Danny Kruger
MP for East Wiltshire · Reform UK · United Kingdom
“There is what might be an important innovation in the text of this year’s sovereign grant annual report and accounts, which the Bill refers to and which the Minister is describing. Usually, the description of the sovereign’s role includes the term “defender of the faith”, but that term does not appear in this year’s report and accounts.”
“Research from the Department for Education confirms that children who move schools frequently often suffer poor outcomes, particularly children with special educational needs. That is why a number of armed forces families—people on average incomes—choose independent education to minimise the disruption that results from their postings.”
“Resilience is obviously the crucial question for the country, and the Government are right to be focusing on the need to strengthen the centre of Government to achieve that. My concern is about the legislation that has been trailed.”
“The Bill contains a lot of useful tightening of electoral law, and we are having a very important debate this afternoon. It is important that we think about how we police donations from abroad and from home. I pay tribute to the remarks made by the hon.”
“No, I am not going to give way. It is their right to support a political cause in their own country, where they are registered to vote and of which they are citizens. It is absolutely wrong to traduce them in that way.”
“That is what the populist revolt is doing, demonstrating the effectiveness and vibrancy of our democracy. Let me turn to the amendments that I support, because we do have a real threat to our democracy, and let me make these points as seriously and soberly as I can.”
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“Could there be some side effects or reactions after taking the drug, such as seizures or choking, that the family or carers will have to deal with? Can the drug be taken at home—that relates to the point that the hon. Member for Ashford made—or must it be used in a clinical setting? We have suggested that it could be used at home, so questions about transportation arise. Is a combination of drugs required? If so, in what order should they be taken? What happens if the patient passes out before taking the entire concoction of drugs? Has the drug formulation been optimised for the purpose of assisted dying, so that it reaches maximum blood levels as quickly as possible? All these sorts of questions are appropriate for medical regulators.”
“Some patients would not be able to take drugs orally and might need to have the drug administered through a tube into the stomach, so different formulations would need to be available. Some drugs may need to be administered by injection. Patients may be unable to do the injection themselves, as we have discussed. Even if the patient is physically capable, injection techniques require proper training, and that needs to be considered when licensing drugs for assisted dying if the patient is responsible for self-administration. There will be further considerations when deciding what drugs can be used. Patients will have a right to know what to expect. If they take the drug orally, how long will they have to wait before they die? Will they lose consciousness first? If so, how long will that take?”
“The amendments that I am supporting would ensure that the MHRA had approved the drug for the specific purpose of ending someone’s life, and that there was scientific consensus that the drug would be effective for that purpose. The MHRA, in the marketing authorisation for the approved substance, would define the dosage of the drug required to bring about death. It would also ensure that specific considerations and warnings were placed in the product licence. For example, some patients have allergies to certain drugs. If they decide to end their own life, that should be brought about as a result of the effect of the drug, not an unintended allergic reaction to it.”
“We need a new licensing regime to ensure that the MHRA is able to properly regulate the substances, or, potentially, another regulatory agency would need to be established to do the job. The Committee needs to make sure that there is a process that applies to approved substances used for assisted dying. It is not necessarily the case that a product licensed for treating a medical condition could not be used to bring about death—it is not the case that we cannot use any drug that is currently used for genuine health treatment—but it would not be being used as a medicine, so medicines law may not apply to its use for that purpose. There is an ambiguity, and I would be grateful for clarity on it.”
“One of the reasons that we need regulation of approved substances is to help ensure that falsified versions of the drug—drugs that do not have a licence for use in assisted dying—cannot enter the market. Such drugs may not be effective and could cause distress to those ending their lives and their families. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify whether, in his view, clause 20 is sufficient to establish the necessary regulatory regime, or whether further legislation will be needed. We had evidence from Greg Lawton, and other pharmacists, who wrote to the Committee to suggest that the approved substances would not legally come within the definition of a “medicinal product”, so medicines law, the protections associated with medicines and the MHRA licensing process might not apply. If that is the case, what do we do about it?”
“I entirely agree. The regulations need to specify not only what drugs may be approved, but, as the hon. Gentleman suggests, how they should be stored and transported. I would expect that to be part of the package of regulations under the Bill. As I have stated, I do not accept that we are talking about healthcare here; nevertheless, we are using products that are comparable to health products. The MHRA would need to significantly adapt its work in order to identify the most effective drug to cause what we currently perceive as harm—namely, the death of a patient. I recognise that that would be a significant change of remit and work for the MHRA, but we need to do it.”
“The hon. Lady puts her finger on the tension—my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate and I expressed it as well—about whether it is appropriate to give the health regulator responsibility for regulating a product that is about not health, but death. Does the hon. Lady agree that no other agency would be appropriate, given the skills she has set out? The purpose of these lethal drugs is to kill the patient; nevertheless, it is appropriate that we consider them in terms of not only that objective but their potential side effects. The purpose is not one of healthcare, but the product is very close to a healthcare intervention. Therefore, despite all our anxieties, it feels appropriate for the healthcare regulator to oversee this.”
“The hon. Lady is right that there is no other agency that is appropriate. The difficulty is that the MHRA is itself highly conflicted—we will come in due course to discuss the role of the profit motive in this mooted procedure—and the big problem is that it is overwhelmingly funded by the pharmaceutical companies. We have to ensure that there is no hint of corruption in the system, but I agree with the hon. Lady that the only way to do this is through that agency, but perhaps after reform.”
“I thank the hon. Lady for explaining the purpose of the amendments. Amendment 500 specifies the information that a final statement must contain. Will she clarify why there is no requirement to record any details of what happened once the drugs were administered, other than the time between the use of the approved substance and death? In this debate, we have acknowledged the importance of record keeping. If the intention is to maintain public confidence in the system, should there not be some provision to record whether complications happen and what complications there were? This skirting of the issue of complications is concerning. We have ruled out explicitly informing patients of the risk of complications.”
“I am sorry; I mis-spoke. I should have said that we have ruled out clarifying the expectations of what doctors should do in the event of an assisted death, and whether or not that is specified by the patient. Earlier today, the Committee again ruled out specifying what the obligations on doctors are if complications arise, whatever the patient has discussed earlier. With this amendment, we now seem to be ruling out gathering any information about what happened, which is surely vital not just for safeguarding but to develop good practice in the operation of the Bill, a point that the hon. Member for Ashford made earlier. There is too much silence in the Bill, between the taking of the substance and death, on what happens if there are complications, what is permitted and, now, what is recorded. Amendment 439, in the name of the hon.”
“She said: “During my work with the Nuffield Citizen’s Jury, the issue of what happens if the drugs do not end the person’s life was raised within the evidence presented to the jury, and this became a point of concern for several jurors.” She also said: “By not addressing this question within the Bill, it allows doctors to exercise clinical discretion, however, it is arguably legally and ethically preferable to clarify the position and address public concern by including a clause that covers this problem.” I hope that is helpful. I will end by referencing the hon. Member for York Central, who tabled amendment 440 and made the case very powerfully. She said that should the procedure fail, the need for record keeping is of significant importance, as with all medical record keeping.”
“That is legal in Canada, but it would not be here, so what happens? In written evidence, Dr Alexandra Mullock, who is a senior lecturer in medical law and co-director of the Centre for Social Ethics and Policy at the University of Manchester, pointed out: “The Bill is silent on the precise obligations of the doctor if the procedure fails.” Clause 18(9)(a)(ii) states that the doctor must remain with the person, but what the doctor should be permitted to do, either in relation to aiding recovery or supporting the person to die after the initial attempt has failed, is unclear.”
“I would be grateful if the Minister or the promoter could offer a definition of procedural failure. What does that actually mean? That question arises in other jurisdictions that have assisted dying laws. A 2019 paper by the Canadian Association of MAiD Assessors and Providers said: “There is no clear cut-off for what constitutes ‘delayed time to death’ or ‘failed oral MAID’.” At what point does a delayed time to death yield to failure? That question is not just abstract for us; it is a philosophical question in other contexts, but we are required to answer it. That paper goes on to suggest that “clinicians should decide with patients in advance at what point they will consider inserting an IV and completing the provision”, which is a rather euphemistic term but we know what it means.”
“We do not fully understand what happened in those instances or, more generally, the prevalence of complications in those jurisdictions. That information will be vital if further interventions are required, including emergency care. Clause 22 deals with two situations: if the person decides not to take the substance or if the procedure fails—the phrase “Other matters to be recorded in medical records” seems a rather innocuous title for a clause that deals with such situations. In fact, I think that is the only mention of the procedure failing in the whole Bill. However, the clause, and amendment 380, simply require the co-ordinating doctor to notify the commissioner that it has happened as soon as practicable. Do we have any sense of when the doctor should judge the procedure to have failed?”
“I rise to speak to amendment 440, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for York Central. I echo the points made by the hon. Member for Banbury. Surely it is the case that the interventions made by a medical practitioner in response to the procedure failing, and the timing of those interventions, must be properly recorded. Should the procedure fail, the need for record keeping is of significant importance, as with all medical record keeping. The doctor with the patient should write up the notes, including the times at which they reacted negatively to the procedure, the amount of medication that they consumed, any side effects and any action taken. That is good practice. In other jurisdictions there has been poor record keeping, as I mentioned, when things have not gone according to plan.”
“(1B) Nothing in subsections (1) or (1A) of this section shall affect any duty to— (a) signpost someone to where they can obtain information about assisted dying (under section 4(5) or otherwise); (b) perform acts of a clerical, secretarial, or ancillary nature; or (c) perform any acts necessary to save the life of or to prevent grave injury to a person.” This amendment would expand the provision of Clause 23(1) to all individuals and clarify the activities in which they are not obliged to participate.”
“I beg to move amendment 480, in clause 23, page 15, line 3, leave out subsection (1) and insert— “(1) No individual is under any duty (whether arising from any contract, statute or otherwise) to be involved, directly or indirectly, in the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act. (1A) In particular, no individual is under any duty (whether arising from any contract, statute or otherwise) to— (a) provide information about assisted dying; (b) participate in an initial discussion; (c) participate in the request and assessment process; (d) supply, prescribe or administer an approved substance; (e) be present at the time of administration of an approved substance; or (f) dispense a prescription of an approved substance.”
“Baroness Meacher’s 2021 Assisted Dying Bill also referred to a person rather than a registered medical practitioner, as did Lord Falconer’s 2024 Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults Bill, so I am not sure that the limitation to registered medical practitioners and health professionals can be justified. It is not the precedent from similar legislation. My amendment addresses all those mischiefs and provides that the benefit of the conscience clause be for all individuals and not limited to health professionals. That accommodates the request of the Royal Pharmaceutical Society on the importance of protecting wider staff and the British Association of Social Workers. It also fits with the precedents that I have described in the Abortion Act and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act.”
“All professionals that could potentially be involved with assisted dying, such as social workers, should be able to conscientiously object to participating in work that could reasonably be argued would be contributing to an assisted death.” I am sure that other professionals who may be called upon to give an opinion on matters pertaining to the processes in the Bill would feel the same way. Members may be interested to know that the conscience clause in the Abortion Act 1967 simply says: “no person shall be under any duty” to be involved, rather than no registered medical practitioner, so there is a difference. The same goes for the conscience clauses under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008.”
“One set of professionals is omitted from that list: social workers. Under amendments 422 and 423 to clause 9, which we passed, social care professionals have a role in the process. The British Association of Social Workers, in its written evidence, said: “social workers have duties in relation to both mental capacity and adult safeguarding, so it is concerning that legal protection in Section 23 of the Bill is given to healthcare professionals but not to social workers.”
“The Royal College of Nursing told us in written evidence that the protection of the conscience clause “should extend to indirect involvement, such as administrative tasks or referrals, to ensure all professionals are supported in line with their personal and professional values.” There is widespread support among our medical institutions for a wide conscience clause that covers everything under the Bill and is not limited to the final act: the administration of the drugs. The second issue is who benefits from the conscience clause. Clause 23 limits it to registered medical practitioners and other health professionals. A “health professional” is defined in clause 40 as: “a) a registered medical practitioner; (b) a registered nurse; (c) a registered pharmacist or a registered pharmacy technician”.”
“As the expert medical bodies are telling us, that is not acceptable. Health professionals and indeed anyone else must be able to opt out of any functions under the Bill. The Royal College of Psychiatrists found that 58% of its members would not be willing to participate as a medical professional in an assisted dying service, including determinations of capacity or assessments of mental disorder, if it became law in the UK. That is well away from the provision of assistance as we understand it from the Bill.”
“Pharmacists, other health professionals , and indeed wider staff, should not unknowingly be involved in supporting an assisted dying procedure, directly or indirectly, without their consent.” I note that the promoter has tabled amendments to clauses 24 and 25 to make it clear that the exemption from both criminal and civil liability covers the provision of assistance under the Bill. Clause 23 also refers to assistance. Additionally, there is reference to a person “performing” any other function under the Bill. Clauses 24 and 25 cover liability, and refer to the provision of assistance and performing any other function under the Bill, but clause 23—the conscience clause—refers only to the former: the provision of assistance. That will likely be interpreted by the courts as Parliament having intended a narrow construction of clause 23.”
“It is essential that the right to refuse is not (unintentionally) narrowed in any way.” The BMA makes a powerful point and is clear that the conscience clause must cover not just the final act but the entire process, with the exception of the signposting duty in clause 4(5). As Members will recall, the BMA opposed clause 4(5) as originally formulated, as it imposed a duty to refer if the original doctor did not want to participate in the assisted death procedure. The Royal Pharmaceutical Society makes a similar point in its further written evidence to us: “We would urge the Bill Committee to make it clear that clauses on conscientious objection (23) and criminal liability (24) extend to all activities associated with assisted dying, and are not limited to a narrower interpretation of the ‘provision of assistance’.”
“We would be very concerned if doctors only had the right to refuse to carry out the activities detailed in Clauses 18 + 19 which are the process of providing the approved substance for the individual to self-administer and remaining with the patient until they have died.” It goes on to say: “We urge the committee to review the use of the word ‘assistance’ throughout the Bill; Clauses 18 + 19 might be better titled as ‘Providing assisted dying’ and ‘Authorising another doctor to provide assisted dying’, or similar, to avoid confusion over multiple uses of (and meanings associated with) ‘assistance’ in the Bill.”
“The Committee does not need to take my word for it, because the British Medical Association said in its written evidence to us: “we are concerned that using the word ‘assistance’ in the titles of Clauses 18 + 19 could be interpreted (by a court, for example) as narrowing the right to refuse in Clause 23(1).”
“I rise to speak in support of my amendments 480 and new clause 22, and amendments 483, 484 and 441, tabled by the hon. Member for York Central. The conscience clause that is provided for in clause 23 is too narrow in two respects: first, in who it covers, and secondly, in what it protects. I will start with the issue of what it protects. As drafted, the conscience clause protects against any duty to “participate in the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act.” My concern is that, as written, and especially in the light of the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Spen Valley to clauses 24 and 25, it is very likely to be interpreted as limited to the final act of assistance.”
“The same would be true of any other landlord, so if somebody lived in a rented property and wanted to die at home, this provision would not give their landlord any right to prevent that. It is instead focused on protecting the rights of those who occupy or operate premises. I hope I have explained the value of the new clause and the amendments.”
“If it is not, I wish to indicate my support for amendment 483. New clause 22, unlike my amendment to the conscience clause, is only about the final act. It makes it clear that the occupier or operator of a premise has the right to refuse its use for the final act of self-administration. That applies regardless of who the occupier or operator is; it is not limited to hospices, but it certainly includes them. So anybody occupying or operating premises should be able to determine that they may not be used for assisted dying services. However, the new clause does not grant landlords or freeholders any right to insist that their property not be used. For example, the Church estates commissioners could not use it to prevent assisted dying from happening on land for which they own the freehold or land that they rent out.”
“The third and final exception is for acts necessary to save someone’s life or health. The need for that exception arises because no one is under any duty to be present when self-administration happens but, if things go wrong, emergency services or other help might be required. It is important that that help is provided; there should not be a conscience exception to it. I hope that exception is uncontroversial. Obviously, if somebody requires emergency help, we expect all medical professionals—all people— to jump to it. For the sake of clarity, there can be no exception under the amendment in those circumstances. I sincerely hope that this amendment to the conscience clause, which reflects the requests we have had from the professionals who will have to deliver this service, will be accepted by the Committee.”
“Interestingly, I note that in the Doogan case, the Royal College of Nursing took the view that the conscience clause should be narrowly interpreted, whereas for this Bill it seems to be asking for a wider exception that covers all administrative tasks. Given that assisted dying is far more controversial than abortion among health professionals, I can see a case for a wider conscience clause in this Bill, but to maximise the chances that my amendments are accepted I have compromised and tried to match the precedent of the Abortion Act and the case law in Janaway. That is why the second exception is as it is. Again, if the drafting is not perfect and we can make improvements through a tidying-up amendment, I would be happy to work with the Government or the hon. Member for Spen Valley.”
“Salford Health Authority, a medical secretary claimed that the conscience clause under the Abortion Act meant that she was not required to type out a letter on behalf of the doctor she was working for, referring a patient for abortion. Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, albeit for different reasons, concluded that such types of secretarial tasks were not protected by the conscience clause in the Abortion Act. That decision was applied about 10 years ago in the Supreme Court case of Greater Glasgow Health Board vs. Doogan and another, in which it was held that the conscience clause did not protect an individual from having to carry out ancillary tasks such as managing the rota of a labour ward where abortions were performed.”
“We have amended the clause to now say that the doctor “must ensure that the person is directed to where they can obtain information and have the preliminary discussion.” The exception makes it clear that clause 23 cannot allow one to avoid that signposting duty. A person cannot say, “I am protected by this amendment from fulfilling the obligations under clause 4 to signpost somebody to where they can get the information they require.” The second exception concerns tasks of a clerical, secretarial or ancillary nature. The presence of that exception means that the Royal College of Nursing’s demand for clause 23 also to cover administrative tasks is not fully met. I regret that I was not able to go that far, but I will explain why. In a 1989 case, Janaway vs.”
“If amendment 480 is passed and the list is in need of refinement or drafting changes, I would of course be happy to work with the Government on a tidying-up amendment at a later stage. The amendment would ensure that all professionals—indeed, all individuals —are properly protected and would not become involved in assisted dying if they did not want to. None the less, it contains three exceptions, which I will briefly explain. The first exception is to ensure consistency with clause 4(5), as amended. Members will recall that that clause imposed a duty on a doctor who did not want to have a preliminary discussion to refer the person to another doctor.”
“I am very pleased to hear it. I thank the hon. Lady for that. That helps me because I was perplexed about the difference. It is good to hear from her that there is no particular group of professionals who she thinks should not be included in the conscience clause. It is good to hear that she agrees with that. I would be interested to hear what her objections to the amendments are because, as I say, they simply bring this Bill into line with previous attempts to introduce assisted dying and with the Abortion Act and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. My amendments provide a non-exhaustive list of activities that would be protected. The list was roughly adapted from the legislation in Victoria, Australia, so I hope Members can see that I am following precedents from elsewhere.”
“Those are the sorts of circumstances in which I envisage an occupier—namely, the manager or the organisation that provides the home—being entitled to state that assisted dying does not take place on their premises. I recognise that that is a challenge for individuals living there, but it is explicitly because they are living in a community of others, supported by members of staff, that it is important to acknowledge the rights of the community as a whole, and particularly the organisation or individuals responsible for overseeing the service. I am thinking explicitly of hospices or care homes, where many people end their days; it is imperative that we give the operators of care homes and hospices the explicit opportunity in law to state that they do not facilitate assisted dying on their premises. I hope I have helped the hon.”
“Not really. It is within the rights of managers—particularly hotel managers or people who host a bed and breakfast—not to admit prostitution on their premises, even if it is legal. Although it is illegal to discriminate against particular groups, it is legal for the occupiers of premises, in certain circumstances, to determine that some activities will not take place on their premises. That reflects the rights of property, which are appropriate. Given that we are creating an entirely new legal event—something that has never been legal in our country before, namely the deliberate administration of death—it is appropriate to consider the impact on certain places where people live or will end their days, and to give those places a specific protection.”
“I am afraid that is right—I am not going to pretend otherwise. I recognise that, in those circumstances, it would be distressing for the individual who lives in the care home either not to have this new treatment—this service—or to go elsewhere to have it. I recognise that that would be an imposition on and an inconvenience for them, and possibly quite distressing. Nevertheless, I proposed the new clause to protect everybody else who lives in that community and the staff who work there. I did that specifically from the point of view of the conscience of staff; if an assisted death takes place in a premises, everybody is involved. The facilitation, the admission of the doctors involved and the support of the process is the responsibility of the occupiers of the premises—the management of the care home.”
“Gentleman, he suggests that because one resident of the care home wants to have the service, the people who live with, and the staff who support, him or her should be obliged either to facilitate or to co-exist with this enormously impactful event that takes place in their space.”
“Yes, I do acknowledge the problem with that. My expectation would be—thinking about this in real human terms—that if somebody wanted an assisted death, and they wanted to do it in a particular care home, that would be a conversation they would have with the care home operator. The care home operator might have an absolute blanket objection, for lots of reasons we can imagine, but they might in certain circumstances recognise that Mrs Smith has lived here for some years and wants to have an assisted death, and that would be perfectly acceptable to the care home operator, other residents and staff—in which case, that is fine. To challenge the hon.”
