John Glen
MP for Salisbury · Conservative · United Kingdom
“I welcome the Chief Secretary to her new position, but what words of comfort could she give the residents of Salisbury in Wiltshire, a unitary authority? We are not part of a combined authority and we do not have a metro mayor.”
“Sam Moody is my constituent. He is the chief executive of Rockhopper. During my time in this House, he has been absolutely scrupulous in following the laws of this country and respecting the Falkland Islanders.”
“I listened carefully to what the Minister said about the process, and I respect that. But most people who take a pretty level-headed, pragmatic view of the need for a transition over time still cannot get their heads around the short-term reality: when we have so much turmoil in the middle east, why would we extend the time that we are no…”
“It is 55 days till the Budget. Given the market’s reaction to the Prime Minister’s statement on Tuesday, and given that our gilt rates are higher than those of our peers in the G7, could we have a debate on the implications of higher taxes for growth?”
“Before the hon. Lady makes her statement on Thursday, will she, when reflecting on the arrangement in Wiltshire that would embrace Wessex—although we have been told that that is not the Government’s view—address the prevailing concern that the people of rural Wiltshire will be considerably worse off without having the opportunity to embra…”
“I recognise that the Minister wants to come to what the Government are going to do, but does he not accept that the decisions already made in the last two years—with respect to the price of employment and the national living wage, the cost of employment with regard to legislation, and business rates—have depressed the appetite of many sma…”
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“At the same time, the FCA published a consultation paper on proposals that will strengthen the oversight that principals have over their appointed representatives, or ARs, and the information available to consumers on the FCA register when dealing with these firms. That call for evidence is essentially gathering information from interested parties and it closed a few weeks ago on 3 March. The Treasury and the FCA are working together to consider the responses, and to set out the next steps in due course and as urgently as we can. I will also speak a little bit about the role of the FCA, which, as the House will be aware, is an independent regulator, and of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme.”
“That will give consumers clarity on what activities they can legitimately discuss with the appointed representative firm and ensure that they know there is regulatory oversight. As we know, Sense was not found to be at fault in its role as a principal, as Mr Greig was acting outside the Sense-Midas agreement. The right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland has spoken about the role of the principal, and the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn asked what the Treasury is doing about this issue, following the Select Committee report last summer. We are undertaking a review of the appointed representative regime and examining how consumers are protected when dealing with an appointed representative and not directly with the authorised firm. On 3 December, we published a call for evidence on the regime as a whole.”
“I hope I am coming to that point. The right hon. Gentleman addresses the core point, which is about the comfort that the appointed representative regime provides to the consumer, and the Treasury and FCA are taking steps to ensure that use of the appointed representative regime is not open to abuse. The relationship between a principal firm and the appointed representatives, including what regulated activities it covers, should be available to the public. That will now be a regulatory requirement, and the FCA is taking steps to improve the information that is available to the public by clarifying what the appointed representative firm is authorised by the principal—in this case, Sense—to undertake and what it is therefore not authorised to undertake.”
“It will always be the case that the Government will need to work with regulators to create an environment that protects consumers while allowing firms to operate. What we have to do—and, since the new chief executive came in about 17 months ago, work has been going on urgently at the FCA to do this—is to undertake a transformation programme to allow the FCA to examine risks across the authorised firms and act more effectively than its predecessor organisation, the FSA, did in this particular case. I hope that is helpful to the House this morning.”
“I think that I have expressed with clarity that this has been an extremely challenging case for everyone involved. I acknowledge unequivocally that Mr Greig’s fraudulent scheme will have caused great misery to the investors he misled, and it is absolutely right that he was brought to justice. I am pleased that so many of those who made losses have been compensated by the FSCS, and I hope they can now put it behind them. The Government are not complacent about this. I have gone into some detail about the lessons that we need to learn. We will work alongside other financial authorities to counter fraud and ensure that cases such as these are prevented wherever possible and that, where they do occur, they are dealt with appropriately.”
“I hope we can learn from this very sad case that, going forward, we will bring more clarity to the appointed representative regime and more clarity to consumers. Of course, consumer care is important. However, we also have to recognise that the FCA is responsible for around 51,000 authorised firms. Of course, the role of some of those authorised firms in acting as principals for appointed representatives needs examination: as I have set out, the Treasury and the FCA are undertaking that. It would be pretty impossible for every appointed representative to undergo the same sort of supervision as an authorised firm—that would expand the scale of the FCA’s responsibilities. We have to make sure that authorised firms’ responsibilities to their appointed representatives are more effective.”
