Joe Robertson
MP for Isle of Wight East · Conservative · United Kingdom
“(3) In preparation of the report under subsection (1), the Secretary of State may have regard to any such measures or information that they consider appropriate, including— (a) an assessment of any variation in dementia services and outcomes between integrated care board areas, (b) information on workforce capacity, capability and trainin…”
“The clause fits into that and would require the collection of data on the provision of dementia services in health and social care. I do not propose to speak too long, but I do want to make a couple of remarks on the current situation, which sets these new clauses in context.”
“That will, of course, impact many more friends, families and carers who support those living with dementia. More than a third of people living with dementia in England do not have a formal diagnosis. Those who do receive a diagnosis live with the condition for an average of three and a half years before that diagnosis.”
“The data requested is imperative to ensuring that the Government can measure and monitor progress against relevant national targets, standards and guidance, including the new modern service framework on dementia, the forthcoming Care Quality Commission statutory guidance and outcome measures that may be set in future NHS operational plann…”
“I thank the Minister for pausing the MCA’s brutal decision about coastguard rescue officers, and for convening meetings on cross-Solent ferry transport to the Isle of Wight, which will start next month.”
“It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms Lewell. These two new clauses, the latter of which is in my name, deal with the publication of an annual report detailing NHS and social care provision for dementia care and how the Government are performing against targets, standards and outcome measures set out in national guidance and…”
The complete record
Every one of 603 lines we hold for Joe Robertson, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 4 of 13.
“I agree with all those comments. The Government should do all they can to support this sector. I say again that coastal communities face some of the biggest structural challenges, in terms of both demographics and geography, of any of our communities. That is why the Government should have a particular focus on these areas. I will finish by speaking briefly about transport. A House of Lords Select Committee identified in 2019 and again in 2023 that poor transport connectivity is holding coastal communities back. The Isle of Wight knows that better than most places. The Government have made no specific investment plans for transport in coastal communities.”
“I thank the Minister for her response. Obviously, it falls short of what we are calling for, but I thank her for her consideration. I urge her to continue to consider providing more support and better relief for those living in coastal communities.”
“The conflict in the middle east is not the Chancellor’s fault, but she has chosen this time to make it more expensive for my constituents to take a car from Fishbourne on the Isle of Wight to Portsmouth. Will she do the right thing and scrap the emissions trading scheme levy that she intends to introduce in July this year? It should not only be Scottish islands that are exempt.”
“I know the Minister is aware of them, and I urge him to do whatever he can to bring down costs in the maritime sector, particularly for ferries on which people rely to connect with the rest of the UK.”
“I echo the words of my hon. Friend the shadow Minister, particularly in relation to the cost to the maritime sector and, for my constituents, the cost of using ferries. Of course, the increase in fuel costs is a significant issue with which they have to grapple, not helped by the Government’s decision to levy a green tax—an emissions trading scheme levy—on them, which they cannot avoid. That is not to say that the Isle of Wight ferry companies are not hugely responsible for their own costs, which they bring to bear on my constituents who try to cross the Solent, given that they are unregulated, private companies that fund private equity and pension funds abroad. I am grateful for the opportunity to remark on the costs.”
“Oh dear. My question was about how many prisoners have been released in error under this Government, and the Minister does not seem to know the answer. That is okay, as I can tell him. It is 441, which over a two-year period is the worst on record. Will he now apologise, or will he provide a convoluted excuse about why it is not his Government’s fault?”
“There is nothing in the King’s Speech that will secure the country’s energy supply, bring down energy costs or create the jobs and investment that the Government have promised. As we have heard from Members across this House, there is a consensus—there is unity. We all want to decarbonise energy use, but Conservative Members will not support doing so at the expense of families, households and individuals, particularly those who are hard up and least able to pay. This is not a binary choice, where we are either pro-decarbonisation or against it; we can be for it, yet understand that the security of energy supply and household energy bills must come first. What country in the world would run headlong into an ideological experiment for the sake of it, leaving hard-up citizens behind? No country in the world.”
