Dr Kieran Mullan
MP for Bexhill and Battle · Conservative · United Kingdom
“I welcome the opportunity to give my personal views on this Bill, as colleagues in health have taken over responsibility for it. I have spent most of my life as someone who was highly sympathetic to the cause of assisted dying and imagined that I would support it if I ever was an MP, but that changed in 2018 when I read the Gosport War Me…”
“I will not; there is not time. While I do not seek to say that the Bill will be used in that way—to deliberately bring about an end to the lives of confused or elderly patients—my worry is about how it will insert itself into that battle in our country between the best and worst of our natures, in families, conversations and settings wher…”
“The report describes what happened to some of them. One patient was admitted for respite care but deteriorated and became confused during his stay. Staff asked permission to give him diamorphine, but his daughter refused as he was not in pain. However, his wife later agreed, and he was started on diamorphine via syringe driver.”
“It happened because the staff in that hospital and on that ward had developed a culture of prioritising convenience in looking after patients over the value of their lives.”
“I remain deeply sympathetic to the scenarios and circumstances that people have described, and I can personally foresee a situation where I would want to make use of this Bill and feel that it would benefit me, but we should not legislate for what we might want.”
“Then there is something that perhaps seems benign but is sometimes very challenging: the patients who continually call out for help again and again and again, perhaps asking for a medicine or a meal that they have already been given, and refuse to be consoled.”
The complete record
Every one of 600 lines we hold for Dr Kieran Mullan, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 5 of 12.
“Assurances are not enough; the test will be the text of the Bill, whether Ministers can explain clearly and consistently how the Bill will operate in relation to our security and other services, and whether the Government can show that they have balanced transparency, accountability and national security in a workable, principled and robust way. I hugely respect the Hillsborough Law Now families and campaigners, but I am not afraid to say that they may well not be entirely satisfied by this law. A responsible Government must sometimes say that to campaigners, but this incredibly weak Prime Minister is not able to do so. The families and campaigners who have fought for this legislation deserve better than drift, confusion and mixed messages; they deserve frankness and candour.”
“We have seen a lack of candour from the Lord Chancellor when he has been asked about prisoner release, and tomorrow we will debate the candour and honesty of the Prime Minister. I have absolutely zero faith in this Government—zero. The Bill is literally about candour in public office, but this process has left campaigners, Members and the public unclear about the Government’s position from one month to the next. The Government should not be surprised, then, that we will not simply accept assurances about the Bill at face value.”
“The Opposition have always accepted that national security raises real and serious issues; there will be material that cannot be handled in the same way as ordinary departmental papers, as well as operations, sources, methods and relationships with allies that require safeguards. Any responsible Government must take that seriously. It was a Conservative Member—my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty)—who asked how those provisions might apply to elements of the armed force, and those elements were then included in the Bill very late in the day. That is another issue that should have been properly thought through before the Government reached the point of withdrawing the Bill in January, which has led us to this carry-over motion. This is part of a broader pattern.”
“On more than one occasion, we were presented with a version of the Bill that the Government told us was the only possible approach to the inclusion of the intelligence services—until it was not. We were told that the balance had been struck, but then the Bill was withdrawn and there were reports of further changes. The issues relating to the security services could not be more serious. The Government cannot have it both ways; they cannot tell the House at one stage that the Bill they have published is the only responsible approach to the inclusion of the security services—and marshal the leaders of the security services to say the same thing—before moving away from that position without properly explaining what has changed, why, and whether the earlier assurances given to Members were sound.”
“What else could we have reasonably assumed other than that those concerns had been addressed? It has since become crystal clear that campaigners were in fact not satisfied with the draft proposals, and that their support was conditional—as I understand it, they made that clear to the Government—but the Prime Minister wanted his big announcement and proceeded anyway. The Hillsborough Law Now campaign has explained its view: the delays since January have been caused not by the families or campaigners, but by disagreements within Government and by objections from the Cabinet Office, the security services and others. All that should surely have been dealt with prior to the drafting, publication and big announcement of the Bill, and the fact that it was not is why we are debating this carry-over motion.”
“I have some sympathy for her—she has been put into difficult situations—but trust has been damaged on all sides. Even though this Bill is about trust, candour and whether the public can believe what they are told by those who exercise power on their behalf, the process by which the Government have pursued the Bill has too often fallen short of the standards that Ministers say they want to impose on others through this legislation. The Prime Minister announced the Bill last September at party conference, and gave the clear impression that families and campaigners were content with the detail on the approach being taken. The House should remember that it had been widely reported several months earlier that a draft Bill had been rejected by campaigners.”
“What I say next is not a criticism of the approach of campaigners, or indeed of the many Labour MPs who have been sincere and consistent in their campaigning on this issue over many years, including the hon. Members for Liverpool West Derby (Ian Byrne) and for Liverpool Garston (Maria Eagle). The Government have utterly mishandled this legislation from start to finish, which is why we are here today, six months on from Second Reading, with a Bill pulled at the last minute—and with broken promises. I do not expect Labour Members to relish joining me in that criticism. The Minister will, I am sure, say that the Government have at least brought a Bill forward, as if that were a blank cheque for the manner in which these proceedings have been conducted.”
“We have already introduced duties of candour in parts of the public sector—for example, the NHS—and have taken steps in recent years in policing to improve accountability, as well as creating the office of the independent public advocate, but questions remain about whether the system works as it should when it really matters. The lesson from Hillsborough, the infected blood scandal, the Post Office scandal and other serious institutional failures is that, yes, the legal framework matters, but so do culture and practice. For that reason, we want the Bill to progress and the areas of consensus to move forward, so we do not intend to oppose this carry-over motion. We have consistently taken part in proceedings in that matter.”
“Let me say at the outset that the Opposition continue to support the broad aims of the Bill, as we have done throughout its passage. We recognise the importance of candour, transparency and accountability in public life and recognise the long and determined work of those campaigners, including the Hillsborough families and others who have fought for many years to ensure that where public bodies fail, evade, conceal or mislead, there are proper consequences. That principle remains an important one, and it is not a partisan principle. It is not owned by any one party or Government; it is a basic requirement of good government and of public confidence in the institutions of the state. As has been recognised throughout the passage of the Bill, legislation on its own cannot guarantee the cultural change that is needed.”
“I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wimbledon, who is not in his place, for the advice received in relation to amendment 54, which was drafted with the assistance of the Clerks. The Minister is right that our intention was to unpick the barriers at the permission stage that the Bill introduces. I think her point applies just to the first amendment; the other amendments fit because they are about what happens after a successful appeal and how it might be re-instigated. On that basis, I will not press amendment 54 to a vote. We will table a suitable amendment at a later stage.”
“As the Bill stands, if the Crown court quashes a conviction and determines that a retrial is necessary, the case must generally be returned to the magistrates court. We believe that that is a rigid approach that ignores the complexity, which does not exist at present, of what might have been revealed by the appeal. Because we are introducing a new system of allocation and decisions around allocation, that is a new area of the law that could be contained within appeals. A successful appeal may demonstrate that the case was too complex, or the evidence too sensitive, for a summary disposal in the new division. Returning cases to the same level of court that originally fell into error will do little to restore public confidence.”
“The legal aid gap means that many defendants who would have qualified for a solicitor and legal aid in the Crown court will be ineligible in the magistrates court due to the different low-income thresholds—£22,325 versus £37,500. Requiring those individuals to purchase costly transcripts just to ask for permission to appeal is a significant barrier that risks entrenching injustice. If the error rate in the magistrates court remains high, restricting access to the remedy is a recipe for uncorrected miscarriages of justice. I will move on to our amendments about the case for retrial by jury. If we accept that the current appeal system exposes weaknesses in the original summary trial, we must also look at what happens after a successful appeal.”
“By introducing a permission stage, the Government are creating a multi-stage system that is complicated and potentially more inefficient than the current situation. We know that many of those facing imprisonable offences in magistrates courts are currently unrepresented. The Bill simultaneously increases sentencing powers in clause 6 while narrowing the ability to challenge those decisions in this clause. The Bar Council has described this as a “comprehensive rolling back of safeguards”. An unrepresented defendant, potentially facing up to two years in prison, will now be expected to navigate the practicalities of reviewing transcripts and preparing permission grounds for appeal without professional help.”
“The Law Commission pointed out that it found no meaningful evidence that this process was being abused, even without that permission stage in place. As we have talked about previously in the Bill, legal representatives cannot support an appeal that is completely without merit. As I have said, due to a combination of the low volume of appeals and the shorter hearing times, our contention is that there would be minimal efficiency gains to weigh against this erosion of an existing right. Actually, the introduction of a permission stage is something that we welcome, but the work that will have to be done to support it, with the introduction of recordings and making available transcripts, will probably—or could—cost significantly more than will be saved.”
“On the importance of correcting error, as I have mentioned, it emphasised the critical role that those appeals are playing. It also highlighted the low volume of appeals. The Minister talked about 4% of receipts in relation to one element; I think 1% of the total number of magistrates court cases are being appealed, so that demonstrates that this measure will make a transformative difference to the backlog. We can talk about receipts, but the other thing to keep in mind is how long the actual appeals take. Although receipts are one way of looking at it—on a numbers basis—that is also distortive, of course, because appeals are much shorter hearings than the ordinary business of the Crown court.”
“The evidence—because let us look at the evidence; this is not just what people might say about it—is that the current system is performing a very necessary function. Around 40% to 42% of appeals against convictions from the magistrates court are successful, and roughly 44% to 47% of appeals against sentences are also successful. That is an extremely high rate of successful appeals. These are not marginal or trivial figures; they indicate, I am afraid, that the lower courts are making meaningful errors in nearly half of the cases in which they are challenged. The Law Commission actually considered this issue in detail. It rejected the proposals that a permission stage should be introduced and highlighted a number of key points in relation to that.”
“The Minister has pointed out the difference between the magistrates court and the Crown court, and processes elsewhere, but my contention is that that is not an accident or happenstance; that is by design, because the magistrates court is very different in many other ways from those other elements of the courts. That is why there is a difference there—for very good reason. Because efficiency must be balanced with accuracy and fairness, the current automatic right of appeal is not simply a source of unnecessary delay; it is a vital check on a part of our system that others have described as being, to some extent, “rough justice”—a forum in which decisions are swift but carry a higher risk of mistake.”
“The Bill proposes to replace that long-standing framework with a permission-based model, whereby the defendant must first prove that their appeal is reasonably arguable before a single judge, often based only on written papers and transcripts. I rise to oppose that restriction on access to justice. I will argue that, where an appeal is successful, justice is best served by providing the option of a retrial before a jury. I will reflect on the Minister’s remarks about how our amendments would operate. I always listen very carefully to what she says and, as I will explain, I think there is some merit in some of her points, so we can reflect on those.”
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. Clause 7 and schedule 2 represent a fundamental and troubling departure from the way that our justice system corrects error. As the Minister said, we have tabled a number of amendments, which essentially form two groups. The first group seeks to reconstitute the existing right of appeal, and amendment 37 aims to stop the Government’s proposal until we have a more substantial and better understanding of how to drive the appeal success rate down, which is our primary aim. As the Minister outlined, at present a defendant convicted in the magistrates court has an automatic right of appeal to the Crown court, where the case will be heard as a full rehearing before a judge and two lay magistrates.”
“I direct the Minister to the report from the Law Commission, which said that there was no significant evidence of people abusing the system or lots of unmeritorious appeals. The point is that someone has looked at this in detail, on an independent, non-party political basis, and they do not support the suggestion that there are lots of appeals going through that should not be in there.”
“That feels counterintuitive and not in line with what the Government are saying about making the system fairer. On that point, the Government are moving in directly opposing directions.”
“It is about the combination of those concerns, along with the fact that there are unrepresented people. The Minister is right to say that people who have representation, if their appeals are valid, will be able to carry on, because they will continue to meet the test. The reason the Opposition support the broader approach is because there are people who do not know the detail of the law or how to make a successful application. That is why there should be a freer approach. The concern is about those two things combining. As my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate pointed out, not only are things being made more consequential—longer sentences and a lower likelihood of a jury trial—but at the same time it is becoming more difficult in the other direction.”
“We talk about the unduly lenient sentence scheme, but people cannot access it in the magistrates court, even though we are about to put more serious cases into that court. At the minute, people are able to access the scheme when a case is heard in the Crown court. For those reasons, we enthusiastically support the hon. Member’s amendment.”
“Again, the interaction of different elements of the Bill, with longer sentences, restricted appeals and more serious cases being heard, builds an even stronger case for victims to have access to the transcripts. The hon. Member for Chichester mentioned the unduly lenient sentence scheme. As we talked about in the context of Crown court appeals and the current use of the scheme, it is pretty hard to appeal an unduly lenient sentence if we do not even have access to the route to sentencing that the judge laid out to explain why they gave the sentence that they did. In my understanding, we have a later amendment that asks for an expansion in the use of the scheme in order for it to be meaningful.”
“I rise to speak in support of amendment 17, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester. I acknowledge the progress that we have made on the issue; it has not been as fast or as good as personally I would like, but it has absolutely been progress. The hon. Member has laid out some of the important points. The idea that we will record these proceedings and that the transcripts will exist, but that the victim cannot have them, is obviously not sustainable. If they do not exist at all and nobody has them, that is one thing, but when they are available and some people might be accessing them—defendants, for example—it is really not reasonable that victims cannot, for all the reasons that we have discussed in relation to the Crown court. The existence of recordings will make that less of an excuse.”
“I have always struggled somewhat with the question of redaction. If reporting restrictions are in place, what can be shared and so on will be controlled, but anybody can sit in a court and listen to the whole thing, unredacted. I am not quite sure that I understand the absolute focus on transcripts being redacted. If someone could have sat in that court and written down what was said, word for word, why are we worried about its being redacted? The judge is the person who can say, “You can’t report that, beyond what you’ve heard,” but, separately, why are we so much more concerned about transcripts than we would be about open court, where everyone can hear the whole thing?”
“The need for reform in this area has been well argued, and protecting victims from irrelevant and prejudicial questioning is a goal we all share. However, as I have said, the Committee’s task is to ensure that this clause is the right approach. That is something we should continue to explore throughout the later stages of the Bill.”
“I have a number of questions in relation to the need to ensure that the measure does not create any unintended procedural hurdles. To forewarn the Minister, this will be a consistent question across these clauses, but what assessment has been made to ensure that the substantial probative value threshold is sufficiently precise—not sufficiently high or low, but sufficiently precise—to meet both sides of the coin, and that it is workable in practice? How do the Government intend to monitor the application of the new framework to ensure that it delivers the intended protection for complainants? Is the Minister confident that the drafting strikes the correct balance between protecting victims from inappropriate and invasive questioning and upholding the fundamental right of a defendant to a fair trial?”
“Furthermore, the clause explicitly requires the court to consider whether the suggested value of the evidence relies on inferences that cannot be properly drawn, to avoid the situation in which evidence is admitted with the defence knowing what inferences be drawn even if it would not be proper to do so. That is another important safeguard designed to prevent the trial process from being distorted by prejudice. Although the Opposition support the aim of ensuring better protection for complainants, our role in Committee is to ensure that the law is not only well intentioned, but clear, workable and consistent with the right to a fair trial. I am sure the Minister agrees that there cannot be a blanket ban on the admission of this sort of evidence where it meets those tests.”
“The underlying principle is that a complainant should not have their credibility undermined through assumptions, stereotypes or what are often described as rape myths regarding their past. To achieve this, the clause will replace the current model with a more rigorous admissibility framework. Under the new rules, such evidence may be admitted only if it meets one of two criteria: it must have substantial probative value in relation to a matter of substantial importance to the case as a whole, or it must constitute important explanatory evidence. This shift is intended to ensure that only genuinely relevant material is put before the court.”
“We now come to a series of considerably less contentious clauses, including clause 8, relating to the admissibility of evidence in our criminal courts. This area of the Bill deals with the sensitive and often contentious issue of sexual history evidence. Of course, we want victims of rape, sexual violence and domestic abuse to experience a justice system that treats them with dignity and protects them from irrelevant, prejudicial attacks. Complainants can be subject to questioning that is invasive and distressing, that may not be relevant or may hold little or no genuine relevance to the legal issues at hand. Clause 8 seeks to tighten and clarify the rules governing when a complainant’s previous sexual behaviour can be introduced as evidence.”
“For example, if we are talking about women and girls, judges are more likely to be men. Those are the issues that will become more contentious as a result of the other changes in the Bill.”
“I mentioned this point in my speech, but I will repeat that these clauses interact with the other elements of the Bill that will remove juries. Under the older jury trial system, the judge decides on things that the jury will never hear, so if something is made inadmissible, there is no question at all of it colouring the judgment. Of course, if we remove the jury in potentially more serious cases, we can have all this legislation and all these things that become technically inadmissible, but as we have talked about, we are then relying on the intellectual operation of the judge’s mind. Whether or not people think it is right for them to draw a direct conclusion, it is a matter of fact that judges are a group of people who are more distant and removed from the people we are concerned about.”
“Is the Minister confident that the current drafting provides judges and practitioners with a clear enough structure to apply the principles consistently across different courts without creating a postcode lottery? In terms of monitoring and evaluation, what work will the Government do to ensure that these new measures have the desired impact? Clause 9 is straightforward: its premise is that a victim should not be put on trial for seeking the compensation they are entitled to under the law. Excluding irrelevant and prejudicial material can help ensure that the trial remains focused on the actual evidence of the offence. However, we must be diligent in our scrutiny to ensure that the drafting delivers those protections without compromising the procedural rigour that a fair justice system demands.”
“The goal is to ensure that irrelevant or purely prejudicial material is excluded, while still allowing genuinely probative evidence to be heard when the interests of justice require it. The law must guard against unfair insinuations, but the admissibility test must be applied with precision and discipline. While the objective of protecting complainants from unfair discredit is welcome, there are practical and legal implications that require clarification. As I have said to the Minister, some of my questions will be consistent throughout the clauses. Can she elaborate on how she expects the courts to interpret the terms “substantial probative value” and “substantial importance”, and outline how the Government will seek to ensure that the restriction does not prevent a defendant from exploring the full circumstances of the case?”
“It is entirely fair and reasonable, and a valid part of our law, for someone to pursue a criminal case and also seek financial compensation. But sometimes there is an underlying misconception that the act of seeking compensation, on its own and without any more evidence, means that the original criminal complaint may have been fabricated. To address that, clause 9 introduces the following measures: a leave requirement, which means that evidence about a compensation claim cannot be introduced without the court’s explicit permission, and an admissibility threshold, under which a court may admit such evidence only if it has “substantial probative value” in relation to a matter of “substantial importance” to the case as a whole.”
“It is a pleasure to have you guiding us through the second part of the proceedings today, Ms Jardine. Clause 9 is part of a rolling set of clauses about the admissibility of evidence. Our task is to ensure that, while we protect complainants from being retraumatised by intrusive lines of questioning, we also maintain a legal framework that is clear, workable and consistent with the fundamental right to a fair trial. Clause 9 specifically addresses the use of evidence regarding compensation claims made by complainants in sexual offence cases. Under current practices, complainants are sometimes discredited or have their credibility attacked simply because they have sought compensation for the harm they say they have suffered.”
“However, unlike other elements of the Bill, the clause is highly specific in what it is excluding, so I want to check whether there is any flexibility for the judge so that, in extremis, they can still admit the evidence, or whether there is a hard no, regardless of circumstances.”
“Is the Minister confident that the current wording provides a road map clear enough to prevent judges from applying different standards? I want to address the gap in the data and understand how the measure will be implemented. In relation to previous complaints, very sadly there are victims of violence against women and girls who have been affected hundreds of times. Will the Minister explain what would happen if some of these “for exclusion” criteria had occurred at an extraordinary rate? If a complainant’s decision not to pursue or support a prosecution relating to a crime that happened hundreds of times, that could in itself be relevant. It would not necessarily be so—they may have chosen hundreds of times not to support a prosecution.”
“This is a helpful step in reforming the trial processes by ensuring that a defendant’s conduct and not the complainant’s history remains the focus of the jury. While the principle of clause 10 is sound, its success depends on how the courts interpret and apply the proper evidential basis test. We must ensure that this framework is robust enough to shield victims from speculative and prejudicial questioning while still being fair to the defendant. I have some questions for the Minister. Can she provide the Government’s thinking on what a proper evidential basis will look like? Do the Government envisage it requiring independent, objective proof of falsity, such as a previous conviction for perverting the course of justice, or will a lower standard suffice?”
“There could be a whole series of reasons why a complainant does not pursue an allegation through to its fullest conclusion, none of which have anything to do with the allegation being false. Under the clause, the following factors are explicitly excluded from being used as sole proof of a false complaint: the fact that a previous allegation was denied; the fact that a previous case did not lead to a charge or result in an acquittal; any delay by the complainant in reporting the previous matter; and a complainant’s decision not to pursue or support prosecution in the past. By codifying those exclusions, the Bill aims to eliminate the use of unsupported assertions and ensure that the court does not rely on assumptions or stereotypes that are frequently used to imply that a complainant is untruthful.”
“The central feature of clause 10 is the introduction of a requirement for a “proper evidential basis” before any suggestion can be made that a complainant has previously fabricated an allegation of sexual offending. Currently, there is an ever-present danger that the defendant may attempt to undermine a complainant’s honesty by pointing to past allegations that simply did not result in a conviction. That is related to the challenges that we discussed in the debate on clause 8 regarding the difficulty of complainants when it comes to seeing a case through to the end—either because of the delays in the courts, which we are all concerned about; challenges with the police; or fears or concerns they might have about how their case was treated in the courts.”
“As the Minister said, we are considering the next iteration of the question of admissibility, which addresses the evidentiary rules regarding previous false complaints in sexual offence cases. This is a sensitive area of criminal law where the pursuit of truth must be carefully balanced against the need to protect complainants from unfounded attacks on their character. The primary objective is to ensure that trials remain focused on the actual facts of the case at hand rather than being diverted by speculative allegations that a claimant has made false allegations in the past. The Law Society and Bar Council have indicated their support for this measure; they recognise that it brings clarity to the statutory framework governing bad character and credibility.”
“Contrary to our other interactions, I think it reasonable for the Minister just to write to me. I read the Bill to mean that these types of things cannot be included at all, so could she at some point to clarify whether that is the case or whether there is some flexibility at the edges?”
“The fact that someone has done something similar before is clearly going to weigh heavily on any reasonable opinion former’s mind when deciding whether that person has done the same thing again. We support the clause, which has great merit.”
“I am personally more hard-line when it comes to bad character admissions and previous convictions. I think the whole system should be much more flexible. We have a tough, rigorous way of finding out if someone is guilty, and we know that previous offending is a massive indicator, across many offence fields, of a propensity to offend again. It is part of natural justice. We all understand that if someone has been found to have done the wrong thing on other occasions, it is quite natural and reasonable for people to give that considerable weight when determining that person’s credibility and reliability, and if they can be trusted. A lot of court cases come down to the likelihood of something happening—how probable it was that someone did something.”
“Of course, the court’s duty is to ensure that a jury does not convict a defendant for a specific charge simply because they have behaved poorly in the past. The evidence has to remain relevant and fair, and to be assessed within the unique context of the case. Nothing about introducing that information stops that from happening, as the jury or judge can weigh it up as they see fit in that regard. How do the Government intend to ensure that propensity is defined narrowly enough to prevent juries from using a defendant’s past as a shortcut to a verdict? Given the Bar Council’s view that that might already be covered, what did the Minister see as the key gaps between how the law operates at present? What are the direct benefits of clause 11 beyond how things currently operate?”
“The primary function of clause 11 is to clarify the rules regarding admissibility in respect of past domestic abuse offending. It establishes that a defendant’s previous conduct can be used to demonstrate an inclination to commit similar crimes, even in instances when the earlier and later offending take different forms. That ensures that the law recognises the underlying reality of abusive relationships, where the specific method of harm may change while the dynamic of power and intimidation remains constant. As we have discussed previously, the prevalence of such behaviour is so great that we have to do whatever we can to support victims. The Bar Council has noted that while much of such material might already be admissible under existing bad character provisions, clause 11 provides statutory clarity for judges.”
“We now go to the other end of the spectrum and look at this from a different direction by addressing how courts handle evidence of a defendant’s propensity to commit domestic abuse. The provision acknowledges that domestic violence is rarely a series of isolated, vacuum-sealed events; rather, it is often characterised by established patterns of coercion, control and escalation over time, repeated across relationships, although potentially in different ways. When thinking about the precedent in our system, it brings to mind Clare’s law, which we brought in for the very purpose of allowing members of the public to know someone’s domestic abuse history, because we recognised just how common it was for abusers to move from victim to victim.”
“A stronger use of screens can be mandated but, if the physical layout of the court and its facilities are insufficient, that will hamper the clause’s benefit. What survey or review have the Government undertaken, or do they plan to undertake, to ensure that there are no physical barriers to the use of screens in this way? I suspect that, on a physical basis, it is easier to have screens just in one direction rather than two, and it probably involves different equipment and facilities. It would be good to get the Minister’s view on any barriers that might practically limit the intention of this measure.”