Joe Robertson
MP for Isle of Wight East · Conservative · United Kingdom
“(3) In preparation of the report under subsection (1), the Secretary of State may have regard to any such measures or information that they consider appropriate, including— (a) an assessment of any variation in dementia services and outcomes between integrated care board areas, (b) information on workforce capacity, capability and trainin…”
“The clause fits into that and would require the collection of data on the provision of dementia services in health and social care. I do not propose to speak too long, but I do want to make a couple of remarks on the current situation, which sets these new clauses in context.”
“That will, of course, impact many more friends, families and carers who support those living with dementia. More than a third of people living with dementia in England do not have a formal diagnosis. Those who do receive a diagnosis live with the condition for an average of three and a half years before that diagnosis.”
“The data requested is imperative to ensuring that the Government can measure and monitor progress against relevant national targets, standards and guidance, including the new modern service framework on dementia, the forthcoming Care Quality Commission statutory guidance and outcome measures that may be set in future NHS operational plann…”
“I thank the Minister for pausing the MCA’s brutal decision about coastguard rescue officers, and for convening meetings on cross-Solent ferry transport to the Isle of Wight, which will start next month.”
“It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms Lewell. These two new clauses, the latter of which is in my name, deal with the publication of an annual report detailing NHS and social care provision for dementia care and how the Government are performing against targets, standards and outcome measures set out in national guidance and…”
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“They could be fairly contested and, of course, the decision made by a judge could be controversial—not necessarily wrong, but controversial—and against what the defendant is seeking. When a judge chooses a judge-only trial, the defendant’s wishes are not disregarded but considered and set to one side, and the judge then hears the facts of the case. The argument is that the judge may be clouded in their view of a defendant, given the robust, perhaps sometimes controversial, arguments the defendant is making about where they want the trial to be heard. That may then unfairly cloud the judge’s view of the defendant when hearing the case itself. In the vast majority of cases, judges have a professional separation as they move on from an important single decision about where to hear the case to hearing the case itself.”
“In a judge-only trial, where the judge is also deciding innocence or guilt, they have to decide whether a piece of evidence is relevant and, if they decide it is not, they have to effectively pretend that they never saw it and to disregard it. Our judges are capable of doing that because of their training, career, expertise and experience. I would suggest that judges in this country are among the best in the world; as I have said before, I believe our common law English legal system is the best, and I believe our judiciary is the best. But it is simply the case—it is human nature—that when someone has seen something they cannot unsee it. That is precisely one of the arguments for why we have jury trials in this country. This is about the arguments a judge hears and assesses when it comes to allocation.”
“When a trial is heard by a judge, the judge makes both those decisions. The disadvantage there, of course, is that when either party to proceedings—the defence or the prosecution—wishes to make representations about the way a trial is being conducted or about the evidence in a jury trial, the jury get sent out of the room. They do not see that argument, and their minds are not clouded by what is discussed in the courtroom on a procedural matter that a judge may rule is inadmissible in the hearing. Frequently in trials, that would be a dispute over evidence, such as whether a certain bit of evidence should be brought before a jury. The jury will not hear that discussion; if a judge says no, the jury come back in and they never see it.”
“Evidently, I support the amendment in the name of the shadow Minister. As he set out, this is about confidence in the trial when it gets under way. It is about understanding what a judge, in exercising their procedural decision making, may have seen prior to the trial getting under way and the evidence being heard. As I see it, the amendment would go some way to at least mitigating what is lost in the Government’s abolition of jury trials for certain offences: that is, the objectivity of jury trials, where a jury decide on the conviction—guilt or innocence, effectively—and the judge decides on the sentencing. In jury trials, there is separation between a judge’s procedural decision making about how the trial runs, including throughout the trial, and the facts of the case—whether someone is guilty or not—being decided on by the jury.”
“It comes from a good place, but unfortunately—this is not her fault, but the Government’s—it does not go anywhere near maintaining the status quo, which in my view is plainly greatly preferable both to her amendment and to the Government’s approach.”
“It is an obvious point, but judges sit alongside magistrates today; it is a tried, tested and understood approach, not an obscure or novel one. Indeed, appeals are often heard in that way, as I understand it, because there is added rigour in having a magistrate sitting alongside a judge. Of course, having a judge sitting alongside magistrates is an improvement on having magistrates alone, because judges bring professionalism from their legal training and experience of the law as part of the judiciary. There is a benefit there, although of course the benefit is already delivered by the Government’s own amendment, notwithstanding that it is worse than what we have today. I commend, or at least understand, what the hon. Member for Chichester is trying to achieve.”
