Mr Louie French
MP for Old Bexley and Sidcup · Conservative · United Kingdom
“As part of that, we allocated £300 million to youth facilities, improving and developing 300 of them. We established the National Citizen Service; this Government cancelled it, but more than 750,000 young people participated in it and it had a 93% satisfaction rate—something this Government could only dream of.”
“As always, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. I congratulate the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Harpreet Uppal) on securing this important debate. We all recognise that this issue is increasingly important to our constituents across the country.”
“The renewed national focus on enrichment is welcome and timely, but access to enrichment remains uneven, and Government funding cuts will only make that worse.”
“Youth work has huge economic benefits. Research has shown that every £1 of Government investment in youth work has a social return on investment of between £3.20 and £6.40. Moreover, it saves around £500 million annually by preventing antisocial behaviour, knife crime and associated criminal justice costs.”
“Government can often be siloed, so I hope that the Minister will also commit to making a concerted effort to ensure that policies and programmes across Government are put into practice in a more holistic and strategic way in this area.”
“The Government’s national youth strategy has some noble aims, including halving the participation gap in enrichment activities between disadvantaged young people and their peers, and giving half a million more young people access to a trusted adult outside of the home by 2035—I believe passionately in the power of role models, and I would…”
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“As we have discussed at length, the Bill is already flawed in this respect, and UEFA and FIFA would intervene if the regulator caused any impact on competitiveness. I only have to highlight the example of Crystal Palace, which is currently in the press, to demonstrate that UEFA and FIFA will stick to their rules rigidly, whether we like them or not. As I said when speaking to my amendment 97, any new licensing requirements introduced by the IFR must be meticulously aligned with existing UEFA and international frameworks. Does the Minister accept that clubs, as entities directly impacted by licensing regulations, must have a voice in the development and implementation of these requirements?”
“That is why we will be looking closely at whether there are sufficient checks, balances and transparency mechanisms in the clause to protect clubs from arbitrary financial conditions. Will the regulator issue any guidance on financial discretionary licence conditions, and will that guidance be made public? Will the Minister consider requiring an annual report to Parliament detailing how many clubs have had such discretionary financial conditions imposed, varied or removed, and on what grounds those decisions were made? Without such checks, there is a real risk of an unequal competition taking place without fans and Parliament knowing, until it is too late and UEFA and FIFA have ejected us from their competitions. That is what I most fear may happen by accident.”
“Although it is welcome that the clause does not set out a consultative process for how the financial conditions are imposed or amended, the process must not be a box-ticking exercise. Clubs should be able to challenge unreasonable conditions, and the regulator should be required to justify in clear terms why any new financial burden is necessary to meet the threshold requirements. It cannot become the case that discretionary conditions are routinely imposed as a back-door method of raising standards in areas for which Parliament has not explicitly legislated. The risk of regulatory mission creep is particularly acute in a sector like football, in which the boundaries between finance, governance and culture are easily blurred.”
“Clause 23 sets out the process that the Government’s new regulator must follow when it wishes to attach or vary a financial discretionary licence condition, which are by definition additional obligations that the regulator may impose on clubs that go beyond the mandatory licensing framework. In doing so, the clause confers on the regulator considerable further discretion. As with other discretionary powers in the Bill, the risk is not merely that the regulator uses its discretion, but that it does so inconsistently, unpredictably or in a way that strays beyond its core remit. Given that the powers provided by the clause relate directly to the financial obligations of clubs, the implications for competitiveness, investment and long-term planning are significant.”
“That is exactly my concern. In trying to tailor the conditions that we are discussing, there is a risk of inadvertently impacting the ability of clubs to compete on a fair and level playing field. I am concerned that that should not happen inadvertently, as the regulator evolves. That is why I keep pushing for more parliamentary oversight, so that we understand the risks. At the end of the day, fans will not forgive us as Members of this House if this goes wrong. I do not believe in any shape or form that the Government are aiming deliberately to get it wrong—I say that openly—but I fear that there will be unintended consequences, and that is the broader point that we have been trying to make in a number of the Committee’s debates.”
“Does the hon. Member for Cheltenham think it might improve the new clause to include a route of appeal against such a decision, as a matter of natural justice, so we are seen to give individuals the right of appeal if they believe that they have been wrongly classified?”
“I thank the Liberal Democrat spokesperson for explaining the objectives behind the amendment, which is aimed at preventing individuals with a record of human rights abuses from owning a club. My question for the hon. Member is about new clause 8(2)(b), which states that “the Regulator shall have absolute discretion to determine whether conduct falls within any of the categories in paragraphs (a) to (d).” In other words, it will have discretion to determine whether such conduct constitutes human rights abuses. Given we are talking about a football regulator, the obvious question to ask is about what qualifications the regulator would need to make such a decision. What information could they rely on? Would we be looking for Government involvement in that, given that that would probably provide the intellectual experience required?”
“I think that all Members would seek to avoid a situation where people disengage from a process because they are concerned about that word “duty”, and what that could leave them exposed to legally if they were to come across information, for example, but did not feel confident in passing it on. That might arise in a variety of circumstances, but I am interested to hear the Minister’s comments on new clause 15 in particular and on how we can seek to deliver the broader objective of strengthening ownership tests, without having to go down the rabbit hole of this duty element.”
“An owner might be deemed an appropriate and fit person to run a club in 2025, but changes to their financial circumstances—assuming that they have other business interests—could mean that they become more stretched, and they might be involved in other activity that comes to light, so it would be right for the review to take place as early as possible to minimise the potential damage to clubs. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East posited a number of important legal challenges around this point of duty. I have sympathy with the broader objective of new clause 15, but this issue of duty poses a number of risks for people who are not board-level employees or in significant roles of influence.”
“We should ensure the consistency of those tests between the leagues, and we should ensure that up and down the country we have the best people in charge of such community assets, and that they have the long-term interests of clubs at heart, as I believe the overwhelming majority of club owners do. Those examples of where problems came to a head and caused significant damage to communities have proven that there is a difference in some of the tests applied by the leagues historically, with gaps and loopholes that individuals have looked to exploit. Such examples have also highlighted the need for ongoing review by the regulator about how it manages the information that comes to light.”
“I thank the hon. Member for speaking to the new clause on behalf of his colleague, the hon. Member for Wokingham. The point that he made is very interesting and I have great sympathy with fans of Reading football club, who he referred to, and with fans of other clubs around the country that have fallen foul of their owners, who, I think it is fair to say, did not have the club’s long-term interests at heart. I say that as someone who has already referred to Charlton a number of times in this Committee—been there, done it, got the T-shirt. As I say, I have a lot of sympathy with fans of Reading and I hope that the future looks brighter for that club. Even before the election, I publicly supported strengthening ownership tests. I believe them to be part of one of the most fundamental roles that the regulator should play.”
“Member for Houghton and Sunderland South (Bridget Phillipson) might move to the Minister’s Department be considered “a reasonable prospect”? There are non-political examples of how that might work too, but it would be interesting to hear what the Government believe to be a reasonable prospect.”
“As the Minister just outlined, clause 27 requires regulated clubs to notify about prospective new owners and officers if there is a reasonable prospect of such a change. It also requires an officer’s proposed job title, job description and senior management functions. If the football regulator is not notified before the change, the club must notify as soon as practically possible. I am slightly concerned that this could be a burdensome requirement on some clubs. Any large organisation, such as a football club, will often cast a wide net when considering such appointments, with people on the radar long in advance. I therefore ask the Minister to enlighten us on what she believes constitutes “a reasonable prospect”. For example, would media speculation that the right hon.”
“If we think about not just the financial penalties imposed, but the points that can be deducted, there are major implications for the competitive nature of the league. I look forward to the Minister answering a few of those questions.”
“Can applicants, for example, challenge or appeal those delays, if the reason for them lay with the regulator rather than the individual club? A delay by the regulator would risk unfairly penalising applicants who were not personally at fault for it. Will there be an obligation on the football regulator to inform applicants of approaching deadlines, to ensure that they know when the determination period is nearing its end, and what oversight will there be to ensure that extensions are not routine? Lastly, will there be monitoring of how often extensions are used and how long determinations typically take, so that clubs can start to plan for such instances where they occur? That would also give greater certainty to the leagues because, as I highlighted earlier, it is not just individuals, but clubs themselves at risk.”
