Karin Smyth
MP for Bristol South · Labour · United Kingdom
“Absolutely, and I am committed to working with my hon. Friend and many other hon. Members across the House. I was pleased to meet my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester Withington (Jeff Smith) to discuss his amendments concerning medicines.”
“As the hon. and learned Gentleman knows—we have spent many long hours in this place discussing the arrangements with regard to our leaving the European Union—there are different regulations, as a result of Brexit, between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.”
“They provide a clearer legal framework for the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency to share information with UK health systems, organisations and trusted international partners.”
“I thank my hon. Friend for her best wishes and commend the work that she and many other Members are doing directly with their trusts to understand the impact of the work that we are doing to bring down those waiting lists and improve access for patients.”
“Member for Gosport (Dame Caroline Dinenage), who spoke powerfully on behalf of the whole House; I commend the work that she has done. My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Haltemprice (Emma Hardy) has spoken to me in great detail about this issue, as has my hon.”
“I will carry on. As the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham knows well, provisions are already in place to appropriately control access to puberty-suppressing hormones for children and young people presenting with gender incongruence or dysphoria. Children and young people with gender incongruence deserve evidence-based care.”
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“The regulatory function is underpinned by the NHS provider licence, which will continue when NHS England’s functions pass to the Secretary of State. That is why we do not consider that the removal of the council of governors will have a negative impact on the governance of FTs, as some hon. Members have suggested.”
“As I said in previous sittings, a debate will continue to be had about where we most effectively have that, but our intention throughout the 10-year health plan and this Bill is about devolution to providers and to ICBs and about making boards, as I also said in a previous sitting, responsible and accountable for the outcomes. Let me outline broadly, because I think this is of interest to people, the impact on governance and the role that governors had. Just to be clear, since the creation of foundation trusts in 2004, NHS England—and, before it, NHS Improvement and Monitor—has had a statutory role to oversee the governance of NHS foundation trusts, including holding the whole board to account and taking steps where it identifies weaknesses in how foundation trusts are being run.”
“I think I am almost going to agree with the hon. Gentleman on his final point. It is important that local people have confidence in how their local systems are run and managed and, clearly, in the outcomes. I will come first to the issue of governors and boards and then move to the amendments. I think we have all had emails, as is quite right, from local board members. Let me say, as I did earlier, that that is with good intent; they are very good people, who have given public service to be part of their local health system. As I said, this provision is no judgment on them; it is, as we heard, about effectively making the really important patient voice and patient experience central to the functions of the organisations delivering our healthcare.”
“Civil servants serve and advise the Government, and act on behalf of Ministers, but it is for Ministers to take decisions and to be held accountable to Parliament for the performance of the NHS. The civil service will run fair, open and equitable campaigns to fulfil these roles and will recommend appropriate candidates to Ministers. Ministers are under a duty to comply with public law principles and to act reasonably, and will adhere to the Nolan principles, including objectivity, transparency and integrity, in discharging this function. The practical arrangements for appointments are being developed as part of the transition planning for the integration of NHS England’s functions into the Department, and will be based on these principles. It would therefore be inappropriate to exclude Ministers entirely from the appointments process.”
“I will move on, if I may. I think my response will the cover the issues raised in the debate. On amendment 36 and new clause 59, I note the concern that the Secretary of State could act inappropriately when making appointments to the boards of ICBs and NHS trusts and foundation trusts. We discussed democratic accountability in a previous sitting, and at the end of the day it is up to the British public whom they elect to Parliament and as the governing party. Transparency and democratic accountability are at the heart of our reforms. It would not be right for the civil service to be given sole legislative responsibility for appointments to NHS trusts, foundation trusts or integrated care boards. Ministers are democratically accountable to Parliament, and civil servants act on their behalf under the Carltona principle.”
“As the Committee will appreciate, organisational change, whether through authorisation to foundation trust status or through acquisition, can bring real benefits for local services, but it can also create a practical issue at financial year end. The predecessor body will have ceased to exist in its previous form and so will not be in a position to complete and sign off its final set of accounts. Clause 34 addresses that gap by making clear where responsibility sits—”
“I should note that the existing capital backstop on which it builds has never been used. The purpose here is not routine financial management, but assurance. By ensuring that foundation trust freedoms operate within a viable and sustainable framework, the clause helps protect those freedoms rather than undermine them. Finally, clause 34 makes straightforward but important provision about financial accountability when NHS organisations change legal form. It requires an NHS foundation trust that has been newly authorised, or that has recently acquired an NHS trust or another NHS foundation trust, to prepare the final accounts for its predecessor organisation.”
