Andy Slaughter
MP for Hammersmith and Chiswick · Labour · United Kingdom
“I welcome the Bill, and thank the Government for introducing it and bringing it back to the House before the summer recess. It is the result of years of committed campaigning, led by the families of the victims and survivors of Hillsborough.”
“I know that case means a huge amount to the hon. Lady as a constituency MP, and I thank her for all the work she does on the Justice Committee. I think we have only begun to scratch the surface. This Bill will be a transforming piece of legislation. I will make one final comment.”
“This would be a new, independent public body that collated, analysed and followed up on the conclusions and recommendations made after official investigations into deaths and state failings, in order to improve oversight and implementation of them.”
“I think I have taken enough time, but I thank the Member for that intervention. This afternoon, the Justice Committee signed off a new major report on legal aid, which will be published on Friday. Those who are interested can read more there.”
“In the time that I have, I will focus my remarks on clauses 1 to 16, which create a new appeals body for immigration and asylum cases known as the independent immigration appeals authority.”
“From that visit, our diagnosis was that these are operational problems. There are two key questions for the House: will the IIAA fix the problems with the current system, and will it be truly independent from the Home Office?”
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“I am grateful to the hon. Member for Glasgow North East for her comments, and for withdrawing her amendment, which was essentially the same—or would achieve the same effect—as our amendment 22. We will, therefore, push that to a vote in due course. As far as the Minister’s comments are concerned, I mentioned the administrative chaos point already; I will return to that briefly on clause stand part because, as I think some of his comments conceded, there are ways around this at the moment. My view is that if the courts can find a route to resolve difficulties, they should be left to do that themselves, and there is no need for us to interfere, but that is specifically around suspended orders—I will come back to that. The Minister calls it semantics or language; well, I agree with him, but I just think our language is better.”
“I beg to move amendment 16, in clause 1, page 1, line 13, after “subsection (2)” insert “and to subsection (5A)” See explanatory statement to Amendment 15.”
“A person could therefore not argue as a defence in the magistrates or Crown court that the statutory instrument was invalid, because this subsection requires a judge to pretend that it was valid. As IRAL noted in paragraph 3.66 of its report: “We readily acknowledge that the law would be in a radically defective state if such collateral challenges to the validity of administrative action were impossible.” We agree and believe that collateral challenges should be expressly preserved in the Bill.”
“As IRAL recognised, that position would leave the law in a “radically defective state”. A further subsection should be included to protect collateral challenge and third- party rights and defences where a remedy under new section 29A(1) is ordered. New section 29A(5) states: “Where...an impugned act is upheld by virtue of subsection (3) or (4), it is to be treated for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been, unimpaired by the relevant defect.” Imagine if one of the statutory instruments issued by the Health Secretary during the coronavirus crisis, which created imprisonable criminal offences, were declared illegal by a court. If a court granted one of the new remedies, this subsection would make it as though that imprisonment were always legal.”
“Ordinarily, where a court has found a measure unlawful, even if it has not been quashed, it is possible to rely on that finding of unlawfulness in other proceedings—that is called “collateral challenge”. A person who has had to pay a tax under unlawful regulations, for example, would normally be able to bring a claim against HMRC to be refunded the money. However, new section 29A(5) requires an unlawful measure to be treated as lawful. That would preclude relying on the unlawfulness of a measure in other proceedings. That raises the possibility of people being charged with a criminal offence under unlawfully made delegated legislation, for example, but not being able to raise as a defence the fact that the legislation was subsequently found to be unlawful.”
“This third and final group of amendments deals with one specific point that causes us concern, but it is a matter on which I can be relatively brief. I give notice that, subject to what the Minister has to say, we will seek a vote on amendment 15, which is the substantive amendment. Proposed new section 29A(5) provides that “Where…an impugned act is upheld”— either until the quashing takes effect in respect of a suspended quashing order, or retrospectively in respect of an prospective-only quashing order— “it is to be treated for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been unimpaired by the relevant defect.” We have significant concerns about the impact of that provision on collateral challenge, which this group of amendments would address.”
“Before the Bill comes back, it really needs to be dealt with.”