“The Government work closely with the FCA. As I have said, we are taking very seriously the implications of this case and the relationship between the principal and the appointed representative, as well as the apparent lack of clarity over what consumers know to be covered by that delegated authority of the principal to the appointed representative. The right hon. Gentleman is referring to the relationship between two entities: the FSA and the FCA. The FCA acknowledges the FSA’s prior failings to do the job as it should have. The right hon. Gentleman is asking me to comment on the eligibility of the victims to access the FCA compensation scheme, which is clearly something that is governed by its protocols.”
“We continue to review and reform our regulatory and enforcement approach to ensure that, as illicit finance evolves, our responses do too. We have announced an unprecedented package of sanctions, including against prominent Russian oligarchs. Last night, we brought forward the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 to crack down further, and we will continue to do further work on the economic crime Bill in the next session. We have also brought a new kleptocracy cell into the National Crime Agency to tackle those explicit threats.”
“The Government have worked closely with the US and the EU on a whole range of interventions. We have sanctioned 500 individuals and entities, including 386 members of the Russian state Duma. We have also worked with the US on the expulsion of banks from the SWIFT banking system, cut off 3 million Russian companies from capital markets and seen $250 billion wiped of Russian stocks. We will continue to work closely with our allies to ensure that our response continues to be comprehensive.”
“We worked to give widespread support to lots of individuals across the economy. I cannot give the hon. Lady the exact chapter and verse on individuals who have been supported, but we will continue to work on Companies House reform, which will be the most significant reform of the companies register in 170 years, and later this year we will publish a second economic crime plan and fraud action plan to address the threats that we continue to see.”
“He is not doing that. The schemes were set up in various ways, depending on the size of businesses, and it will be for the individuals who borrowed money to engage with the lenders to refinance those loans on a case-by-case basis.”
“As ever, the hon. Gentleman has made a powerful point about a very important matter. Work with our allies is ongoing to establish how we can deepen our response in a co-ordinated way in order to make a real impact on illicit finance.”
“Trustees are required to update the register within certain time limits, if the information held on the register relating to the individuals involved in the trust changes. In recognition of the fact that such changes are often triggered by traumatic life events—for example, bereavements—the instrument extends the time limit so that trustees will have 90 days to report such changes to HMRC. Lastly, the instrument makes changes to the categories of trusts that are excluded from registration. Certain types of trusts that pose an inherently low risk of money laundering are excluded from registration.”
“Today’s statutory instrument amends the money laundering regulations to ensure that the trust registration service operates as effectively as possible as an anti-money laundering tool, striking the right balance between the public interest of tackling money laundering and the right to privacy of those who use trusts for legitimate purposes. First, to ensure that trustees have sufficient time to gather the necessary information and complete the registration process, the instrument extends the registration deadline for those types of trusts newly required to register until 1 September 2022. Secondly, the instrument extends the time limits for reporting changes to the information held on the register.”
“However, they can also be used to conceal the true beneficial ownership of assets, and therefore to impede law enforcement as it investigates money laundering and terrorist financing. The trust registration service addresses that risk by providing law enforcement with a key source of up-to-date information on the beneficial ownership of assets held in trusts. As a result of changes introduced in 2020, the trust registration service has been expanded so that most types of UK express trusts are now required to register. In addition, overseas trusts with certain connections to the UK, including the acquisition of land or property in the UK, are now for the first time required to register.”
“We have taken significant action to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing and to strengthen the response of the whole financial system to economic crime. Front and centre to those efforts are the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017—the money laundering regulations—which are a key part of our legislative framework, and set out a number of measures with which businesses and trusts must comply to make the UK an inhospitable place for money laundering and terrorist financing. Those measures include the requirement for trusts to register with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ trust registration service. Trusts are an integral feature of the UK’s legal system and are used for a wide range of legitimate purposes.”
