to bring a collateral challenge following an illegal public act. That is a point we will deal with more fully when we come to the third group of amendments.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  34. It creates a judicial fix for an unlawful Government act, when such an action would ordinarily be the exclusive domain of Parliament. Further, when deciding whether to issue a weakened remedy, judges must consider the likely future actions of public bodies, something that judges have previously described as a job they are ill-equipped to undertake. That would be an especially regrettable and ironic consequence when the Government’s avowed aim is to prevent judges stepping into the political realm. Fourthly, and as senior judges have acknowledged, one of the benefits of the current system of quashing orders is its simplicity.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  35. Prospective-only remedies would be particularly likely to have a chilling effect on individual claimants bringing judicial review claims. Why, as we have already said, would someone spend money, time and effort to challenge an unlawful decision made against them if that decision cannot be rectified in their specific case? The proposed changes risk creating a situation where unlawful actions go unopposed and individuals’ ability to defend their rights against an overbearing state is undermined. Thirdly, the remedies make it more—rather than less—likely that judges will be forced to enter the political realm. The effect of a suspended or prospective-only quashing order may be to grant legal validity to an action that, on its face, contravenes an Act of Parliament.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  36. The words "or proposed to be taken” should be removed from proposed new section 29A(8)(e) so that it refers only to undertakings. Amendment 36 provides clarity that the principle of good administration includes the need for administration to be lawful. This requires clarification. There are five main reasons why greater recourse to these weakened remedies, and especially any presumption in their favour, should be resisted. I will conclude my comments when I have gone through those five reasons. First, these remedies place victims of unlawful actions in an unfair position; remedies which are prospective-only may leave individuals without redress at all. Secondly, they insulate Government from scrutiny and make it more difficult for decision makers to be held to account.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  37. The reality of public body decision making, Executive action and the legislative timetable is that priorities and policy positions change, and resources and time may have to be diverted. In the meantime, the judicial review claimant and all others adversely impacted by the measure must wait—potentially continuing to be detrimentally impacted—with limited, if any, legal recourse against the defendant or other relevant public body. There is too much uncertainty in the actions a public body proposes to take to form a legal basis for suspending a quashing order or making it prospective-only. Any intentions indicated to the court could change in the light of subsequent developments, leaving those affected potentially without any recourse.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  38. Again, they are not ideal, but it would be good if in the Bill it was indicated that where these—in our view—undesirable remedies are to be available, that they should be limited to where there are acceptable circumstances or it is in the interests of justice. Amendment 20 seeks to address the issues caused in proposed new section 29A(8)(e), which states that the court must consider “any action taken or proposed to be taken, or undertaking given, by a person with responsibility in connection with the impugned act”. I am particularly concerned with the requirement on the courts to consider any action proposed to be taken. This provides little or no legal basis to require the public body to act, especially if only said during submissions and not reflected in the court’s judgment.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  39. The phrase “adequate redress” in proposed new section 29A(9)(b) should be amended to “effective remedy” to increase certainty, and it should be made clear that the redress or remedy must be adequate both for the claimant and for any other person affected by the impugned act. The proposed new section 29A(10) should also be removed in its entirety. With amendments 13 and 14, the power to suspend quashing orders and prospective-only quashing orders would be limited to exceptional circumstances where it is in the interests of justice through an amendment to proposed new section 29A(1). I do not think I need go into any detail on those amendments; they speak for themselves.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  40. As a less preferable alternative to removing the presumption altogether, our amendment 23 seeks to remove the presumption in proposed new section 29A(9) and insert a precondition of the court’s exercise of the new remedial powers, that they would offer an effective remedy to the claimant and any other person materially affected by the impugned act. Amendment 24—less preferable than both 22 and 23 —leaves the presumption and would require an effective remedy to the claimant and any other person materially affected by the impugned act. The Committee cannot say that we are not trying, at least, to meet the Government halfway on this matter. I have set out a smorgasbord of alternatives, from which the Government can select what they wish.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  41. The courts must remain alert to the potential impact of these provisions in particular cases, and a statutory presumption would hinder their ability to do so. At a minimum, we believe this presumption must be removed. Clause 1 stands to weaken the effectiveness of remedies available to the courts. The Government claim that they are giving extra tools to judges—as we heard earlier—but by imposing a presumption in favour of their use, they are in fact restraining the freedom of the courts to rule as they see fit. That is the key point that the Minister needs to answer. This presumption restricts the remedial discretion of the courts and should be removed.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  42. However, it should be for the courts to determine in the circumstances of the case what weight should be given to public body assurances, to ensure that the most appropriate remedy is made, considering the difficulties with relying on assurances. The courts should not be required to preference these assurances at the expense of other considerations, in particular the impact on the claimant and other third parties. Suspended and prospective quashing orders both have a significant impact on the ability of individuals who have been subject to state wrongdoing to receive a full and timely remedy. Furthermore, they allow, to varying degrees, an act that has been found to be unlawful to remain valid and untouched.