“The possibility of collateral challenges should be expressly protected by proposed new section 29A(5A), which is what amendment 15 seeks to do by ensuring that if a prospective-only or suspended quashing order is made, the illegality of the delegated legislation can be relied on. That is really the only point I need to make on this group of amendments; of course, the other amendments are consequential on amendment 15. I hope that the Minister has taken the point. I ask him, in responding, to say first whether he supports amendment 15; if he cannot, as I say, we will press it to a vote. Would he then accept that this is an issue that needs to be dealt with? It clearly is. It may be unintended, but it is nevertheless a consequence of what the Government have set out to achieve in clause 1.”
“In other words, a person could be arrested under a regulation ruled unlawful by a court, but they would not be able to use that in their defence. The IRAL report quotes Professor David Feldman, whom we heard from, on the “intuitive revulsion” felt against that state of affairs, and concludes: “We readily acknowledge that the law would be in a radically defective state if such collateral challenges to the validity of administrative action were impossible.” Clause 1 fails to protect the ability of individuals to rely on the finding of unlawfulness of a measure in other contexts—for example, as a defence to criminal proceedings. A further subsection should be included to protect collateral challenge and third-party rights and defences where a remedy under proposed new section 29A(1) is ordered.”
“Without the protection given by legislation and regulation on issues such as health and safety, the public are put at risk. Even where a case has been brought and a decision has been found unlawful, the Bill stands to threaten the ability of people to bring collateral challenges. Proposed new section 29A(5) states that when a prospective-only or suspended quashing order has been made, the unlawful act is “to be treated for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been, unimpaired by the relevant defect”, either retrospectively or until the quashing comes into effect. That situation, in which the court pretends that an unlawful decision was valid for a period of time, would appear to inhibit the ability of the person to rely on its unlawfulness in other proceedings.”
“My hon. Friend makes a very good point, and makes it better than I did. When one starts down this tinkering route—as the Government have in the Bill—and starts trying to nudge judges one way, putting in lists of qualifications and conditions with matters that have to be taken into account, altering the time period over which orders will take place, there are bound to be consequences. We have already said that there is likely to be uncertainty and satellite litigation, but genuine harm could also be caused in this way. I agree, as well, about red tape. It is all very well to try to cut through in that way—and it sounds very good when Ministers say it at the Dispatch Box—but unfortunately it leads to tragedies such as Grenfell Tower.”
“The Minister has made my point for me in drawing attention to proposed new section 29A(8) in clause 1, which does not deal with this point other than under the non-exhaustive provision— “any other matter that appears to the court to be relevant.” It is too serious and too specific to be left to be casually dealt with in that way. Therefore, I wish to press amendment 15 to a vote. I would ask the Minister to go back and look at this provision, and whether we need further, specific qualification of the kind that I have outlined that could be introduced at a later stage of the Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.”
“The Government have yet meaningfully to justify with evidence why that additional and more radical proposal was needed.”
“Despite the Government’s reference to political cases, these remedies will harm the role of individual judges in judicial review, which is to uphold the will of Parliament, ensuring that the public bodies and Government Ministers exercise their powers within the four walls of the empowering statute. If the court issues a prospective-only quashing order, it is effectively saying, “Even though the public authority acted outside the powers granted it, we must pretend that its past action was lawful and we are only going to do something about it going forward.” The power to issue quashing orders that have only prospective effect, or that have limited retrospective effect, is a power that goes well beyond what IRAL recommended.”
“When deciding whether to issue a weakened remedy or to grant an ordinary quashing order, judges would have to consider the likely future actions of a public body and would have to speculate on what administrative consequences the order would have. It is difficult to see how those judicial assessments are within the judicial expertise and experience. Indeed, some judges have previously described these assessments as a job they are ill-equipped to undertake. That would be especially regrettable and ironic, given the Government’s aim with this Bill.”
“In his speech on Second Reading, the Minister stated that the Bill supports “very important principle of judicial review”, namely “better public administration of the law in the best interests of our constituents.” —[ Official Report , 26 October 2021; Vol. 702, c. 233.] Judicial review is indeed extremely important in upholding high standards of public administration. It is an excellent incentive for public bodies to make decisions lawfully. As the Government submission to IRAL acknowledges, judicial review ensures that “care is taken to ensure that decisions are robust”, which “improves the decision”. If claimants are discouraged from bringing legitimate cases, there is a risk that standards of decision making may be lowered as a consequence of these changes.”
