← LEADERSHIP TERMINAL

UK PARLIAMENT · SITTING

Mr Louie French

MP for Old Bexley and Sidcup · Conservative · United Kingdom

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

As part of that, we allocated £300 million to youth facilities, improving and developing 300 of them. We established the National Citizen Service; this Government cancelled it, but more than 750,000 young people participated in it and it had a 93% satisfaction rate—something this Government could only dream of.

NATIONAL YOUTH STRATEGY · 2026-07-08 · READ IN HANSARD

As always, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. I congratulate the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Harpreet Uppal) on securing this important debate. We all recognise that this issue is increasingly important to our constituents across the country.

NATIONAL YOUTH STRATEGY · 2026-07-08 · READ IN HANSARD

The renewed national focus on enrichment is welcome and timely, but access to enrichment remains uneven, and Government funding cuts will only make that worse.

NATIONAL YOUTH STRATEGY · 2026-07-08 · READ IN HANSARD

Youth work has huge economic benefits. Research has shown that every £1 of Government investment in youth work has a social return on investment of between £3.20 and £6.40. Moreover, it saves around £500 million annually by preventing antisocial behaviour, knife crime and associated criminal justice costs.

NATIONAL YOUTH STRATEGY · 2026-07-08 · READ IN HANSARD

Government can often be siloed, so I hope that the Minister will also commit to making a concerted effort to ensure that policies and programmes across Government are put into practice in a more holistic and strategic way in this area.

NATIONAL YOUTH STRATEGY · 2026-07-08 · READ IN HANSARD

The Government’s national youth strategy has some noble aims, including halving the participation gap in enrichment activities between disadvantaged young people and their peers, and giving half a million more young people access to a trusted adult outside of the home by 2035—I believe passionately in the power of role models, and I would…

NATIONAL YOUTH STRATEGY · 2026-07-08 · READ IN HANSARD

The complete record

Every one of 604 lines we hold for Mr Louie French, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 9 of 13.

  1. By requiring the regulator to repay its start-up costs and then operate independently, we would make a clear distinction between initial public investment and long-term industry responsibility. It is not unreasonable to ask that football, having accepted the need for regulatory oversight, for which many have lobbied, now contributes to that oversight on a permanent and self-sustaining basis. That gives rise to a number of questions for the Minister. Is there a timeline for when the regulator is expected to be self-funding, or will it continue to draw on the public purse for a number of years? What provision, if any, has been made to recover the taxpayers’ outlay once the regulator begins to collect levy income?

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  2. The idea that the British taxpayer should continue to fund the ongoing operations of this new body is simply not justifiable, particularly at a time when families are feeling the squeeze and public services are under pressure. If clubs need a regulator—and the Government have decided that they do—then clubs, not pensioners in Bexley or shop workers in Barnsley, should pay for that regulator. The amendment would also introduce discipline into the regulatory model. It would ensure that the Government’s regulator lives within its means, plans sustainably and operates efficiently, just as it will expect clubs to. We must avoid the slow drift we have seen with other public bodies, where what begins as temporary state support gradually hardens into permanent public subsidy with no sunset clause or accountability.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  3. However, the Government have gone to great lengths to compromise that independence through their appointment, as we have discussed, and the principle would be fully compromised if the regulator remained financially reliant on the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, or the Treasury for that matter. Independence is not just about who makes the appointments, but about who signs the cheques. If the regulator is to carry out its duties credibly—overseeing financial discipline, enforcing ownership standards and planning across the football pyramid for the long term—it must operate free from any perception of ministerial influence. That means being self-funding.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  4. The principle behind the amendment is simple: if we are to create an independent regulator for football, its independence must extend beyond structure to include financial independence from the taxpayer. The clause gives the Secretary of State discretion to determine the mechanics of the levy, but it leaves unanswered an essential question: who ultimately pays—we have had a bit of discussion about that—and for how long? The amendment provides a clear and reasonable answer: the taxpayer may support the regulator’s launch, as might be expected, but once that is done, the regulator should stand on its own two feet. Let us not forget the purpose of the Bill: the regulator is intended to be arm’s length, neutral and shielded from political interference.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  5. The amendment would require the Government’s new regulator to be self-funding through the industry levy, but after it has paid its initial costs and the Secretary of State’s establishment costs to the Treasury, so that it is entirely self-sustaining. That is not unreasonable; taxpayers are already being squeezed by this Government, so it would be ludicrous to suggest that they should foot the bill for the Labour Government’s regulator. That is why I tabled the amendment, which seeks to place a clear financial obligation on the regulator to ensure that, after covering its start-up and establishment costs, it becomes entirely self-funding through the industry levy.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  6. I beg to move amendment 105, in clause 53, page 42, line 42, at end insert— “(6A) Once the IFR has established a levy under subsection (1) and made the required payments under section 96, the IFR must only fund its functions under this Act through its own revenue streams. (6B) For the purposes of subsection (6A) the IFR’s ‘own revenue streams’ are any amounts payable to the IFR from regulated clubs under subsection (1).” This amendment requires the IFR to be self-funding through the industry levy, but after it has paid its initial costs and the Secretary of State’s establishment costs to the Treasury.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  7. I appreciate that the Minister said that she will come on to that subject in a later debate, but can she be clear about start-up costs and their recovery for taxpayers? How is it envisaged that those costs will be repaid? I appreciate the point she makes about levy contributions, but how will the start-up costs that have been incurred now, along with the cost of the shadow football regulator, be recovered, if at all?