“I will give way to my right hon. Friend, but I want to invite Committee members to recognise or consider evidence that I have heard, from the settings where assisted deaths take place in other countries, of the genuinely disturbing impact that an assisted death has on everybody involved, even those people who support the principle and support the act itself. It is not nothing when someone participates in the assistance of someone else’s suicide, and I can well imagine that care home operators would be very wary of inviting assisted suicides to take place in their premises, not least because of the disturbing signal it sends to residents about the end that might occur for them.”
“I am grateful for my right hon. Friend’s concern about my experience on social media. I referenced prostitution because he, or another Member, asked me in what circumstances it might be acceptable for an owner or occupier of a premises to specify activity that may or may not—”
“I am suggesting that the likelihood with a care home is that the operator would, on behalf of residents and staff, say, “We’re not doing that here.” If they wanted to—if there was a pro-assisted dying care home—it would then be a question for residents and staff whether they wanted to live or work there. I am simply attempting to insist on the right of property—or the right of occupation, I should say, because it is a question not just for the freeholder but for the occupier of the premises. In the case of a house or a business premises, that would be the tenant. Whoever operates the business or the activity of the premises should have the right to conclude that they are not going to have assisted dying in their premises.”
“Well, I think prostitution is actually legal; it is the soliciting of it that is illegal—but others can correct me. The only thing that an owner or occupier of a premises is not allowed to forbid is activity that is covered by the Equality Act 2010 or other equality laws. There is nothing in the Equality Act or other laws to prevent an operator from exercising their right to deny assisted dying. My amendment would clarify that right. My right hon. Friend asks how the collective will of the community would be ascertained. It would not be. I am proposing that the operator of the premises would have the right to determine whether assisted dying could take place there or not.”
“I implore Committee members to expand their scope beyond the single individual who would be the subject of the application, and to consider the community they live in.”
“I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, because that is exactly the sort of organisation that I would expect to have an objection to assisted dying taking place in its premises. He invites us to consider the alternative to the amendment, which is that there should be an obligation on a care home provider to facilitate an assisted death if somebody wants one. That would mean, in the case of a care home run by the Sisters of Mercy, that a resident could insist on their right to have an assisted death in a care home that is staffed by people who have strong moral objections to that treatment and that is inhabited by other residents who are also deeply uncomfortable with it taking place in their home.”
“The hon. Lady is absolutely right. We have heard so many professionals convey their concerns about the Bill. The majority of medical professionals who work with the dying—care workers, palliative care specialists and hospice staff— oppose assisted dying, and it is not right to ask them to take a job knowing that they might be called on to witness, if not directly facilitate, assisted death. My other amendment speaks to the whole range of activities that can lead to an assisted death, not just the provision of assistance at the end. It is important that that amendment is accepted too. The hon. Lady is absolutely right: it is important for staff to have that protection. The amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate speaks to that as well, and would address that concern.”
“On the hon. Lady’s first point, about the gardener refusing to mow the lawn, the activities that an individual will be allowed to opt out of are clearly specified in the amendment and they are the activities covered under the Bill. It is not about unrelated activities connected with the premises but the provision of assistance—not just at the end but all the way along. I hope that is clear. On her second point, again we have—”
“Does my hon. Friend agree that just as we are specifying that an individual who is in receipt of public funds—a public employee, a medical professional—is allowed to decline to participate in this service, institutions in receipt of public funds should be able to do likewise? Many institutions receive public funds for specific purposes and they are perfectly entitled to decline to take part in other activities. Just because they are in receipt of public funds does not mean they should do anything that any member of the public requests of them.”
“I am not objecting to that suggestion. No one would want me working in any sort of clinical setting. I just wanted to emphasise my hon. Friend’s point, and that speaks to the point from my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire about the symmetry. Her amendment would enable a service like Dignitas, or the equivalent to be set up in the UK, to ensure that it only employed workers who supported the work that they were doing, and there would not be some sort of fifth column of objectors coming in to cause trouble. That could happen. We worry about all sorts of things happening in the context of this Bill in future. It would at least ensure that people who worked in an assisted suicide clinic would actually support the procedure.”