“First, at the time, the Health Secretary was already conducting a full merits test review into the faulty consultation process, which was considering the issues afresh and was set to make new recommendations regarding clinic closures. Given that that second review might still have recommended the closure of the clinic, a suspended order might have been thought appropriate at the time of the report. Secondly, the claimant was neither the actual Leeds clinic, nor a child denied surgery there, so a suspended order might have been adequate redress for the claimant. If a suspended order had been granted, the clinic closure would have been far longer than 12 days, putting more families through those difficulties.”
“The court held that the NHS committee’s decision to authorise the closure was unlawful due to procedural unfairness and omissions of key considerations in the consultation leading to the closure. The decision to close the clinic was quashed and paediatric heart surgeries resumed at the Leeds clinic in early 2013, shortly after the quashing order was granted. In the span of just 12 days in which the clinic was shut for surgeries due to the closure, it was reported by the BBC that 10 seriously ill children were forced to be transferred to other hospitals as far away as Newcastle and Birmingham, causing considerable difficulty to children and parents. A suspended order could have been granted in this case for two reasons.”
“It is useful to illustrate examples of injustices that might not have been addressed if this clause were in place. In 2015, new Government guidance said that non-religious beliefs could be excluded from religious education curriculums in secondary schools. Three humanist families successfully challenged the guidance, in a groundbreaking judgment that established that non-religious beliefs such as humanism should be treated with equal respect in the curriculum. Had these reforms been in place then, it could have meant that the curriculum would not have had to change for the pupils affected, and justice would not have been served. To give one other example, in the case of Save Our Surgery Ltd, the claimant was a group dedicated to preventing the closure of a clinic in Leeds that provided surgery to children with serious cardiac problems.”
“It should be noted, that while IRAL did not suggest a presumption, a list of factors also goes against the panel’s report, which said that “it would be left up to the courts to develop principles to guide them in determining in what circumstances a suspended quashing order would be awarded”. While undermining the “flexibility” that the Ministry of Justice has held up as a justification for this measure, suspended quashing orders also have the potential to introduce greater complexity and uncertainty into the currently simple system of quashing orders, and they are likely to give rise to satellite litigation. If the Government are determined to legislate to clarify that courts may suspend the effects of a quashing order, there must not be any presumption in favour of their use.”
“We have said already, and I will not go back over old ground, that in any event we are against any presumption in favour of a suspended quashing order. Proposed new section 29A(9) says that if it appears to the court that a suspended quashing order was a matter of substance, offering adequate redress in relation to the relevant case, then it must make one. Again, as has been said before, that was not recommended by IRAL. Imposing a presumption is not handing the judge additional tools, despite what Government Members say; it has the potential to hinder them from making use of the rest of their toolkit, even when it may be more appropriate to do so. The imposition of the list of factors to which the court must have regard in proposed new section 29A(8) likewise serves to hinder flexibility and discretion still further.”
“That means that the order is made, but there is a delay before it comes into effect. For example—I think we have used this example before—if a quashing order means that the rules on entitlement to social security benefit would be void, the court may suspend the quashing order to allow the Government time to make new rules that do not break the law. Quashing orders give teeth to the court’s power to vindicate the rights of citizens. The ability to suspend a quashing order is helpful, as it makes a more nuanced remedy available. This avoids a binary choice between simply refusing a remedy and opposing a remedy, which causes administrative problems. Any uncertainties can be clarified by future decisions and not via primary legislation.”
“That is why the pragmatic approach of the courts, occasionally issuing declarations in lieu of quashing orders with attendant justification, is defensible in principle as well as evident in practice. This is intuitively correct; if something is unlawful, it ought to be invalid. However, there may be some unusual cases in which a court may feel that a quashing order ought not to be made. The court has the discretion to do that. For example, if a quashing order would cause what I think the Minister called administrative chaos in a range of public actions, or indeed with many individuals, the court may instead simply make a declaration. Alternatively, it may make a quashing order but suspend its operation, allowing the public authority some time to fix the legal problem itself.”