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  43. Secondly, the recourse would only be against the defendant public body, not against other public bodies who have said they would act. Thirdly, in rejecting the introduction of a conditional quashing order, the Government recognised the practical difficulties with deciding whether a condition has been complied with—the same concerns apply equally to court orders made on the basis of public body assurances, including the potential for further protracted and costly litigation. The courts do already take into account steps that the Executive or Parliament are intending to take or have taken, as well as now being required to by proposed new section 29A(8)(e), and generally accept that the defendant will comply with the court’s ruling on lawfulness.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  44. I therefore submit that proposed new section 29A(9) can be removed. In applying the presumption, proposed new section 29A(10) requires the court to “take into account, in particular” anything under proposed new section 29A(8)(e). This directs the court to give special consideration to anything that the public body with responsibility for the impugned act, which may or may not be the defendant, has done or says it will do. However, there are difficulties with making a prospective-only quashing order on the basis of statements made, or even undertakings given by the defendant. First, only the claimant would be able to enforce, if at all, the undertaking or statement, even though others will also be impacted by the defendant’s non-compliance. Further, claimants may not have the funds, ability or resources to bring the case back to court.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  45. There is no need for a convoluted legislative provision telling the courts to do so. The presumption also conflicts with the Government’s stated aim of increasing remedial discretion, as it requires particular remedies to be used in certain circumstances. We oppose prospective-only orders for the reasons set out in the earlier debate, but if they are to be used, it should be at the court’s discretion. Suspended orders should also be used only in exceptional circumstances, as determined by the court. It would greatly undermine the protective constitutional role of judicial review and risk incoherence if proposed new section 29A(9) constrained the courts to issue a suspended order or a prospective-only order when a straightforward quashing order would be more suited to the circumstances of the case.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  46. A statutory presumption could force the court into using these provisions in circumstances in which they would not be appropriate. Any legislation will lead to debates in court as to the meaning of terms, but it is not justifiable unnecessarily to introduce new processes and concepts for the courts to grapple with. The Government state that proposed new section 29A(9) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 can “direct and guide the court’s reasoning to certain outcomes in certain circumstances”, notably, whether remedies under new section 29A(1) can provide adequate redress. However, the courts already seek to craft the most appropriate remedy for the circumstances that are before them. A court will issue a prospective or suspended order if it is the most appropriate remedy.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  47. Some people think it is okay and some wish to go further than what is in the Bill, but I would say that the balance of opinion, in the responses to the previous consultation—let us remember that in addition to IRAL, the Government have had their own consultation—and in the written evidence submitted to the Bill Committee, has been overwhelmingly against the presumption, for some of the reasons that I am giving. We do not believe that a statutory presumption is in keeping with the Government’s own stated commitment to pursuing incremental change. It is not yet clear in what cases a suspended or prospective-only quashing order would be appropriate, and there remains some apprehension about the possible consequences of those orders. They should, therefore, be used with caution.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  48. I take the right hon. Gentleman’s point very seriously. We touched on that point this morning, although I know he was not in Committee. I gave a little thumbnail of some of the witnesses and indicated that their views were—as one might expect from senior academics and practitioners—free from bias and prejudice, and what they said was quite interesting and variegated. If the right hon. Gentleman were talking about suspended quashing orders, I would have some sympathy with him, because I think the balance was probably in favour of those, with some reservations. Even on prospective-only orders, there was a degree of support, and that may be what he is referring to. I thought that there was very limited support for the statutory presumption, however.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  49. Whatever the Minister says, he cannot get away from the fact that the presumption is a heavy-handed way to give a steer to the judiciary about how to operate, and it does not actually need to be there at all. He and the Government should trust the judiciary on the presumptions that it wishes to put forward. There is a simple disagreement here, as sadly must happen sometimes between Government and Opposition. We cannot see any reason or logical argument in favour of the presumption, so we will exercise our right to press amendment 22 to a Division, although I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment 13. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  50. By that, I mean it is more precise and more familiar: concepts such as “exceptional circumstances”, “the interest of justice” or “effective remedy” more correctly sum up what we are intending to do here, and will be more familiar to the court in applying its jurisdiction. That is also why we wanted to say that good administration must be lawful. The central point, which the Minister just has not persuaded me on—that is why I will persist with amendment 22—is, “Why is the presumption in there?” I am not at all persuaded by the non-exhaustive list of matters to which the court must have regard in subsection (8) either. They are not well drawn.

    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COURTS BILL (FOURTH SITTING) · 2021-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD