Mr Louie French
MP for Old Bexley and Sidcup · Conservative · United Kingdom
“Major sporting events bring visitors to our towns and cities, support jobs across hospitality and tourism, generate income for local businesses and showcase Britain to the world. Like the Olympics, they can also inspire the next generation to participate in sport, leaving a lasting legacy well beyond the final whistle.”
House of Commons20 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I appreciate the Minister’s comments today, and when we discussed the issue last week during the pre-Committee briefing. The Government are rightly seeking to balance the commitments required to host major international sporting events with the rights of existing local traders.”
House of Commons20 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“If somebody is knowingly advertising a touted ticket, of course they should face the full and proper penalties provided for in the Bill. I hope the Minister and the Committee will agree that the amendment would make a small and simple change to avoid trapping unsuspecting persons in a legal mess because they have been misled or did not kn…”
House of Commons20 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I echo the comments of the Minister, who outlined why the clause and schedule 5 need to work together. As we have heard, it is important that neighbouring authorities seek to work together to ensure that sport and transport regulators and major sporting events are joined up.”
House of Commons20 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“People fall ill, family commitments change and work or travel arrangements can fall through. It cannot be right that a fan who has paid good money for a ticket should have no reasonable means of transferring it to somebody else.”
House of Commons20 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Amendment 12 mirrors one of the defences in the Birmingham Commonwealth Games Act 2020, which ensures that the offence of advertising that an event ticket is available for purchase does not apply strict liability.”
House of Commons20 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
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“Five years, however, is a long time in football. Broadcasting cycles, financial realities and competitive conditions can change quickly. In that time, for example, a team such as Luton Town went from playing in League Two in the 2017-18 season, to competing in the Premier League in the 2022-23 season. Granted, the team have now fallen down the pyramid to League One again, but that helps prove that, even with parachute payments being handed out from the Premier League and potentially now being included in the resolution process, that does not stop a club from failing on the pitch or in the boardroom.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“In particular, it creates a cooling-off period, a requirement that certain preconditions be met before the regulator can become involved in live disputes between football’s governing bodies and competitions. Of the conditions listed in the clause, condition 4 is especially significant. As the Bill stands, condition 4 is met only if the relevant distribution agreement between competitions—for example, between the Premier League and the English Football League—has been in force for at least five years. We understand why the five-year test was included: the intention is to prevent the Government’s regulator from being dragged into every routine renegotiation, and to ensure that the resolution process is only triggered in relation to long-standing agreements that may have become outdated or contentious.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It is a pleasure to serve under you again, Sir Jeremy, and I welcome back everyone else in Committee. The clause sets out further details on the circumstances in which the specified competition organisers can apply to trigger the resolution process. The Government have moved on the mechanism within the backstop, which is welcomed by the leagues, but the amendments tabled in my name seek to correct some gaps in the clause. Amendment 130 would allow the relevant leagues to set a different period other than five years for the resolution process to be triggered. Amendments 128 and 129 would also allow the relevant parties to set the appropriate period for triggering the backstop. The clause matters, not just because of what it allows, but because of what it delays.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Amendment 51, in clause 60, page 50, line 15, after “resolution” insert “set out in a notice under section 59(5)(b)(zi)”.— (Stephanie Peacock.) This amendment clarifies that the question or questions for resolution subject to the mediation process are those set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(zi). Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I will be brief. I echo some of the Minister’s comments. His Majesty’s official Opposition welcome any efforts to ensure that the backstop process is triggered only as a last resort and we will carefully monitor how that works in future. Question put and agreed to. Clause 59, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 60 The mediation stage Amendments made: 49, in clause 60, page 50, line 4, after “resolution” insert “set out in a notice under section 59(5)(b)(zi)”. This amendment clarifies that the question or questions for resolution subject to the mediation process are those set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(zi). Amendment 50, in clause 60, page 50, line 6, leave out “the question or questions for resolution” and insert “that question or those questions”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 49.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I will not repeat the comments the Minister has made, but we also believe that this new mechanism is an improvement on the previous one, in line with feedback from the other place and from the leagues. The new clause would allow modified proposals to be submitted to the football regulator and for more of a negotiated settlement rather than a binary one. The only question we have at this stage, because we will have to see how this works in practice, is about the criteria the regulator would be looking to apply when selecting one party’s proposals over another. What does the Minister envisage that will look like?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“In the current drafting, if the expert panel finds that neither of the final proposals submitted by the parties is consistent with the statutory principles, it is required to terminate the process and notify the parties that it has done so. That is not an option; it is a legal requirement. We must ask what kind of resolution process it is, if both sides present imperfect proposals and the committee’s only course of action is to walk away. That is not resolution; that is resignation.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Clause 62 is, in many ways, the most far-reaching and contentious provision in the Bill. It establishes the legal framework by which the Government’s regulator, having assessed final proposals under the new resolution process we have already discussed, may issue a legally binding “distribution order”, thereby compelling parties to adopt a financial redistribution model imposed by the regulator. This is not a minor regulatory power. It is a direct intervention into the financial core of English football. While the desire to resolve long-standing disputes, particularly between the Premier League and the EFL, is understandable, the clause as drafted gives rise to very real risks of overreach, unintended consequences and potential conflict with international football rules. Let me start with subsection (1 )(c).”
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“That would not abolish the regulator’s ability to consider fair distribution; it would simply make clear that internally agreed mechanisms, such as parachute payments, fall outside the regulator’s remit.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I understand my hon. Friend’s concerns, and I note that the Football Association sent a letter to Bill Committee members over the weekend, highlighting its concern about scope creep and how that may also interfere with what the regulator is meant to be tightly governed to do. I would like to think that we would rather solutions were made within football. It is important that backstop powers are a clearly defined last resort and that the process encourages the principle of bodies working together to find a joint solution. Let me be very clear: by defining “relegation revenue” in statute and bringing parachute payments into scope, the Government risk triggering exactly the kind of interference that UEFA explicitly prevents in its statutes. Amendment 126 would remove subsection (3) in full.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point; I will move on slightly while he seeks his tie and then come back to his question. We believe that such mechanisms should fall outside the regulator’s remit unless or until the parties themselves choose to make it part of a proposed solution. We believe that is a reasonable balance: it respects the autonomy of leagues, avoids placing English football at odds with UEFA compliance and helps ensure that the regulator remains focused on its core mission of financial sustainability and integrity, not financial redistribution imposed by decree.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but we do not believe that it necessarily applies to what the amendment seeks to do: to allow the leagues to resolve such issues themselves, rather than the regulator. That is what we are talking about here.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“They ensure that the Bill delivers what it promises: a sustainable and respected football regulator without overreach, scope creep or crossing the line into political interference. We believe that the Government must take the warnings seriously about the impact on international competition. As a Committee, let us ensure that this Government’s regulator supports the game, rather than risks its place on the international stage.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Are this Government and this Minister truly prepared to jeopardise English clubs’ participation in Europe? Is the Minister so confident in her regulatory model that she is prepared to put English football on a different legal footing from that of every other UEFA member, and have English football cast out from international football? I hope not—the clubs will also hope not and the fans will not forgive it, if that were to happen. Clause 62 is the most interventionist part of the Bill. If we are to retain it, we must amend it by removing subsection (1)(c) to allow the expert panel to act with realism and discretion. We must remove subsection (3) to ensure that parachute payments and, by extension, football’s autonomy remain protected. These are not wrecking amendments but safeguards.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The inclusion of parachute payments in this clause, and the inflexible process in subsection (1)(c), are classic examples of the very scope creep that other regulators fear. The clause, as it stands, is not just a domestic issue; it is a risk to England’s standing within European football, as we have said before. The Government must remember what the Bill is supposed to do. It is about ensuring that clubs are run sustainably, that fans are respected and that football’s heritage is protected. It is not about the Government’s imposing financial structures or about overriding the autonomy of leagues. It is certainly not about placing us on a collision course with UEFA and FIFA. UEFA has made clear the potential compliance risks from the Bill, and it has warned of the ultimate sanction: exclusion from UEFA competition.