“The difficulty was that the court had already made a concrete decision, which held that the provisions were void, and did not want to undermine that decision. The making of these orders remains at the courts’ discretion, although they have usually declined to do so, on the basis that doing so will often conflict with the fundamental principles of administrative law. It is recognised that there is debate on this point, so clarifying that suspended quashing orders are available is not an illegitimate aim. Professor Jeff King agrees with the default approach that substantial orders for relief are much better than a declaration only, but he recognises that in exceptional cases it might be justifiable to depart from that presumption.”
“Such an order would have indicated that the Regulations would be quashed within a couple of months of the Court’s judgment unless the Secretary of State in the meantime properly performed his ‘public sector equality duties’ and considered in the light of that exercise whether the Regulations needed to be revised. Such a remedy would have ensured that the Secretary of State was not left free to disregard his statutory duties in regard to the Regulations.” That may be a legitimate use of this power, but there are concerns that the possibility of making such an order was ruled out by the UK Supreme Court in Ahmed (No. 2), which was also mentioned earlier today. In that case, the court readily concluded that it has the discretion to suspend the effect of an order that it makes.”
“For example, earlier the Minister mentioned the case of Hurley and Moore, where the court found the Secretary of State to have breached his public sector equality duties in making regulations that allowed tuition fees of up to £9,000 without properly assessing the policy’s potential discriminatory impact, but declined to quash the regulations due to the expected logistical difficulties. Instead, the court just issued a declaration. The report of IRAL, which as we know was established to feed in to the Bill, says of that case: “As a remedy, a suspended quashing order would have had more teeth.”
“As it is currently drafted, the clause fails to do that and dilutes the effectiveness of judicial review as a necessary means of holding public bodies accountable for their actions and as a means of offering fair redress to victims. Through the use of suspended quashing orders, judges will be capable of allowing the unlawful conduct that led to the legal case in the first place to remain in effect. There are some exceptional cases where it may make sense to suspend the effect of a quashing order, when neither immediate quashing nor a declaration of unlawful action seems appropriate.”
“Proposed new section 29A(1)(a) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 allows for the use of suspended quashing orders, which would delay the imposition of a quashing order until a specified date. Up until the date was reached, the unlawful decision or policy would be treated as if it were valid. In the case of suspended orders, the public body would effectively be permitted to continue taking the same approach, despite that approach having been found to be unlawful, until a certain future point in time. Fundamental to the principle of justice is that if an action of a public body is found to be unlawful, the victim can expect that unlawfulness to be rectified in a timely manner.”
“We have had a good debate on the clause and I do not want to try the Committee’s patience by making a long speech. However, I would like to speak about suspended quashing orders, which we have danced around but not really touched on. I will explain why it is more appropriate to do so in this clause stand part debate. While I do not want to give away the denouement of my remarks too soon, our view is that although there are elements on both sides in relation to suspended quashing orders, we do not think, on balance, and certainly given our hostilities to the rest of clause 1, that there was enough in that to preserve clause 1. It is therefore our intention to vote against clause stand part. It depends on what the Minister has to say.”
“I have been very restrained with the Minister. He puts his case in a moderate and reasonable way: he believes that the clause will improve not just the armoury of the courts, but their performance. Why does he think that, in bringing judicial review claims, almost every claimant, organisation and practitioner does not think that, but thinks it will hamper them? Would it not be quite perverse if they were saying that without actually believing it from their own experience?”
“This amendment would provide a further list of exceptions to the ousting of the High Court’s jurisdiction that is proposed by Clause 2.”
“I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 2, page 3, line 19, at end insert— “(1A) Notwithstanding subsection (1), subsections (2) and (3) shall not apply where the party refused permission (or leave) to appeal by the Upper Tribunal was the appellant before the First-tier Tribunal and— (a) that party was without legal representation and the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal was not within legal aid scope; (b) that party was not of full age or capacity; (c) the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal was not an in-country appeal; (d) the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal was subject to any accelerated procedure; (e) the decision of the First-tier Tribunal was subject to any statutory restriction or direction concerning how that tribunal was to evaluate the credibility of the appellant or the evidence before it; or (f) the application to the Upper Tribunal raises a point of law concerning the construction of any statutory provision for interpretation of an international agreement.” This amendment is contingent on the interpretative provisions in Amendment 44.”
“The Public Law Project has questioned the empirical evidence for that and suggested that Cart judicial reviews are much more effective, with an actual figure between 2.3% and 9.2%. It is difficult to know what the true figure is, but it is conceded that the 0.22% figure is a significant underestimate. I will say more about this later. However, I felt that that there was a degree of consensus around some of the evidence we heard on Tuesday that the figure was certainly about 3%, and possibly around 5%. I will come on to what I think the significance of figures of that kind may be.”
“In the case of Cart, the Court of Appeal stated that “the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, well known to Parliament as one of the great historic artefacts of the common law, runs to statutory tribunals both in their old and in their new incarnation unless ousted by the plainest possible statutory language.” There is no such language in the 2007 Act. The Supreme Court confirmed this approach. This has led to what are known as Cart judicial reviews, whereby a decision of the upper tribunal can be judicially reviewed. There has been an on-going debate about how effective Cart judicial reviews are in catching errors of law made by the upper tribunal. The Independent Review of Administrative Law panel found that there were errors of law in only 0.22% of cases.”
“The courts have said: “It is a principle not by any means to be whittled down that the subject’s recourse to Her Majesty’s courts for the determination of his rights is not to be excluded except by clear words.” In reality, courts are adept at reading even very clear words which purport to establish an ouster clause as not actually having the effect of creating an ouster clause. The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 contained an ouster clause relating to decisions of the upper tribunal. The upper tribunal deals with appeals from the administrative appeals chamber, the immigration and asylum chamber, the lands chamber and the tax and chancery chamber.”
“Rule of law objections to ouster clauses have often been made in Parliament. For example, in relation to the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, the Constitution Committee of the House of Lords objected to an ouster clause, stating that “the Rule of Law is diminished if an aggrieved citizen is barred from challenging an allegedly unlawful decision taken by a public authority.” It is reasonable to say that ouster clauses are at odds with the rule of law. The orthodox view is therefore that courts will give effect to them only if the statutory language introducing them is absolutely clear.”
“There is very little to recommend in clause 2, unlike in clause 1, where we at least sought to find some imaginative ways of improving it. It is difficult; nevertheless, I will in a little while speak specifically to the amendments that we have tabled. However, I will start as I did with clause 1 by setting the background so that it is clear where we are coming from on the amendments and on the clause as a whole. An ouster clause is a clause in legislation that seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. The desired effect is that the subject matter of the ouster clause cannot be challenged in the courts. If given effect by the court, this would mean that the decision or action of an official in relation to that subject matter is final and cannot be challenged legally.”
“We are making splendid progress. I will again disappoint those who like cliff-hangers by saying right at the beginning what our attitude is towards clause 2. We find it concerning, both of itself and on its own merits. We believe that reversing decisions in Cart, and subjecting Cart judicial reviews to ouster, is wrong on its own merits. We also think, as the Government have perhaps unwisely said, that the clause may serve as a template for further or wider use of the ouster, possibly including in more controversial areas further on. We have an issue of practicality and an issue of principle, and are therefore very likely to vote against the clause. This short group of amendments is an attempt to improve, ameliorate and mitigate clause 2. Frankly, we found it very difficult.”
“The context is the importance of scrutiny and accountability mechanisms to hold public authorities to account. Cart judicial review is used in cases where no other right to appeal exists. This type of judicial review is a crucial safeguard against errors in the tribunal system in decisions of significant importance for the people concerned, which often involve the most fundamental rights.”
“We have been left with a Bill that is bad for claimants bringing cases, disincentivises others who have been wronged bringing their own, fetters discretion while dragging courts into matters of policy, and jettisons a vital safeguard for very little gain. There is nothing in this part of the Bill to help improve the quality of decision making. It simply risks making it worse. The judicial review aspects make up only a small amount of the Bill, but there is very little that we think can be salvaged. Clause 2 introduces the ouster in respect of decisions of the upper tribunal. That means that some decisions will now be final and cannot be appealed to another court, because the clause would abolish the Cart judicial review. The upper tribunal deals with a host of appeals from various tribunals.”
“However, as the commentator Joshua Rozenberg recently put it, commenting on a decision of the Transport Secretary on the Stonehenge case, which I have already referred to today, if the Transport Secretary “had got it right the first time, taxpayers’ money would not have been squandered.” Rather than a Minister complaining about a court rectifying unlawful decisions, it would be better to make lawful decisions in the first place. The clause would take away proper, full judicial oversight in a specific area of public decision making, leaving vulnerable individuals affected by decisions more at risk of injustice. It does so in a way that the Government explicitly state is a test run for other ouster clauses—trying to get rid of judicial oversight in other policy areas.”
“The Government said they would introduce legislation to reverse the law on Cart judicial reviews. They said that they would seek to widen ouster clauses to other areas, although accepting that they would be rare. They also said they would legislate for modifying quashing orders so that they could be suspended or have limited effect. The proposals announced by the Government appear to be more radical than those envisaged by the independent panel—I think that is true. The Lord Chancellor recently suggested that there may be more reforms to come on judicial review. His view was that judicial review meant that public money was being squandered, as courts are overturning Government decisions.”
“I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point. We did hear a number of different figures. I am now stretching my memory to recall exactly who said what. Was it Professor Feldman who said 30% to 50%, and Dr Morgan who posited 5%? I cannot quite remember. However, yes, there are different success rates for different types of judicial review. The point is that, even if the figure is small, Cart judicial reviews are important—I will come on to that more fully. However, if it is 5%, that is not a negligible figure. One in 20 is still a lot of cases. I am going to give some case examples to show the type of case that we are dealing with here. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will be persuaded that there are sufficient by way of number and variety or that the compelling facts of the cases are such that he would want to retain Cart reviews. We will see.”
“I am not sure I have bought into that. I know it has become a mantra in the Bill, but I am not sure I have bought into the cherry analogy. I would rather say it is horses for courses.”
“Bolting the stable door—whatever. If the hon. Member for Burnley gives me a few more moments, he will see that my argument is that the way the Supreme Court has configured this is sensible, because it works. There is a problem with Cart and Cart cases. Far from being otiose or an extravagance, the ability to review these cases is very necessary.”
“I have said, and I am coming back to the issue, that it is right and just to maintain Cart judicial reviews, but I will come on to the issue of cost shortly and whether that is appropriate. I hope that will answer the hon. Gentleman’s question.”
“The result of these appeals may decide whether someone has the means to live and to be housed, or whether they may be deported, separated from their family and face potential mistreatment, and the Government are not unaware of that.”
“In short, the streamlined procedure for Cart judicial reviews, together with the high test for permission in Cart cases, provides a proportionate means of achieving the aim, which the Government commend, of ensuring some overall judicial supervision of the decisions of the upper tribunal in order to guard against the risk that errors of law of real significance slip through the system. An entirely appropriate and proportionate amount of judicial resource is used in identifying and correcting errors of law that would have potentially catastrophic consequences for the individuals concerned. As I have said, it is not just the number of cases but their nature that is concerning. Many relate to immigration and asylum. Many of the remainder concern access to benefits for the disabled and others facing destitution.”
“That is in the context of immigration Cart JRs for 2018-19, minus cases pending an appeal decision in the upper tribunal. Therefore, based on those figures and a more accurate definition of success, which still does not account for settlement, the success rate is 7.37%—more than double the 3.4% that the Government now rely on, and more than 30 times the original figure cited by IRAL. In addition, there is required to be an arguable case that has a reasonable prospect of success.”
“The potential injustices at stake concern the most fundamental rights and may literally be a matter of life and death. The cases that succeed in a Cart judicial review will also, by definition, involve important points of law or practice, which would otherwise not be considered, or compelling reasons such as the complete breakdown of fair procedure. Cart JRs have several purposes, including the identification of errors of law in upper tribunal permission decisions where important issues of principle or practice are raised. That will be achieved if the upper tribunal’s refusal of permission to appeal is quashed. The impact assessment states that of a total of 92 cases, out of 1,249 applications, 48 were remitted to the upper tribunal for permission to appeal decisions.”