“The security and price of energy affect every household, individual and business in every constituency, up and down the country. It is a matter that concerns everyone. That is why, when the Secretary of State was in opposition, he promised during the last election to cut household energy bills by £300. Instead, in government, he has presided over a £200 increase in those bills. That is his record as he sets his sights on his next job, the job he so desperately craves: replacing the Prime Minister. He is also the Secretary of State who has set up GB Energy, which will not produce any energy, will cost taxpayers £8 billion and, as its own chief executive says, will take something like 20 years to employ just 1,000 people.”
“I accept that there are some difficult questions in and around this whole area of debate. The truth remains that no Government have done more to decarbonise the economy and to bring forward green technology than the last Conservative Government, but we would not do that at the expense of hard-working families. The bonkers green tax agenda that this Government are peddling is harming the debate on decarbonising the economy. I will give an example of that.”
“The Government, instead of helping us—they say they will help, and I am still holding out hope that they will—will in July levy a carbon emission tax on the Fishbourne to Portsmouth route that the ferry company cannot avoid. It cannot decarbonise its ferries and go electric, because there is no grid charging capacity in Portsmouth harbour. There is no grid charging capacity in Southampton either. These are not strange little harbours—they are the naval base of the United Kingdom and one of the biggest export container ports respectively—yet there is not the grid capacity to charge an Isle of Wight ferry. The ferries will pay, however, and guess what: they have passed on that charge to consumers and my constituents.”
“I acknowledge that the last Government made mistakes—I do not have a problem with that—but that is not an excuse for the hon. Lady’s Government to do even worse for hard-up working families. Bonkers green taxes harm the debate, and I will give this House an example. UK emissions trading scheme levies on the maritime sector are levied on ferry companies. My constituents on the Isle of Wight rely on those ferry companies to access things that everyone else takes for granted: health, education, jobs and seeing friends and family. Next month, someone can travel across the Solent to the Isle of Wight, taking their car on one return trip, for £511. That is for a five-mile return crossing.”
“The EU is bringing in that charge and ringfencing the money it receives from its emissions trading system to invest in grid capacity in ports—but not the UK Government; they are taking the money, shoving it into the Treasury and making no promises about investing in grid capacity. That is not the last Government; it is this Government. I say to those on the Government Front Bench that these bonkers green levies make no sense, harm ordinary people and undermine the entire case for their green agenda.”
“I gently say to the hon. Lady that the reason her Government are in such a mess and polling at under 20% is that she and her colleagues think that the universal excuse for her Government’s inaction is to blame a previous Government. She won that argument at the last election, and since then her Government have done nothing. Southampton will have that grid-charging capacity for boats in the mid-2030s, yet the Government are bringing in a charge in July this year. Do you know what the irony is, Madam Deputy Speaker? One of those ferries has batteries on board. It is a hybrid boat that can use batteries to cross the Solent and not burn fossil fuels, but it is being charged because it cannot use its batteries, because it has nowhere to plug into.”
“It is, as ever, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. I too support the new clauses, and I concur with a lot of what has already been said about the reasons for supporting them. I will make a couple of wider points on the merits of specialist rape courts and courts for sexual offences. There is nothing wrong with the legal system in this country when it comes to the fundamental principles of trying these crimes—that someone is innocent until proven guilty, that they have a right to be heard in court, and that evidence must be tested rigorously, as is the right of a defendant in any case. The issue is how that is applied in the way our courts operate in respect of a set of crimes that are extremely sensitive because of the impact on the complainant—the victim—who is almost always a live witness.”
“I seek clarity on whether the new clause would apply to all judges or just to those in the criminal courts. In the family court the idea is to bring in expertise around the sort of issues that she talks about from agencies—such as the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service, and even social services—in which there are lots of trained people, but that system does not always ensure that the judge is best placed to make a good decision, as we have seen in evidence. Will the hon. Lady clarify that point?”
“I realise that the hon. Member is struggling to read his own handwriting, but does he have anything at all to say about the Prime Minister’s conduct in appointing Peter Mandelson?”