“I beg to move, That the Committee has considered the draft Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2022. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Robertson. The Government recognise the threat that economic crime poses to the UK, and are committed to combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Illicit finance not only risks damaging our reputation as a fair and open economy, but poses a threat to our national security by undermining the integrity and stability of our financial markets and institutions. Illicit finance also has significant social and economic costs through its links to serious and organised crime, and can reduce opportunities for legitimate business in the United Kingdom. That is why the Government are focused on making the UK a hostile environment for illicit finance.”
“I thank Committee members for their examination of this important piece of legislation. In summary, the instrument will amend the money laundering regulations as they relate to trust registration to ensure that the regulations strike an appropriate balance between providing an effective anti-money laundering tool for law enforcement and minimising the administrative burden on those who use trusts for legitimate purposes. This amendment will enable the money laundering regulations to continue to work as effectively as possible to protect the UK financial system and allow the UK to continue to play a leading role in the fight against economic crime. I hope colleagues will join me in supporting this legislation.”
“I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. I am aware of the tension regarding the application of rules designed to keep our banking system both clean and accessible. It has come to my attention in a number of ways over recent weeks and months, and in particular the issue of accounts being difficult to set up for charities and small community organisations. I intend to convene a roundtable with the banks to examine the issue and ensure that the interpretation of these legitimate restraints against abuse does not impede access to banking for our constituents. This instrument just makes some small changes to the existing categories of excluded trusts to ensure that the burden of registration is proportionate to the money laundering risk that certain types of trust pose.”
“It is clear that HMRC has had an enormous task over the last two years to deliver some pretty complex interventions. The regulations simply give an extension on those registration deadlines. I am not convinced that there is an enduring IT problem in HMRC; there is an administrative necessity consequential to a particular failure. The hon. Member for Glenrothes picked me up on the use of certain language. It was not my intention to be provocative, but it is my sincere wish to convey the absolute frustration that we feel and our desire to shut down loopholes that allow bad actors to enter our financial system.”
“Indeed, the regulations set out 23 different exclusions: this is not an exhaustive list, but it includes pension trusts, insurance trusts, registrable charitable trusts and trusts meeting certain legislative requirements. When the trust service was set up, the register of beneficial ownership of trusts—the trust registration service—was established five years ago. We have now seen 200,000 taxable trusts registered. It is the case that it is perfectly legitimate for some of those trusts to be excluded. There is a matter of the legitimate privacy for some of the trustees, but that does not prevent law enforcement or regulated entities from being able to access them. I think that there is a question here about the IT service. The hon. Members for Wallasey and for Hampstead and Kilburn mentioned that.”
“It is the Government’s view that this amendment will assist in ensuring that the money laundering regulations operate as effectively as possible and continue to protect the financial system from the threat posed by money laundering and terrorist financing, and that will allow the UK to continue to play its part in the fight against economic crime. The hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn mentioned several points made by Transparency International and other organisations about access to trust information. The SI will extend the existing exclusion for insurance trusts to exclude all healthcare policies in trust and will clarify how the exclusion applies to certain retirement policies and life policies with temporary disablement cover. The SI also adds a new exclusion for trusts created in the course of opening child bank accounts.”
“I will endeavour to cover the points raised by the hon. Members for Hampstead and Kilburn, for Glenrothes, and for Wallasey. I acknowledge that a number of those points refer to the broader canvas of economic crime and I shall try to deal succinctly with those, respecting the fact that the Treasury Committee published a report last week, on which the Government will reflect and respond in due course. There is an obligation and, indeed, a determination on my part to bring forward a broader money laundering SI later this year.”
“That is a reasonable observation. I think, however, that the hon. Gentleman’s frustration echoes mine; I have been in this job over four years, and I was before the Treasury Committee on 29 November referring to some of these imperatives, which had been thrown into focus by the FATF report in December 2018. We need to make further interventions. I cannot prejudge the outcome or the business managers, as I think the hon. Member for Wallasey knows, but the point is that this is an absolute imperative from where I stand in the Treasury. We do need this legislation to deal with the broader issues that are outstanding.”
“We have got to get that balance right, but I recognise the challenges outstanding. On a broader canvas, at a later point, I will address those points. I hope that the Committee has found this debate informative and will support the regulations. I commend the regulations to the Committee. Question put and agreed to . Resolved, That the Committee has considered the draft Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2022.”
“I welcome the hon. Lady’s intervention on this subject. I am happy to recognise her characterisation of the diffused responsibilities in the report. There are observations and questions about many interactions. That is something for the Government to reflect on, as we will do in our response. The hon. Member for Glenrothes referred to parliamentary time. Fixing some of these things will take a bit more than a few hours, but the point he is making is that there is a will to do this, and I recognise that. This is a modest set of changes to deal with an administrative problem with one part of this Government’s response to a challenge. We are one of the most open jurisdictions for financial services. We employ 2.3 million people in financial services and 7.4% of jobs in the UK are in financial services.”
“I hold regular discussions, usually on a six-weekly basis, with the chief executive of the Financial Conduct Authority on a range of issues regarding the regulation of financial markets, including the insurance market.”
“The FCA has been looking at this matter, and last week my colleague the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities wrote to the FCA to ask it to look at whether there is a market failure. Since then, it has written back, with the Competition and Markets Authority, to say that they are engaging with the industry and will produce a statement on the matter in due course. I recognise the concerns that the hon. Member has raised and the dysfunctionality that may exist in the market, and it is important that that is looked at carefully.”
“We are making progress. We are in deep conversations with the Prudential Regulation Authority and its actuaries on the way that the risk margin and the matching adjustments should be altered to release that additional capital. We are confident that progress will be made and we are also working closely with the insurance industry to see that that comes to pass.”
“My hon. Friend, who has great expertise in this area, makes a reasonable point. The Government’s Help to Save scheme is under way, but the Government continue to work very closely with the Money and Pensions Service to look at new ways of increasing financial resilience and getting young people to understand the opportunities of saving earlier.”
“I am grateful to be able to confirm to the hon. Lady, as I have on numerous occasions in Committees over the last two or three years, that this is a key priority for us in the Treasury. Obviously, as the Chancellor said, we cannot comment on future legislative agendas, but the measures she mentions, picking up on the Financial Action Task Force report from 2018 with respect to Companies House, are something we agree with.”
“I thank my hon. Friend for his question. He has a long-standing interest in the issue. The difference between the two is that people received compensation from Equitable Life on the basis of relative losses, which is the gap between what they received from their policy and what they could have expected from investing in a similar product. With LCF, the bondholders were expected to lose the majority of their principal investment and stood to get less back than they put in. The schemes were looked at in the context of their respective instruments and appropriate support was given. There are no plans to open up compensation for Equitable Life again.”
“Indeed, I am glad that so many were. That did not involve recklessness, but know your customer, AML and anti-fraud checks. The bounce back loans helped 1.5 million businesses through the crisis. As the Paymaster General pointed out, the sheer volume of schemes that we introduced and the speed at which they were designed and implemented meant that it was not possible to prevent every instance of fraud and error.”
“I think back to the reality of the situation in March, April and May 2020, when the first iteration of the CBILS met with delays; it did so because banks, following the previous crisis, had been forced and indeed constituted to do affordability checks. There was an outcry of anxiety, quite reasonably, from business owners and individuals up and down this country, and from hon. Members across the House. As a consequence, the Government recognised that we needed to develop a new iteration of that particular support, involving a 100% guarantee. We had conversations with the shadow Chancellor at the time about certain measures that needed to be taken to accommodate some of the challenges in getting that scheme to work quickly. We did so in full knowledge that the speed of delivery was critical if businesses were to be protected.”
“That is also why we are opening up opportunities to all through our transformative levelling-up agenda and our plan for jobs, and why we are focused on building back better and stronger from the coronavirus. All those policies and ambitions are underpinned by a pledge we made to the British people to safeguard our nation’s finances, so I turn now to the specifics of the debate. First, I address the matter of covid-related fraud. Our covid support schemes have safeguarded millions of jobs and livelihoods throughout the country during the most difficult of periods. Our priority during the pandemic was always to ensure that support swiftly reached the businesses and individuals who needed it most.”
“It is a privilege to close this debate on behalf of the Government. I thank the 14 Back-Bench Members who made contributions this afternoon; I listened carefully to all those speeches, and I will try to address many of their points in the next few minutes. I particularly thank my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland (Jerome Mayhew) for his thoughtful speech. I think it is clear that we are united in our recognition of the importance of tackling the twin scourges of fraud and waste, and I start by taking this opportunity to remind the House why we consider it a matter of great importance. This Government are ambitious for this country; that is why, during the pandemic, we sprang into action to save the economy, rapidly unleashing more than £400 billion in a package of support to protect jobs and businesses.”