“There is also no requirement, it appears, for the football regulator to consider other external stakeholders, which could include other directors or supporters’ trusts involved with the running of a club. Should an individual receive a negative determination, the legal and financial resources to make a strong representation within a specified timeframe might be considerable. Does the Minister envisage many applicants seeking legal aid or other advisory support mechanisms in such a scenario? Clause 32 outlines several points about the football regulator’s determinations after an individual makes an application under clauses 28 and 29. The IFR seems to be able to extend its determination periods several times, but the clause fails to outline for what reason an extension might be justified and how long it should or could be.”
“It is vital that decisions taken by the regulator are independent and impartial, as already discussed, so what safeguards will there be to ensure that neither media nor political pressure is exerted on the football regulator to deem an owner unsuitable? Clause 31 states that the football regulator must “have regard to” representations from affected clubs or individuals. What does that constitute in reality—a response, or simply a consideration? Must the football regulator provide written reasoning if it rejects the arguments made in the representation? Does this clause not lack basic safeguards and, without a framework for how representations should be made or evaluated, does it not risk leading to inconsistent decision making? Again, I fear there would be various legal challenges, given the financial implications of such decisions.”
“It would be helpful for Members to have an insight into how that might look, because this clause does not offer a specific timeframe within which the football regulator must act at once if it becomes aware of an unauthorised appointment at a club. It also seems that the football regulator can indefinitely extend the deadline for submitting such an application; the clause fails to clarify how many times and under what conditions. I therefore wonder whether the Minister has considered the potential effects on the stability of the club of the football regulator deeming an individual unsuitable: would that open clubs to legal or operational risk, and would there be financial consequences of those risks?”
“What assurances can the Minister provide that this process will be completed swiftly and will not unnecessarily delay any ownership changes which, as we have already discussed, may need to happen very quickly when a club is under significant financial stress—to ensure wages are paid and to prevent further hardship when seeking a change of ownership? Clause 30 sets out what should happen in the event that a person has become an owner or an officer of a regulated club without first obtaining the suitability determination from the football regulator. The clause assumes that the football regulator “becomes aware”; is the expectation that there is a disclosure from the club, or will the IFR be probing clubs, looking at news reports, Companies House and so on?”
“Clause 29 prohibits any person from becoming an owner of a regulated club without first applying to the independent football regulator and being determined suitable for that role. It requires any applicant to provide information on the proposed operation of the club, estimated costs, how those costs will be funded and the source of funding, which is a point that is been raised already in this Committee. The football regulator must make an affirmative determination regarding the application if the potential owner is considered to have sufficient financial resources and meets the individual ownership fitness criteria. I already spoken about why I believe it is important that these fitness tests are strengthened wherever possible, but there are a couple of questions I would like to ask the Minister on this clause first.”
“It will be interesting to see how the Government will seek to manage that risk in terms of financial compliance, given that an issue with a particular owner or officer could have significant financial implications for a club and therefore potentially leave individuals inside that loop at risk of being involved with inside information from a dealing perspective. As we all know, if anyone is found to be in breach of inside information, it has very serious consequences. It will be interesting to see how the mechanism in this clause to inform clubs and individuals first will work with the broader notifications in the market where clubs are listed.”
“The clause stipulates that the regulator must inform incumbent owners and officers only that it is minded to find them unsuitable, not of the reasons why. Given the vital importance of these representations, should there not be a requirement for the regulator to disclose the reasons to the person and club so that they can fully engage? I would appreciate the Minister picking up the point about the reasons, because it is important. There is a broader point here about clubs that may be listed on the open market. My understanding of this clause is that, before a final decision is taken, the club would effectively become an insider from a trading perspective.”
“If the bar is set too low, the regulator may be immediately burdened by the need to review multiple existing officers for each club. I ask the Minister again: what level of information will be required to qualify as grounds for concern? There is also no time limit for the regulator to make its assessment, so how will it ensure that this threat does not needlessly hang over existing officers? Lastly—you will be pleased to know, Mr Turner—clause 36 requires the football regulator to give advance notification to an incumbent owner or officer if it is minded to find them unsuitable. Before making a final decision, the clause requires the person and club in question to be allowed to make representations, which must then be taken into account.”
“There is also no time limit for the regulator to make its assessment, so how will the regulator ensure that the threat does not needlessly hang over existing owners? Clause 35 empowers the football regulator to determine whether an incumbent officer meets the fitness criteria if the regulator has information that raises grounds for concern. It requires the regulator to inform the owner and club before making a determination and then notify them of the outcome. As I said regarding the previous clause, more than 100 English football clubs will be regulated if the Bill passes. It is not specified in the Bill what level of information would raise grounds for concern regarding officers, of which there are even more to consider.”