“My hon. Friend is articulating it perfectly. Does he agree that the principle of innocent until proven guilty is no comfort at all for these people who are subjected to years of gruelling inquiry just to establish what we already know: they are innocent?”
“I wish to address a number of issues in relation to this grouping. First, I will say something about the figures that have been quoted at length today and in previous sittings. Secondly, I will say something about the reasons given by the Government for curtailing jury trials in this way. Then I want to go on to say something about evidence and procedure, and why jury trials exist at all, because sometimes it is possible to sit here listening, wondering whether the Government’s reasoning would not justify a banning of all jury trials for evermore on any crime. Finally, I will talk about some of the perversities that the hon. Member for Chichester has articulated well.”
“I intended to intervene on the Minister to ask a question, but I am happy to pose it by way of a speech. She has indicated—in fact, she stated very clearly—that she wants to formally clarify in writing, but she is declining to formally clarify orally. Does she not accept that if we proceed to a vote on clause 3, she is at risk of inadvertently misleading this Committee if she cannot clarify what she says she wants to clarify in writing before we vote?”
“The Minister talks about the statutory test for complexity, among other things. I cannot identify the statutory test for complexity. Where is the test in the new legislation?”
“It seems that efficiency is being used to justify a fairly hastily put together Bill, and that the Government do not recognise the possibly unintended consequences of its provisions in order to get their business through. The best way of addressing those issues, and accepting that there might be loopholes and unintended consequences, is to give genuine due regard to amendments tabled in good faith, on this occasion by the shadow Minister, to improve the lawmaking process and the Bill. The amendment does not seek to drive a coach and horses through what the Government are trying to achieve with the Bill, even though we disagree with some of it; it seeks to improve, to perfect and not to allow unfairness to creep into the Bill.”
“The arguments have been well made by the shadow Minister, and I do not wish to repeat them, but it is not an inefficient process to allow a right of appeal. I assume that the decision made by the judge in the first instance on how to allocate the trial will not be a particularly lengthy process anyway, so an appeal of that decision will be no lengthier—indeed, less so. I have never heard the argument that appeals are against efficiency in any other aspect of law. Indeed, appealing the substantive outcome of a case—a claim of wrongful conviction—has not one but many stages of appeal: appeal to the High Court, appeal to the Court of Appeal and appeal to the Supreme Court. I have never heard the argument that someone should not have the right to appeal the outcome of a trial because it is inefficient or might cause delays.”
“I support the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the shadow Minister, which would ensure the right of appeal to a decision whether a trial should be heard by a jury. The Government’s reason for not accepting the amendment, as they have put forward on a number of previous amendments, is the principle of efficiency—that it would slow the system down and would not drive the efficiencies that they hope to secure through the Bill. The principle of efficiency cannot be an untamed principle that runs roughshod over carefully fought legal principles of fairness and natural justice. Efficiency cannot simply trump everything. If efficiency has no limits, why have trials of more than a few days at all?”
“The hon. Member is making a very good speech, but she is almost being generous. The wording in the Bill is not “complex”; it is “complexity”, which is a description, not even a value. The Bill is even vaguer than what the hon. Member is suggesting in her well-made point.”
“The principle of reasonableness, while giving discretion and, some might argue, a vague term in the English language, is a well-tested word in criminal law and the English legal system. We know what reasonableness means; it is an objective test—“What would an ordinary person think is reasonable?” What about appropriateness? Does that mean appropriate to that judge on that day? Does it mean appropriate to a particular, theoretical juror? There is absolutely no guidance in Bill about how this novel word, “appropriate”, should be interpreted. Even when there are words in legislation such as “reasonableness”, which are backed by decades or even centuries of case law, the judge is very often given guidance in the legislation as to what is and is not reasonable.”