“The Department must therefore ensure it has in place robust tools to oversee the finances of the health service, to reassure taxpayers and Parliament that public money is being managed effectively and to ensure that the Department can meet its financial obligations. The power will remain subject to strong safeguards, including a mandatory consultation period with the foundation trust before any order is made, the requirement for any order made to be published, and detailed statutory guidance setting out the circumstances in which the power would be used and how limits would be determined. Crucially, this is a last-resort measure. This power would be used only in exceptional circumstances—for example, when the Secretary State thinks there is a risk of breaching a departmental delegated expenditure limit.”
“It does that by updating sections 42B and 42C of the NHS Act 2006 so that the existing last-resort statutory capital spending limit for foundation trusts can also apply to revenue expenditure for a given year. Foundation trusts account for a substantial proportion of NHS revenue spending, at around 40%, and continue to benefit from significant operational autonomy, including the freedom to retain and reinvest surpluses. We remain committed to seeing those freedoms expanded further through our advanced foundation trust programme. However, this strengthened power ensures we have a financial framework that makes it easier to consider additional freedoms.”
“NHS foundation trusts are already required to publish the information provided on this register, and where a foundation trust is placed into special administration the administrator is required to publish its report. As a result, the additional requirement to maintain a register is unnecessary, burdensome and duplicative, providing the public with no new information. For those reasons we are removing that bureaucratic duty in the Bill. On clause 33 stand part, the Department of Health and Social Care, like all Departments of State, has a responsibility to diligently and responsibly steward taxpayer’s money in delivering services to the public. Clause 33 updates and strengthens existing legislation to make sure we have the statutory tools we need in order to effectively manage and oversee the finances of the NHS.”
“This means that foundation trusts will in future be subject to the same auditing requirements as trusts and integrated care boards, ensuring a clear, consistent and transparent framework for local audit across NHS provider organisations. Taken together, these measures strengthen consistency in financial reporting and audit assurance across the NHS provider sector, while preserving the independence of the local audit process. Clause 32 repeals provisions of the NHS Act 2006, requiring NHS England to maintain a register of NHS foundation trusts and a power to charge fees related to maintaining the register. The register formed a repository of documents that related to how foundation trusts were governed and regulated. However, removing the requirements does not mean there will be no transparency.”
“I will address clauses 31 to 34 and schedule 4 together. Clause 31 ensures that NHS foundation trusts are subject to the same robust, transparent audit regimes as other NHS bodies. Together with schedule 4, clause 31 makes provision about the audit of NHS foundation trust accounts, which is needed as a consequence of the abolition of NHS England and the removal of the requirement for NHS foundation trusts to have councils of governors and members. Schedule 4 does that by removing the current bespoke provisions related to the auditing arrangements for the accounts of foundation trusts and amends the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 so that foundation trusts are subject to the auditing regime under that Act.”
“I will start where I left off. Clause 34 addresses the gap by making it clear where responsibility sits, so that there is no doubt about who must produce the final accounts and ensure that they are completed properly, and about how those accounts should be audited. We think this is a proportionate provision to ensure continuity and clarity on how NHS money has been managed during organisational transition. I commend the clauses to the Committee.”
“It is a usual process for the Department to go through, as anyone who has sat on the Public Accounts Committee will know. Adherence to the departmental expenditure limit creates and maintains the necessary environment for the foundation trust to exist. Question put and agreed to. Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 4 agreed to. Clauses 32 to 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 35 Conversion of failing NHS foundation trust into NHS trust Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“The Committee can be assured that financial control is important. The shadow Minister referred to limits. Of course they are overall limits; the Secretary of State does not go line by line through what a trust spends. I understand the point that people are trying to make to conflate some situations, but of course it is an overall limit. The safeguards in these provisions are designed to protect foundation trusts’ freedoms and not constrain them, but a foundation trust can enjoy such freedoms only if it is in a well-overseen and stable NHS financial system. By including a backstop for use in exceptional circumstances, clause 33 helps to safeguard public funds and will help the Department to meet its financial obligations, which I think hon. Members understand.”
“I thank the shadow Minister for in general, I think, agreeing that the alignment of many of these processes is quite sensible. The shadow Minister talked in general terms about financial controls. The Government take financial controls and our responsibility for taxpayers’ money very seriously. As I said last week, from very early on, we were very keen to ensure that there is a grip on NHS finances in order to properly deliver the sort of healthcare that all our constituents deserve. We take that very seriously. There has not been that sort of grip at board level and through the system in recent years. As a result of the measures that we have taken, I think this is the first year in six or more years that the NHS has not gone back to the Department for additional funds to get through the year.”
“The Secretary of State is also required to consult the CQC before making an order, ensuring that independent expertise on quality and safety informs decisions and that intelligence on service performance is co-ordinated. The provisions in the Bill ensure that the process remains fit for purpose, proportionate, and aligned across NHS trusts and foundation trusts. They support faster, more coherent decision making in the most serious cases, with the aim of protecting patients and securing sustainable, high-quality services for the future. Taken together, the clauses provide the necessary tools for the Secretary of State to take proportionate, swift and decisive action in the event of provider failure. I therefore commend these clauses to the Committee.”
“They align more closely the processes for trusts and foundation trusts, and set out a simpler process in relation to the administrator’s draft report, consultation and final report. They also require, as is the case now, that key documents and decisions are published and laid before Parliament. That will help ensure proper and meaningful scrutiny of the TSA process and outcomes. It also helps ensure that affected patients, staff and local partners have the opportunity to engage during the process, while maintaining the balance with the need to deliver timely intervention and secure continuity of safe services. In addition, the amendments in schedule 6 make changes to the role of the Care Quality Commission in trust special administration. The CQC will be able to recommend that a trust special administrator should be appointed.”
“It is used to protect patients, stabilise services and put the organisation back on a sustainable footing. Where deemed necessary, a trust special administrator would be appointed to manage the trust and work with relevant key stakeholders to develop recommendations regarding the organisation and its services. The amendments made by schedule 6 remove functions that currently sit with NHS England and confer the key decision-making functions on the Secretary of State, who will provide clearer lines of accountability and faster decision making when rapid intervention is required. The amendments also simplify the steps involved in the TSA process, with the aim of improving the speed of intervention and providing transparency.”
“In short, clause 37 ensures that the legal framework reflects the new institutional landscape while retaining the ability to act swiftly to safeguard continuity of services during special administration. Clause 38 makes changes to the trust special administration framework to ensure that it continues to function coherently after the abolition of NHS England. This clause, together with schedule 6, make targeted changes to the trust special administration process set out in the NHS Act 2006 for NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts as a consequence of the abolition of NHS England. It also aligns more closely the processes between NHS trusts and foundation trusts. Trust special administration is, and will remain, a last resort mechanism used only in cases of serious failure.”
“With the abolition of NHS England, the duty to establish a mechanism for financial assistance for independent providers will be retained and conferred on the Secretary of State. It is worth noting that the provisions related to financial assistance in special administration cases, and chapter 5 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, which sets out the powers and processes for the making of health special administration orders, have not yet been commenced. However, the amendments made by the clause ensure that the special administration regime can operate smoothly if it is ever needed. The clause does not create new financial support mechanisms, but ensures that existing ones can be used appropriately in the reformed system.”
“Clause 37 makes changes to the special administration framework to ensure that it continues to function coherently after the abolition of NHS England. The clause makes focused, technical amendments to the Health and Social Care Act 2012 to amend the framework for establishing a mechanism for financial assistance in cases where a provider is subject to a health special administration order under chapter 5 of that Act. It also amends the Act to remove the duty to establish a mechanism for financial assistance to foundation trusts to which a trust special administrator has been appointed. The duty no longer needs to apply to foundation trusts, because the Secretary of State already has the power under provisions in the NHS Act 2006 to provide financial assistance to NHS foundation trusts if needed.”
“Further, acting under section 111 does not preclude the Secretary of State from using their other regulatory powers, including to require the foundation trust to take steps to address a breach of any condition of the licence, or to accept undertakings from the trust to address the breach. Finally, the section 111 power was originally granted to Monitor in 2012 under transitional arrangements, as it was anticipated that the power could be withdrawn once governors had transitioned into their roles and could hold boards to account without outside intervention. Over 13 years on, that has proven not to be the case. With the abolition of the foundation trust councils of governors, it makes sense to repeal the provisions under sections 112 to 114 of the same Act that made it transitional.”
“Should the foundation trust breach any conditions imposed via section 111, the Secretary of State may require it to make changes to the executive directors of its board as necessary, including removing or suspending executive directors, replacing executive directors with interims, and preventing the trust from appointing specific individuals. If the foundation trust fails to take those actions, the Secretary of State may implement the changes. To reassure the Committee, there are clear safeguards underpinning the clause, which can be used only where there is evidence that failures of governance in the foundation trust will cause it to breach the conditions of its licence.”
“The clause is a consequence of abolishing NHS England and makes changes to the powers currently held by NHS England under section 111 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, to confer them on the Secretary of State, with additional consequential changes reflecting the abolition of councils of governors. The clause sets clear expectations for a foundation trust through the licence conditions and provides the Secretary of State with a transparent mechanism to take more urgent, targeted enforcement action to address failures of governance.”
“Deauthorising a foundation trust has no impact on the property it holds, the contracts it has with commissioners and other groups, or the terms of employment of employees. These powers set clear organisational consequences for significant underperformance and allow the Secretary of State the freedom to take action to protect patients in extreme circumstances. Clause 36 contains another critical power to allow action in the case of a failing foundation trust. It allows the Secretary of State to add conditions to an NHS foundation trust’s provider licence where they consider that the trust will breach its licence conditions due to issues with its governance.”
“The conversion power is also subject to two additional requirements. First, the Secretary of State must publish guidance about the matters they will consider in deciding whether to exercise the conversion power, including the factors I just outlined. They must consult on any such guidance before its publication. Secondly, where the Secretary of State proposes to use the power, they must first consult the foundation trust in question, any integrated care boards in the areas in which the trust operates, and any other person to whom the trust provides goods and services, and whom the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult. Clause 35, together with schedule 5, also inserts new schedule 9A into the NHS Act 2006, which sets out the immediate consequences of a conversion order.”
“Foundation trust status should be a mark of good performance, and there must be a mechanism to remove it when performance is seriously deficient. This deauthorisation power will help to maintain the integrity of the reinvigorated foundation trust status and provide an additional incentive for challenged foundation trusts to improve. The power to make a conversion order can be used where the foundation trust has failed to comply with a condition of its provider licence or with another legislative requirement. In deciding whether to make a conversion order, the Secretary of State must consider various factors, including the seriousness of the failure, the health and safety of patients, the quality of the provision by the trust of goods and services, the financial position of the trust, and the way the trust is being run.”
“During the process of producing our 10-year plan, we were clear that, as much as we will reward the best performing providers with new freedoms to innovate, we will not hesitate to act on poor performance, and this group of measures deal with just that: action in the event of a failing provider. Clause 35 and schedule 5 insert new provisions into the NHS Act 2006 to enable the Secretary of State to, by order, convert a failing foundation trust to an NHS trust. This is intended to take place only in the most critical circumstances, and where it is in the public’s best interest for the Secretary of State to be able to direct the trust about how it should exercise its functions, to address safety or other issues at the trust.”
“Schedule 5 agreed to. Clauses 36 to 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 6 agreed to. Clause 39 Joint working and delegation arrangements”
“The analogy with general practice does not hold; this is a very different set of circumstances. But, obviously, she raises an important point about public concern relating to the service’s provision, and I assure her on that. We need to make sure that we diagnose the situation, provide the trust with support and assess which toolbox is most applicable. The CQC can recommend that a trust special administrator should be appointed where it is satisfied that there is a serious failure to provide services of a sufficient quality, and it must provide a report on the safety and quality of services following the appointment of an administrator. The Secretary of State must also consult the CQC before making an order to appoint a trust special administrator. Question put and agreed to. Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.”
“I hope that that addresses some of the points that have been raised. Secondly, having a more dynamic environment with the potential for deauthorisation in such cases, and the consequent loss of statutory autonomy, may act as an incentive for challenged foundation trusts to improve, and it would show that there are consequences. As I think the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham knows, the usual processes exist for managing performance across various aspects of the provider. They will continue. This is for exceptional circumstances. As I said, this is about maintaining a more dynamic model than the one we have. The purpose behind her questions about continuous service—the purpose of having a range of failure powers—is to ensure continuity of care for patients and the public.”