“I would appreciate a response to that point today. Moving on to clause 34, it empowers the football regulator to determine whether an incumbent individual owner meets the fitness criteria or has wealth associated with serious criminal conduct, if the regulator has information that raises grounds for concern. It requires the regulator to inform the owner and club before making a determination and then notify them of the outcome. If passed, more than 100 English football clubs will be subject to the regulation. It is not specified in the Bill what level of information would raise grounds for concern regarding incumbent owners. If the bar is set too low, the regulator may be immediately burdened by reviewing multiple existing owners, causing unease in English football. What level of information is required to qualify as grounds for concern?”
“What appeal or review mechanisms will be available to a club if the football regulator finds that it failed to notify as required? Will there be a formal process for representations or challenge before any enforcement action is taken? How does the clause interact with the broader principles of legal privilege and privacy? Will clubs be expected to disclose internal HR issues or ongoing internal investigations, even if there is no conclusion yet? Have the Government assessed whether the clause is compatible with UEFA and FIFA expectations of non-interference in the running of football clubs? I had a written response from the Minister this morning regarding her last meeting with UEFA and FIFA, which was 1 November. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since then, so we are still concerned about the broader point regarding UEFA.”
“Could the Minister clarify what sorts of events would qualify as a “change in circumstances” under clause 33? Will guidance be issued by the football regulator to ensure consistent interpretation? Will the definition be limited to formal, objective legal changes? What level of evidence or certainty will clubs be expected to have before reporting a change? Will clubs be required to report allegations or media speculation? Will the football regulator consider good-faith failures to notify or take a strict liability approach? How will the regulator account for differences in club size, structure and resourcing when judging what is “reasonably practicable”? Will there be any threshold or scaling in terms of compliance expectations for clubs of differing means?”
“We do not want to create a culture of regulatory paranoia, where clubs feel compelled to notify the Government’s regulator of every minor development just in case it is later deemed relevant, nor do we want smaller clubs punished for failing to meet standards that are de facto only achievable for the top tier. The Government must ensure that the clause is not a trapdoor for arbitrary enforcement, and that it supports predictability, stability and confidence in the regulatory framework. We understand the underlying principle, but we will continue to press the Minister to ensure the practical operation of the clause does not give rise to legal ambiguity, unjust outcomes or unaccountable discretion. Before moving on, I have a number of questions on clause 33.”
“Clubs cannot become the regulator’s enforcement arm, expected to carry out continuous due diligence on their own officers and owners, with the threat of regulatory action hanging over them if they get it wrong. Clause 33 touches on a sensitive area: the relationship between clubs and their owners, and the role of the state in policing suitability. It is right to expect clubs to act responsibly and keep the regulator informed, but the duty must be clear, proportionate and fairly enforced to avoid lower-level staff being put in extremely difficult situations.”
“Furthermore, clause 33 requires that the Government be notified “as soon as reasonably practicable” after a change has occurred. Again, the language is open to wide interpretation. What is “reasonably practicable” for a large Premier League club with extensive legal support may be entirely different for a National League side with minimal back office capacity. We must ensure that smaller clubs are not disproportionately penalised because they lack the administrative infrastructure to track and report such changes with the same immediacy as those international brands that sit atop the English football pyramid. We must also ask whether the sanctions for failing to report, which could be very serious, potentially leading to licence revocation, are proportionate to each breach.”
“If so, I fear that the Government and their regulator would be on very shaky ground, not just because clubs would find themselves in the near-impossible position of having to second-guess what the regulator might later deem to be relevant, even when no formal wrongdoing has occurred, but because it would open up the regulator to spates of judicial reviews. As we see already, the wealthiest clubs would be able to hire the best lawyers, and those clubs that are already struggling would be subject to the personal diktats of the chairman of the Government’s regulator. That is not a sustainable, appropriate or moral way to regulate, and it is totally incompatible with the principle of legal certainty that should underpin any new statutory regime.”
