Miatta Fahnbulleh
MP for Peckham · Labour (Co-op) · United Kingdom
“I am pleased to speak once again on the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill. I thank Members from across the House for their constructive engagement in getting the Bill to this point.”
“I hope this Bill represents the start of a journey that will fundamentally change the way that Government works and how we, in this place, serve the communities that we are here to represent; where the principle of devolution by default, underpinned by a clear framework, is locked in; where local leaders are empowered to drive economic ch…”
“However, we have heard concerns expressed in the other place and in this House that requiring a council to move to the leader and cabinet model within a year could create challenges for some councils, their members and officers—for example, where an authority has submitted a proposal for a boundary change or merger in response to the Secr…”
“We have listened carefully to the concerns raised in both Houses on the remaining issues: the ministerial power of direction in schedule 1, the prioritisation of development on brownfield land, and the models of governance in local authorities. That is why the Government have today tabled three amendments, which I will now outline.”
“To that end, and in the interests of not delaying the progress of the Bill and of showing that communities can benefit from the powers that we all wish to see enacted at the earliest opportunity, the Government are content to remove all powers in schedule 1 that would allow the Secretary of State to direct the establishment of a strategic…”
“As I have said consistently throughout the passage of the Bill, our policy and our practice are very clear. We are working with local leaders and we will continue to work with them to develop devolution proposals that command broad support across their area. That collaborative approach will always be our clear preference.”
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“Let me first clarify that no decision has yet been made on who will deliver public provision. It is important to state that. The Bill is drafted deliberately to allow flexibility, whether through the Local Audit Office itself, through a company that it establishes or in collaboration with the private sector. That said, I fully agree that if the Local Audit Office does act as the audit provider, it must be subject to robust and independent scrutiny to maintain trust and confidence across the sector. That principle is wholly right, and I think everyone would agree with it. Clause 66 already requires the Local Audit Office to appoint an independent entity to scrutinise its audit work.”
“That reflected a move to the private market provision of the local audit, with the expectation that local bodies would individually appoint their own auditors. By contrast, the LAO will restore central oversight and public accountability to the local audit system, with mandatory and independent auditor appointments to all local authorities, as well as some other local bodies. The schedule streamlines and simplifies the regulatory framework. I commend the clause and the schedule to the Committee.”
“The LAO would retain overall authority for the audit quality and act as the final arbiter where enforcement action is required. We expect the LAO to continue the current model under which a professional accountancy body is recognised to register and oversee audit firms, although it will not be bound to do so. The framework will facilitate high-quality, timely audits and restore the confidence of local bodies and users. Schedule 29 sets out the detail of the new framework for the registration, oversight and quality of local audits. It replaces the existing statutory framework, which aligned local audit regulation with corporate audit regulation, and had rigid statutory safeguards and regulatory functions delivered by a range of bodies.”
“Clause 62 will establish a new framework for the regulation of local auditors, which will be overseen by the Local Audit Office. Independent reviews have been consistently clear that local audit regulation is too fragmented and lacks central co-ordination. The system is failing and, at the same time, audit quality requirements designed for corporate audits have driven up work on areas of accounts of little relevance to users. That contributes to delays and increases costs. The clause enables the LAO to hold a register and regulate the sector directly, or to designate and supervise an external registration body to oversee the registration, quality monitoring and conduct of audit providers. Designation of an external registration body would reduce potential conflicts of interest for inspectors and monitoring.”
“For us, the key is consistency and clarity across the piece on the standards and norms that all professional accountancy bodies are using.”
“I apologise to the hon. Member for the lack of response—I will make sure we get one to him swiftly. Inevitably, different accounting standards will be used. We will set out guidance, and we will of course look to retain flexibility within that, so that local authorities can ensure that they are using the appropriate standards. We do, however, need a far more centralised and streamlined process, whereby the appointment of auditors is done through a central function—the LAO. Across the piece, there will be uniform and consistent standards that apply both to local authorities and public bodies. That is currently sorely missing, but within the system, there will be different accounting standards and professional body accreditation that individual auditors will apply to.”
“(5) The arrangements and rules must allow for the Local Audit Office to be able— (a) to determine that a particular case raises or appears to raise important issues affecting the public interest, and (b) to assume enforcement responsibility in a case in which it has made such a determination. (6) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (5), the Office assumes enforcement responsibility if it assumes responsibility for the final decision (subject to any appeal) as to— (a) whether the requirement or rule in question has been breached, and (b) if so, the sanction to be imposed.”— (Miatta Fahnbulleh.) See the explanatory statement for Amendment 239. Schedule 29, as amended, agreed to. Clause 63 New appointment arrangements for non-NHS audits”
“Amendment 239, in schedule 29, page 301, line 28, at end insert— “(c) arrangements for the imposition of sanctions in respect of breaches that are established, and (d) registration rules and lead partner rules designed to secure that providers and lead partners are bound by any sanctions.” This amendment and Amendment 240 require the body maintaining the register of local audit providers to put in place a system of sanctions, including financial penalties, against registered providers and their lead partners. Amendment 240, in schedule 29, page 301, line 30, at end insert— “(3) The available sanctions must include financial penalties. (4) The arrangements and rules must allow for appeals to be made to a person who will determine the appeal independently of the maker of the decision appealed against.”
“(4) This court may not make an order under this paragraph in respect of the requirement to comply with a direction under paragraph 2 unless it is satisfied that the failure of compliance on the ground of which the direction was given did in fact occur.” This amendment empowers the Local Audit Office to take enforcement action against an external registration body if it fails to comply with its duties.”
“(5) The court may— (a) make an interim order suspending the effect of a direction or penalty appealed against under this paragraph; (b) if it allows an appeal under this paragraph against a penalty, make any order as to interest that it considers appropriate (including an order varying the effect of paragraph 4(6)(a)). Compliance orders by the court 2D (1) This paragraph applies if the High Court is satisfied, on an application by the Local Audit Office, that an external registration body has failed to comply with a requirement under— (a) this Act, or (b) an agreement under section 6B(5). (2) The court may order the body to take steps that the court considers will secure that the requirement in question is complied with. (3) Such a step— (a) must be one that the body has the power to take; (b) may consist of not doing something.”
“(2) The grounds on which an appeal may be brought are— (a) that the failure of compliance on the grounds of which the direction was given or the penalty was imposed did not occur, or (b) that any of the following is unreasonable— (i) the decision to give the direction or impose the penalty; (ii) any of the terms of the direction; (iii) the amount of the penalty, or the time or manner of its payment. (3) If satisfied that any of those grounds is made out, the court must allow the appeal and do whichever of the following it considers appropriate— (a) cancel the direction or penalty, or (b) vary the direction or the notice imposing the penalty. (4) Otherwise, the court must dismiss the appeal.”
“(4) The Office must publish— (a) a direction under paragraph 2, (b) a notice imposing a penalty under paragraph 2A, and (c) any notice cancelling or varying such a direction or notice. (5) But it must do so only after the direction or penalty can no longer be cancelled or varied on appeal (ignoring any possibility of an appeal out of time). (6) If a penalty imposed under paragraph 2A is not paid in time— (a) the penalty (or the unpaid part of it) carries interest at the rate for the time being specified in section 17 of the Judgments Act 1838; (b) the Office may recover the penalty (or the unpaid part of it), with the interest, as a debt. Directions and penalties: appeals 2C (1) An external registration body may appeal to the High Court against a direction given to it under paragraph 2 or a penalty imposed on it under paragraph 2A.”
“(2) A notice of intent is a notice that— (a) states the Office’s intention to give the direction or impose the penalty, (b) sets out the intended terms of the direction or of the notice imposing the penalty, (c) explains the Office’s reasons for intending to give the direction or impose the penalty, and (d) specifies the time by which, and manner in which, representations may be made. (3) Where the Office has given a direction under paragraph 2 or imposed a penalty under paragraph 2A, the Office may by written notice given to that body— (a) cancel the direction or penalty, or (b) vary the direction, or the notice imposing the penalty, it in any way that does not make it more onerous.”
“(4) An external registration body must, as soon as practicable after the end of a financial year, notify the Office of its total income in that year from fees charged under section 6A(5). (5) The amount of a penalty imposed on a body under this paragraph may not exceed 30% of the sum last notified by the body under sub-paragraph (4). Directions and penalties: procedure etc 2B (1) Before giving a direction under paragraph 2 or imposing a penalty under paragraph 2A, the Local Audit Office must— (a) give the body a notice of intent, and (b) consider any representations made by the body in response to (and in accordance with) that notice.”
“Schedule 29 Local audit: registration bodies, registered providers and qualifications Amendments made: 238, in schedule 29, page 297, line 17, at end insert— “Financial penalties 2A (1) If the Local Audit Office considers that an external registration body has failed to comply with a requirement under— (a) this Act, or (b) an agreement under section 6B(5), the Office may impose a financial penalty on the body. (2) A financial penalty is imposed by giving the body a written notice requiring the body to pay the Office a financial penalty of a sum specified in the notice. (3) Such a notice must— (a) explain the Office’s reasons for imposing the penalty, and (b) specify the time by which, and manner in which, the penalty must be paid.”
“We all want to achieve that but, sadly, the audit regime is not delivering it at the moment. It beggars belief, but it is where we are now. These additional provisions will strengthen the entire infrastructure, add to the responsibilities of our finance directors as accounting officers, and deliver local authorities that are more financially secure and able to deliver the services their users require. Question put and agreed to. Clause 62 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.”
“That ensures that we are raising standards across the piece. If a council gets an audit, it will know it is an audit of good quality that will drive and deliver the change that we want. Thirdly, we already have the best value regime, where central Government can intervene when local authorities are not performing, or there are financial considerations at play. That will still apply. This takes the best of the current system but deals with the existing gap, which is that we do not have a uniform, consistent auditing regime that ensures an independent review of what individual councils are doing. The new system will also ensure that when problems are found, there is a mechanism for escalating, so that councils will be financially viable and delivering effective services.”
“I misunderstood the hon. Gentleman’s original question. The accountability of the finance director, the sets of standards already locked in and the legislation they have to consider to ensure good use of public funds completely apply to this. It is their responsibility to ensure that the council’s decisions are right, that it is financially viable and that it is delivering the services required. The changes we are putting in place do not cut across that or undermine it. It remains a fundamental plank of this. We are, however, changing the oversight. First, we are enabling an independent auditor to come in and do the function of auditing, as that is currently not happening. Secondly, it will be done with auditors who adhere to a standard code of norms consistent across the public sector.”
“The clause will also establish a proportionate framework in which the LAO will make appointments, including requirements regarding when and how appointments are made. I commend the clause to the Committee.”
“Clause 63 is central to our reform agenda. It will give the new Local Audit Office responsibility for appointing auditors for all local authorities, as well as some other local bodies, such as police and fire bodies. Currently, such bodies can choose to opt into an appointment scheme overseen by Public Sector Audit Appointments Ltd or appoint their own auditor. In practice, more than 99% of bodies are opted into PSAA’s scheme, demonstrating the sector-wide support for a centralised appointment regime. Centralised appointments significantly reduce burdens on individual authorities. The LAO’s position at the heart of the audit system will make it uniquely qualified to ensure that audits provide value for money, support market sustainability and effectively manage audit contracts.”
“It means that they get an auditor that is accredited and approved to be of a certain standard, and therefore they can be confident in that auditor. The system should make it easier for all our public bodies. At the moment, all our conversations suggest that they hugely support the direction of travel and have no concerns about it. Perhaps I have not understood the hon. Gentleman’s question. We are taking something that is happening by default anyway and making it better and standard, in a way that will work for all those public bodies.”
“I confess that I am not 100% clear about what the hon. Gentleman is getting at. I might partly answer his question by saying that the majority of public bodies—99%—are going through the Public Sector Audit Appointments regime anyway, because they see value in it. What we are now doing is taking that function, aligning it with the oversight of the entire regime and putting it in the Local Audit Office. That will make it streamlined and more effective. We are not fundamentally changing the decisions that individual local bodies are making. If there was a big clamour for diversity in the market, that would be a different thing, but at the moment we hear from local public bodies that they want a centralised system. That makes their life much easier; it means there is a standard procurement process, which reduces the burden on them.”
“They will mean that a proper accountability system is in place, so that we are better able to validate when authorities are either failing or in financial distress and put in place the measures that I have talked about, such as the best value regime, to get them out of distress. Once again, the clause is not an attempt to run counter to the accountability system that local authorities must have for their people. It is an attempt to strengthen that accountability system, so that local people have an independent basis to verify what the local authority is doing. I think that Members across the piece will support that. Question put and agreed to. Clause 63 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 64 Audit providers to nominate lead partner Question proposed , That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Decision making at the local authority level will remain. Accountability to the constituents in the local authority will remain. We are not fundamentally changing that regime, and hopefully we are making it better by, for example, moving to multi-year budgets for local authorities and consolidating budgets, so that there is far more flexibility for them to manage the challenges that we know they have to manage. That is complementary to what we are trying to do by creating a national audit system that is coherent, of a high standard and works, which is not what we have now. These arrangements will not undermine the decision-making ability of local authorities.”
“Instead, local audit officers will work with an external registration body to establish suitable competence requirements. The measure will empower the sector to draw on the best possible range of talent, while continuing to ensure that senior auditors are competent and understand the distinctive element of the local audit. I commend the”
“The clause will change the current requirement whereby local audits may be signed off only by a key audit partner—a senior auditor who meets specific eligibility criteria determined through statutory guidance. The current requirement for local audit sign-off is both rigid and unique to local audits. No other audit category places such a specific condition on the eligibility of senior auditors. That has restricted the pipeline of senior auditors to the sector and places a significant barrier to market entry. It can be difficult for a firm wishing to enter the market to recruit or develop individuals who can satisfy the specific criteria. Under the clause, the requirement for key audit partners to sign off local audits will end.”
“We understand the risk that there might be bleed into the much bigger audit infrastructure and regime that we are creating, but the job now is to reach into the private and public sectors to train up a cadre of auditors so that the system is fit for purpose. At the moment, the system is under strain and collapsing. There is urgency, certainly on the part of the Government—that is why we are bringing forward these reforms—to address the problem. Question put and agreed to. Clause 64 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 65 Code of audit practice Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“We recognise that we have a challenge in bringing in sufficient audit capacity of the standard we need. That is the status quo. We are working closely with the sector to ensure that we are generating a pipeline and that there is training provision. We are working with the Local Government Association to ensure that that happens. To be completely candid, we are in a mess. I will not play party politics by mentioning where that mess came from, but the status quo is dire. The regime is failing, and we do not have sufficient audit capacity of the quality that we want. That is why we are putting these reforms in place. I reassure the Committee that we completely understand the challenge we face. We want to keep high-quality finance directors in local authorities.”
“In the current system, it has not been possible to vary the interpretation of standards to better reflect the risk profile of local bodies. It is vital that the LAO has the powers to interpret some standards differently for local audit. Otherwise, extensive work will continue to be required on areas of accounts that have little relevance to account users, contributing to timeliness and capacity issues as well as undermining value for money. Through its ownership of the code of audit practice, the LAO will be empowered to define appropriate audit requirements for different categories of body in the principal audit regime. This is central to delivering our commitment to a risk-based and proportionate approach to local audit that is focused on the needs of local bodies and account users. I commend the clause to the Committee.”
“This clause will transfer responsibility for the code of audit practice from the Comptroller and Auditor General at the National Audit Office to the Local Audit Office. The clause also unequivocally sets out that, as the standard-setter for local audit, the LAO will be able to modify auditing standards to reflect the needs of local public bodies—a point that the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner was making. The LAO will review the interpretation and/or application of international standards on auditing, including where the requirements of specific standards should be interpreted for the local audit context. Currently, auditing standards are interpreted for corporate and local audit by the Financial Reporting Council.”
“It is not wild or out there to say that the new auditing body we are creating should have full flexibility to ensure that the standards being applied are appropriate. The feedback we are getting from local government and public bodies is that the status quo is not fit for purpose, that it is onerous, and that its requirements do not align with their needs or, critically, the needs of the user. Is the hon. Member suggesting that the current system is fit for purpose? Is he suggesting that we retain it or that it does not require reform? If he is, he should stand up and say so.”