“Judges all share one thing: they went to law school, they are legally qualified and they have had a career that is privileged—that is not a criticism, but I do not think it is an unfair word to describe a judge’s career. Magistrates have a greater variety of life experience. To bring magistrates into the decision making alongside a judge, as Sir Brian Leveson envisaged, would be to bring at least some element of a jury trial: the quality of being unjaded by a career in law and being unencumbered by the experience of being a well-paid legal professional. I struggle to support the amendment, because it does not go anywhere near maintaining the system that we have today, but it would at least be a small improvement.”
“For a start, there would be three decision makers rather than one; with a jury there are 12, but clearly three is better than one. But it is not just a matter of numbers. Magistrates could be viewed, and certainly have been viewed, as a hybrid of jurors and judges. They are not judges, and they are not legally qualified people. They bring the quality that jurors bring—varied life experience—to the decision-making process. Of course, in a magistrates court, they are guided in the law by a legally qualified clerk. It is fairly obvious that magistrates as a group are less diverse than the population of the United Kingdom, from which jurors are drawn, but at least they represent a greater diversity and variety of experience than judges.”
“The hon. Member for Chichester has set out the reasoning behind her amendment very well. If the amendment were agreed to, it would not go anywhere near restoring jury trials, but it would plainly be an improvement. The leading argument in its favour is that it is what Sir Brian Leveson recommended. The Government have repeatedly cited Brian Leveson’s review, and rightly so—that is what the Bill flows out of—but as the hon. Member for Chichester says, it cannot be a pick and mix. The Government cannot cite Leveson on the one hand and ignore him on the other. Quite aside from the fact that the opinion expressed in the independent review has been ignored here, there are objectively good reasons why a trial heard by a judge and two magistrates is preferable to a trial heard by a judge alone.”
“If there is, perhaps she can explain why it is important enough to risk even her principle by having more serious crimes—those with a sentence over three years—potentially being heard without a jury. Again, I reiterate that I disagree with the primary disapplication of jury trials for what are now either-way offences. That is not what this is about; this is about the Bill doing something more than the Government may wish to do. I invite the Minister to address that in some detail.”
“I invite the Minister to address that point about instances where a judge decides, on their own without a jury, that a case is of significant seriousness—and that may mean complexity that was not apparent at the outset but became apparent during the trial—that he or she wishes to pass a sentence of more than three years. Three years is a serious length of time for someone to be locked up and deprived of their liberty. Wherever we think that the threshold should sit, I think that we all agree that jury trials have a role in this country for more serious crimes. If the threshold can rise above three years through that avenue, how high a threshold is the Minister willing to tolerate? In how many cases is she willing to tolerate that apparent loophole? Maybe she does not see it as a loophole. Maybe there is purpose behind it.”
“Once again, it would not, in any material way, move away from what she is trying to achieve with the legislation, which is tackling the backlog of Crown court cases. Again, that intention that is perfectly well meant. The amendment would not, in any way, get rid of her primary intent to get rid of either-way offences so that they are not heard by a jury. Notwithstanding the fact that I do not agree with her on that, the amendment would not defeat what she is trying to do there. Effectively, what it would do is close a loophole.”
“As I understand it, it is not the intention of the Government to capture more cases of that serious nature than they had originally intended would be decided by a judge. They themselves are not arguing that jury trials do not have a place in this country for a great number of cases—unfortunately, not enough after this legislation. The hon. Member for Rugby made the point in an earlier sitting that other Governments have adjusted the threshold, notwithstanding our disagreement over what is being proposed in this legislation. Clearly, the issue with this provision, if it remains unamended, is that more serious crimes, with a sentence of more than three years, will inadvertently get caught. I cannot quite understand why the Minister will not accept the amendment, but I am sure she will address that.”
“I echo the points made by the shadow Minister. The issue here is where sentences may go above three years. A sentence of three years or more is fairly significant. The crime, of course, will match the sentence; no one is suggesting that the sentence is inappropriate in these cases—someone has been convicted. However, the issue is that the trial—the fact of innocence or guilt—will have been decided by a judge. Without raking over too much old ground, the point in a jury trial is that on more serious offences, jury decides innocence or guilt. What we have here, without the amendment, is a back-door way for a judge to decide what turns out to be a more serious case than perhaps had originally been thought, because the sentence passed is more than three years.”
“If the situation the courts find themselves in is so obviously caused by the previous Government, why on earth is the hon. Member’s Government scrapping jury trials as a response?”
“This is an extraordinary exchange. I accept that the hon. Member for Amber Valley is not the official voice of the CPS or of the Labour Government, but her sense of “officialdom knows best” will give ordinary men and women in this country great concerns about these changes. Of course, there are some cases in which there is no victim. There are some cases in which the victim is a person who has been falsely accused. That is why we have a legal system in which the ordinary men and women of this country are judged by their peers. That is the principle that is up for debate here—not some wider official view from a prosecuting organisation, rather than the courts.”
“It seems that the Minister has perhaps momentarily forgotten that the entire legal system in this country is tilted in favour of the defendant. The defendant is innocent until the prosecution makes its case, and it cannot just make a good case, because the case has to be beyond reasonable doubt. The whole system is tilted in favour of the defendant, and rightly so. It is slightly strange to hear her use the argument that the defendant should not have freedom and liberty to elect when they are innocent people until convicted—and many of them are never convicted.”
“However, at the same time, he has said that, if the backlog is brought under control and reduced, he will not restore the right to elect a jury trial that is being abolished, and the same goes for the complementary provisions in clause 2. Plainly, whether he is right or wrong, he is inconsistent, and it makes no sense.”
“Critically, there is also no right of appeal against the allocation decision. Of course, the Government have chosen not to provide one—unfairly, but in my view understandably—because an appeal route would undermine what they are trying to achieve. We are treating a symptom as though it were the disease itself. Before I turn to the specific failings of the approach in clause 2, I want to spend a moment on context. I think the Government have framed this debate—maybe not deliberately—in a way that obscures the actual problem. The Lord Chancellor has repeatedly said that the Crown court is in a state of emergency, and he is certainly right that it is under very significant pressure; the backlog stood at just under 80,000 cases at the end of September 2025. He has also repeatedly said that a jury trial is a major driver of that emergency.”
“The assessment is made on the papers available at the outset; while it is probably not fair to call it an educated guess about how a case will unfold or, in the case of clause 2, how a guilty plea may be pleaded, every experienced practitioner knows that the true seriousness of a case or sentencing becomes apparent as it develops. How a matter looks on the papers can become very different when oral representations are made. Indeed, the Criminal Bar Association has noted—particularly in reference to clause 1, but it applies to the combined effect of clauses 1 and 2—that the Government’s own impact assessment assumes that cases heard in the magistrates courts under extended sentencing powers will average just four hours, for cases where the likely sentences are approaching 18 months. That is not a serious assumption.”
“Under the current law, albeit not yet implemented, the allocation works in two stages: there is a role for the court, a role for the prosecution and a role for the defendants. However, under clause 2, the role for defendants disappears, or perhaps it is more properly described as being watered down until it is no longer a right. The magistrate or the court decide, and that decision is final. The criteria applied may, and will, take into consideration any representations made by the defendant, but that is not the same as the defendant’s being able to object.”
“Under it, courts—acting alone and without the defendant’s consent—decide on a venue. That is made obvious by the substitution of wording, with “objecting” replaced by “make representations”. I have some distinct arguments against clause 2. I will take them in order, and I make no apology for the time that may require. The Committee is being asked to make a decision of constitutional significance without, I will argue, adequate evidence, safeguards, honesty or straightforwardness about its consequences and the extent to which it has been properly examined. That deserves serious scrutiny. The gateway itself is poorly designed. Let me begin with the mechanism itself; before one can assess the consequences, it is necessary to understand the structure.”
“I am not sure to what extent it is relevant, but I should probably declare that I used to be a practising solicitor, regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered with the Law Society. The Committee dealt with similar issues on the implications for the right of election at some length during the debate on clause 1. Of course, proper time should be devoted to relevant issues in clause 2, but there is a significant overlap. If clause 1 is the constitutional sword that strikes down the right to choose a jury, clause 2 is the mechanism, or at least part of the mechanism, that replaces it. It is the mechanism, its operation in practice and its real-world consequences that I want to examine in some detail. Clause 2 establishes an allocation framework where there is a written indication of a guilty plea.”
“I should clarify that I no longer get paid on an hourly rate—I am paid by the taxpayer, as the hon. Gentleman is, on the same terms. I do not reject the argument about reform. I accept that. Sir Brian Leveson was very clear that the complexity of cases, including cases heard in the Crown court by a jury, has increased over the years, but he also said that he does not blame jury trials for the backlog. That is the difference between us. I do not see that the only option available to the Government is to end the election opportunity or the powers and rights of a defendant to select trial by jury or by magistrate.”
“My hon. Friend articulates that point exactly and represents the concerns that most people have. In the evidence session, we heard that the current court backlog is the result of many things, including lack of investment—the Minister talked today about the lack of investment, and the issues with recruitment and retention, and criticised the previous Government for caps on sitting days—and the effect of the covid pandemic. The Minister and I might disagree on the extent to which that is true, but none of those things should be cured by abolishing jury trials.”
“I agree with my hon. Friend. There is a slightly strange implication that while jury trials have become more complex over time, due to technology and techniques for examining evidence—obviously a good thing—that somehow does not apply if the trial is in the magistrates court. That is the alarm bell, is it not? Magistrates courts are more capable of dealing with things in summary and they will not examine a case in as much detail and may miss things. That is not a criticism of magistrates and of the magistrates court—that is the system we have designed. When the consequences are less serious and the crime is less serious, the examination and process may be naturally less thorough. That is not a reason to bring cases that today would be heard in the Crown court into the magistrates court without the defendant’s having the right to choose.”
“I accept the Minister’s statement to the extent that it is a statement of fact of people’s evidence. To address the issue of taking cases out of one court to give to another, however: that is a small minority of cases. Indeed, that is the argument that the Government make, certainly to their own Back Benchers when they are worried about the Back-Bench view of their proposals: “Don’t worry. Most cases are heard in the magistrates court anyway, and only a tiny percentage are being taken out of the Crown court.” The Government cannot have the argument both ways: when speaking to their own Back Benchers, “Don’t worry, this is not going to be meaningful,” and when speaking to the rest of the world about tackling backlogs, saying that that in itself is a meaningful change.”
“Ministers argue that one problem with the current system is that defendants elect a Crown court to delay proceedings and therefore game the system. But why would a defendant in a serious case choose the Crown court? Often precisely because they know that in the Crown court they are more likely to have or to be able to afford a lawyer, and in the magistrates court they may not. The election is not a game. It is part of a system that has stood for a very long time. It is a rational response, in this case, to a legal aid system that is itself under severe pressure.”
“Under clause 2, a significant cohort of defendants who previously had a right to elect, and with it the more generous legal aid provision, will find themselves in the magistrates court facing charges and sentencing that could result in a sentence of 18 months, or ultimately 24 months, without adequate legal representation. The Institute for Government has flagged this explicitly. Because of the low-income threshold to qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court, many more defendants are likely to go unrepresented or under-represented, and an unrepresented defendant in serious criminal proceedings is not a defendant receiving fair justice. There is a cruel irony in the Government’s framing of the issue.”
“The magistrates do not reflect the country that they are being asked to judge in the same way as a jury do. I turn to the argument that the legal aid threshold will leave defendants unrepresented when making their plea in sentencing. That is a further systemic consequence of clause 2. The means test for legal aid differs, of course, between the two tiers of court, as we have heard. In the Crown court the threshold is more generous. Defendants in a wider income range qualify for representation at public expense. In the magistrates court the threshold is lower and less generous. Many defendants who would qualify for legal aid in the Crown court may not qualify for it in the magistrates court.”
“We would demand it be withdrawn pending a full equality impact assessment. We would not pass it on a Government Whip. This is the standard I invite the Committee to apply here. The fact that the discrimination operates through an allocation mechanism in the criminal courts, or in some cases through an administrative form, does not change its nature or its effect. The test is the outcome, not the intention. No one is suggesting the Government intend this, but it is the outcome and the outcome is documented. The racial disparity in outcomes does not exist in a vacuum. It is connected causally, not merely coincidentally, to a documented and persistent deficit in judicial diversity. In 2019, 12% of magistrates were from a BME background, which compares to an 18% share of the general population.”
“I welcome the progress that has been made, particularly in the judicial system, but that still does not compare to the fairness and legal principle of trial by jury. I want to put the constitutional point more plainly. Parliament is being asked to pass a provision that it knows, on the basis of evidence submitted to its own Committee, will produce racially differentiated outcomes. The Government have seen that evidence. Ministers have been questioned on it at length, and the Bill has not been amended to address it, but it must be. If a different Government Department proposed a policy that its own evidence showed would increase adverse outcomes for ethnic minority applicants by, in this case, up to 40%, what would we say? We would say it is discriminatory and grossly unacceptable.”
“I would suggest, without quoting evidence, that a number of them elect the Crown court because they believe they will get a fairer trial—because they are more likely to have their fate at least partly decided by someone who shares something of their own background and lived experience. Let me address the Government’s response to this evidence, which has been inadequate. The Lord Chancellor—who, as he has reminded this House, knows the experience of racial disparity personally and profoundly, and has long spoken about it throughout and before his time in this place—has argued that progress is being made. He has cited the figure that 21% of judges now come from an ethnic minority background.”
“It is not hard to see why: the principle—the whole idea—behind a decision being made by someone’s peers is that juries reflect the country in which we live. Magistrates and professional judges are predominantly whiter, more educated and more male than the population at large. It is interesting to note, but is not a criticism, that this Committee itself is evidently less diverse not only than juries, but than the population at large. A defendant from an ethnic minority background charged with an either-way offence this week has a right to elect. They can look at the data—thank goodness we have that data—take advice from their legal representatives and make a considered choice about the venue in which they believe they are most likely to receive fair treatment.”
“Member for Chichester mentioned that if someone has a clean record they would be tried in the magistrates court, but if they had a list of previous offences they may be tried on the same facts in the Crown court, where conviction rates are lower. Having previous convictions therefore puts someone into a venue with lower conviction rates. I am not suggesting that the Government have designed the measure in that way, but it is plainly nonsense and unacceptable for that to come about. The Government need to look at that and amend it. Charities have responded to Sir Brian’s proposals and have provided further granular data. In Crown court jury trials, people of colour are convicted at broadly similar rates to their white counterparts.”
“It has been referred to already in debate on clause 1, but it is relevant to clause 2 as well. The venue to which all relevant cases we are discussing will be diverted is the magistrates court, which produces—measurably, consistently and substantially—worse outcomes for defendants from ethnic minority backgrounds than the Crown court does. That is not a theoretical proposition or a position of advocacy; it is the statistical evidence and the documented finding of researchers, legal practitioners and analysis drawing on Government data. Magistrates courts convict people from ethnic minority backgrounds at rates up to 40% higher than non-ethnic minority defendants. That is not a small or debatable margin; it is a significant consideration. Albeit to make a slightly different point, the hon.”
“Once again, I agree with the shadow Minister. If the Government genuinely want to address the backlog, the answer lies in the other 179 recommendations that Sir Brian Leveson made: increasing sitting days, which the Government have now done in a modest way; improving case management; removing unnecessary adjournments; rebuilding or restructuring the legal profession; sustainable legal aid; and a whole list of recommendations. None of that requires the—in my view—brutal axe taken against the right of election to jury trial. In fact, it is more than a brutal axe; jury trial is just being denied for an either-way offence That is being restricted to the magistrates court. I now turn to what I consider the most serious argument against the clause, which is an uncomfortable one.”
“Indeed, when the Government are looking to tear up centuries-old principles, whether in whole or in part—depending on how we analyse the crimes that will no longer be allowed to proceed to the Crown court—the burden of proof must surely be on the Government to explain why they are all wrong. That explanation, in my view, has not been provided.”
“The Law Society has raised concerns about the retrospective application of the provisions, the fundamental unfairness of removing trial rights from defendants who have already elected under existing rules, and the prospects for those with cases already listed. It has also raised concerns about the legal aid means test misalignment, proportionality and cases involving children, as well as the potential unworkability of fraud provisions. I submit that the burden of proof in this debate does not lie with those opposing the Bill, when the entire criminal law profession, leading independent think-tanks, retired judges and KCs have come out so united in their strength of opposition.”
“I thank the hon. Member for paying attention to my speech and staying with me on this. Fairly obviously, I do not think that the Criminal Bar Association is always right, but I do in this case. The Institute for Government published “Beyond reasonable doubt?” on the day of Second Reading. Its conclusions were stark: the reforms risk prioritising speed over fair justice; the projected savings remain highly uncertain; a 10% to 15% increase in demand on the magistrates court will be difficult to manage in practice; and the structural reforms are likely to impede attempts to improve productivity and could make the situation worse in the short to medium term. That is not the view of lawyers protecting their professional interests; it is the view of independent public governance researchers.”