“The Government and the new regulator must be up front, open and honest with fans and Parliament as to what those terms actually mean. We fear that the Government are deliberately muddying the waters around what the regulatory environment would look like under the Bill, and around the rules that the regulator will seek to apply. The Minister must answer whether a “change in circumstances” is limited to formal legal developments, such as bankruptcy, a criminal conviction, or something as small as a parking fine. I hope not the latter. Could the definition extend to more subjective matters such as personal, reputational issues, media allegations, or ongoing investigations?”
“The explanatory notes prepared by the Government give a small indication of what such circumstances might include, stating that “Relevant material changes could include, for example, an officer becoming subject to criminal proceedings or regulatory action”. That is somewhat clear, but what qualifies as “regulatory action”? Could it be an Ofcom investigation, for example? The explanatory notes add that “new information coming to light regarding whether an owner’s source of wealth is connected to serious criminality” also qualifies as a material, relevant change. What qualifies as “new information”? Does it mean a full-blown criminal investigation or spurious claims, potentially made by activist groups against foreign owners? How the provision will work needs to be clarified.”
“Clause 33 places a duty on clubs to notify the Government’s new regulator of any change in circumstances relating to the current owner or an officer that could impact their suitability under the regime set out in part 4 of the Bill. On one level, it is an understandable provision. To fulfil its statutory duties, the regulator must be kept informed of material changes, as ensuring the fitness and propriety of owners and officers is a core part of its remit. However, the clause as drafted raises a number of serious and practical concerns about how such a duty will be defined, interpreted and enforced. The first issue with the clause is its vagueness. What exactly constitutes a “change in circumstances”?”
“Residents in Bexley village in my constituency—it is one of London’s outer villages—are particularly concerned about the erosion of their green areas around the village. Does my hon. Friend share my concern and surprise that, when the outer London green belt issue was discussed in the London Assembly last week, Reform backed Mayor Khan in building over the green belt? Reform backed Khan against the interests of Bexley residents.”
“After all, that is what the Government say is the intention of this regulator. I hope that hon. Members will support the principle behind the amendment. We have heard some of the issues that may arise if not.”
“The amendment also supports the broader aim of stability in football. A system without timelines invites inconsistency and subjectivity. One club might be processed in a week, and another in six. That cannot be right. We owe it to clubs at all levels, from the top of the Premier League right the way down to the National League, to create a system that is predictable and fair. Finally, good regulation is not just about the rules but about responsiveness. It is about a regulator that can act promptly, efficiently and in partnership with the people it is overseeing. Our amendment does not weaken the regulator; it makes it better. It strengthens the trust between the regulator and the regulated. It gives clubs the certainty that they need to plan, invest and survive.”
“Let me also be clear that the time limit does not bind the regulator to approve an application within a month; it simply requires a decision one way or another within that time. That allows the Government’s regulator to reject unsuitable applications if needed—hopefully not—but it removes the damaging uncertainty of a process that otherwise could drag on indefinitely. We must not forget who bears the cost of delay. It is not just the club executives and directors, but the fans, players and staff. We have just heard about transfers, which are a great example. It is about the people who turn up on a Saturday afternoon come rain or shine, the people who run the club shop and the ticket gates, and the people whose local economies benefit from having a club that is alive, operating and secure.”
“We know from numerous examples across different industries that when regulators are left without timetables, backlogs just build up. I will not name examples because I am conscious of time, but we know that it happens. My amendment proposes a time limit of one month—a full 30 days—for the regulator to determine whether a provisional licence should be granted. That is not a rushed timetable; we believe that it is a reasonable one, especially considering that when a club applies for a provisional licence, the key facts will likely already be known by the regulator. Again, this is not designed to be a forensic financial autopsy, but a short-term stabilising mechanism.”
“I thank the hon. Member for that point. Transfers are a key aspect. If a club is in limbo, it could arguably be at a much bigger disadvantage when the season starts if it had not been able to make transfers because it was uncertain about whether it could compete in the competition. The point is well made. Secondly, the absence of a defined period creates a lack of accountability within the regulator itself. As we have discussed, the regulator cannot be scrutinised in the way that we would have hoped. We know that the Government do want it to be strong, but with strength must come accountability and transparency. If it is to command the trust of fans, clubs and local communities, it must be seen to act with purpose, not with delay.”
“I do not plan to speak again at length. I appreciate the Minister’s comments, but we are concerned that without a set timetable on the regulator’s granting of a provisional licence, the uncertainty would create a number of issues.”