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“As I was explaining, our preference would be for the leagues to use their autonomy to reach a conclusion. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s frustration, but I will move on. Building on this, there remains a broader point that we have sought to create through a number of amendments to the Bill, and one that we fear the Government consistently leave the door open to—the likely empire-building of the Government’s regulator. We know that UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep, as is the FA in the letter referenced earlier. If this Government’s regulator expands into broader aspects of football governance, it could undermine established structures and processes of the sport.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The legislation will leave it entirely up to the football regulator how best to determine the questions of resolution, with the only guardrail seemingly being that the distribution order should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of any specified competition organiser, and the distribution order should not result in a lower amount of relegation revenue being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to the club during that period had the order not been made. It would also be helpful if the Minister could outline whether either of the parties would be offered the right of appeal, following a distribution order from the regulator.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Given the previous debate, the Minister will be pleased that I am willing to withdraw amendment 125, so she gets a win out of that one. I listened carefully to her comments on removing that subsection (1)(c), and, in the light of that and in a spirit of goodwill, I will withdraw the amendment. It would be helpful if the Minister would explain what checks and balances there will be surrounding the football regulator’s final determination.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendment proposed : 126, in clause 62, page 52, line 6, leave out subsection (3)— (Mr French.) Question put, That the amendment be made.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I have only a brief question for the Minister in the light of her comments: how frequently does she envisage distribution orders being reviewed by the regulator, and is there a risk that clubs or competitions may face financial instability due to short-term changes to distribution orders?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The clause requires the regulator to periodically review distribution orders and monitor compliance. It also gives the regulator power to determine who should bear the costs of the resolution process, including mediation and the final proposal stages. I have the following questions for the Minister. First, who is liable for the cost of reviews, and is there a cap on the expenses that can be passed on to clubs? Secondly, what criteria will determine how costs are apportioned between parties? Lastly, will the regulator be independently audited on its cost management in conducting such reviews to minimise the costs for clubs?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Clause 65 allows the regulator to require persons, including clubs and their officers, to provide information that may be needed for the exercise of the regulator’s functions. I have the following questions for the Minister. First, what are the limits on the volume or sensitivity of information that the regulator can demand from clubs? Secondly, could the clause lead to regulatory overreach if requests are too frequent or expansive? Lastly, how will the cost of compliance be managed, especially for smaller clubs?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“As the Minister outlined, the clause gives the regulator the power to appoint an expert to prepare a report on a club. I have three questions for her. First, who will select the expert reporters and how with their independence be assured? Secondly, will there be cost limits or reimbursement rules in place to prevent financial strain on clubs that are required to co-operate? For example, without naming any individual companies, over the years we have seen many examples of excessive costs being applied by certain accountancy firms for such reviews. I am sure that we would not want those overburdening small clubs. Lastly, will clubs have a right to comment on or challenge a draft of the report that the expert provides before action is taken?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“What assessment has been made of the potential of the clause to inadvertently delay or obstruct investigation? Clause 74—you will be pleased to know that this is my last point, Sir Jeremy—requires the football regulator to publish a notice where it has given a person an investigation notice under clause 68 or a closure notice under clause 69. Is there a timescale for such publication? How will the notice be communicated or published? Will it be publicly available? If so, will full details of the investigation be published, or will some material be redacted or withheld? Will there be an opportunity to appeal before publication to avoid reputational damage? Will clubs or individuals have the right to respond with advance warning prior to publication, if that is the case?”
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“Likewise, will the regulator determine whether a document is falsified or authentic? The phrase “relevant” is broad, and it is open to interpretation by the regulator. Clause 73 ensures that privileged communications are to be protected from the football regulator’s requirements. That is extremely important, as it covers communication between a professional legal adviser and their client to do with legal proceedings. However, will the football regulator have any powers to challenge claims that a communication is privileged? I would appreciate if the Minister could clarify whether that is a possibility. Furthermore, who will verify that a communication is privileged? Could the football regulator seek voluntary waivers of privilege in exceptional circumstances?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Furthermore, it sets out that the football regulator may release a person from a commitment and must give the person a notice as soon as possible after deciding to do so. Many of the factors that the football regulator must consider are at its discretion, such as reviewing the appropriateness of a commitment. That raises further questions about consistency and the importance of making unbiased decisions. Clause 72 places a duty on individuals under investigation to preserve information. The clause is key, but how will a person suspect they are subject to an investigation? Furthermore, the clause does not provide a date range up to and from when an individual must preserve relevant information. Will the football regulator adjudicate on whether information has been disposed of on purpose or accidentally?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“If a commitment does not prevent the regulator from starting a new investigation into the same behaviour, it raises the question: why add another layer of bureaucracy when the ultimate result may be the continuation of said investigation? Clause 71 adds provisions to clause 70. For example, it sets out that the football regulator must give the person a notice as soon as reasonably possible after it decides to accept, or not to accept, a commitment in lieu of investigation, and sets out what the notice should state. Can the Minister clarify how this notice will be given to individuals at a club? It also clarifies that the football regulator may accept a variation to a commitment, provided the varied commitment would still be appropriate. What is the process an individual would need to go through to amend or vary a commitment?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“If so, what effect will that have on the football regulator’s ability to conduct an investigation? The clause clarifies that accepting a commitment does not prevent the regulator from continuing an investigation into different behaviour in relation to the same or a different relevant infringement, or starting a new investigation in relation to the same behaviour to which the commitment relates. It is therefore for the regulator to determine whether to continue the investigation. What criteria will be used to determine whether a commitment should defer or withhold investigation? Does this leave scope for inconsistencies in the approach of the regulator?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“If an individual is found to have had a reasonable excuse, will that encourage others in the leagues to consider using that excuse if they are investigated? How will the outcome of an investigation be communicated to the relevant club or individual? Will the outcomes of investigations be publicly available? Once again, clause 69 raises important questions about consistency. If closure notices or outcomes are not published, what mechanism will there be for ensuring that investigations by the regulator are consistently applied? Clause 70 sets out that the football regulator may accept an appropriate commitment from a person during the course of an investigation into certain relevant infringements. Does the Minister anticipate that that will be a regular feature?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Does the Minister believe that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that investigatory powers are not used disproportionately? Could the powers result in unnecessary costs or disruption to the day-to-day operations of clubs? Clause 69 covers the outcomes of investigations. The clause sets out that the football regulator may find that there has been no infringement or, if it finds that there has been an infringement, that it may decide to take no action —possibly because the person had a reasonable excuse for committing the infringement. In what circumstances does the Minister envisage there to be a reasonable excuse, and does she worry that this risks setting a dangerous precedent?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Could smaller clubs face disproportionate challenges in dealing with investigations due to limited resources? Schedule 8 outlines the investigatory powers available to the football regulator in relation to relevant infringements. It includes the power to ask questions, require documents or information, and apply for a warrant to enter premises where necessary. The schedule also sets out the circumstances in which those powers may be used and the procedural safeguards that apply. The powers are designed to assist the regulator in establishing the facts of a case and determining whether enforcement action is appropriate. The provisions reflect standard regulatory practice and are intended to ensure that investigations are conducted in a proportionate and lawful manner.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Does the Minister think there are sufficient limits in schedule 7 to prevent the scope of relevant infringement from expanding over time without parliamentary scrutiny? Could broad definitions allow the regulator to pursue cases not originally envisaged by Parliament? How will consistency in interpretation be maintained across different clubs and cases? Clause 68 allows the regulator to investigate whether a relevant infringement has occurred. It sets out the procedure to be followed and the types of action the regulator may take during an investigation, including seeking information and issuing notices. The clause forms part of the regulatory enforcement framework. What procedures are in place to prevent investigations from becoming unnecessarily protracted or burdensome?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The provisions in this group all relate to infringement and the enforcement of infringements. Schedule 7 sets out the detailed definition of what constitutes a relevant infringement for the purposes of parts 7 and 8 of the Bill. It provides clarity on the types of conduct that may lead to investigation and enforcement action by the football regulator, including failure to comply with a duty under the Bill, a condition of a licence or a direction issued by the regulator. The schedule also enables further types of infringement to be specified through regulations. The intention is to provide a clear and comprehensive basis for the regulator’s investigatory and sanctioning powers.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Could any of the sanctions—for example, licence suspension—create unintended consequences for fans and local communities? The Minister will be aware that I have pointed out in previous sittings the sporting competition impacts of any removal of a licence and how that may or may not affect relegation. We are interested in the Minister’s comments on how licence conditions would work when sanctions are applied.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Part 1 deals with sanctions related to information failures, including financial penalties and censure statements. Part 2 concerns infringements of substantive duties and conditions and includes suspension or revocation of licences and the appointment of a skilled person. Part 3 contains further provisions regarding financial penalties, including about daily rate calculations and enforcement of penalties as civil debts. The schedule supports the enforcement powers in clauses 75 to 78 and provides the operational framework for sanctions. How are the levels of financial penalties determined in order to ensure fairness across clubs of different financial sizes? What checks exist to prevent excessive reliance on fines as a primary enforcement tool?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The notice must set out the proposed action and give the person an opportunity to make representations, which is welcome, but is there an independent review mechanism if a club believes that a warning notice is unjustified? Clause 77 requires the regulator to issue a decision notice, following a warning notice, if it decides to proceed with a sanction. The decision notice must explain the reasons for the decision and the right of appeal. Is there a process to allow clubs to challenge decision notices before they are published? What legal advice and support will be available to smaller clubs facing regulatory action? I will move on to schedule 9, regarding sanctions overall. This schedule sets out further details on the sanctions available to the football regulator.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Sir Jeremy, you and the Committee will be pleased to know that I will not seek to repeat word for word everything that the Minister has said on each of the clauses, but I will pose a number of questions to her on each of them. As we have heard, clause 75 gives the football regulator the power to impose sanctions in response to relevant infringements. How is proportionality assessed when deciding between different types of sanction? What is the estimated administrative cost of monitoring, imposing and reviewing sanctions? What legal protections are in place to prevent sanctions from being used punitively? Clause 76 requires the regulator to issue a warning notice before imposing a sanction.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Again, I will not seek to repeat the Minister’s words. Clause 78 creates specific offences for destroying and falsifying information, providing false or misleading information, and obstruction. On summary conviction, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates court, for a fine, or both. On conviction or indictment, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment not exceeding two years, for a fine, or both. In relation to those offences, what evidentiary threshold must be met before a criminal offence would be pursued? Could the clause deter voluntary disclosure for fear of criminal liability? What is the projected cost to the public purse of enforcing those offences through the criminal justice system?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I have some brief questions for the Minister. On clause 79, what criteria will the regulator use to justify issuing an urgent direction? Is there a risk of overreach if urgent powers are exercised without immediate oversight? Will clubs have a right to appeal or review such directions after the fact? We believe that clause 80 mirrors clause 74 in providing a general duty for the regulator to publish various notices and statements issued under the Bill. Are there exceptions where publication could be delayed to prevent market disruption or reputational harm?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Secondly, can the Minister explain why Government amendment 72 removes the decision to exercise the power to ask questions in an interview from the list of reviewable decisions? Why have the Government made that decision?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I will keep my comments brief, which the Committee and you will probably be pleased to hear. I have listened carefully to what the Minister outlined, and the natural questions that arose about the amendments and clauses relate to how she imagines perceived biases will be avoided from boards and the panels, given that the expertise required to review such decisions will most certainly mean that most people involved in the process will be from the football industry. How will the regulator seek to avoid any perception of biases, so we can ensure that what looks like a stage 1 complaints process—it is easiest to compare this with a council—has the relevant transparency and process involved to avoid going to stage 2, which would be the Competition Appeal Tribunal?