“On length, it says that the judge will have to decide if the “likely length of the trial…makes it appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.” On complexity, they will have to decide whether “the likely complexity of the trial” is “appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.” It is even hard to decipher from that whether it means complex is good or bad for a jury. Complexity is just a description; it is not a value. This is incredibly unusual, novel and, I would say, badly worded legislation. Ordinarily, a provision of this sort would say something along the lines of: “If the court is satisfied that the length of trial is so long that it would make it unreasonable for a jury”. That would be more normal wording.”
“How long is a piece of string? The unanswerable question. I could ask another question: is a 2-metre piece of string a long piece of string? If I asked you that question, Ms Butler, you would have a lot of questions for me before you gave your answer, yet the Minister thinks it is easy to answer the question, “Is a two-week trial a long trial?”. She thinks it is obvious and that a judge will be able to make a decision. She is not willing to put a definition on that, because she says it is evident in the way that the Bill is drafted. I look at the words in the Bill—which is all that a judge will have to make that decision.”
“That is her view as to what will make a case lengthy, and I do not criticise her for that, but there is no guidance here for the judge to consider those things —[Interruption.] I paraphrase her—she is welcome to intervene if she disagrees about how I characterise her views on what is lengthy for a juror.”
“I agree with my hon. Friend. Indeed, the Bill will basically lead to a complete lottery in decision making, depending on the judge a person gets on the day. I suspect that judges ordinarily do not like vague law or having to provide their own interpretation. They are usually more comfortable if the statute is more precise, or if it is backed by caselaw, but there is no caselaw here. On the issue of length, we know what the Minister thinks because she has told us in this Bill Committee. I do not criticise her for this opinion, but she thinks a case is long if it is disruptive to the personal or professional life of a juror or their wellbeing.”
“This theoretical person that the judge has to imagine would make an argument that it is appropriate that the trial should not take place with a jury, because they do not have a week in their busy life to just hand over. Alternatively, others may say that they see it as a civic duty and a fundamental contribution they make to society to be available for jury trial if called. Perhaps they have never been called and they have reached a ripe old age, and they are happy and prepared to take a month or two out of their life to devote to making a decision on whether someone is guilty.”
“I agree with my hon. Friend; he actually pre-empts the point I am about to get on to. I thank him for taking me on to that. It should be fairly obvious to most people that there will be a wide range of views as to how much time a person can take out of their ordinary life, bearing in mind that people are not called for jury service at the drop of a hat. They are not told, “You must cancel all your plans next week”; there is a degree of warning. Most people take quite a wide view on how much time they can afford to give, depending on what is going on in their life. For some people, taking two weeks or even a week out is very disruptive.”
“Indeed. Might a judge, halfway through a trial, decide that it has suddenly become inappropriate, having heard whatever formal or informal representations are made on that point? Even if there is some objective consensus about how long an ordinary person in this country should be prepared to set aside to serve on a jury, does that in itself make it appropriate that a case should not be heard by a jury? Even if we could agree, for example, that devoting any more than a month to a jury trial is disruptive to a person’s life, does that automatically make it inappropriate for a case to be heard in a jury trial? No, not at all. If it is inconvenient for someone to sit on a jury for a particular length of time, that does not mean the case is inappropriate for a jury trial.”
“If they did something knowingly, dishonestly or recklessly, also depending on the crime, that would normally be enough for them to be convicted.”
“I would argue that the more complex a case, in certain circumstances, the more it should be heard by a jury, especially if the complexity relates to what is in the mind of the defendant, rather than, for example, complex financial papers. Does the involvement of complex financial papers, on its own, necessarily make a trial more complex, if the real issue in the case is whether the defendant intended to be dishonest? As we have already heard with fraud cases, as well as most of the cases in schedule 1, the real issue is not whether something happened; it is the mindset—the legal term would be mens rea—of the person who did that thing. If they did something by accident or unintentionally, depending on the crime, that would often be enough for them to be acquitted.”
“My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There are a number of personal and professional circumstances that can enable people to make that argument and get exempted from jury trial or, indeed, not have to sit on the jury in the original case but have it deferred to a more convenient time. She is absolutely right that flexibility for ordinary people in this country is already built into the way that juries are selected. “Length” is probably the easiest of these three difficult terms; “complexity” is even harder to nail down. How is a judge supposed to decide what level of complexity makes it appropriate to have a jury?”