“It would have caused further delay—in some cases, not just weeks but months—and would have led to serious harm for many SMEs at a time of what we all acknowledge was acute crisis. Subsequently, however, we have given the Insolvency Service and Companies House new powers to prevent rogue company directors from escaping liability for their loans by winding down their businesses. We have invested £4.9 million in the National Investigation Service to probe serious fraud and it has recovered £3.1 million in the last year alone.”
“Some £2.2 billion of potentially fraudulent bounce back loan applications were blocked through up-front checks and extra fraud checks were introduced in relation to the bounce back scheme at the earliest practical point. The Government categorically do not accept the suggestion, however, that those checks could have been part of the scheme at its launch. I have spoken to officials on several occasions over the last two years about what more could have been done at the inception of those schemes. The extra checks that we put in place as quickly as we could would have delayed the start of the schemes, which were already delayed because of the circumstances I explained earlier.”
“When we designed the schemes, it was clear that we had to put in reasonable measures around the identity of individuals and that we had to allow people to self-report their turnover. The whole conversation with the banks was designed to ensure that that money was available as quickly as possible while not being reckless with those finances. We did it on the basis that, inevitably, there would be a measure of fraud. I am grateful for the measured way in which the hon. Gentleman speaks in the House. I cannot give a specific answer to his question, but that explains the context in which the schemes were designed. The measures that we put in place were robust and comprehensive. There was no one single point in time where we said, “We’ve got everything right”—I would never stand at this Dispatch Box and say that.”
“We are right to take this action to fulfil that enduring commitment to the economy, to the country and to every citizen. Question put and agreed to. Resolved, That this House agrees with the remarks of Lord Agnew of Oulton in his resignation letter that the Government’s record on tackling fraud is lamentable; recognises the vast amount of taxpayers’ money that has been lost to waste and fraud since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, including the estimated £4.3 billion recently written off from Treasury-backed Covid business support schemes; notes the Government’s unacceptable record of poor procurement over the last decade, including £13 billion wasted on defence projects; further notes the warnings the Chancellor received in 2020 regarding the serious weaknesses allowing for public funds to be diverted to criminal enterprises; calls on the Government to set out a strategy to recover all taxpayers’ money obtained by criminal groups and to fully engage with a thorough National Crime Agency investigation into all issues related to the fraudulent exploitation of the covid-19 support schemes; and further calls on the Chancellor of the Exchequer to make a statement to this House before 31 March 2022 detailing how much taxpayers’ money has been successfully retrieved.”
“Equally, we are sharpening our tools to deal with the scourge of economic crime. We are committed to delivering reforms through the economic crime plan and the forthcoming fraud action plan and, thanks to the spending review settlement and private sector contributions, as has been mentioned, we have an additional £400 million to tackle such crime over the next spending review period. I repeat my thanks to Members across the House for participating today. I have listened very carefully to their remarks and will reflect carefully on them. There can be no doubt that fraud and waste hamper a Government’s efforts to change lives and transform a country for the better. That is why we are focused on combating those threats to our national wellbeing, while working hard at boosting efficiency across every part of Government.”
“As somebody who was a member of the Defence Committee for a couple of years and attended the Royal College of Defence Studies course, I take a great interest in these matters personally. My hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (Simon Fell) mentioned the complexity of some of the procurements and the evolving scope of individual projects—sometimes, at the inception of these capabilities, their formation is not fully known, so it is a particularly challenging element of Government spending. However, the National Audit Office has noted the progress that we have made so far. The financial settlement of the 2020 spending review is helping the Ministry of Defence to move to a sound financial footing and we are focused on driving improvements that will result in greater value for money.”
“However, as has been mentioned today, the pace of this roll-out involved a change in risk appetite, and meant that Treasury Ministers and officials had to make calculated judgments on how to apply that spending control. It was not business as usual. None the less, at all times, the principles set out in “Managing Public Money” continued to apply, DHSC took decisions on the basis of sound advice and all transactions were approved by the Cabinet Office and the DHSC clearance board. We will continue to combat fraud in that area. We will pursue any contracts where there has been a technical failure or other breach, and we will not hesitate to take legal action against suppliers where needed. I will finish on some of the other aspects included in the motion, starting with defence.”