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  8. I appreciate the Minister’s comments, but it is very difficult to withdraw an amendment without clarity about the questions that we are posing. On that basis, I am afraid that we will not seek to withdraw the amendment. Question put, That the amendment be made.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  9. I beg to move amendment 102, in clause 54, page 44, line 7, leave out subsection (2). This amendment would remove the ability for the IFR not to consult on changes to the levy rules if the IFR considered them to be minor.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  10. Removing the minor change loophole would ensure that no future regulator could bypass scrutiny at its own convenience, and the requirement to provide six months’ notice would guarantee that clubs are not left scrambling to deal with cost changes with no time to prepare. This is about good governance, fair process and fiscal discipline. Clause 54 provides the procedural backbone for how the Government’s regulator will engage with the industry when amending leverage rules.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  11. If the answer is that it will be left to guidance or good practice, that will simply be not good enough. Good intentions are no substitute for legislative certainty. Both amendments are modest, reasonable and—we believe—entirely consistent with the Government’s stated ambition to build a trusted and transparent regulator that works with clubs, not over them. We must get the process right. Clubs must know when a charge is coming and how much it will cost them and their fans, and they must be given a chance to respond. That is what the amendments would provide—nothing more and nothing less.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  12. It is about financial certainty, about clubs being able to plan and about not changing the rules on the eve of a new season. We know that many clubs, especially further down the pyramid, operate on tight annual budgets. They finalise player contracts, ticketing strategies and community programmes months in advance. A late change to the levy rate or calculation method could throw all that into confusion. The amendment would help to give English football clubs the clarity that they need to prepare. It would ensure that levy changes are not imposed at short notice and it would enforce a principle that reasonable regulators should provide advance notice of costs. What safeguards, if any, will the Government establish to ensure that levy changes are communicated to the affected clubs in good time?

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  13. Even the perception that the Government’s regulator could tweak the levy regime unilaterally using the exemption for minor changes could erode trust, particularly among the smaller clubs that are already concerned. Consultation must not be seen as optional; it must be the default, not the exception. That leads me to amendment 103, which aims to improve the clarity of the Government’s regulator’s approach to any levy that it seeks to impose. The specific issue that it seeks to correct is that, under the Bill as drafted, the regulator must publish details of the levy as soon as is reasonably practicable before the start of a chargeable period. My amendment would require the Government’s new regulator to publish the levy rules at least six months before the beginning of the chargeable period to which they apply.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  14. Does the Minister recognise that cumulative so-called minor changes could, over time, significantly increase the regulatory burden on clubs without ever triggering a formal consultation? That is the risk of leaving this loophole in the Bill. It is not just about what the Government’s regulator might do today; it is also about what a future regulator—possibly a more activist regulator, although I hope not—might decide in years to come. We need to close the door now before that risk becomes reality. If clubs are to have confidence in the new regulatory regime, they must feel that major financial decisions will not be made without their involvement.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  15. Will the Minister explain why the Government believe it is acceptable for a statutory regulator to decide, on its own authority, when it is allowed to bypass the requirement to consult clubs and stakeholders that will be legislated for by Parliament? In every other walk of regulated life, such exemptions would be expected to come with clear limits or external oversight, yet in this instance we are effectively giving the Government’s regulator the ability to mark its own homework. Let us not forget that the levy is not an optional contribution but a statutory obligation. Clubs will have no choice but to pay whatever is set, which means that even small changes could have big consequences, particularly for those lower down the pyramid. What may seem minor to the regulator may not seem so minor to a National League club balancing its books.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  16. I suspect that the answer to those questions will be no, which is why I tabled amendment 102, which would remove the regulator’s power to skip consultation when it determines a change to be minor. The intent behind the exemption may be practical and be—to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy—but in reality it gives the Government’s regulator unilateral power to decide whether stakeholders should be consulted on changes that could have material financial consequences. Crucially, the definition of “minor” is left entirely to the regulator’s own judgment, as I have said. There is no objective test, no threshold and no review.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  17. We must consider the cumulative effect of so-called minor changes: one small rule adjustment may seem harmless, but several such changes made without consultation could over time significantly alter the levy framework, placing new burdens on clubs without ever facing proper scrutiny. That is how regulatory creep begins, and that is precisely what the clause should be guarding against, but, as drafted, it does not. Would the Minister consider amending the clause to define “minor” changes more clearly, perhaps by setting out objective criteria or requiring approval from the Secretary of State, Parliament or an independent panel? Alternatively, would she consider a threshold mechanism where changes with a financial impact above a certain level must trigger consultation regardless of her own regulator’s view?

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  18. The clause states that the Government’s regulator does not need to consult at all if it considers the proposed changes to the levy rules to be “minor”. Crucially, the regulator itself is to determine whether such a change is minor. Why is the regulator being permitted to define what counts as minor without any external check, threshold or approval? That creates a dangerous conflict of interest where the Minister’s regulator becomes the judge and jury in its own process. What is minor to the Government’s regulator may be highly significant to lower league clubs, such as a League Two or National League club trying to manage a tight budget. Once again, the Bill has a significant risk of regulatory mission creep.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  19. It is the mechanism by which clubs will fund the regulator, and the amount of levy and the method by which it is calculated or collected could have serious financial consequences, especially for clubs operating on tight margins, as we have discussed. We are talking about a compulsory statutory payment, not a voluntary contribution or a negotiated fee. Any change to the rules governing the levy must therefore be subject to robust scrutiny, proper stakeholder input and full transparency. The clause requires the regulator to consult a named list of stakeholders as well as any others it considers appropriate. It also requires a draft version of the proposed levy rules to be published as part of the consultation. So far, so good. But—this is a significant but—the clause also includes a major loophole.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  20. The clause sets out the consultation process that the Government’s new regulator must follow before introducing or amending the rules governing the industry levy that clubs will pay to fund the regulator’s operations, as we discussed on clause 53. The clause is designed to ensure that any such changes are not made in a vacuum and that the regulator consults the right people, provides a draft of the rules and gathers feedback before finalising anything. On the face of it, this is a welcome safeguard, but, as is so often the case with this Bill, the detail deserves much closer scrutiny. Let us be clear: the industry levy is not a trivial matter.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  21. I thank my hon. Friend for that valuable contribution, which gets to the heart of the amendments and what we are seeking to do. As I have said, they are designed not to undermine the regulator but to give transparency and fairness to clubs, so they can prepare their finances accordingly. As I was saying, clause 54 leaves too much discretion in the hands of the regulator, particularly through the vague and undefined minor change exemption. We cannot create a system in which financial rules that affect the entire English game can be altered without oversight simply because the Government’s regulator says that the change is small or minor. If we want confidence, we need consistency. If we want accountability, we need clarity. Let us ensure that the Government’s regulator consults not just when it wants to, but when it needs to.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  22. I listened carefully to the Minister’s response, which was fairly limited. I do not have enough confidence in her replies to withdraw the amendments. We are concerned about the impact on clubs and about the loophole in the interpretation of minor changes. I am not clear on the regulator’s accountability to stop scope creep. I suggested a number of options that the Government might look to adopt instead and did not hear any response to them. On that basis, and linked to some of the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne, I wish to press the amendments to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  23. For example, Greece was briefly suspended from international football in 2006 after the Greek Government passed a law that interfered—that was the term used—with the autonomy of the Greek football federation, in violation of UEFA and FIFA regulations. In 1999, Moldova’s clubs and national team faced a ban from UEFA competitions, after it was deemed that there was political interference in the running of its football federation. In 2002, FIFA suspended Zimbabwe and Kenya from international competitions due to perceived Government interference in the football administrations of those countries.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  24. If she has received any correspondence to the contrary, will she also place that in the Library so that the Committee has confidence ahead of Third Reading and can scrutinise the provision properly? What safeguards are in place to prevent this from being interpreted—either in Brussels or somewhere else—as a breach of sporting autonomy? This is not theoretical—it is a real and dangerous risk for English football. Let us remember, in recent years, that other countries have faced disciplinary threats or warnings for perceived interference in football. We have seen federations sanctioned before. National teams and clubs have been threatened with exclusion from competitions.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  25. Once that principle is established, the scope can grow. We know that there are international concerns about scope creep, as I mentioned when speaking to amendment 97. “UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep within the IFR. While the initial intent of the IFR is to oversee the long-term financial sustainability of clubs and heritage assets, there is always a risk that, once established, the IFR may expand its mandate beyond these areas”. Those are not my words. Will the Minister confirm whether UEFA has been consulted on the drafting of the clause, and whether the Government have received written assurances that this level of regulatory involvement is compatible with UEFA’s independence rules? If she has, will she place a copy in the Library?

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  26. Moreover, FIFA echoes that approach in its regulations, particularly in article 14 of the FIFA statutes, which ensures that member associations, such as the FA, remain autonomous and free from governmental or political influence. Article 15 of the FIFA statutes further requires members to be neutral in matters of politics and religion, to be independent, and to avoid any forms of political interference. Subsection (6) brings us dangerously close to the line, if not across it. Unfortunately for the Minister, the Government seem to be on the wrong side of that line. I will press the Minister on that point, because however carefully the clause may have been worded in terms of consultation, in reality it inserts the Government’s new regulator into the core rule-making processes of the football pyramid.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  27. The relevant rule is article 7bis (2) of the UEFA statutes, which states: “Member Associations shall manage their affairs independently and with no undue influence from third parties.” Article 9 goes on to state: “A Member Association may in particular be suspended if state authorities interfere in its affairs in such a significant way that...it may no longer be considered as fully responsible for the organisation of football-related matters in its territory”. It is pretty clear that the FA will no longer be considered fully responsible for the organisation of football-related matters in its territory should the Bill pass with this provision.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  28. That might sound innocuous, but let us be clear about what it means in practice: for the first time, a politically appointed regulator, accountable to the Secretary of State, who has received donations from that regulator, would be given a formal, statutory role in the internal rule-making processes of English football competitions. This is not a light-touch oversight mechanism; we fear it might end up being a direct institutional influence. As we know, it is not compatible with UEFA’s requirements on the non-interference of Government. UEFA statutes are clear that national football associations and their affiliated leagues and competitions must be free from political or Government control.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  29. Subsection (6) imposes a statutory duty on specified competition organisers to consult the regulator when they either add or remove a relevant rule of a specified competition, or vary a relevant rule of a specified competition. I note the comments of the hon. Member for Sheffield South East about when the regulator is involved in a competition and when it is not, with regard to the FA Cup. Some clarity on that would be much appreciated. In short, the provision means that competitions such as the Premier League, the EFL and the FA Cup would be required—based on the wording of this part of the Bill—to consult the Government’s football regulator every time they change or amend a rule deemed to be relevant by the regulator itself.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  30. The clause sets out a series of duties that require various football stakeholders, including leagues and governing bodies, to notify and consult the Government’s new regulator in certain circumstances. At its core, the clause is intended to improve co-ordination and to prevent regulatory surprises, which in principle is reasonable. We all agree that where the governance of the game affects financial sustainability or club integrity, the Government’s regulator should be aware and engaged. I will focus on subsection (6), which is a far more consequential provision than it might first appear. I believe it strikes at the very heart of one of the most sensitive and important issues in football governance: the independence of sport from Government control.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  31. If we allow the Government’s regulator to adjudicate disputes over parachute payments, we risk setting a precedent that any form of commercial agreement, no matter how internal, can be referred for outside resolution. We believe that that would be a mistake, and would likely undermine the willingness of top-flight clubs to continue sharing revenue in any form at all. If the Minister starts this process off on the wrong foot with clubs and this is not done in the right way, we fear that resentment would set in from day one. With the top flight already questioning—

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  32. The amendment does not oppose the resolution process in principle; it supports it, and in fact returns the Bill to what the Minister previously supported. Can she tell us what has changed, and why she felt the need to make the change when she previously had no issue with this part of the Bill? My amendment seeks to make sure that the Government’s regulator does not intervene in areas that are already managed by mutual agreement between competitions. Parachute payments are, by their nature, a Premier League solution to what is often a Premier League problem. They are not imposed on the EFL or funded by it, and although their knock-on effects may be debated—I have my own views on that—they should not be subject to arbitration by a third party.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  33. This is obviously an important point, given the wage bills and so on when clubs go down, but it is never far from being controversial. Some see the payments as being necessary to ensure financial continuity and competition in the Premier League on the way up, while others argue that they distort competition in the Championship on the way down, solidifying clubs as so-called yo-yo clubs that go up and down regularly. Bringing parachute payments within the scope of the regulator’s resolution process, as clause 56 does, takes a significant step towards Government involvement in revenue redistribution among private members of the competition. That is not regulation; it is reallocation. In our view, it is an inappropriate function for a state-backed regulator.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  34. In subsection (2), this is revenue received “as a result of the sale or acquisition of rights to exploit the broadcasting of football matches included in a competition organised by the specified competition organiser, or…from any other source specified, or of a description specified, in regulations made by the Secretary of State.” In essence, the provisions allow disputes over financial redistribution to be brought before the Government’s new regulator, which may then facilitate a resolution or, in some cases, take further steps to impose one. The specific issue we have with the clause, which was introduced by the Government, relates to the parachute payments of financial support offered by the Premier League to clubs that are relegated to the EFL to help them adjust to the significant drop in broadcasting and commercial income.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  35. It risks turning the regulator from a referee into a participant, and that risk becomes very real when we consider what types of decisions might fall within that process. That is why I have tabled amendment 124, which would exclude parachute payments to the regulated clubs from the scope of the resolution process, as was the case in the Bill that the Minister supported during the previous Parliament. Clause 56 is not procedural, but foundational. It defines who can apply to trigger the resolution process, namely certain governing bodies and competition organisers, and what is meant by the term “relevant revenue”.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  36. The clause is important because it sets the boundaries of when and how the Government’s new regulator may be invited, or, in some cases, compelled to step into the room on issues that until now have been managed internally within the football pyramid. We understand the intention behind this process. It reflects years of unresolved tensions in the game between different tiers of the pyramid, between governing bodies, and, most notably, between the Premier League and the EFL. Clause 56 and the following clauses in part 6 provide the bones of a system for dispute resolution, in the hope of reaching consensus where negotiation has failed. In principle, that has merit. However, we believe that the clause as drafted risks crossing a line—not into oversight, but into interventionism.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  37. I beg to move amendment 124, in clause 56, page 46, line 3, leave out subsection (2) and insert— “(2) In this Part, revenue received by a specified competition organiser is ‘relevant revenue’ if— (a) it is revenue received as a result of the sale or acquisition of rights to exploit the broadcasting of football matches included in a competition organised by the specified competition organiser, and (b) it is not revenue that the specified competition organiser distributes to a club by virtue of a team operated by the club being relegated from a competition organised by the specified competition organiser.” Clause 56 introduces the framework for the resolution process, which is a formal mechanism through which the Government’s new regulator may intervene to help to resolve disputes between football authorities, competitions and clubs in certain prescribed areas.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  38. I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s experience with Derby, and I understand his point. That is why I said there are a number of opinions, and this a very controversial subject. I have engaged with EFL clubs as part of this process, and we get a variety of opinions, even before we get to asking the Premier League clubs for their opinion, so I absolutely understand his point. This amendment is about trying to exclude parachute payments from this part of the Bill, rather than trying to take a decision on what parachute payment levels should be in any shape or form. That is the distinction we seek to make with the amendment, and I commend it to the Committee.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (EIGHTH SITTING) · 2025-06-12 · READ IN HANSARD

  39. We in the Opposition do not want to restrict clubs from increasing capacity and investing in communities around the country; I am sure that we will see a lot more of that, going forward, as clubs seek to increase their revenues and the capacity of stadia. Nevertheless, I have great sympathy for the arguments made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (FIFTH SITTING) · 2025-06-10 · READ IN HANSARD

  40. Member highlighted some of the tensions it causes, particularly with fans, and the great uncertainty about the future of the game and the participation of those clubs. It is always extremely disappointing and frustrating when a small number of owners clearly do not have the best long-term intentions for the club or the community that they serve. I am interested to hear the Minister’s response to the amendment and how it might work if it is agreed to. I would also like to understand how it would work for good owners who look to invest in their communities and grounds, and who ensure that clubs have new stadia, for example. The most obvious example, going into the new season, is Everton’s new stadium.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (FIFTH SITTING) · 2025-06-10 · READ IN HANSARD

  41. It is a privilege to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy, and to speak on day three—is it day three? Time flies when you’re having fun!—of this Bill Committee. The hon. Member for Sheffield South East has explained in quite lengthy detail the aims of the amendment; I will not repeat what he has said, because it is his amendment, but I have great sympathy with his arguments. Examples, as he says, include Derby, Sheffield Wednesday, Coventry, Wimbledon—for us slightly older football fans—and of course my home club, Charlton, where as I understand it the person who owned the club two owners ago retains ownership of both the stadium—The Valley—and the training ground. That creates a number of challenges for clubs, not only on the playing side, but behind the scenes and on the academy side. It is a real issue in football. The hon.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (FIFTH SITTING) · 2025-06-10 · READ IN HANSARD

  42. I beg to move amendment 104, in schedule 4, page 99, line 31, at end insert— “(f) the club’s political statements and positions.” This amendment ensures that clubs have to engage their fans on the political statements a club might adopt.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (FIFTH SITTING) · 2025-06-10 · READ IN HANSARD

  43. Does it mean formal board structures, independent non-executive directors and complying with the UK corporate governance code, or something else entirely? Could the Minister please clarify that for the Committee? We fear that this schedule hands a blank cheque to the regulator to determine how football clubs, from Premier League giants to National League sides, must structure their affairs, able to coerce them into restructuring their club to fit a narrow regulatory framework that has not been voted for by the fans of any club. This is a serious transfer of power from clubs and their owners to a Government body, and we must ask: is it proportionate? Is it justified?

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (FIFTH SITTING) · 2025-06-10 · READ IN HANSARD

  44. Let us take paragraph 4, for example, which sets out: “The fan engagement threshold requirement is met, in relation to a club, if the club has adequate and effective means by which— (a) the club consults its fans about the relevant matters, and (b) the club takes the views of its fans into account in making decisions”. However, it does not tell us what constitutes “adequate” or “effective”. Can the Minister tell us what those terms mean, or when we can expect to be told? Who defines those terms? Is this another instance of the regulator being able to set its own definitions, terms of reference and standards? Paragraph 3(2)(c) states that the Government’s regulator must have regard to a club’s “corporate governance arrangements”. I ask the Minister: what does that actually mean? We are not told, and again it is not clear.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (FIFTH SITTING) · 2025-06-10 · READ IN HANSARD

  45. However, there is a clear difference between ensuring prudence and exercising control over a club. My concern, and that of many clubs and fans, is that schedule 4 risks crossing that line. Under paragraphs 2 to 7 of schedule 4, the Government’s regulator is empowered to set requirements for financial resources, suitable governance structures, appropriate corporate plans and the ability to comply with all relevant obligations. On the surface that might seem sensible, but the provisions are broad, vaguely defined and, in practice, leave almost every detail to be filled in by a politically led regulator at a later date via licence conditions.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (FIFTH SITTING) · 2025-06-10 · READ IN HANSARD

  46. On the face of it, few would argue against the principle of minimum standards, but as is so often the case with regulation, the devil lies in the detail. In this case, the sheer breadth and flexibility that the Bill hands to the Government’s regulator raise real and pressing concerns. I start with a central and unarguable point: clubs must be well run. No one disputes that, and thankfully, the vast majority of clubs in the country are. However, we have seen hard-working communities let down by reckless owners and weak governance—from Bury and Derby to the recent struggles at Reading, which the hon. Member for Newbury mentioned. The purpose of this legislation should be to help to protect footballing communities better and to ensure that all clubs are not only sustainable, but rooted, responsible and resilient.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (FIFTH SITTING) · 2025-06-10 · READ IN HANSARD

  47. Amendment 104 would amend schedule 4 to insert “the club’s political statements and positions”, to ensure that clubs have to engage their fans on any political statements that the club might adopt. New clause 16 introduces a duty to consult fans on political statements and is an expansion of what that means in practice. As everyone can see the amendment paper, I will move on to my speech. Schedule 4 sets out the threshold requirements that a club must meet to be granted a licence by this Government’s regulator. In essence, those are the baseline criteria that every club must pass before the Government allow them to play football. Never before has a Government been involved in deciding who can play football. This is a huge moment for English football, its governance and, most importantly, its fans.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (FIFTH SITTING) · 2025-06-10 · READ IN HANSARD

  48. I will try to stick to the footballing part of the question and not stray into the transfer market, which I believe opens today or tomorrow. When we have people camped outside Conservative Campaign Headquarters on deadline day, I will know that the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth has sent them there. In all seriousness, what we are looking to do is to talk about representations made by a club in an official capacity rather than a personal capacity. I think that there is an important distinction with what a person does in their own time. What was the party—the Referendum party? The hon. Member for Cheltenham is showing his age.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (FIFTH SITTING) · 2025-06-10 · READ IN HANSARD

  49. We are not suggesting a referendum. We are saying that fans should be involved in the decision-making process. There is a debate around Pride and other issues, but that is not the point we are trying to make. We are trying to make sure that football clubs, wherever possible, stick to the game and that fans have a say. I have already said that we are not trying to bind clubs and prevent them from addressing initiatives that are often taken by the leagues rather than just individual clubs, but we are trying to ensure that fans have a say.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (FIFTH SITTING) · 2025-06-10 · READ IN HANSARD

  50. I appreciate the point that the hon. Lady makes. I am not aware of the financial example that she gives—genuinely I am not—so it would not be appropriate for me to comment, but the crossover between politics and football is one that we have to acknowledge, regardless of party allegiance. The vast majority of fans, when they go to the football at the weekend or midweek, go to watch football and in many ways to switch off from the harsher realities of life. I am personally a big believer in politics staying out of sport, as I have said on a number of occasions.

    FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE BILL [ LORDS ] (FIFTH SITTING) · 2025-06-10 · READ IN HANSARD