“There is absolutely no reason why the Government could not have included a test in the Bill—it does not have to be the same test—to assist the court and give certainty, which would help defendants and victims and would improve efficiency.”
“This is what a test looks like. The law of New Zealand directs a judge to consider, in determining whether a case is likely to be long and complex, “the number and nature of offences with which the defendant is charged”. We understand what that means. It also directs them to consider “the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of the evidence likely to be presented” and “the imposition on potential jurors of sitting for the likely duration of the trial”. It has a catch-all, which is not unusual in legal drafting: “any other matters the court considers relevant.” The judge in New Zealand has a test to apply: whether the case is likely to be long and complex.”
“She could help judges making this decision by setting that out in the legislation. This is not merely a theoretical, academic discussion on the criminal law of this country. I can point to another country. The Minister has taken pleasure in using other countries as examples to justify many provisions in the Bill, as though England and Wales can learn from other jurisdictions. I do not disagree with that premise. I will give her the example of New Zealand, another common-law jurisdiction. It has a similar provision, whereby a judge has to exercise a similar sort of decision making about whether a trial is likely to be “long and complex”, rather than its likely complexity. Set out in its legislation is a legal test. The Minister says that there is a test of complexity in the Bill. I tried to intervene on her to say that there is not.”
“She thinks—I paraphrase; I do not seek to put words in her mouth—that it is complex financial evidence, presumably written evidence in many cases, in a fraud trial or crimes related to money. It is perfectly possible to have a great volume of evidence but, as the case unfolds, a detailed understanding of that paperwork may no longer be the issue on which the case turns. Does having a large volume of written evidence and a long list of witnesses make a case complex, or does it depend on what the witnesses might say or exactly what is in those papers? The Minister has spoken about juries moving at the pace of the slowest member. Is her test for complexity the mindset of the slowest member of a random 12 selected from the British public, or is it the average—one might say reasonable—person?”
“That is specifically what juries are for—to make that sort of judgment on whether it was reasonable for someone to do something. That is why we have 12 members, so that they must come to a view unanimously, or certainly as a large majority. A judge is not in a more privileged position—no one would argue that they are—to decide what is and is not reasonable. They are in a more privileged position to make decisions about the law, and indeed they do make decisions about the law in jury trials and direct the jury on matters of law. It is incredibly uncertain what “complexity” means. I know what the Minister thinks it means, and I do not criticise her. It is a perfectly reasonable view of what it means. My point is that it is not the only view.”
“My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Obviously judges are not infallible. That is not a criticism of judges—judges know that they can make mistakes. On the mindset of the person, I am unclear as to whether the Government or indeed anyone on the Committee, regardless of party, thinks that there is anything more complex than what is in a person’s mind—a mind that cannot be unlocked or opened. We can ask this person what was in their mind, but they want to be acquitted, so we must take a value judgment on whether they are telling the truth or not. Surely the most complex thing there can possibly be is what is in the mind of a human being. A very complex set of spreadsheets or cryptocurrency that only half of us understand is complicated, but there is perhaps nothing more complicated than the motivation and mindset of a human being.”
“However, when the judge is also deciding the facts—that happens, of course in magistrates courts, where the magistrates decide the facts and are guided on the law by a legal professional sitting in front of them—and indeed when a judge is deciding the facts and the law, and procedural issues and issues of the admissibility of evidence, then, if they take separate arguments or separate submissions from the defence and prosecution on whether an item of evidence is admissible or not, and they decide that it is not admissible because it would cloud the judgment of the jury or confuse the issues of the main trial, they effectively have to pretend that they never heard that prejudicial evidence, having decided that it is prejudicial. Judges are trained and professional, and have to do all this anyway in certain cases where a judge decides both—”
“A judge might decide that evidence is inadmissible because it is not relevant, or—this is where I go way beyond my legal expertise; I never practised as a criminal lawyer—because it might effectively prejudice the jury. We do not want the jury seeing that evidence, which is why they are out of the room. If the judge rules that the evidence is inadmissible, the jury come back into the room never having seen it, and the trial continues with the jurors’ minds unclouded by inadmissible evidence.”