“As people who have been listening will know, this is a chunky set of clauses on some technical details. Let me broadly pick up some of the key points. I want to be very clear about deauthorisation and our seeking to establish, essentially, a more dynamic model. As I said, the coalition Government repealed the legislation on deauthorisation in the 2012 Act. Although other regulatory levers exist to manage poor performance, we are using two core arguments. First, converting foundation trusts into NHS trusts will enable the Secretary of State, if needed, to intervene further through their power of direction over NHS trusts. The Secretary of State will therefore be able to focus on the patient and public interest over preservation of providers’ statutory freedoms in cases of serious failure.”
“The Government’s new clause will extend the guidance power so that it can cover all aspects of section 75, helping us to support the wider and more effective use of partnership arrangements. For those reasons, I commend new clause 20 and clause 39 to the Committee.”
“Building on our ambition to support greater local partnership working, as set out in our 10-year plan, we have tabled Government new clause 20 to strengthen section 75 of the NHS Act 2006 by providing much greater scope for combined authorities, combined county authorities and the Greater London Authority to use these arrangements. Section 75 currently supports flexible voluntary partnership arrangements, including the pooling of budgets between NHS bodies and local authorities. These arrangements are a critical tool in supporting local collaboration and ensuring more joined-up working within systems. The new clause looks to strengthen the section 75 guidance-making power. At present, that power only covers consultation and applications for consent on section 75 arrangements.”
“It also allows the Secretary of State to issue guidance to relevant bodies about the use of their powers under sections 65Z5 and 65Z6. This proposal is not, however, a means to avoid accountability. Accountability for any function delegated through this power remains with the person delegating it whereas liability rests with the person to whom the function is delegated. Accountability, as opposed to liability, means that the body delegating a function must provide oversight for how their functions are carried out and ensure that any issues are dealt with. Ultimately, the Secretary of State will continue to be accountable to Parliament for the health service in England, including any delegated powers. I am sure that Parliament will relish holding all Ministers to account.”
“The result is stronger integration, with better joint working between NHS and local government, and services better tailored to meet local needs. With the abolition of NHS England and the new functions of the Secretary of State, it is right that the Secretary of State should have the flexibility to delegate their health functions appropriately and efficiently under a voluntary arrangement, as and when necessary. We would not want to exclude the Secretary of State from joint working arrangements, if joint working would bring benefits to patients and the public. The power is therefore purposefully broad to allow that, including allowing the Secretary of State to delegate to a range of public bodies, establish joint committees and pool funds.”
“Government new clause 20 and clause 39 both look to strengthen joint working arrangements across the health system. Clause 39 is part of the architecture of the Bill that allows the delegation of functions from the Secretary of State to NHS bodies, local authorities or other relevant organisations. The clause builds on the existing delegation powers in section 65Z5 of the National Health Service Act 2006, which already allow NHS bodies to delegate functions and pool resources with one another and with local authorities or other relevant bodies on a voluntary basis. It is a well-used voluntary power that enables systems to develop joint working and ensure that health functions are carried out by the most appropriate body or groups of bodies.”
“Although I do not know the whole context of the quote, I understand the frustration of colleagues in social services and this whole area as it is one that I worked in myself. I understand the issue, but it is slightly different because it concerns the what, rather than the how, of what is being discussed. Section 75 is part of the how. We want to make this easier for people who are trying to do the right thing, and these provisions, which I commend to the Committee, do just that. Question put and agreed to. Clause 39 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 40 Consolidated accounts Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Members raised important issues about clarity of accountability and responsibility. To reiterate, the legislation is clear: the legal responsibility or liability for a function being carried out properly rests with the receiving party; however, the delegating party is accountable for that function being carried out, and they must know how it is being carried out and make sure that any issues are addressed. The hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham rightly alluded to one of the examples that we are exploring around section 75, which is how it might support key priorities in delivering neighbourhood health, to make absolutely clear and sure that we bring services closer together. Both spokespeople outlined a quote from Melanie Williams of ADASS.”
“While I understand the new clause, it is not necessary. The Department can review the section 75 framework without needing legislation, and indeed it has already done so. The Department carried out a review of section 75 in 2023, as has been said. Since then, we have continued to consider how these partnership arrangements can best support health and care integration. The new clause would risk duplicating ongoing work. Furthermore, that work is not a one-off exercise but an ongoing process of learning and improvement across the country, and we want something that is responsive and flexible enough to respond to changes in health and care services and to the changing needs of people who use them. For that reason, I do not consider requiring a single statutory review to be the most effective approach. Hon.”