“I thank my hon. Friend for making that point. That is not my understanding of how the Bill works, but the Minister may want to clarify that.”
“That was a rather long intervention, but I suspect it was probably needed. I appreciate the clarity from the Minister on that point, but in terms of the time limit, we are concerned about the impact of the uncertainty relating to the provisional element. In this situation, we would like that to be a focus of the regulator, given that it is being set up for exactly this kind of work. We will therefore press the amendment to a vote. Question put , That the amendment be made.”
“As such, I would appreciate it if the Minister will confirm that there will be no demands, for example, on clubs to provide diversity quotas, net zero targets or enforced political campaigns, all of which stray beyond the regulator’s core remit of financial sustainability and good governance. Let us not forget that football clubs are not franchises, as they are in the American sport system. Our clubs are community institutions with long histories and unique identities. They are not all cut from the same cloth.”
“I am not sure that the club would do that, as it was a tongue-in-cheek comment, but what would happen if a club says, “We are not going to meet these conditions, and therefore we will not apply for a licence”? Would the Government or regulator be willing to kick that club out of the Premier League? Even though that question is hypothetical, we need to know where this might lead, because we are talking about a regulation that will have an impact. If the Minister can answer where she thinks that club might go, I would be particularly interested in that. We are also concerned about the future interpretation of eligibility and how that may veer into what we believe to be subjective decisions, or where the Government’s regulator will take on new powers as it enters mission creep.”
“We have spoken about our concerns about the impact that that may have on the statutes of UEFA and FIFA—in the interests of time, I will not go into that again. If clubs feel under pressure to comply with this new licensing regime to be able to play in English football, there may be a concern about them breaching other regimes, such as UEFA and FIFA, and, again, they may fear expulsion from those competitions. One club asked me this question, although it was a tongue-in-cheek comment, so I will not name them. If a Premier League club decided not to apply for a licence, would the Government look to exclude it? There is the risk that, if a club feels that it will not be able to compete in Europe, for whatever reason, it may choose what this Bill was originally intended to stop: the European breakaway league.”
“As I have said, we should not write blank cheques to a politically led regulator. Another issue with the clause is timeliness. As we have explained, clubs will need to plan ahead, financially, structurally and operationally. If the licensing process drags on, it risks becoming a bottleneck and not a safeguard for clubs around participation. We tabled amendments that would ensure timely decision making on provisional licences, and the same principle must surely also apply to full licences. However, we appreciate the different context within which a full operating licence will exist. That is why we have not tabled an amendment to this clause with a specific deadline. We understand that full licences will take slightly longer. Moreover, there is a danger that the full licence becomes a tool for undue influence.”
“We must be alive to the risk of regulatory overreach, as the Opposition have highlighted, and we should all recognise that bad regulation is worse than no regulation at all. If clubs are to be subject to vague or ever-changing thresholds, with little recourse or clarity on what is required, we risk imposing a level of uncertainty that could deter vital investment, discourage long-term planning and undermine the very sustainability that the regulator seeks to ensure. That is why the Opposition will—as we already have done in Committee—continue to press for greater transparency around the costs and cumulative burdens that flow from the action of the regulator; and it is why we believe that the regulator should not have unfettered discretion to shift the goalposts without clear parliamentary scrutiny and approval.”
“However, the clause raises several questions that the Committee must interrogate, and that I hope the Minister will be able to answer—not least whether it achieves the right balance between regulatory assurance and operational flexibility. Under the clause, the regulator may grant a full operating licence only if satisfied that a club meets the relevant conditions of eligibility. That is right and proper, and clubs should be expected to operate on a stable financial footing, meet appropriate governance standards and protect the game’s integrity. But I am concerned about the breadth and, in some respects, the open-ended nature of what those conditions of eligibility might come to mean in practice.”
“The Minister has outlined clauses 17 and 18 at some length. We had a lengthy debate on clause 17 in relation to our amendment 101. We are naturally disappointed that the amendment, and the time limit that we seek for the provisional licensing, was not agreed to. However, in the interests of time, I will move on to clause 18. Clause 18 sets out the process by which the Government’s regulator may grant the full operating licence to a club, which is a crucial stage in the proposed licensing regime, with significant long-term implications for the structure, stability and future of the English game. This clause is where the Government’s regulator transitions from assessing provisional eligibility to giving a formal stamp of approval for a club’s longer-term competition and compliance.”