“I dare not do the job of the Local Audit Office, or indeed trained auditors, and go into detail. This provision creates powers for the LAO to design a system that works for local bodies. As I said, the feedback that we have had from local authorities and public bodies is that the current system is onerous. It will depend on whether we are looking at a fire and rescue service or a local authority service, but it is absolutely right that we confer the powers on the LAO to look at the system and say, “We will change and adapt the standard so that it is fit for purpose.” I do not think that is controversial; I do not think it requires me to talk about it in great detail. We will issue guidance for the LAO and it will set the standards and what is appropriate. It is right that we give it the powers to do that in the Bill.”
“It is right that we create the provisions for that new body to do that. Question put and agreed to. Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 66 Audit committees”
“If the hon. Member wants examples, one example—I am sure that we can give others based on the conversations that we have had with local government—is that pensions do not drive local government decision making and financial resilience, so the audit reviews focus on operational assets that may not be necessary, depending on the local body that we are talking about. There are clearly examples within the system. I come back to the fact that we are not prescribing this; we are saying it is right that a new body that will have oversight of a regime that we all agree needs to be reformed should be able to make sure that those standards are commensurate with what is required by the local authority and public bodies as well as the user. That is not controversial; that is common sense.”
“There is a job to be done to make sure that we have a pipeline of members, that they are fit for purpose and that we have the right training and capacity building in place. I hope that that assures the hon. Member that we are doing everything we can to ensure that training is fit for purpose, as we need audit committee members of a high quality and standard, and that we will continue to work with the relevant bodies to ensure that that is a reality.”
“For that reason, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw her amendment. On amendment 362, I fully support the hon. Member’s view that audit committee members must demonstrate the necessary skill, understanding and competence that we are asking of them. The committees are integral to robust local governance, playing a critical role in ensuring that public resources are used efficiently, transparently and in the public interest. Clause 66, however, already provides for the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance in relation to audit committees. It is our intention that the guidance will include a requirement for members to undertake appropriate training. Alongside that, we will continue to work with the LGA and CIPFA to ensure that training programmes support existing and new audit committee members.”
“Amendments 18 and 17, however, would delegate important policy and legislative functions from Ministers—who are directly accountable to the House, which is the way we believe it ought to be—to an independent body. Given the central role that audit committees play in local financial governance, it is essential that responsibility for their statutory framework remains with the Secretary of State, who is responsible for the overall integrity and effectiveness of the local government system. My Department will continue to work closely with the Local Audit Office and key stakeholders in the sector to ensure that audit committee requirements are effective, proportionate and well-functioning. We think, however, that parliamentarians would want the Secretary of State to be ultimately accountable, so that Parliament can hold them to account.”
“Let me deal directly with amendments 18 and 17. I reiterate to the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon what I have consistently said: the governance regime of local government finance is not changed by the measures in the Bill. It will still stand, including the decisions that accounting officers and the finance director need to take, and the accountability to the local community still holds. We are shoring up the system of assurance so that it is fit for purpose, and to ensure that there is independent scrutiny that then feeds back into what the local authority does. That is how the system should be operating, but it is not currently, which is why we are driving through these reforms. On the amendments, I recognise the important role that the Local Audit Office will play in overseeing the local audit system.”
“In addition, the clause mandates that at least one member of the audit committee must be independent. Independent members bring impartiality, technical expertise and continuity, ensuring that scrutiny is robust and well informed. Where elected members may lack specialist knowledge in audit or finance, independent members can provide the professional insight needed to effectively challenge financial reports. Mandating audit committees is a key pillar of our local audit reform programme. It is about getting the basics right. Good governance and financial management start at the heart of local authorities. The clause is a practical, proportionate and necessary measure to strengthen local accountability and ensure that every authority is equipped to manage public money responsibly, and I commend it to the Committee.”
“Clause 66 introduces a statutory requirement for all local authorities, excluding NHS bodies, to establish an audit committee with at least one independent member. Members will be aware that audit committees are the cornerstone of good governance and financial management in local government. They provide independent oversight of financial controls, risk management and internal audits, reinforcing transparency and accountability in the use of public funds. Although many councils have already adopted audit committees as best practice, and combined authorities are required by statute to do so, it is time to standardise this requirement across the board. Consistency in governance structures is essential to ensuring that all local bodies are held to the same high standards of scrutiny and accountability.”