“The NCA has investigated cases of fraud against the schemes and contributed to 13 arrests in relation to bounce back scheme fraud. The Treasury has worked closely with the Home Office on the law enforcement response to fraud, and I agree that the NCA should continue to pursue cases of serious fraud against bounce back loan schemes. As part of the 2020 spending review, the Government committed a further £63 million to the Home Office to tackle economic crime, including fraud. I now want to address some of the points raised on procurement; the motion talks about public procurement. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Paymaster General said, we take our duty extremely seriously. On personal protective equipment, our focus during the crisis—rightly—was on saving lives and protecting our healthcare workers.”
“We are taking decisive action to recoup it. We have invested more than £100 million in a taxpayer protection taskforce, which has over 1,200 HMRC staff focused on combating fraud. Make no mistake: this is one of the biggest and swiftest responses to a fraud risk ever made by HMRC. In fact, over 13,000 one-to-one inquiries were set up in the last tax year, and already the taskforce has contacted over 75,000 people, some of whom could face criminal prosecutions. Meanwhile, HMRC has already recovered over £500 million through a host of other robust measures, and I know that it will continue to consider every avenue when it comes to recouping money lost through fraud and error. The motion refers to an NCA investigation. I stress that we have not prevented the NCA from investigating fraud associated with covid-19 support schemes.”
“I pay tribute to the hon. Lady’s work to highlight the inadequacies, which she reflected in her amusing but serious speech about Companies House reform. She knows my view, which I have stated numerous times, including at Treasury questions earlier today, that the reform of Companies House is an urgent priority. That is why, in the last spending review, the Treasury gave an extra just over £60 million to start that process. More needs to be done and legislation will be required to fulfil that process. I will now address the motion’s claim that the Treasury has written off £4.3 billion in the furlough scheme and other HMRC-delivered covid support schemes, which could not be further from the truth. As the Chancellor has previously said, no, we are not ignoring that money and no, we are definitely not writing it off.”
“Importantly, throughout the pandemic we have been transparent about the estimated level of fraud and error in the covid schemes, and HMRC’s annual report and accounts, which were laid before the House in November last year, included the latest information on error and fraud in the HMRC-administered covid-19 schemes. Figures on estimated losses and the bounce back loans, including those due to fraud, were published in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy’s annual reports and accounts. Given the unprecedented efforts that the Government have made to protect jobs and livelihoods during this pandemic, it would have been impossible to prevent all related fraud. However, we have taken reasonable steps, and will continue to do so, to deflect and combat that fraud, and we will continue to be vigilant.”
“The value of prevented fraud was £2.2 billion, and we continue to recover further funds through our counter-fraud work. In addition, as part of the spring Budget last year, we announced plans to significantly strengthen enforcement activity against fraudulent bounce back loans. That included introducing processes with the Insolvency Service to prevent the fraudulent dissolution of companies being used as a means to escape liabilities, granting the Insolvency Service new powers and investing further in the National Investigation Service.”
“That included cut-off dates around scheme eligibility and the need for customers to be registered for pay-as-you-earn online or self-assessment. In 2020-21, HMRC recovered £536 million of over-claimed grants. To further bolster anti-fraud measures, at the spring Budget last year, the Government invested more than £100 million in a taxpayer protection taskforce of more than 1,200 HMRC staff to combat covid-related fraud. This taskforce is expected to recover between £800 million and £1 billion from fraudulent or incorrect payments during 2021-22 and 2022-23. The Government’s bounce back loan scheme supported more than £46 billion of finance to 1.5 million businesses. We are continuing to actively work with the British Business Bank, lenders and fraud authorities to tackle fraud and to recover loans obtained fraudulently.”
“Since March 2020, the Government have delivered a comprehensive multibillion-pound package to support individuals and businesses during the pandemic. As the House would expect, the Government have taken the issue of potential fraud relating to covid grant schemes extremely seriously. Robust measures were put in place to control error and fraud in the key covid support schemes from their inception. For instance, to minimise the risk of fraud and error and unverified claims, the coronavirus job retention scheme and self-employment income support scheme were designed in a way to prevent ineligible claims being made up front, and made grants for employees and businesses using existing data held on Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ systems.”