“I got a little confused at the end, but I think the Opposition generally accept the power in this clause. The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon contended that this Bill and previous amendments to it will drive local authorities and the NHS further apart; just to have it on the record, I do not accept that that is true at all. Section 75 of the National Health Service Act 2006 and the work that we are doing on this further highlights the effect of some of the things that we are trying to do. The hon. Member for Winchester raised new clause 26. I have sympathy for the intention behind the new clause. We all want health and care services to work closer together, as I have said repeatedly, and we agree that the partnership framework under section 75 of the National Health Service Act 2006 is a useful tool for doing so.”
“The clause avoids duplication and confusion and ensures that financial accountability is clearly defined in the post NHS England system. Under the reformed framework, the Department is responsible for the overall funding of the NHS and for national financial assurance, while integrated care boards and providers continue to operate within defined statutory financial duties and controls. Clause 42 plays an important housekeeping role, providing legal clarity and underpinning a more transparent and coherent financial framework that is fit for the NHS future operating model. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.”
“The clause updates the legislation for the new landscape by removing NHS England from the arrangements and ensuring that responsibility for administrating the schemes rests appropriately with the Secretary of State. Although the clause is targeted and technical, its effect is essential in that it ensures continuity and legal clarity and continued effective operation of arrangements that underpin confidence and functionality across the health service. Clause 42 is a necessary technical and structural change that supports the new statutory framework following the abolition of NHS England. It removes provisions in the NHS Act 2006 and the Health and Care Act 2022 that relate specifically to NHS England’s funding and financial responsibilities, which will no longer be required once NHS England ceases to exist.”
“The clause therefore seeks to prioritise high quality audited financial accounts information being made available while balancing against administrative costs, both of which are important to the Government. Clause 41 amends the Secretary of State’s existing power to create a scheme allowing NHS bodies to pool funds to cover property losses and legal claims arising from their healthcare activities. They ensure that when liabilities arise, whether from damage to property, negligence or other claims, there is a clear and consistent mechanism through which those liabilities can be managed and resolved. In doing so, they protect the financial stability of the NHS.”
“We believe that bringing the accounts together in this way will assist the public, Parliament and the National Audit Office in scrutinising NHS expenditure. Although it is not covered by the clause, it is important for the Committee to be aware that there will be no change to the current requirement for the Department to publish a Department of Health and Social Care group annual report and accounts that will consolidate the NHS accounts with the core Department and other group bodies—for example, its arm’s length bodies. However, the Government recognise that only reporting figures for the NHS in the overall Department group would reduce transparency compared with the current structure of NHS financial accounts.”
“The financial accounts for integrated care boards are currently included in the NHS England group accounts, which are presented separately and audited by the National Audit Office. With the abolition of NHS England, the Government intend to reduce central administration costs, so financial reporting needs to be proportionate while balancing stakeholders’ keen interest in financial information related specifically to the NHS. Clause 40 therefore replaces the current consolidated accounts of NHS providers with a single set of consolidated accounts for the NHS covering its trusts, foundation trusts and integrated care boards. That consolidated account will continue to be audited by the National Audit Office.”
“We know that robust finances are an essential part of the health service. The financial accounts related to the NHS are of keen interest to His Majesty’s Treasury and indeed to Parliament. The Government are especially mindful of the keen interest of the Public Accounts Committee in this area. Under current arrangements, NHS England prepares a set of financial accounts for all NHS trusts and foundation trusts, and that is audited by the National Audit Office. That is the point at which the National Audit Office conducts its oversight of NHS providers, with that feeding into the National Audit Office’s assurance over the Department of Health and Social Care group.”
“C lause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 41 and 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. — (Emma Foody.)”
“That will mean separate information about NHS providers being included in the document, such as a summary of income and expenditure. Separately, providers and ICBs will continue to publish accounts so that people can look at those. The Government will listen to any feedback from users to adapt the nature of this content in future years after the initial publication, recognising that this is a new development following the abolition of NHS England. We are also mindful that too many separate publications add to administrative costs and risk losing focus. The intention is to have transparency at the local level, building that up to do something more sensible and cost-effective that is also transparent at national level. I commend the clauses to the Committee. Question put and agreed to.”