“It is for the judge, even in a jury trial, to decide the law, to direct the jury—where appropriate—and to decide issues of procedure. Some of the procedural issues or arguments about evidence, including about whether evidence is admissible or not, are decided by the judge in the absence of the jury. The jury is sent out of the room. Of course, that can make the whole trial last longer, but there is a very good reason for it. It is because sometimes the arguments that are made—for example, arguments about the admissibility of certain evidence—are in themselves prejudicial to the decision maker of the facts, which is the jury, or prejudicial to the way that they might decide the case. A judge might need to hear the contested evidence, or at least hear what it is about to decide whether it is admissible.”
“However, they have not been prepared to spend the time to assess that remedy, to see whether the benefits in reducing the backlog will be felt in the coming months and years. To take an inherent feature of the jury system—the jury itself—as a justification for doing away with it in certain cases because of more recent pressures for other reasons is neither logical nor fair. The problem with simply transferring all the provisions that would ordinarily happen in a jury trial to a trial that is decided by a judge alone, as clause 5 seeks to do, is that there are features of a jury system that cannot simply be replicated by a judge sitting alone. Let us remember that a jury decides the facts. It decides whether something happened and it decides what was in the mind of the defendant at the time in question. That is the preserve of the jury.”
“Citing issues with juries that have existed since juries began, in order to deal with the more recent issue of backlogs, misses the point. The Government have taken measures to deal with the more recent issues with criminal cases, including the fact that evidence inherently takes longer, although that is the same with evidence that a judge has to consider, and that cases have become more complex because of evidence and technology. That also is true of cases that are heard by a judge only. The Government have made plenty of complaints and shared plenty of views about what they think of the previous Government. They have spoken about under-investment and caps on sitting days, things that they say they have addressed through allocating more sitting days and investing in the legal system. Surely, that is the remedy for their complaints.”
“As my hon. Friend the shadow Minister pointed out, there are a number of problems that not only arise with what clauses 3 and 4 try to do, but carry over to clause 5, which tries to replicate aspects of jury trials in trials that will not be heard by a jury because a judge has made an allocation decision. The problems with juries seem to be, as the Minister and the Government have articulated, time wasted through swearing in, the unpredictable nature of convening 12 people—with people sometimes dropping out—and the fact they can hear evidence only at certain times of the day, which makes the day for hearing evidence shorter. Of course, none of those things are new; they are things that have always existed with jury trials.”
“I accept that judges can do all this, and indeed sometimes do all this. Surely, however, the Minister will accept that, given human nature, there is a limit to the extent to which a human being can be so well trained or so professional that they can simply disregard something that they have heard as though they had never heard it. Indeed, that is one reason why we have jury trials. It is also one of the leading reasons why in more complex cases or longer cases—in cases involving murder, or sexual offences, or in all those cases that have to be heard by a jury—we have a jury. It is to separate the decision makers of fact from the decision makers of law and procedure.”
“That possibly demonstrates the slightly rushed and painful nature of how we are having to deal with this legislation, with so many loopholes and gaps in it. I am happy to be discharging my duties, dissecting and scrutinising the Bill. I do not mind how long it takes because that is my job; it is why I am here and I am pleased to be doing it.”
“Of course, juries are used in civil courts in some defamation cases. Again, it is where the value judgment on intention—why somebody made a statement about someone and whether they knew it to be false or not—of 12 ordinary people selected at random in this country is better than a judge’s decision making alone. My issue with clause 5 is that it simply sweeps all sorts of provisions in a number of existing clauses of different legislation passed at different times into judge-only trials when those provisions were designed for jury-led trials. Unless I have misunderstood, that seems to have been done through a set of Government amendments and elements of existing law that were not envisaged on the first drafting of the Bill.”