“We will issue guidance when the Bill gains Royal Assent. The broad principle, which is applied across the piece with all our reforms, is that where there is good practice, we look to build on that. However, we will set out principles that we want to see standardised across the piece, to ensure that we have mechanisms that are fit for purpose and effective. To take the example of the independent member, we think that having that expertise massively helps, whatever function it is. However, where there are existing arrangements in place, our intent is to transition those to something that adheres to a set of principles that we will set out in guidance.”
“However, the principle that we absolutely need to strengthen the status quo is one we completely accept and recognise the need for. I ask the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole to allow us the time to do the work properly, so that we can come up with a system that works alongside the reforms we are driving through. I therefore ask her not to press the new clause.”
“That includes the requirement to have overview and scrutiny committees and an audit committee. We absolutely recognise that there is scope for further strengthening the system of accountability and scrutiny for mayoral strategic authorities, and we are carrying out engagement with the sector on what that looks like. Although I accept the principle of new clause 45, the Government intend to do further work to ensure that whatever new regime or additional arrangements to strengthen the status quo we put in place, they work well alongside not only the huge reforms we are driving through in the audit system but what already exists on the ground, to ensure that we are not duplicating or creating confusion. We need a little time to work that through and to think about the right set of reforms to put in place.”
“I thank the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole for tabling new clause 45, and I have a lot of sympathy with what it tries to do. She rightly quoted the English devolution White Paper, in which we committed to explore local public accounts committee models. We consulted on the initial proposal for such a model in December last year, as part of our local audit reform strategy. The Government’s response on 9 April confirmed that they would explore how any model could draw on audit findings and interact with the Local Audit Office, once established. It is important to consider how that would fit with the reformed local audit landscape. Mayoral strategic authorities are already expected to follow the principles and processes described in the English devolution accountability framework and scrutiny protocol.”
“That is a more proportionate and practical solution than leaving them unaudited in the principal regime. It will help ensure that public resources are used more efficiently, both within local authorities and across the audit system, while maintaining robust yet appropriate external scrutiny.”
“Public Sector Audit Appointments Ltd has been unable to secure auditors for those bodies under the principal regime, leaving them without external assurance, and contributing to the wider audit backlog. The principal regime demands significantly more complex financial reporting, which smaller authorities may not be well equipped to deliver. There is currently no transitional support for those moving into the regime, despite limited internal capacity and capability. Overall, those circumstances mean that auditors from the principal regime are reluctant to be appointed to those bodies, particularly given the wider capacity problems. Clause 68 lays the groundwork for regulations that will allow those two bodies to be retrospectively treated as smaller authorities, enabling them to receive a limited assurance review.”
“That flexibility will lay the foundations to reduce unnecessary burdens on smaller or lower-risk councils, while maintaining robust oversight where it is most needed. On clause 68, fixing the broken local audit system for authorities is the intention behind all the measures we are debating in this part of the Bill. However, the Bill also provides an important opportunity to address specific challenges within the smaller authorities audit system. In recent years, Salisbury city council and Lindsey Marsh drainage board have surpassed the outdated financial threshold for smaller authorities—a limit that remained unchanged for more than a decade, despite significant growth in local budgets and financial activity.”
“Clause 67 paves the way for greater flexibility in how audit regimes are determined, moving away from a one-size-fits-all approach that relies solely on the size of a local authority. We recognise that local authorities vary not just in scale, but in complexity, risk profile and the services they deliver for local people. This proactive measure will enable the Local Audit Office, working closely with my Department and the sector, to design and implement audit frameworks that are proportionate, targeted and fit for purpose. Although any changes to the classification of local bodies within the category 2 regime would require secondary legislation, the clause removes any ambiguity about the future basis for audit regimes. It makes it clear that size alone should not determine audit requirements; risk and complexity should also be considered.”
“It will be the Local Audit Office, working closely with my Department, but we will obviously engage with the sector while doing that. As the hon. Member will understand, there is always a judgment call in this, and it is about balancing a set of factors. Our job is to ensure that the Local Audit Office has the capabilities and skills to be able to make that judgment, working with our respective authorities. Ultimately, if we get it wrong, it is for Parliament to haul up the Secretary of State and hold them to account. Question put and agreed to. Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 69 Amendment paving way for separation of LGPS accounts Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“It is more logical to publish pension fund accounts separately, as those funds are ringfenced for the benefit of scheme members and not available to the administering authority for other purposes.”