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Amendment 72, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 35 and 36.— (Stephanie Peacock.) This amendment removes a decision to exercise the power to ask questions under paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 from the list of reviewable decisions in Schedule 10. Schedule 10 , as amended, agreed to. Clauses 82 and 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 84 Appeals to the Competition Appeal Tribunal Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to make a distribution order under NC4 is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel. Amendment 70, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 21 and 22. This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4. Amendment 71, in schedule 10, page 120, line 23, column 2, leave out “a committee of the Expert Panel” and insert “the Board”. This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to revoke a distribution order under clause 63 is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel. Amendment 69, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 27 to 30. This amendment removes a decision to conduct an investigation under clause 68 and not to accept a commitment in lieu under clause 70 from the list of reviewable decisions in Schedule 10.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I am happy to receive a response in writing. Question put and agreed to. Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 10 Reviews Amendments made: 66, in schedule 10, page 120, line 17, column 1, leave out “not to trigger” and insert “to trigger, or not to trigger,”. This amendment includes a decision to trigger the resolution process in the list of reviewable decisions set out in Schedule 10. Amendment 67, in schedule 10, page 120, line 17, column 2, leave out “a committee of the Expert Panel” and insert “the Board”. This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to trigger the resolution process is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel. Amendment 68, in schedule 10, page 120, line 19, column 2, leave out “a committee of the Expert Panel” and insert “the Board”.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“This part of the Bill is important. We have argued consistently throughout this Committee that we believe that the right of appeal will be fundamental to the clubs in the context of this Bill. But we do have concerns, as the official Opposition, that football clubs will increasingly see themselves in legal disputes rather than focusing on matters on and off the pitch. The natural question regarding this process is really about how the Minister will help to ensure that there is a fair playing field in terms of the financial costs of going to an appeal. How will those smaller clubs have the same rights and access to such appeals when they clearly will not have the same financial means as some of the Premier League clubs?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Without wishing to sound like a broken record, the Opposition have raised concerns about scope creep for the regulator down the line, and how that may lead to unintended consequences. The obvious question to the Minister is: what consultation will take place with Members of this House so that we can scrutinise any rule changes and be confident that the regulator has not gone beyond the scope of the powers that we deem necessary at this point?”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“By tabling amendment 127, we are saying that revenue boundaries must be set in statute, not in statutory instruments, that Parliament, not the Secretary of State, should decide where the line is drawn, and that the regulator should focus on its core remit and not be dragged into every financial dispute, with a “revenue” label slapped on by regulation.”
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“In particular, through the mechanism created by clause 56(2)(b), it allows new revenue streams to be brought into the scope of the Government-backed intervention without proper parliamentary scrutiny. That is not what was promised when this Bill was introduced. We were told by the Government and this Minister that their regulator would be a light-touch and targeted regulator—one designed to uphold financial sustainability and protect supporters, not one that could be weaponised by future Ministers to remake the game’s financial settlement from above.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“If football governance is to remain independent, and if the regulator is to operate with a clear mandate, the definition of revenue categories must not be subject to political discretion; it must be set by Parliament in primary legislation, not by the stroke of a ministerial pen. That is especially true when the very mechanism in question, the resolution process, is designed to resolve disputes about money. What qualifies as “relevant revenue” goes to the heart of the matter. It is not ancillary; it is foundational. Clause 91 may appear to be about procedures, but it is in fact about power. It determines how broad the reach of the Secretary of State will be in defining, influencing and intervening in the financial affairs of English football.”
House of Commons17 June 2025Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“This is not just about the risk of interference; it is about certainty, predictability and trust in the regulatory model. We have already made clear our concerns about how English football will run into issues with UEFA and FIFA regarding their statutes. I will not repeat that again now, but we believe that, by granting the Secretary of State the power to redefine revenue categories by regulation—outside of parliamentary debate—clause 56(2)(b), as enabled by clause 91, risks violating those principles. Such interference has one clear sanction: “the ultimate sanction…would be excluding the federation from Uefa and teams from competition.” As we have already discussed, that is not a risk that should be taken lightly.”
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