“Of course, the Minister made that point—in her view, this is about thresholds. Whether we want to call it an argument about thresholds, and whichever part of history we want to look at, the Opposition’s fundamental point remains. There is a distinct lack of evidence for this Government’s plans today, set against the range of other provisions that could be, and in some cases have been, introduced. In our view, they have not been given the time to bed in and potentially deliver the savings that the Government want. I accept the hon. Member for Rugby does not accept that, but I think that is the point of contention here.”
“I thank the shadow Minister. I am probably not in a position to arbitrate between the two arguments; the hon. Member for Rugby will have to forgive me, as I come from the starting position that I back the shadow Minister, not least because he was wielding a particularly substantial file when he just spoke. I want to address a provision that is not the immediate subject of this grouping, but which fundamentally determines the significance of clause 2—the reform of appeal rights from the magistrates court contained in clause 7. Currently, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court has an automatic right of appeal to the Crown court. That right is exercised in approximately—”
“As we have heard, the Criminal Bar Association represents more than 4,000 practising criminal barristers. In answer to an earlier intervention, I do not say that the Criminal Bar Association’s word must be final, but it is clearly heavily persuasive, especially on this issue, which has already faced much scrutiny and disagreement from people with particular expertise in the field of criminal justice. As we have heard, its snap survey—so that is individual members, rather than the association—found that around 90% of members are against the proposals.”
“They will not be able to identify legal errors that may appear in magistrates’ reasoning or decisions in the same way. As I understand it, they will also not be able to commission a transcript of proceedings in the same way and construct a submission that meets the permissions test. The permission stage is, in practice, a barrier that falls disproportionately on those least equipped to overcome it. The opposition to the clause is broad and has not been answered. In some cases, the opposition is expert; in others, it comes through lived experience. I will briefly look at the range and weight of expert opposition to the provisions, some of which I have referred to already, because the Committee should understand— I am sure it does—what it is seeking to perhaps have regard to but set aside if it passes clause 2.”
“When clauses 2 and 7 are combined, a defendant who believes they have been wrongly convicted must first persuade a Crown court judge that their appeal has sufficient merit before it is even heard. The Government argue that the 41% success rate shows that meritorious appeals will get through, but in my view, that misses the point. The Law Society has identified precisely why the current simple route matters. A significant proportion of defendants in the magistrates court do not have a lawyer. As I have argued, under clause 2 more of them are likely to be unrepresented. Owing to the misalignment of legal aid means testing, an unrepresented defendant who has been wrongly convicted will surely be less likely to know how to draft grounds of appeal.”
“Thank you, Ms Butler, and I will of course stick to clause 2. I welcome any challenge that a specific point that I have made does not relate to clause 2. There is possibly a slight lack of clarity across the whole Committee, and I do not profess to be the only expert in the room; indeed, I am not an expert. However, I echo the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate that there seems to be a distinct lack of clarity about what clause 2 does. I am not suggesting that the Minister does not know, and I welcome an intervention if she feels that I need to be brought back into scope in this part of the debate. Clause 2 specifically replaces automatic rights with a permission stage.”
“I thank the Minister for rather politely encouraging me to come towards the end of my speech. I will finish by addressing the idea that somehow, because something does not happen in Scotland, it must be okay not to happen in England. That plainly has nothing to do with politics or even football—not that I am suggesting the Minister thought it did. I am happy to say, as a proud citizen of the United Kingdom, that I think the English and Welsh legal system is the best in the world. The common-law system is the foundation, it has been adopted all around the world, and is by far the most widely-used legal system. It is possibly our greatest export, along with the English language.”
“I am very happy to say that I agree with all the things the Minister said. I also agree with learning from other systems. Plainly, the English legal system, like the English language, has been successful in its ability to adapt and evolve. Without going back to the beginning of my speech, started just a few minutes ago, for the reasons I have set out, I believe that this is an evolution—or arguably a revolution. [ Interruption. ] Was that another intervention? I think these measures are a stage too far.”
“But jury trials are not the principal reason. Sir Brian Leveson: No, no, I do not and have never blamed jury trials at all. The reason is that the complexity has changed. Pace, disclosure of unused material, special measures, bad character, hearsay and data—cell site data, which is now critical to almost every single prosecution, and data taken from phones—have all added to the complexity and length of trials. I am not criticising juries at all, and I welcome jury trials, but the threshold must now be adjusted if we are to get justice for everybody in good time.”
“Q Victims say that they want to see greater diversity in the criminal justice system, and I agree with them. Which group of people is more diverse: juries, the British public or judges? Dame Vera Baird: Is it your only point? The answer would be that judges are not as diverse as juries.”